Annual Monitoring Report on **Integration** 2013

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and while the report was reviewed in both The Integration Centre and the ESRI, the views do not necessarily represent those of either body or of the Geary Institute.

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We welcome the fourth edition of the Annual Integration Monitor. We can say with confidence that by now it has become a key publication in the field of migrant integration in Ireland. It sets out key trends, based on an EU-wide framework, in such areas as employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship, to allow for assessing the integration of broad non-Irish groups in Ireland. Such information should be strongly considered by policymakers when designing general policies that also affect migrants, or specific targeted measures.

Looking back over the last four years, we are happy to observe some positive trends. Many migrants are and have remained highly skilled, more skilled than in many other European countries. A considerable group of migrants work in highly skilled jobs: the large number of non-EU nationals in highly skilled jobs is in contrast to a number of other European countries; although there is a group that struggles to fill roles commensurate with their qualifications.

When the first Monitor was published, over 12,000 citizenship applications were rejected as invalid and the process lasted over two years on average, but in many cases longer. People received their citizenship certificate in the District Court. Since then the process became much quicker, the rejection rate dropped significantly and the number of people that were granted citizenship has grown dramatically: it is estimated that perhaps up to 31 per cent of eligible non-EEA nationals had been granted citizenship by the end of 2012. Citizenship ceremonies were introduced where people make their oath of fidelity to the Irish nation in a much more appropriate fashion than previously was the case.

The performance of migrant children in school also offers some reasons to be content. In PISA 2012, about half of the migrant children speak English at home and their scores are broadly similarly to those of their Irish peers in reading and mathematics. On the other hand, it is clear that non-English-speaking children tend to perform worse, although the gap seems to have lowered somewhat. Ensuring that young migrants growing up in Ireland do not fall behind should be a key objective for policymakers.

The migrant employment figures also raise concerns. Migrants have been more affected by the recession than non-migrants, and they do not seem to have benefited from the recent recovery. Across gender and age groups, migrants again have higher unemployment rates. This suggests a very similar picture to other European countries. The unemployment rate is particularly high among Africans, who are also more likely to suffer from multiple deprivations such as not being able to afford an evening out or replacing worn-out furniture. UK nationals and people from Accession States have also been affected by unemployment and deprivation, although to a lesser extent.

The very low number of political representatives with a migrant background highlights the need to make more effort in identifying and supporting migrants with leadership potential. Notwithstanding the fluctuation in migration movements, there is a strong cohort of migrants that have been living in Ireland for many years, with a marked number of those now becoming Irish citizens. It is important that migrants emerge in leadership positions to reflect the diverse society we now live in and to avoid disenfranchisement of groups.

We welcome the recent announcement of adopting a national integration strategy in Ireland and appreciate that submissions were sought by the Department of Justice and Equality to inform the development of the strategy. It is essential that the strategy will have concrete actions and a monitoring mechanism built-in. We are aware of the difficult financial circumstances Ireland is still in; however, we believe that actions can be developed with limited resources and through good co-operation among statutory and non-statutory actors. There are already many good local initiatives but they need acknowledgement, guidance and support from the State. One key step should be to formally link integration and intercultural forums to local authorities, and set up a national integration forum much the same way as has been done in Portugal and Denmark.

Lastly, we must highlight the need for monitoring. It has been stressed before that Ireland opted
for mainstream service provision for migrants. However, mainstreaming without monitoring is of little use since it is not possible to establish the impact of services on migrants. That is why we also recommend monitoring actions developed in the new strategy.

We need to see how migrant children perform in school exams and what resources are allocated for assisting with language learning. In the same vein, we need to monitor whether labour market activation programmes address the need of migrant groups suffering from high unemployment rates.

This is also a strong reason for continuation of the current publication. In many European countries the State funds the publication of monitoring reports on integration. The Integration Centre will no longer be in a position to publish the Annual Monitoring Report on Integration in the future. We strongly hope that the State will take responsibility for this important task.

Killian Forde & Péter Szlovák
The Integration Centre
AUTHORS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Integration Monitor benefited from the comments and assistance of a number of people and we would like to take this opportunity to thank them.

We acknowledge the support of the Central Statistics Office (CSO), in both providing access to the data and commenting on their use. We would also like to thank officials from the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration, the Department of Education and Skills and the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service for supplying data, information and very useful observations on an earlier draft of this report. Fidèle Mutwarasibo from the Immigrant Council of Ireland also provided useful input. Thanks also to Diana Gouveia and Rachel Perkins for their comments.

The special theme on the ‘Second Generation’ is based on the researcher micro file from the Infant Cohort of the Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) study, made available through the CSO and the Department of Children and Youth Affairs (DCYA). GUI data have been funded by the Government of Ireland through the DCYA and have been collected under the Statistics Act 1993 by the CSO. The project has been designed and implemented by the joint ESRI-TCD Growing Up in Ireland Study Team. © Department of Children and Youth Affairs. The authors would like to thank the study team for their support, in particular James Williams for his encouragement and insightful comments.

Other ESRI colleagues gave very helpful comments on their specific areas of expertise, in particular Merike Darmody, Corona Joyce, Bertrand Maître, Richard Layte and Dorothy Watson. We also wish to thank Jennifer Armstrong for copy-editing the report. As with previous Monitors, this Integration Monitor has also been shaped by reviewers and commentators from previous years.

Finally, we are grateful for comments and input from The Integration Centre, particularly Péter Szlovák, throughout the research process.

While others have given generously of their time and comments, responsibility for the contents of the report rests with the authors.
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GLOSSARY: ABBREVIATIONS AND IRISH TERMS

AMIF  Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
BTEI  Back to Education Initiative
CSO   Central Statistics Office
DG    Directorate general
EAL   English as an Additional Language
EEA   European Economic Area
EIF   European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals
EPIC programme  Employment for People from Immigrant Communities
ERF   European Refugee Fund
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute
ESOL  English for Speakers of Other Languages
ETB   Education and Training Board
EU    European Union
EU12  EU Member States that acceded in 2004 and 2007: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania
EU13  ‘Old’ EU15 Member States excluding Ireland and the United Kingdom: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
EU-SILC  EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions
GAM   General Allocation Model
Garda Síochána  Police force
GNIB  Garda National Immigration Bureau
GP    General practitioner (family doctor)
GUI study  Growing Up in Ireland
HSE   Health Service Executive
ICT   Information and communications technology
IHREC  Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission
INIS  Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service
ISCED  International Standard Classification of Education
MIPEX  Migrant Integration Policy Index
MRCI  Migrant Rights Centre Ireland
NAPS  National Anti-Poverty Strategy
NGO   Non-governmental organisation
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Oireachtas  Parliament (the President, Dáil Éireann – lower house and Seanad Éireann – upper house)
OPMI  Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration
ORAC  Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner
PISA  OECD Programme for International Student Assessment
PRSI  Pay-related social insurance
QNHS  Quarterly National Household Survey
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
INTRODUCTION

Following very rapid immigration of non-Irish nationals to Ireland during the economic boom, there are indications that Ireland may be entering a new phase of migration and integration. The inflow of immigrants is now far behind the 2007 peak, and a significant minority of migrants of non-EEA (European Economic Area) origin have become Irish citizens. The number of non-EEA adults holding temporary immigration permissions has declined. An increasing proportion of families among the migrant population also points towards a more settled migrant population. These changes underline the need for a long-term, proactive approach to migrant integration, and for integration monitoring.

This is the final report in a series of four annual Integration Monitors that measure migrant integration in four key life domains: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. The series has been the only regular study to report quantitative, objective indicators of migrant integration in Ireland and, after this report, we are not aware of any plans to monitor integration in the future.

The core indicators in this Integration Monitor closely follow those proposed at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration held in Zaragoza in 2010. They are comparable across European Union (EU) Member States, based on existing data and focused on outcomes. Most indicators are based on the latest available survey data and compare outcomes for Irish and migrant populations in each domain. Chapter 6 also presents a special theme: ‘The Second Generation: Children of Immigrants (at 3) and Their Families’, which uses data from the Infant Cohort of the Growing Up in Ireland study.

Using nationally representative indicators means we can create valid, reliable indicators that allow monitoring of change over time. Yet there are some drawbacks. First, as the core indicators measure people’s ‘objective’ circumstances, the report does not capture the experience of integration, or indeed the lack of it. Second, in many cases a number of different nationalities are combined, so any variation within national groups may be hidden. Third, relying on national data sources that are not specifically designed to measure migrant integration poses challenges to adequately representing these groups. Finally, some of the differences between Irish and non-Irish groups in these indicators may be a result of differences between the groups in other characteristics, such as age, gender, educational background and work experience, rather than national background. Accounting for this by using statistical models is beyond the scope of this Monitor, although the possible role of these factors is generally acknowledged in the text, and avenues for further research indicated.

Throughout the report reference is made to different groups of EU countries. EU13 refers to the ‘old’ Member States, prior to enlargement in 2004, excluding the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland. EU12 refers to the ten ‘new’ Member States that joined the EU in 2004, plus Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007. This summary focuses on overall differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals: individual chapters give more information on differences between national groups.

INTEGRATION MONITOR: KEY FINDINGS

Employment Indicators

The chapter on employment presents core labour market indicators for the working-age population in early 2013: employment, unemployment and activity rates (see Table A1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A1</th>
<th>Employment (Working Age) 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irish %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) Quarter 1 (Q1) 2013.

In early 2013 employment rates were almost identical among Irish and non-Irish nationals.
although immigrants had somewhat higher labour market activity rates than the Irish population, due to their smaller share of inactive groups such as retired people or people on home duties.

Ireland is emerging from a deep and prolonged recession. Overall, immigrants have been harder hit by this recession, as shown in the higher unemployment rate for non-Irish nationals in early 2013, compared with Irish nationals. Among non-Irish nationals, Africans had the highest rate of unemployment (30 per cent), whereas the unemployment rate was lowest (7 per cent) for EU13 nationals.

The youth (15–24 years) unemployment rate is very high in Ireland, and by early 2013 it had become higher for non-Irish nationals than for Irish nationals. Among prime-age and older workers, the unemployment rate remained higher for non-Irish nationals.

While unemployment is higher among non-Irish nationals for men and for women, the gap between Irish and non-Irish nationals is greater for women.

**Education Indicators**

The chapter on education considers educational qualifications among adults; and presents academic achievement scores of 15 year olds, based on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) data from 2012 [see Table A2].

In early 2013 a very similar proportion (around 50 per cent) of Irish and non-Irish nationals aged 25 to 34 had third-level education. A slightly higher proportion of young non-Irish adults (20–24 age group) than of Irish adults had left school before finishing second-level education.

