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Incumbent-Challenger and Open-seat Elections in a Spatial Model of Political Competition
December 2, 2016 | Journal Article
Authors: Paul Redmond Public Choice , Vol. 170 , Issue 1 , January, 2017
, pp. 79-97
In Groseclose (Am J Political Sci 45:862–886, 2001), candidates with asymmetric valence scores and varying degrees of policy motivation simultaneously choose divergent policies. I take a version of the Groseclose model with policy-motivated candidates and extend it to allow for sequential policy announcements. This may be a suitable approach for incumbent-challenger elections because the incumbent’s policy is typically known before the challenger’s. I show that policy divergence is greater when candidates announce policies sequentially as opposed to simultaneously. I also show that policy-motivated incumbents benefit from first-mover advantage.
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