



Pension Policy: New Evidence on Key Issues


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The Economic and Social Research Institute

Overview


- *Context*
- *Framework for the analysis*
- *Pensions and incentives*
- *Public sector pension levy*
- *Policy options*

Older persons “at risk of poverty”



At risk= living on an income below 60% of median disposable income adjusted for household size and composition (“equivalised”)


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Demographic context

% of population aged 65+



International evidence

- *How effective are tax incentives in boosting pension saving?*
 - *Substantial “deadweight losses” especially at high incomes - would have made pension savings even in absence of tax incentives*
- *Double taxation?*
 - *overrsimplified: real world tax systems have to compromise between conflicting principles*
 - *Latest thinking: Given that labour income is taxed, what is the best way to tax capital income*


Framework for the analysis

- *SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model*
 - *calculates welfare entitlements and tax, PRSI liabilities of a nationally representative sample*
- *Adjusted to take account of demographic developments*
 - *so policy impact can be assessed for future years as well as current circumstances*

Potential impact of higher private and State pension coverage


	<i>Reduction in head count</i>	<i>Reduction in poverty gap</i>
<i>Higher private coverage</i>	33%	35%
<i>Higher State Pension coverage</i>	22%	43%

Pension coverage by earnings level



“Deciles” each contain 10% of earners, ranked from lowest to highest incomes

Impact of standardisation of tax relief on pension contributions by income level



Why is the benefit of tax relief so concentrated on high earners?

- *High earners more likely to be covered by pension scheme*
- *More likely to make higher contributions (employer/employee)*
- *Value of tax relief is greatest if paying the top rate of tax – high earners*

Pitfalls

- *Restrictions on relief for EMPLOYEE contributions unlikely to be effective unless same applies to EMPLOYER contributions*
- *Restrictions on relief affecting funded schemes in private sector would be inequitable unless accompanied by similar measures for unfunded schemes in public sector*

Public service pension levy (PRD)

- *Wage cut, tax or pension contribution?*
- *Shift from employer to employee pension contribution*
- *For employees, like a wage cut*
- *But not same as a wage cut for current or future pensioners*
 - *Current and future pensions still based on the same gross wage*

Policy options

- *Standardisation of relief at standard rate*
 - *Reduces relief for top rate taxpayers*
 - *Potential revenue over €1,000m*
 - *Could help to sustain State pension levels as demographic pressures intensify*
- *Standardisation at hybrid rate (e.g. 30%)*
 - *Gains for standard rate taxpayers, losses for top rate taxpayers*
 - *Exchequer gain approx. €500m*

Lessons from behavioural economics

- *Power of the default option (“soft mandatory”)*
 - *automatic enrolment, with an “opt out” clause leads to more saving*
- *Visibility/transparency*
 - *Partial matching of funds saved rather than tax relief found to boost saving (cf. SSIA structure)*



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Full document now available at

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