In English reading, immigrant students from non-English speaking backgrounds had lower achievement scores, on average, than their Irish peers in 2012 – although the gap between the groups has narrowed since 2009. There was no significant difference between immigrants from an English-speaking background and Irish students in mean achievement scores on English reading. In 2012, in contrast to 2009, there was also no significant difference between immigrant students and Irish students in achievement in mathematics.

**Social Inclusion Indicators**

Income, poverty, home ownership and health are used as core indicators of social inclusion [see Table A3].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE A2</th>
<th>EDUCATION 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irish</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-Irish</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of 25–34 age group with tertiary educational attainment</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of early leavers from education (20–24 age group)</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in English reading (2012)</td>
<td>527 English speakers: 529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in maths (2012)</td>
<td>503 English speakers: 508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE A3</th>
<th>SOCIAL INCLUSION 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irish</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-Irish</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median annual net income (needs adjusted)</td>
<td>€18,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At risk of poverty rate</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent poverty rate</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population (aged 16+) perceiving their health as good or very good</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of households that are property owners</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After adjusting for household needs (the number of children and adults in the household), the median income for non-Irish nationals in 2011 was slightly lower than that of Irish nationals. Yet both the at risk of poverty rate and the consistent poverty rate, which takes into account the experience of deprivation as well as income poverty, are similar for Irish nationals and non-Irish nationals. However, Chapter 4 reveals substantial differences in deprivation between different sub-populations of non-Irish nationals.

Sources: QNHS Q1 2013, except achievement scores, which are based on PISA 2012 data.

1 The ‘at risk of poverty rate’, which refers to the percentage of a group falling below 60 per cent of median equalised income, is the official poverty threshold used by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and agreed at EU level. ‘Consistent poverty’ combines at risk of poverty with enforced deprivation of a range of items.
A very high proportion of non-Irish nationals report good or very good health, and in general non-Irish nationals tend to report better health than Irish nationals. This situation is at least in part due to the fact that non-Irish nationals are younger, on average, than Irish nationals.

Rates of home ownership are much lower among non-Irish than Irish nationals. Home ownership is particularly low among EU12 nationals, but is higher among non-EU nationals.

**Active Citizenship Indicators**

Very significant changes have been seen in the active citizenship domain since the start of this series. Three indicators were proposed at the Zaragoza conference to assess active citizenship: the share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship; the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and the share of immigrants among elected representatives (see Table A4). Data constraints make these indicators challenging to construct in Ireland, and the results reported here should be seen as tentative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE A4</th>
<th>ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP END-2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual citizenship acquisition rate (non-EEA adults who acquired citizenship in 2012 as share of non-EEA nationals holding ‘live’ immigration permissions)</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of non-EEA adults who ‘ever’ acquired citizenship to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-EEA adults holding ‘live’ immigration permissions in 2012 who hold long-term residence</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants among elected local representatives</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Taking a longer-term perspective, between 2005, when records began, and end-2012, almost 54,700 non-EEA adults acquired Irish citizenship. This represents 31 per cent of the estimated adult immigrant population of non-EEA origin resident in Ireland at end-2012 and is, therefore, a substantial proportion of the group. The estimate assumes that those naturalised in this period did not leave the State, and excludes naturalisations before 2005 as no data are available.

Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence immigration status with clear rights and entitlements attached. Such a status is expected in a revised Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill. The share of non-EEA nationals holding long-term residence permits, under the current administrative scheme, was estimated to be just under 5 per cent at end-2012.

**Special Focus: The Second Generation**

Many commentators argue that the outcomes of the second generation should be the benchmark for judging integration (OECD, 2012). This Monitor used a large sample of three year olds from the Infant Cohort of the Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) study in 2011, all of whom were born in Ireland, to examine differences between the children of immigrants and their families. The analysis looked at the child’s family background, care arrangements, financial circumstances and health outcomes. All of these factors have been shown by previous research to be important for later child outcomes (Zhou, 1997), and they vary by immigrant groups.

In terms of family context, most three year olds, whether from an Irish or immigrant background, live in families with two parents and other children. However, many immigrant children aged three, in particular children whose mother is from Eastern Europe, are less likely to have siblings.

Immigrant mothers are more likely to have a third-level qualification than Irish mothers, particularly those from Western Europe, but also those from Asia and the ‘Rest of the World’. In spite of their higher level of qualifications, immigrant mothers are less likely to be employed than Irish mothers and consequently immigrant three years olds are less likely to be in non-parental childcare. The...
main exception is Western European mothers, who have high levels of employment. Where immigrant children are in childcare, they are much more likely than Irish children to be in childcare centres than to be looked after by relatives. The lack of an extended family living in Ireland may mean it is more difficult to combine work and caring for immigrant mothers, especially those with low earning power.

Financial strain, which has risen markedly in recession, also tends to be higher among immigrant families, particularly those of African origin, but also those of Eastern European or Asian origin. There is also a very high proportion of African families in the lowest income quintile.

There are rather small differences in overall health, antibiotic use and diet between Irish and immigrant children. Immigrant three year olds have healthier diets than Irish three year olds, this is particularly so for those whose mothers are from Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the ‘Rest of the World’.

To determine the extent to which these differences are due to how long the family has been living in Ireland, the family’s financial resources/socio-economic status and the educational resources of the mother would require further detailed analysis. The GUI data are ideally suited to such research. The GUI study also interviewed these children, and their families, at five years old, giving an excellent opportunity to monitor individual child outcomes over time.

Policy Issues
This report is primarily concerned with assessing outcomes for non-Irish nationals. In Chapter 7 we discuss a number of issues for policy emerging from the analysis of outcomes.

For example, given the high unemployment rate for non-Irish nationals, it is important that labour market programmes are implemented to ensure that vulnerable groups are integrated into the labour market, with programmes targeted to their skill needs. Given differences in achievement shown by the PISA study, it is important to monitor education outcomes for migrants at primary and secondary levels. The extent of financial difficulties varies across migrant groups, but evidence suggests that levels of both deprivation and financial strain are high among the whole African group (Chapter 4) and among African families of three year olds (Chapter 6).

Chapter 5 documents a rapid rise in the size of the naturalised population since 2010. Notwithstanding ongoing issues, such as the absence of administrative appeal, recent progress in processing applications is very positive. To build on recent progress in processing naturalisation applications, a clearly defined and widely accessible long-term residence status would ensure naturalisation is not the only way for long-term migrants to achieve security of immigration status. Yet continued delays in enactment of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010 mean that Ireland remains without a statutory long-term residence permission.

There has been a substantial decline in funding allocated to the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI) since 2008. Budget cuts have hit most government departments and agencies, with consequences for mainstreamed integration initiatives. In this context, the Government’s recent commitment to developing a strengthened integration strategy seems timely, if matched with sufficient resources. In addition, philanthropic foundations, which, in recent years, have been an important source of funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who support migrant integration through a range of measures, are likely to wind down in the medium term and it is not clear if and how their activities will be replaced.

Future Data Collection
At both EU and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) levels, the issue of monitoring the integration of immigrants has received increasing prominence, with some work focusing on implementing indicators that monitor integration. The value of such monitoring indicators will only be as good as the data on which they are based.

One issue in Ireland is how well represented non-Irish nationals are in social surveys. To be confident that the situation of non-Irish nationals is accurately measured and monitored over time, they need to be appropriately represented in such surveys. In the short term, it is very important that continued efforts be made to encourage the participation of non-Irish nationals in the EU-SILC and the QNHS surveys.
In the medium term, immigrant or ethnic minority boost samples would go a long way to addressing the persistent issue of small sample sizes.

In terms of recording immigrants in official statistics, significant improvements have been made in the accuracy and availability of administrative statistics on immigration in recent years. However, the absence of data on children aged under 16, who are not required to register with the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service or the Garda National Immigration Bureau, is the key remaining gap.

The increasingly permanent nature of migration in Ireland means researchers and policymakers need to think carefully about whose outcomes they are measuring and how they do this. As noted in Chapter 7, the sizeable group of immigrants who now possess Irish citizenship means that measuring integration on the basis of nationality will miss an increasing number of naturalised citizens, and strengthens the case for including alternative measures such as ethnicity, ancestry or parents’ country of birth in social surveys.

Table A5 brings together the core indicators in the domains of employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE A5</th>
<th>KEY INDICATORS AT A GLANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment (working age) 2013</strong></td>
<td>Irish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education 2013</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of 25–34 age group with tertiary educational attainment</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of early leavers from education [20–24 age group]</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in print English reading [2012]</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in maths [2012]</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social inclusion 2011</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median annual net income [needs adjusted]</td>
<td>€18,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At risk of poverty rate</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent poverty rate</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population [aged 16+] perceiving their health as good or very good</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of households that are property owners</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active citizenship end-2012</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual citizenship acquisition rate [non-EEA adults who acquired citizenship in 2012 as share of non-EEA nationals holding ‘live’ immigration permissions]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of non-EEA adults who <code>ever</code> acquired citizenship to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-EEA adults holding ‘live’ immigration permissions in 2012 who hold long-term residence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants among elected local representatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: QNHS Q1 2013 for employment and education indicators [except achievement scores, which are based on PISA 2012 data]; EU-SILC 2011 for social inclusion indicators. Citizenship and long-term residence indicators: Irish Naturalisation and Citizenship Service, Eurostat. Political participation indicator: Immigrant Council of Ireland. See Appendix 2 for further details of sources.

Notes: This table summarises data presented in Chapters 2 to 5. The data sources are diverse and vary in quality and coverage. The relevant section of the report should be consulted for further details of measurement and definitions. Note the small sample of non-Irish nationals in the EU-SILC data used for the social inclusion indicators.
Integration is important as it allows immigrants to contribute to the economic, social, political and cultural life of the host country and to become an accepted part of the society; it is also crucial for social cohesion. The challenge of facilitating integration becomes greater during periods of economic recession, such as that recently experienced in Ireland, when access to jobs and other resources becomes more limited. International experience tells us that the consequences of failed integration may manifest themselves in a variety of ways, from early school-leaving and residential segregation to greater social conflict.

This report is the last in a series of four annual Integration Monitors that aim to measure the integration of immigrants into Ireland in four key domains or policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. This report updates core indicators from the 2010, 2011 and 2012 Integration Monitors as well as presenting a special theme on ‘The Second Generation: Children of Immigrants (at 3) and Their Families’. We are not aware of any plans to monitor integration from 2014 onwards.

This chapter provides an introduction to, and context for, the indicators. In Section 1.1 we discuss the challenges of measuring and monitoring integration. Section 1.2 outlines the main trends in migration in Ireland. Section 1.3 presents an overview of Irish migration policy and legislation. Section 1.4 examines integration policy in Europe and Ireland. In addition, Box 1.1 considers access to family unity and family reunification, and Box 1.2 considers integration indicators.

1.1 THE CHALLENGES OF MEASURING INTEGRATION

1.1.1 Defining and Monitoring Integration

Defining integration is not easy. At a very basic level, when immigrants move to a destination country they have to find a place in that society in the practical sense (e.g. a home, a job and income, and access to education and health services) and also in the social, cultural and political senses. Integration might thus be defined simply as ‘the process of becoming an accepted part of society’, both as an individual and as a group (Penninx, 2010). European countries vary considerably in their understanding of integration, from assimilation to multiculturalism (Bijl and Verweij, 2012). The European Union (EU) definition sees integration as ‘a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states’ (Common Basic Principles; see Appendix 1).
Most commentators agree that a number of aspects of life need to be considered. For example, while recognising that the needs of immigrants vary significantly with the length of time they have lived in Ireland and their personal experiences, The Integration Centre defines integration as achieved when immigrants enjoy economic, political, social and cultural equality and inclusion.4

Integration is on the EU policy agenda: in 2011 the European Commission proposed a new European agenda for the integration of non-EU migrants.5 This policy focus has been accompanied by an awareness of the need to monitor integration. One of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU6 is that developing clear indicators is necessary to adjust policy and evaluate progress on integration (see Appendix 1). These indicators should be based on existing and comparable data for most Member States, limited in number, simple to understand and focused on outcomes.7 This series of annual Integration Monitors has followed the recommendations for key indicators, with some adaptations for Ireland. A report reviewing a pilot of the integration indicators proposed at the fourth EU Ministerial Conference on Integration held in 2010 (known as the ‘Zaragoza indicators’) was published in 2014 and is discussed in Box 1.2 at the end of this chapter (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013). A further Eurostat report on integration indicators at EU level is expected in early 2015.8

Another significant cross-national publication on monitoring integration adopts a different approach. Rather than pooling indicators from multiple countries, individual country chapters describe integration policy and how integration is monitored at national level in 17 countries in Western and Eastern Europe (Bijl and Verweij, 2012). In addition to the policy argument for monitoring, Bijl and Verweij (2012) highlight the benefits of providing factual information about immigrants and integration in what can sometimes be politically charged debates on the topic. This publication also highlights the diversity of both migration and integration processes between European countries.

In their review of mainstreaming approaches to integration policy in four European countries, Collett and Petrovic (2014) also highlight the importance of monitoring. Mainstreaming can be a very effective policy approach to the integration of migrants, particularly in the longer term when narrowly defined stand-alone immigrant integration policies may fall short. However, these authors also stress that when a policy is mainstreamed, specific data on immigrants will be important to ensure that immigrants are being reached and their needs served by the policies. Without monitoring outcomes, mainstreaming can mean that the needs of immigrants are being ignored or at least not effectively addressed.

1.1.2 This Integration Monitor

The Integration Monitor series aims to provide a balanced and rigorous assessment of the extent of integration of immigrants in Ireland using the most up-to-date and reliable data available. The framework for that assessment is based on the Zaragoza indicators.9 A number of key principles guided the choice of these integration indicators and here we consider some of their strengths and limitations.

First, the indicators are focused on outcomes. For each indicator, outcomes for immigrants are compared with those for the native population, in this case the Irish population, which means that the focus is on the difference between the Irish and the immigrant populations. Two exceptions to this principle of comparing outcomes are the indicators concerning citizenship and long-term residence (see Table 1.1), which measure empirical outcomes.

Second, there are a limited number of indicators that are largely based on nationally representative data sources that already exist and are comparable.

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6 Council of the EU [2004], adopted following agreement among EU Member States about the need for more dynamic policies to promote the integration of third-country nationals in Member States.
7 Swedish presidency conference conclusions on indicators and monitoring of the outcome of integration policies, proposed at the EU Ministerial Conference on Integration, Zaragoza, Spain [April 2010]. Hereafter these indicators are referred to as the Zaragoza indicators.
8 Information received from European Commission, DG Home, Immigration and Integration Unit.
This approach makes them cost-effective and, in principle, highly comparable, but it does have some disadvantages:

(i) The existing comparable data sources may not be designed to represent and measure outcomes for immigrants. This is discussed further in Section 1.1.3.

(ii) Attention is primarily given to the structural dimensions of integration, i.e. labour market participation and educational attainment. Cross-national data on an ongoing basis do not exist for many subjective indicators, such as sense of belonging, so these are not included in this core Monitor.

(iii) The focus on quantitative, nationally representative data means that we miss out on elements of the lived experience of integration: this is better captured by qualitative work using interviews and case studies. This Monitor measures integration at a national level, although it is clear that integration often takes place at the local level and that the experiences of immigrants at local level may vary across the country.

Third, the indicators are designed to be comparable over time. The focus is not on the change in an individual’s circumstances over time, but on changes for groups in the population. This emphasis on change is important from not only a policy perspective, but also a research perspective (comparing change over time can overcome some of the limitations of the indicators). An indicator might underestimate the proportion of an immigrant group who have poor health, but if it does so consistently over time, it will still pick up changes in that proportion.

Fourth, the indicators should be simple to understand, transparent and accessible. Basing indicators on familiar concepts such as unemployment and poverty means that they should have resonance for both policymakers and the general public. This transparency requirement also means they need to be defined clearly (see Appendix 2). The publication and dissemination of a report such as this should increase the accessibility of these indicators, at least in Ireland.

The clear focus on outcomes distinguishes this Integration Monitor from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). The MIPEX tool aims to assess, compare and improve integration policy indicators by providing ongoing assessment of policies. That said, policy forms the context for those outcomes and will be discussed briefly in this report, particularly in the access information in Boxes 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. These boxes are not intended as a statement of entitlements, and readers should refer to the relevant official bodies for further information (additional sources of information are noted in the boxes).

Table 1.1 sets out the indicators presented in this Integration Monitor, which draw on those proposed at Zaragoza. See also Appendix 2 for definitions and details of indicators not in the core Monitor but included in this report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.1 OUTLINE OF CORE INDICATORS, BROADLY EQUIVALENT TO THOSE PROPOSED AT ZARAGOZA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Employment</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest educational attainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of 25–34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of early leavers from education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean reading and mathematics scores for 15 year olds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Social inclusion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median net income (household income and equivalised income)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At risk of poverty rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of property owners among immigrants and in the total population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Active citizenship</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of immigrants who have acquired citizenship to non-EEA (European Economic Area) immigrant population (best estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits (best estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants among elected local representatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In some instances the indicators are slightly different because of data constraints (see Appendix 2).

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10 Examples of such studies include: Gilligan et al. (2010), Migration and Citizenship Research Initiative (2008), UNHCR (2014).
In addition to these core indicators, each annual Integration Monitor includes a different special thematic focus. This year the focus is on ‘The Second Generation: Children of Immigrants (at 3) and Their Families’. Chapter 6 uses new data from the Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) study to examine the lives of three-year-old children born of immigrant parents in Ireland and how these compare with the lives of children born of Irish parents.

The primary task of this Monitor is to present the integration indicators using the most recent data available. In most cases, we use new data released since the 2012 Integration Monitor. This report will not present figures in detail from the 2012 Monitor, but instead will draw readers’ attention to levels of change or stability, where this is relevant or interesting. Chapter conclusions summarise any significant developments.

1.1.3 Challenges of Monitoring Outcomes Among Immigrants

Monitoring outcomes among migrants is challenging for a number of reasons related to the use of survey data, how immigrants are defined, shifting populations and monitoring change over time. This Monitor aims to cover all immigrants but some are not captured in the available data sources.

Aside from the active citizenship indicators, most of the indicators in this Monitor draw on survey data. Survey data need to be examined carefully to determine how effectively information was collected on immigrants. These large, nationally representative, excellent datasets are not designed to represent and record details of immigrants. One key concern is the tendency for certain groups to be under-represented in survey data due to, for example, poor language skills. There is also a very diverse range of nationalities among immigrants to Ireland. Small numbers in particular national groups may mean they need to be combined into larger groups, thus losing detail about the experience of specific nationalities. Some groups, such as the homeless and those living in residential homes or direct provision centres, are not picked up by household surveys at all.

A second challenge is how to define immigrants. The general definition of immigrants in this Monitor is based on nationality, and is consistent with the previous Monitors in the series. Where relevant, various sub-groups, such as refugees, migrant workers or family members, are discussed separately. The nationality definition may miss second-generation immigrants and naturalised citizens, who are not typically identified using general social surveys. Most immigration into Ireland is relatively recent, but this is an area of change (see Chapter 5). How best to define the immigrant population is a point we return to in Chapter 7.

EU nationals are distinguished from non-EU nationals as they have very different rights and freedom of movement in Ireland. As previous research (Barrett et al., 2006) has indicated that the experience in Ireland of people from the United Kingdom (UK) differs from other EU nationals, we have distinguished UK nationals separately, where possible. EU13 nationals and EU12 nationals are also distinguished separately. In this Monitor, where data permit, we distinguish non-EU nationals into the following groups: ‘Africa’; ‘North America, Australia and Oceania’; ‘Asia’ (which comprises South, South-East and East Asia); ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of the World’ (which comprises Central America, Caribbean, South America, Near and Middle East, and Other countries).

A third challenge with monitoring the situation of immigrants is the shift in population size and composition each year, so that the year-on-year comparisons are not of the same groups. This is particularly true in Ireland in the current context of rapid labour market change. Recent migration flows to and from Ireland illustrate how migration patterns closely reflect economic conditions: economic growth brings strong labour demand and stimulates immigration, whereas recession and falling labour demand stimulate emigration. At such times of change the impact of immigration policy on migration flows is important – this is discussed in the next section.

1.2 OVERVIEW OF MAIN TRENDS IN MIGRATION IN IRELAND

In this section we discuss the main trends in immigration and how these have developed in recent years. Figure 1.1 shows that Ireland has one of the highest percentages of foreign-born, typically first-generation, immigrants, among EU Member States: 15 per cent.

11 The proportion of elected representatives is unchanged as there have been no nationwide elections in the interim period.
12 Nationality and citizenship are used interchangeably in this Monitor, though it is recognised that the use of the terms may differ. In some cases, nationality is used to mean a national identity and citizenship refers to a legal status. This Monitor uses survey data and administrative records and the distinction is not always clear, so they are assumed to mean something broadly similar.
13 EU13 comprises the 'older' EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU12 comprises the EU Member States that acceded in 2004 and 2007, i.e. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Aside from Luxembourg (not shown) and Cyprus, Ireland has the highest percentage of resident foreign-born immigrants who were born in another EU Member State: 11 per cent. The high proportion of foreign-born persons reflects the recent nature of large-scale immigration to Ireland. It should also be noted that Census 2011 showed that almost one-third of the foreign-born population in Ireland held Irish nationality, many of whom were born in the UK including Northern Ireland.14

Ireland has experienced extensive migratory change in the past two decades, linked to changing economic conditions and the expansion of the EU.15 Prior to the mid-1990s Ireland was a country with a long history of net emigration, but a period of economic growth from the early 1990s attracted returning Irish emigrants and other immigrants. In 2004 the enlargement of the EU led to particularly strong net inward migration. Ireland, UK and Sweden were the only three EU Member States to open their labour markets, without restrictions, to workers from new Member States. Inflows of migrants peaked during the economic boom in 2006/7. However, due in part to a collapse in the property market, together with deteriorating international economic conditions, Ireland entered into recession in 2008. As a result, immigration declined. In 2010 Ireland re-entered a phase of significant net emigration.

Figure 1.2 shows that immigration flows have risen slightly in the past year (from around 52,700 in 2012 to around 55,900 in 2013). However, this rise is offset by a large increase in emigration flows: emigration was estimated to have reached 89,000 in the year to April 2013, an increase of just 2 per cent year on year, but three times the flow recorded in 2003 (29,300). The year to April 2013 was the fourth consecutive year of negative net migration. The 2013 net migration figure stood at -33,100. Glynn et al. [2013] show that Ireland has experienced significantly higher levels of emigration per capita than other Western European countries affected by the Eurozone crisis.

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14 Census 2011 showed that approximately 241,200 of the 766,770 foreign-born residents in Ireland are Irish nationals. (Over 54,000 of the total foreign-born population were born in Northern Ireland.)

The CSO creates these Population and Migration Estimates using the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) and the Census. Estimates are also compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as the number of Personal Public Service numbers allocated to non-Irish nationals, the number of work permits issued/renewed and the number of asylum applications. See also Box 2.1.

Figure 1.3 demonstrates that there has been a dramatic drop in immigration flows since the peak of 151,100 was reached in the year to April 2007. Flows have recovered somewhat in recent years but are around 95,200 less than the 2007 peak (a decrease of 63 per cent). Immigration increased for all national groups in the year to April 2013 except the Irish, for whom immigration has fallen by an estimated 4,900 since 2012 (a decrease of 24 per cent). Among non-Irish groups, the biggest change was in the non-EU group, whose immigration rate grew by an estimated 4,700 compared with 2012 (an increase of 38 per cent).
Figure 1.4 shows the nationality breakdown of emigration flows from 2006 to 2013. Overall, emigration flows (of Irish plus non-Irish nationals) have increased sharply since 2006, more than doubling in this time frame to reach 89,000 in 2013. There has been a large increase in Irish emigration flows in this period: the outflow of Irish was around 15,300 persons in 2006, increasing to an estimated 50,900 in 2013, a more than three-fold increase. In 2013 Irish nationals accounted for 57 per cent of the emigrant flow. The outward flow of EU12, EU13 and non-EU groups decreased since 2012, perhaps reflecting improved employment prospects in Ireland. The emigration of Irish nationals continued to increase, however.

Figure 1.5 shows the breakdown of Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) registrations, or residence permissions, of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over from 2008 to 2012. EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals aged 16 and under are not required to register, although provision for the registration of the latter group is anticipated in forthcoming immigration, residence and protection legislation. The most recent confirmed data relate to year-end 2012, when there were 120,281 ‘live’ registrations recorded, representing a decline of 21,500 registrations since 2008. The provisional 2013 year-end estimate of non-EEA nationals with permission to remain in the State is 107,800. The decline in permissions to remain in the State in 2012 has been attributed to the increase in the number of people acquiring citizenship (Department of Justice and Equality, 2014a); this increase has impacted very significantly on the number of people who are required to hold a residence permission to remain in the State. Recent developments regarding processing applications for citizenship are discussed in Chapter 5.

17 The European Economic Area (EEA) comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
18 Non-EEA nationals who wish to stay in the State for more than 90 days must register with An Garda Síochána, and on registration are issued with one of several immigration permissions or ‘stamps’, depending on their particular circumstances (e.g. work permit holder, student). There are seven main categories of stamps issued in Ireland, some more clearly defined than others.
19 Estimate received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS), February 2014.
This Bill constitutes a single piece of proposed legislation for the management of both immigration and protection in Ireland and has been in preparation for several years. The previous Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008 also failed to complete the legislative process.

Figure 1.5 shows that the share of ‘live’ residence permissions issued for the purpose of work fell sharply between 2008 and 2012, from 35 per cent to 17 per cent of all ‘live’ residence permissions, perhaps in part reflecting the much increased number of naturalised citizens (see Chapter 5) and the impact of the recession. As discussed in Table 1.2 below, the number of work permits issued also fell sharply. The number of residence permissions issued to family members grew from 12 per cent to 19 per cent in the same period.

Provisional data released by the Department of Justice and Equality indicate that at year-end 2013 the top six registered nationalities, accounting for over 50 per cent of all persons registered, are: India (11 per cent), Brazil (10 per cent), China (9 per cent), Nigeria (8 per cent), United States (6 per cent) and Philippines (6 per cent) (Department of Justice and Equality, 2014a).

1.3 OVERVIEW OF IRISH MIGRATION POLICY AND LEGISLATION

There have been several policy and policy-related developments relevant to immigrants in Ireland since the 2012 Integration Monitor. For example, new policies intended to facilitate the migration of highly skilled non-EEA workers and investors have been introduced. The Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010 was again not enacted in the period and a new Bill, incorporating amendments, is expected to be introduced in 2014.20 An update of recent developments relating to four main groups of migrants – migrant workers, students, family members and protection applicants – is set out in Table 1.2. A similar table was included in the 2011 and 2012 Monitors and a more detailed discussion of policy relating to migrants is available in the 2010 Monitor. The access of immigrants to employment, education, social welfare, citizenship and voting will be discussed in Boxes 2.1 to 5.3 below.

Where possible an indication is given of the size of each group discussed in Table 1.2. However, data are often available only on non-EU nationals aged 16 and over, as this is the only group required to register with the GNIB.

The overall number of residence permits held by non-EEA adults declined between 2011 and 2012 by almost 8,000 (6 per cent). A marked decrease in the number of residence permits held for remunerated activities accounted for almost all of this fall (permits in this category declined by 31 per cent year-on-year).

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20 This Bill constitutes a single piece of proposed legislation for the management of both immigration and protection in Ireland and has been in preparation for several years. The previous Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008 also failed to complete the legislative process.
**TABLE 1.2  OVERVIEW OF RECENT POLICY/LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS**

**Migrant workers**

**Overview:** Labour migrants in Ireland include: work permit/spousal or dependant permit/green card holders; intra-company transferees; certain non-EEA students; holders of an alternative immigration registration that allows access to the labour market without a permit (e.g. non-EEA spouse of an EEA national); and EEA nationals.

**Recent trends:** The number of residence permits held by non-EEA nationals for remunerated activities declined by 31 per cent between 2011 and 2012. Work permit allocations also continued to decline between 2012 and 2013, from 4,007 to 3,863. This represents a fall of 47 per cent since the publication of the first Integration Monitor in 2010, when the total number of permits issued was 7,271.

Unemployment has declined but remains high and there are almost no labour shortages in Ireland (the National Skills Bulletin 2013 identified skills shortages for certain areas, mainly confined to niche skill areas and in most instances shortages remain of low magnitude; Expert Group on Future Skills Needs, 2013). Quinn and Gusciute (2013) show that Ireland is actively competing for certain high-skilled non-EEA workers in sectors such as information technology, engineering, finance and healthcare. Notwithstanding the fact that shortages exist in certain sectors, the study shows that Irish policies have been effective in selecting high-skilled workers: almost half of non-EU nationals in employment in Ireland work in high-skilled occupations. Among 20 EU Member States for which data are available, only the UK and Luxembourg show higher proportions.

**Policy update:** In April 2013 the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation updated employment permits policies to facilitate the migration of skilled workers, particularly in the ICT sector. The Department undertook to increase the number of permits issued in the ICT sector by 50 per cent in 2013 and to reduce the processing time for employment permit applications. A broadened list of high-skilled eligible occupations was issued to correlate with known shortages of key skills in the labour market.

Complementary immigration initiatives were also developed, by the Department of Justice and Equality, to increase the pool of highly skilled workers available to employers in Ireland. With effect from July 2013 a ‘highly skilled job interview authorisation’ has been available on a pilot basis to non-EEA nationals who have been invited, by an employer based in the State, to attend an interview for employment in a recognised highly skilled shortage occupation.21

A review of the operation of the immigrant investor/entrepreneur programmes was undertaken in 2013 and resulted in the minimum threshold value of investments being reduced in order to attract more potential investors.22 These schemes were introduced in 2012 and offer residence in Ireland to pursue a ‘high-potential’ start-up, or in return for a significant investment in the State.

In May 2013 the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation confirmed that Ireland will not restrict access to its labour market to the nationals of Croatia following its accession to the EU in July 2013.23

The Employment Permits (Amendment) Bill 2014 has been published. This Bill is intended to ‘reform and update’ Ireland’s employment permits system (Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, 2014).

**Size of group: migrant workers (non-EEA)**24

In December 2012 there were 20,461 ‘live’ residence permissions held for work-related reasons by non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over (Eurostat). This represented 17 per cent of ‘live’ immigration permissions held by non-EEA nationals at that time.

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21 See www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/HIGHLY%20SKILLED%20JOB%20INTERVIEW%20AUTHORISATION.
23 Dáil Debate Written Answer Nr 124 (30 May 2013). The Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation indicated that an assessment, which included a review conducted by Forfás, was carried out in order to determine the possible impact of allowing Croatian nationals to access the Irish labour market, concluding that it was unlikely to have a negative impact (Quinn and Gusciute, 2013).
24 It is not possible to estimate the size of these groups for EEA nationals, hence estimates for the non-EEA population are given.
Students

Overview: Non-Irish students comprise EEA plus non-EEA students in primary, second-level, third-level and further education.

Recent trends: The number of ‘live’ residence permissions held by non-EEA nationals for education-related reasons has remained broadly stable from the end of 2009 to the end of 2012.

Policy update: As of July 2013 non-EEA nationals who acquire EEA citizenship during their college course are not required to pay full tuition fees, provided that they have been resident for three of the previous five years (Department of Education and Skills, 2013a).

In April 2013 the Minister for Education and Skills launched new ‘Government of Ireland international scholarships’ to strengthen links with ‘emerging markets’ such as China, India, Brazil and the United States (Joyce, forthcoming).

A policy document on non-EEA family reunification issued in December 2013 states that persons who are resident in Ireland as students, other than those pursuing a PhD, are not currently eligible as sponsors in the initial stages of their stay, with some limited exceptions (INIS, 2013).

Size of group: students (non-EEA)25

In December 2012 there were 35,028 ‘live’ residence permissions held for education-related reasons by non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over (Eurostat). This represented 29 per cent of ‘live’ immigration permissions held by non-EEA nationals at that time.

Family members

Overview: Recognised refugees have a statutory entitlement to family reunification in Ireland, based on the Refugee Act 1996. Such applications are made to the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) but are investigated by the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC). Non-EEA family members of EU nationals also hold family reunification rights and such cases are assessed by INIS. An administrative scheme exists for the unification of family members with other groups of migrants but no data are available on the numbers admitted to the State under such schemes.

Recent trends: The number of residence permissions held by non-EEA nationals for family-related reasons has grown steadily in recent years, up by 35 per cent since 2008 to 22,836 in 2012. ORAC received applications for family reunification from 206 persons in 2012, representing a decrease of 15 per cent on 2011 figures (ORAC, 2013).

Policy update: INIS recently published a policy document, including guidelines, on family reunification for non-EEA nationals. See Box 1.1 for further details.

Size of group: family members

In December 2012 there were 22,836 ‘live’ residence permissions (19 per cent of all permissions) held for family-related reasons by non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over. This represented a 4 per cent increase in the number of permits issued in this category year-on-year (Eurostat). It must be noted that certain issues exist regarding the accurate measurement of the family member group.27

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25 It is not possible to estimate the size of these groups for EEA nationals, hence estimates for the non-EEA population are given.
26 A breakdown of students in Higher Education Authority (HEA) institutes by domiciliary of origin is available; however, these statistics do not cover all non-EEA students (only those who are registered in HEA institutes, i.e. all national universities and institutes of technology), the data do not include a breakdown of students in private education institutes.
27 Non-EEA members tend to hold stamp 4, stamp 4 EUFAM or stamp 3 immigration permissions, depending on the status of the principal person. Stamp 4 is issued to a broad range of non-EEA nationals, including family members of refugees, parents and siblings of Irish-born children, while EUFAM is given to family members of EU nationals. Stamp 3 is granted to family members of employment permit holders. Family members and siblings who qualify under the Irish Born Child scheme are not included in the ‘Family reasons’ category, instead, those who qualify under the scheme and who have not naturalised are included in the ‘Other’ category.
Protection applicants and protection status holders

**Overview:** A person seeking international protection in Ireland must first seek a declaration of refugee status from ORAC. A negative decision may be appealed to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. If the appeal is refused, an applicant may seek subsidiary protection. In the event of refusal of a subsidiary protection claim, the Minister for Justice and Equality will consider whether to make a deportation order or to grant leave to remain.

**Recent trends:** A total of 956 applications for asylum were submitted to ORAC in 2012, falling slightly to 946 in 2013 [Department of Justice and Equality, 2014a]. During 2012, 511 applications for subsidiary protection were made (down 43 per cent from 889 in 2011) and 35 persons were granted the status (up from 13 in 2011) (Joyce, forthcoming).

**Policy update:** EU Regulations introduced in 2013\(^{28}\) mean that responsibility for investigation and determination of subsidiary protection applications at first instance now lies with ORAC. This development is an important step towards issuing a decision on a large backlog of pending applications, which should also impact on the number of long-term residents in reception centres (see Section 1.4.2 below).

Ireland does not currently have a single procedure for protection claims, whereby all protection claims (refugee, subsidiary protection and leave to remain) would be assessed at once. This was proposed under the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010, and is expected to be included in the revised draft to be published later in 2014. One of the anticipated impacts of the introduction of a single protection procedure is to reduce the time spent by applicants for international protection in reception centres: over 4,800 asylum applicants were being accommodated in 35 reception facilities at end-2012. Some 59 per cent had been resident for over three years, 31 per cent for over five years, and 9 per cent for over seven years. The Government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) agree that the reception system is not suitable for long-term residence [Joyce and Quinn, 2014].

**Size of group: protection applicants/status holders**

In December 2012 there were 1,963 ‘live’ residence permissions held for protection-related reasons by non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over.

Of those seeking asylum in Ireland in the past 20 years, just over 10,000 persons from 116 countries have been granted refugee status. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that 6,100 of this number may now be naturalised Irish citizens [UNHCR, 2014].

Provisional figures for end-2013 indicate that there were approximately 4,370 persons seeking international protection accommodated in direct provision centres in the State, some 470 fewer than at the end of 2012 [Department of Justice and Equality, 2014a].

Ireland joined the UNHCR-led resettlement scheme in 1998. Between 2000 and 2013, 1,045 persons have been resettled as ‘programme refugees’.

\(^{28}\) European Union (Subsidiary Protection) Regulations 2013 (S.I. No. 426 of 2013).
Third-country nationals require permission to reside in Ireland and, ordinarily, this permission entails no right to be joined by family members. Statutory provisions regulate family reunification for certain groups, including persons granted refugee status and holders of subsidiary protection. Non-EEA family members of EU nationals also hold family reunification rights. ORAC investigates applications from refugees and persons granted subsidiary protection. ORAC sends a written report on individual applications to the Minister for Justice and Equality, which the Minister considers before issuing a decision.

Ireland does not have a statutory family reunification scheme available generally to third-country nationals and does not participate in the Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification.

INIS published a detailed policy document, including guidelines, in December 2013: Policy Document on Non-EEA Family Reunification, which states that it ‘is considered as a matter of policy that family reunification contributes towards the integration of foreign nationals in the State’. The policy document does not address family reunification for refugees/EU nationals and is confined to policy where ministerial discretion applies. It is asserted that ministerial discretion will continue to apply to most decision making on non-EEA family reunification, but it is proposed to provide greater detail on how that discretion will be used.

For the purposes of making an application for family reunification, non-EEA nationals are categorised as follows:

- **Category A**: eligible to sponsor applications for immediate family reunification; including: green card holders; entrepreneurs; researchers (subject to conditions).
- **Category B**: eligible to sponsor applications for family reunification after 12 months; including: non-green-card employment permit holders; stamp 4 holders. Sponsors must have a minimum gross income.
- **Category C**: ineligible to sponsor applications; all other non-EEA nationals [INIS, 2013].

The publication of the policy document responds to repeated calls from civil society organisations for greater transparency. A comparative study on the family reunification policies in six EU Member States, including Ireland, highlighted that the wide discretion of the Irish authorities creates insecurity and lack of transparency [Strik et al., 2013].

Under Irish and EU law, EU citizens may live and work in Ireland for three months without any requirement that they register their presence. After three months, an EU citizen is permitted to remain in Ireland as long as he or she is employed, self-sufficient or in education. EU citizens have a right to family unity, meaning that they are entitled to be accompanied by their spouse/partner, their children and their dependent relatives. Non-EU family members of EU citizens resident in Ireland may submit an application for residency on the basis of ‘EU Treaty Rights’ to the INIS. If successful, they will be given EUFAM residence permission. Accompanying non-EU family members may need an entry visa if they are moving within EU borders, but this should be granted free of charge.

The right of non-EU family members to move and reside in the EU is derived from the EU citizen’s right to freedom of movement under EU law. These rights do not extend to Irish citizens resident in Ireland who may wish to be joined by non-EU family members. The High Court has held that an Irish citizen resident in Ireland is not entitled to rely on any right to family unity derived from EU law because he or she, being resident in Ireland, is not exercising his or her right to freedom of movement. An Irish citizen’s right to family unity is recognised by the Constitution and by the European Convention on Human Rights. This right is not absolute and the State is entitled to exclude non-Irish family members under certain circumstances or to effect their removal.

29 Family reunification for persons with refugee status is set out in Section 18 of the Refugee Act, while family reunification for persons with subsidiary protection status is dealt with under Regulation 16 of the European Communities [Eligibility for Protection] Regulations 2006 [S.I. No. 518 of 2006].


31 Becker (2010) notes that the question of whether recognised refugees who subsequently naturalise retain family reunification entitlements provided for under the Refugee Act 1996 is under consideration by the Attorney General.

32 See also Case C-434/09, McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department, in which it was ruled that EU citizens who have never exercised their right of free movement cannot invoke EU citizenship to regularise the residence of their non-EU spouse.
1.4 INTEGRATION POLICY

1.4.1 EU Integration Policy: Update

As discussed in previous Integration Monitors, the EU may promote, incentivise and support the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States (Article 79.4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). Harmonisation of integration laws and regulations is still explicitly excluded and integration remains a Member State competence.33

The European Commission Directorate General (DG) for Home Affairs is responsible for facilitating and supporting the promotion of integration. DG Employment and Social Affairs and DG Education and Culture also have a role in this regard. Other relevant actors, institutions and instruments used to promote integration include: the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, ministerial conferences, the European Integration Forum and National Contact Points on Integration (a network of designated Member State officials through which information and experience is exchanged at EU level). At the tenth meeting of the European Integration Forum, in November 2013, representatives of civil society adopted a statement on the participation of migrants in the democratic process (European Integration Forum, 2013). A range of EU-level resources have been produced to promote integration, such as the European website on integration, handbooks on integration and European integration modules.

The EU does not define integration but rather uses the Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration Policy to guide policy development (see Appendix 1).

In July 2011 the Commission proposed a new European Agenda for the Integration of non-EU Migrants. The 2011 Agenda follows from, and builds on, the 2005 Common Agenda for Integration. In the 2011 Agenda the Commission proposes that an effective integration process should ensure that migrants enjoy the same rights and have the same responsibilities as EU citizens. Emphasis is placed on migrants’ full participation in all aspects – economic, social, cultural and political – of ‘collective life’. A number of challenges are identified, specifically: low employment levels of migrants, especially of migrant women; rising unemployment; high levels of ‘over-qualification’, i.e. individuals whose qualifications exceed the skills required for the job; increasing risks of social exclusion; gaps in educational achievement; and public concerns with the lack of integration of migrants. Consistent with the EU’s role of facilitation and support, strategies rather than legislation are proposed. Monitoring of the results of integration policies is also noted as a priority.35

1.4.1.1 EU Funding: Update

The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (2014–2020) [AMIF] will replace the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (EIF), the European Refugee Fund (ERF) and the Return Fund. Calls for proposals under EIF and ERF were issued in August 2013 for the last time and decisions were made in December 2013.36 The European Social Fund, administered by the Department of Education and Skills, is also used to fund integration activities in Ireland, namely the Employment for People from Immigrant Communities (EPIC) programme.37

The Department of Justice and Equality engaged in dialogue with the European Commission in October 2013 to prepare for a national multiannual programme for expenditure from the AMIF.38 Civil society organisations in Ireland have welcomed the potential of the AMIF and stressed the need for a process of dialogue with civil society about local and national needs to inform the identification of State-level priorities (Migrant Rights Centre Ireland et al., 2013). The AMIF envisages a new partnership approach to developing the national programme.

However, funding has been reduced: Ireland has a budget allocation of €19.5 million under the AMIF for the period from 2014 to 2020,39 compared with an annual allocation amounting to €21.1 million under the SOLID programme 2007–2013 (including the

33 Prior to the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 there was no legal basis for EU involvement in Member State integration policy. A new legal provision to the TFEU, introduced by way of the Lisbon Treaty, changed this position.
34 The European Integration Forum exists to provide an opportunity for civil society organisations to express their views on migrant integration issues and to discuss with the European Commission and the European Economic and Social Committee (http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/policy/legal.cfm).
36 The Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI) is the ‘responsible authority’ for the ERF and EIF. Pobal is the ‘delegated authority’ and manages the funding on behalf of OPMI.
38 Minister for Justice and Equality, Answer to Parliamentary Question, July 2013.
EIF, ERF and Return Fund.\textsuperscript{40} The full allocation of European funding available to Ireland has not been drawn down in recent years: the Minister for Justice and Equality indicated that up to and including the 2010 annual programme (which is the latest for which final figures have been compiled), 40 per cent of the national allocation under the EIF and ERF was unspent due to an insufficiently of suitable projects with the required level of matching funding.\textsuperscript{41}

1.4.1.2 Justice and Home Affairs Policies, Post-Stockholm 2014
The EU’s existing Justice and Home Affairs policy framework, known as the Stockholm Programme, is due to expire at the end of 2014. The European Commission (2014) has outlined its vision for the future of Justice and Home Affairs co-operation, set out the themes and political priorities that will guide the Commission’s work up to 2020, and established its position ahead of discussions with the European Parliament and Council of Ministers in June 2014.\textsuperscript{42} In relation to migrant integration, the Commission stresses that in order to “enhance social cohesion and to reap the full benefits of migration, commitment to effective integration of migrants in the labour market and receiving societies should be strengthened”. Increased attention to addressing the employment gap for migrant women is recommended. It is stated that “Further work will be necessary on capacity building and on engaging with local and regional authorities, which are at the forefront of integration policies.”

1.4.2 Irish Integration Policy: Update
There have been several positive recent developments in relation to integration policy in Ireland. The Minister for Justice and Equality has launched a review of migrant integration policy (discussed below). Continued progress has also been made in clearing the backlog of applications for naturalisation, with a significant proportion of people with immigrant origin in Ireland now holding Irish citizenship and therefore much improved opportunities for integration. Migration and integration policy are closely connected and developments in the migration sphere often impact on the opportunities for migrants to integrate. For example, since the publication of the 2012 Integration Monitor progress has been made on the issue of family reunification for non-EEA nationals. The Policy Document on Non-EEA Family Reunification clearly acknowledges that “it is considered as a matter of policy that family reunification contributes towards the integration of foreign nationals in the State” (INIS, 2013). Ministerial discretion is still absolute in this policy area, but there is now increased clarity, in the form of guidelines to be applied to decision making.

However, the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill has again not been enacted, with wide-ranging implications for immigration and protection policy in Ireland. For example, a transparent and widely accessible long-term residence status remains unavailable to non-EEA nationals in Ireland and the introduction of a registration requirement for non-EEA children remains pending – registration of under 16s is necessary to allow the residence of such children to be officially documented, facilitating access to long-term residence, naturalisation and possibly to reduced fees in third-level education in the future [see Box 3.1].\textsuperscript{43}

Regarding specific integration policy development, as noted in previous Integration Monitors, Ireland pursues a policy of mainstream service provision in the integration area, with targeted initiatives to meet specific short-term needs. Integration touches on a whole range of policy areas. The fiscal situation has impacted negatively on the budgets of most mainstream government departments, with implications for the priority attached to immigrant integration. The initial time frame for the National Intercultural Health Strategy (2007–2012) has lapsed. While certain actions under that strategy continue to be progressed by the Health Service Executive (HSE) National Intercultural Health Governance group, work has not yet begun on follow-up at a strategic level. The Intercultural Education Strategy (2010–2015) is ongoing. However, a reorganisation of resource allocations (resources for special needs education and language support have now been combined, see Chapter 3) means that monitoring of progress under that strategy is now much reduced. An update of the Garda Síochána Diversity Strategy (2009–2012) is being prepared, following consultation meetings with key stakeholders that took place up to June 2013.\textsuperscript{44} A Cultural Diversity and the Arts Policy and Strategy is ongoing.

\textsuperscript{40} Correspondence received from OPMI.
\textsuperscript{41} Minister for Justice and Equality, Parliamentary Question, 4 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{42} European Parliament elections will take place in May 2014 and new Commissioners will take up their positions in November 2014.
\textsuperscript{43} The possibility of the introduction of interim administrative arrangements for the registration of non-EEA children, pending enactment of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, was raised in the Policy Document on Non-EEA Family Reunification (INIS, 2013).
\textsuperscript{44} Email update from OPMI, April 2013.
UNHCR (2014) noted that while ‘Intercultural strategies for wider migrant integration have been adopted by different government departments and specific strategies for the integration of refugees have been drawn up … the measurement and evaluation of those strategies remain unclear’.

In September 2013 a call for submissions was issued by the Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality to inform a proposed study of integration, multiculturalism and combating racism. No update on the activity of the committee in this regard is available.\(^{45}\) Separately, the Minister for Justice and Equality issued a call for submissions to inform a review of migrant integration policy.\(^{46}\)

In terms of structures with a role in integration policy development, the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI) has central responsibility (discussed below). A Ministerial Council on Integration was established in 2010 and convened by the then Minister for Integration. The position of Minister for Integration ceased to exist in 2011 and the Council has not met since. A Cross-Departmental Group on Migrant Integration was also established to assist the former Minister for Integration to drive forward the integration agenda in relevant departments and agencies.\(^{47}\) Following a hiatus in activity (its last meeting took place in 2011), this group has recently been reconstituted and tasked with the ongoing review of integration policy.\(^{48}\) In addition, three meetings of an Interdepartmental Working Group on Resettlement and Integration took place during 2013,\(^{49}\) and a new NGO forum established by OPMI in April 2013 met four times during the year.\(^{50}\) The activities of OPMI and other integration-related policy developments are discussed below.

### 1.4.2.1 Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration

OPMI is located within the Department of Justice and Equality. OPMI has ‘a cross-Departmental mandate to develop, drive and co-ordinate integration policy across other Government Departments, agencies and services’.\(^{51}\) OPMI is the responsible authority in Ireland for the administration of the ERF and the EIF. It also acts as Ireland’s National Contact Point on Integration.

The 2014 budget of OPMI remained broadly the same as in 2013 at €2.312 million, while the number of full-time equivalent staff members is provisionally expected to fall from 12 to 10 in the same period (Government of Ireland, 2013b). Table 1.3 provides an overview of funding and staff resources available to OPMI between 2008 and 2014. While it should

### Table 1.3 RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO OPMI 2008-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>End of Year Outturn (€000)</th>
<th>OPMI Programme Staff Numbers Recorded (Full-time equivalents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,659</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5,380</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,394</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,601</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2,312*</td>
<td>10*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Revised Estimates for Public Services (Government of Ireland, 2008–2014). Note: Data show provisional end-of-year outturns, except in 2014 where an indicative estimate (*) is supplied because the outturn figure was not available.

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\(^{45}\) See McGinnity et al. (2013c).

\(^{46}\) Email update from OPMI, March 2014.

\(^{47}\) Including: Department of the Taoiseach; Department of Public Expenditure and Reform; Department of Justice and Equality; Department of Education and Skills; Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government; Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation; Department of Health; Department of Children and Youth Affairs; Department of Social Protection; Department of Arts, Heritage and Gaeltacht Affairs; Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport; and the CSO (www.integration.ie).

\(^{48}\) This group is chaired by the Department of Justice and Equality and comprises representatives from: Department of the Taoiseach; Department of Public Expenditure and Reform; Department of Education and Skills; Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government; Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation; Department of Health and the Health Service Executive; Department of Children and Youth Affairs; Department of Social Protection; Department of Arts, Heritage and Gaeltacht Affairs; Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport; Department of Defence; CSO; An Garda Síochána; and the County and City Managers’ Association (Department of Justice and Equality, 2014b).

\(^{49}\) Correspondence received from OPMI.

\(^{50}\) The forum met twice in 2013 to discuss integration issues and developments with NGOs working in the immigrant integration area (including AkiDwA; Crosscare; Doras Luimni, Immigrant Council of Ireland; The Integration Centre; Nasc, New Communities Partnership and ENAR Ireland) and a further two times on specific topics (www.integration.ie).

\(^{51}\) OPMI website: www.integration.ie.
be noted that the budgets of all government departments contracted due to a severe economic recession in the period, the resources available to OPMI have reduced very significantly – by 65 per cent – since a peak in 2008.\textsuperscript{52}

In addition to the core budget allocation, €1.5 million is allocated from the Irish exchequer to co-finance projects funded under the ERF and the EIF in 2013. This allocation is the same as in 2012. As noted above, a significant portion of funding under these funds is not drawn down due in part to a lack of matching funding.

The funding provided by OPMI to local authorities, sporting bodies and other national, regional and local organisations to promote the integration of immigrants is shown in Table 1.4. Just under 40 per cent of funding allocated in 2013 was to the EPIC programme, which is 50 per cent co-funded by the European Social Fund.

OPMI co-ordinates Ireland’s participation in the UNHCR Refugee Resettlement Programme, working with UNHCR, International Organization for Migration, Consular Services, Irish Aid and the Department of Foreign Affairs. During 2013, 86 persons (including medical cases and their families) were resettled, including 31 Afghan refugees and 24 refugees originally from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.\textsuperscript{53} OPMI participates in the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, which is a forum for discussion between Government, NGOs, UNHCR and the UNHCR Working Group on Resettlement.

1.4.2.2 Universal Periodic Review

In March 2012 Ireland submitted responses to those recommendations made during the first review under the Universal Periodic Review process. Of the 127 recommendations made by United Nations member states, Ireland accepted 91, partially accepted 17 and declined 19. Ireland submitted a voluntary mid-term report on progress with regard to the accepted recommendations early in 2014. Several of the recommendations are directly relevant to the integration of migrants in Ireland. For example, Ireland accepted a recommendation to establish appropriate mechanisms to encourage the reporting of racist incidents and crimes and reported activity on behalf of the Garda Síochána Racial, Intercultural and Diversity Office and OPMI in this regard. A recommendation to establish a consolidated framework relating to immigration and asylum issues, including an independent appeals body, was also accepted (Department of Justice and Equality, 2014c).

1.4.2.3 Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission

In April 2013 the Minister for Justice and Equality announced the names of 14 new members designate of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC).\textsuperscript{54} Legislation to formally merge what were two separate bodies is pending enactment into law.

### Table 1.4 Beneficiaries of OPMI Funding 2008–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National sporting organisations</td>
<td>505,000</td>
<td>504,513</td>
<td>398,000</td>
<td>253,302</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City/county councils</td>
<td>817,019</td>
<td>967,275</td>
<td>1,219,573</td>
<td>181,995</td>
<td>156,240</td>
<td>194,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based groups/other</td>
<td>2,867,695</td>
<td>1,692,178</td>
<td>1,232,790</td>
<td>806,675</td>
<td>964,604</td>
<td>949,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,189,714</td>
<td>3,163,966</td>
<td>2,850,363</td>
<td>1,241,972</td>
<td>1,295,844</td>
<td>1,178,986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OPMI (www.integration.ie); includes updates provided by OPMI to data 2008–2010.

\textsuperscript{52} Data from the Department of Public Expenditure indicate that Total Gross Voted Spending by Government Departments declined by 12.5% in the period 2008-2013. (Source: http://www.per.gov.ie/expenditure-trends/). These data represent all current and capital spending by Government Departments and some of their agencies, including spending from the Social Insurance Fund, but does not include non-voted spending directly from the Central Fund such as debt-servicing costs.

\textsuperscript{53} www.integration.ie.

\textsuperscript{54} www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR13000136.
The Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Bill 2014 makes important reference to integration: a stated purpose of the IHREC is to ‘encourage the development of a culture of respect for human rights, equality and intercultural understanding in the State’. To further its core functions, the IHREC is invited to ‘undertake, sponsor, commission, or provide financial or other assistance for programmes of activities and projects for the promotion of integration of migrants and other minorities, equality (including gender equality) and respect for diversity and cultural difference’.

**Box 1.2 Integration Indicators**

*Using EU Indicators of Immigrant Integration* was prepared for the European Commission in order to review a pilot of the integration indicators proposed at the fourth EU Ministerial Conference on Integration (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013). The report is intended to be a tool to monitor the integration of immigrants and evaluate integration policies. The results were presented in discussion papers to the European Commission and the National Contact Points on Integration. An extensive consultation process took place during 2012 with governmental and non-governmental integration actors and academics.

Overall, the analysis reconfirms the usefulness of the Zaragoza indicators (used in this report). It reflects on the different ways in which indicators could be used to understand national contexts, evaluate the outcomes of policies and create targets to improve integration. The suggested data sources are generally endorsed as the best available but improvements are suggested. Additional indicators are proposed in each of the original domains (employment, education, social inclusion, active citizenship) and a new domain of analysis is proposed, welcoming society, which includes attitudes to immigrants, discrimination, trust and sense of belonging.

Proposed new indicators in the area of employment include part-time employment, long-term unemployment and the share of foreign diplomas recognised. It is proposed that these supplementary indicators would be included on an ad hoc basis, where data of sufficient quality are available, to provide a more informative outlook on migrant integration. For example, part-time and temporary employment rates can work as key indicators of underemployment. The long-term unemployment rate is a key indicator of those at risk of long-term detachment from the labour market and of social exclusion. In addition, further analysis by key demographics, such as gender and age group, would demonstrate some of the chief determinants of migrant employment outcomes.

Proposed indicators in the area of education include the rate of those ‘not in education, employment or training’ – derived from the labour force survey, and the rate of immigrants participating in lifelong learning.

Proposed indicators for social inclusion incorporate measures of life expectancy, health and the persistent poverty risk.

Suggested indicators for the domain of active citizenship include participation in voluntary organisations and political activity.

Indicators suggested for the new domain of analysis, welcoming society, include the experience of discrimination, trust in public institutions, sense of belonging, as well as the public perception of racial/ethnic discrimination.

Other suggested measures to improve the strength and validity of the integration indicators include increasing the migrant sample size in data through a migrant boost sample, pooling data over the years, showing uncertainty in results and harmonising methods of data production across countries.

Several European countries produce national, state-funded reports that use integration indicators to monitor the relative position of migrants in society (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Germany and Netherlands.) The European Services Network and the Migration Policy Group (2013) argue that the use of EU integration indicators makes it easier to understand the integration context in the EU Member States enabling policy actors to better learn from one other; the use of indicators over time gives policy actors a new long-term perspective for policy planning.
CHAPTER 2
Employment and Integration

Employment is central to the process of economic integration and social inclusion. It leads to financial independence. It allows migrants to contribute to society and avoid the risk of poverty and social exclusion in their host country. Through employment, legal residents can also build networks, develop their language skills and increase participation in society. Job loss can be associated with poverty, psychological distress and more general social exclusion. The Great Recession meant that labour market conditions deteriorated in many countries, and in Ireland in particular. In general, immigrants are more exposed to the consequences of economic downturns, and this has clearly been the experience in Ireland during the recession (see previous Integration Monitors). A weak recovery began in 2012, with a modest increase in employment and a fall in the number unemployed: a key question for this chapter concerns the extent to which immigrants may have benefited from this upturn in the labour market.

This chapter presents key indicators of employment integration by nationality, including employment, unemployment, economic activity (Section 2.1) and self-employment (Section 2.2) rates. The data used in this chapter are derived from the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS), which provides labour force estimates. The QNHS is a large-scale nationally representative survey of households in Ireland, conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Unless otherwise stated, this report refers to data from QNHS Quarter 1 (Q1) 2013 in order to ensure comparability with previous editions of the Monitor, which also use Q1 data. The indicators discussed in this chapter are based on special analyses of the QNHS data conducted for this Monitor and refer to the working-age population (15–64 years). Box 2.1 considers access to employment for migrants.

2.1 EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES

Overall, total employment in the Irish labour market increased by just over 1 per cent in the year to Q1 2013 (CSO, 2013, QNHS Q1 2013). This was the first year-on-year growth in employment since the onset of the economic crisis at the end of 2007, and employment would continue to grow throughout the remainder of 2013 (anticipating CSO, 2014b, QNHS Q4 2013). Unemployment decreased by 1.3 per cent in the year to Q1 2013, bringing the national unemployment rate down to 13.7 per cent of the labour force, from 15 per cent one year earlier.

Figure 2.1 presents the rates of employment, unemployment and activity for Irish and non-Irish nationals aged 15 to 64 years for the first quarters of

55 Note that differences observed between population sub-groups refer only to Q1 data, and therefore do not necessarily reflect differences in the other quarters of 2013.
2012 and 2013. The employment rate is measured as the proportion of working adults in the working-age population (15–64 years). The employment rate increased slightly, by just over 1 per cent, for the Irish group between Q1 2012 and Q1 2013, and remained stable for non-Irish nationals. The average employment rate among non-Irish nationals is virtually identical to that among Irish nationals.

The unemployment rate is the number unemployed expressed as a percentage of the labour force, which is the sum of the numbers employed plus unemployed. Unemployment decreased for both Irish and non-Irish nationals between 2012 and 2013: the unemployment rate of Irish nationals decreased from 14.7 per cent in 2012 to 13.2 per cent in 2013.\(^{56}\) The unemployment rate is considerably higher among non-Irish nationals, at 18.1 per cent in 2013, and that rate had decreased only slightly (by less than half a percentage point) over the previous year. As a result, the gap between the unemployment rates of Irish and non-Irish nationals has widened somewhat, from just under 4 per cent in Q1 2012 to almost 5 per cent in Q1 2013. The difference in unemployment rates between the Irish and non-Irish groups is statistically significant. Immigrants are particularly vulnerable during prolonged economic downturns, and this economic crisis has affected immigrants in the labour market more severely (Barrett and Kelly, 2012).

The labour force activity rate is calculated as the proportion of working-age adults who are in the labour force, which consists of the number of people employed and unemployed. The activity rate marginally decreased (-0.3 per cent) for non-Irish nationals between Q1 2012 and Q1 2013, and marginally increased (+0.1 per cent) for Irish nationals. The activity rate among non-Irish nationals (72 per cent) has remained higher than that of Irish nationals (68.3 per cent), which may be due to the younger age profile of the immigrant group. The differences in activity rates between Irish and non-Irish nationals are statistically significant.

Table 2.1 shows that there are important differences in employment and economic activity rates between immigrant groups.\(^{57}\) In Q1 2013 nationals of the pre-enlargement ‘old’ EU13 Member States have the

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\(^{56}\) The QNHS classifies as ‘unemployed’ persons who in the week before the survey were without work and are available for work within the next two weeks, and who had taken specific steps in the preceding four weeks to find work.

\(^{57}\) The classification is based on the country codification in the EU Labour Force Survey from 2011 onwards. The non-EU groups are: ‘Africa’, ‘North America, Australia and Oceania’, ‘Asia’, which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; and ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of the World’, which comprises Candidate, EFTA and Other European countries, Central America and Caribbean, South America and the Near and Middle East.
highest employment rate, at 71.5 per cent. Nationals of the ‘new’ EU12 Member States also report a high employment rate (65.5 per cent), as well as the highest activity rate (66.5 per cent) – so there are less economically inactive people in this group – but with a high unemployment rate (19.9 per cent). UK nationals also have a high unemployment rate (20.7 per cent) but also a relatively low employment rate (52.7 per cent). African nationals report the highest unemployment rate (29.9 per cent) and the lowest employment (39.3 per cent) and activity rates (56 per cent). Previous research on immigrants in the Irish labour market in 2010 suggests that the main concentration of labour market disadvantage occurs among the Black African national-ethnic group (Kingston, et al., 2013). Two groups stand out with substantially lower-than-average unemployment rates: nationals of the EU13 Member States (6.7 per cent) and those from North America, Australia and Oceania (8.8 per cent). The Asian group also shows a relatively low unemployment rate. Those from the ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of the World’ group combine a relatively low employment rate (65.5 per cent) with a relatively high unemployment rate (17.6 per cent) and a relatively low activity rate (60.8 per cent), a pattern which may reflect the diversity of this group.

Compared with 2012, unemployment rates decreased for the nationals of the ‘Rest of the World’ countries (by 5.6 per cent), the UK and the EU13 (by more than 3 per cent) and the Asian nations (by 1.1 per cent), as well as among Irish nationals. Unemployment increased among all other groups.

Table 2.2 shows the main employment indicators by age group. Unemployment rates for young people (aged 15–24) are extremely high among both Irish (25.9 per cent) and non-Irish nationals (32.8 per cent). These rates reflect the difficulties faced by young people in finding jobs. In most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries unemployment among immigrant youth is higher than among native youth (OECD, 2012).

Since 2012 the unemployment rate has decreased by 4.1 per cent for young Irish workers, but increased for the non-Irish group (up 5.6 per cent). There was

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TABLE 2.1  KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY NATIONAL GROUP Q1 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Group</th>
<th>Employment rate (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
<th>Activity rate (%)</th>
<th>Total population (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>2,581.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>18.1*</td>
<td>72.0*</td>
<td>448.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>52.7*</td>
<td>20.7*</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU13</td>
<td>71.5*</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>76.6*</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>65.5*</td>
<td>19.9*</td>
<td>81.7*</td>
<td>187.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>39.3*</td>
<td>29.9*</td>
<td>56.0*</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America, Australia and Oceania</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Europe and Rest of the World</td>
<td>47.1*</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>57.2*</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>3,029.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2013 (15–64 age group).
Note: Differences between Irish and non-Irish unemployment rates and activity rates are statistically significant in both years, differences in employment rates are not.

58 These differences, between these national groups and Irish nationals, are not statistically significant, mainly due to the limited numbers of cases in the unemployed sub-samples.
a slight increase in the employment rate of young Irish nationals between 2012 and 2013 (up 0.6 per cent) but a fall of 3.2 per cent in the employment rate of young non-Irish nationals. Underlying these trends was a substantial decrease in the population size of both groups between 2012 and 2013, largely attributable to emigration. The population of Irish nationals aged 15 to 24 decreased from about 492,000 to 482,800, and the population of non-Irish nationals decreased from 68,100 to 59,200. The total number of Irish nationals aged 25 to 44 also declined by almost 27,000, although the Irish population aged 45 to 64 increased by 16,000, the size of the non-Irish population in these age groups remained stable.

Irish nationals also report lower unemployment rates in the other, older, age groups and the unemployment rate is substantially higher for non-Irish nationals aged 45 to 64 (20 per cent) compared with Irish nationals in this age group (10.5 per cent). The unemployment rate among Irish nationals in the 25 to 44 age group fell by 2 per cent between 2012 and 2013, but by just 0.5 per cent among non-Irish nationals in this age group.

Employment and activity rates among young people are substantially lower than among older age groups, irrespective of nationality. Low activity rates among younger Irish nationals reflect the fact that many who are still in the educational system are neither working nor looking for a job (so they are not part of the labour force). Many young non-Irish nationals are also engaged in education, but a significant proportion come to Ireland to work. Lower activity rates in the older cohort (aged 45-64) may be explained by some people who have retired early or are engaged in home duties (and are not part of the labour force).

Table 2.3 presents the key employment indicators by gender and nationality. In general, the recession has had a much greater impact among men than among women: the decline in male employment was greater, as was the increase in male unemployment (Russell et al., 2014). This finding reflects the rapid decline in construction and, to a lesser extent, manufacturing, sectors in which male employment was concentrated. This impact of the recession persisted throughout 2013.

In 2013 the employment rate was higher among non-Irish males (65.3 per cent) than among Irish males (63.2 per cent), and the activity rate was also higher for non-Irish males. However, the highest unemployment rate occurred among non-Irish males (19.2 per cent), compared with 15.8 per cent among Irish men. Non-Irish females had a higher activity rate (63.6 per cent) than Irish females (61.7 per cent); however, they reported a lower employment rate (52.9 per cent compared with 55.5 per cent for Irish females) and they also suffered a substantially higher unemployment rate (16.8 per cent) than both Irish females (10 per cent) and Irish males (15.8 per cent). The relatively low unemployment rate among Irish women may reflect their concentration in more sheltered areas of employment, including the public sector.

### Table 2.3  Key Employment Indicators by Age Group Q1 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Employment Rate (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate (%)</th>
<th>Activity Rate (%)</th>
<th>Total Population (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15–24</td>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>482.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>32.8*</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–44</td>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1,122.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>66.2*</td>
<td>16.2*</td>
<td>298.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–64</td>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>976.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>20.0*</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2013 (15–64 age group).

Note: * denotes that the indicator for the group is significantly different from Irish nationals at p≤0.05.
2.2 SELF-EMPLOYMENT

In some countries self-employment represents an important source of employment for immigrants, partly, perhaps, because it affords access to employment in a manner less susceptible to discrimination than might be the case in dependent forms of employment. However, this does not appear to be the situation in Ireland. Power and Szlovák (2012) show that the level of self-employment is lower among foreign nationals in Ireland than among comparable groups in other OECD countries. This situation may be due to the stringent immigration requirements faced by migrant entrepreneurs wishing to move to Ireland or to barriers to migrant self-employment such as language, access to local business networks, difficulties in accessing finance and lack of previous financial history in the country. All these factors may be related to the relatively recent nature of Irish migration, and the resulting lack of established ethnic networks.

Table 2.4 shows the self-employment rates in Ireland in Q1 2013 by nationality. The self-employment rate of Irish nationals (16.3 per cent) was higher than that of non-Irish nationals (9.6 per cent) in general. However, between 2012 and 2013 the self-employment rate decreased by 0.9 per cent among Irish nationals, whereas it increased for non-Irish nationals (+1.1 per cent), thus narrowing this gap.
Notwithstanding the overall difference between Irish and non-Irish nationals, UK nationals show the highest rate of self-employment – 22.3 per cent overall, and 21 per cent in the non-agricultural sectors – substantially higher than the native Irish rates of self-employment. The self-employment rate of UK nationals increased by 6 per cent between 2012 and 2013.

Nationals of the EU13 Member States also show relatively high rates of self-employment (13 per cent), not significantly different from the Irish rate. Nationals of the post-enlargement EU12 Member States, as well as those from outside the EU, show much lower rates of self-employment. These findings may reflect a pattern in which longer-established immigrants have gradually overcome barriers to entrepreneurial activity in Ireland, although this is clearly an issue that merits further research.

2.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON EMPLOYMENT

Ireland appears to be slowly emerging from a deep and prolonged recession, which entailed a sharp contraction in employment and a dramatic rise in unemployment. Previous Integration Monitors have shown that the recession hit non-Irish nationals even harder than it hit Irish nationals. The contraction in employment was much greater among non-Irish nationals, while the growth in unemployment was substantially greater.

There is little evidence to suggest that immigrants shared in the first stirrings of recovery at the beginning of 2013. While the employment rate among Irish nationals increased marginally between 2012 and 2013, the rate among non-Irish nationals remained static. Although both groups saw a fall in the unemployment rate, the decline was greater among Irish than among non-Irish nationals, and the unemployment gap between the two groups overall grew wider.

Employment rates among young non-Irish nationals (aged 15 to 24) declined between 2012 and 2013, whereas they increased slightly among young Irish nationals; and unemployment rates increased among the former but fell among the latter. These trends occurred against a general decline in the young population, irrespective of nationality.
All nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) may migrate to Ireland to take up employment without restriction. Non-EEA nationals who hold a stamp 4 registration certificate (including refugees, people with leave to remain and other resident non-EEA nationals) enjoy rights equivalent to Irish citizens with regard to seeking employment. Non-EEA students who hold a stamp 2 registration may also access the Irish labour market for up to 20 hours per week during term time and work full time during vacations. Applicants for protection may not work while their case is pending.

Managed labour migration policy relates to workers from outside the EEA. Policy is developed and administered by the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation in co-operation with the Department of Justice and Equality. Most newly arrived non-EEA workers hold a stamp 1 registration certificate and an employment permit. There are four main types of employment permit: green cards, work permits, spousal or dependant permits and intra-company transfer permits. In response to high unemployment, it is the Irish Government’s policy to limit permits issued to non-EU workers to those in niche occupations, and to reduce the number of permits issued to lower paid workers.

Holders of employment permits now account for a very small proportion of immigrant workers in Ireland. In 2013, 3,863 employment permits were issued. This figure represented just 1.4 per cent of total employment of non-Irish nationals and 0.2 per cent of total employment in Q4 2013 (CSO, 2014b).

**Self-employment**

Non-EEA nationals who wish to be self-employed in Ireland may apply for a business permission. To qualify, however, they must transfer capital of at least €300,000 and provide employment for a minimum of two EEA nationals. The number of business permissions issued is low. An immigrant entrepreneur scheme introduced in 2012 and amended in 2013 is for ‘high-potential start-ups’, has a lower capital requirement (€75,000) and has no initial job creation targets. An immigrant investor scheme has also been introduced. The business permissions scheme remains for more traditional business areas such as retail or hospitality.

**Support with accessing employment**

Several support organisations may be accessed by migrants in Ireland, including the National Employment and Entitlements Service (formerly FÁS), the Local Employment Service; and the EPIC programme in Business in the Community Ireland. Each may be accessed by EU citizens and non-EEA citizens with stamp 4 residence permission. Other migrants who are entitled to work may use centres for the unemployed/resource centres. Quality and Qualifications Ireland has a range of responsibilities, including facilitating the recognition of qualifications gained outside the State. An online international qualifications database is maintained, which lists certain foreign qualifications and provides advice regarding the comparability of a qualification to one gained in Ireland. Individuals whose qualifications are not listed in the database may apply to the qualifications recognition service, part of Quality and Qualifications Ireland, to have their qualification recognised.

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60 See www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/WP09000012.
62 For detailed information for migrants on how to find employment, see The Integration Centre (2012).
63 See www.qualificationsrecognition.ie.
Education systems play a crucial role in the process of integration, providing opportunities to immigrants and their children to acquire the skills needed to enter the labour market, and education also contributes wholly towards social and cultural integration (OECD, 2013; Huddleston et al., 2013). Education can be a route out of social disadvantage; investments in education lead to better job prospects for youths facing greater risks of poverty, and reduce the prevalence of income poverty in adult age (Machin, 2006). Education has also been shown to significantly raise labour market earnings and employment probabilities (Card, 1999). The earnings advantage of having high education is particularly pronounced in Ireland: people aged 25 to 64 with third-level qualifications earn, on average, 75 per cent more than those with upper secondary qualifications (OECD, 2013).

Ireland has undergone large-scale changes in recent decades. Significant immigration (greater for a period than the more familiar emigration) means that Ireland has become increasingly diverse in recent years – in 2011, 12 per cent of the population were non-Irish nationals (CSO, 2012). The majority of non-Irish nationals came to Ireland as adults, and therefore acquired their qualifications abroad; an exception to this general pattern is that a significant minority of non-Irish nationals come to Ireland to study. However, an increasing number of migrants are and have been progressing through the Irish education system. Most of these are known in the integration literature as the ‘1.5’ generation, having come to Ireland as children, albeit at different ages (Rumbaut, 2004). Ireland’s second-generation population is relatively small, but it is rapidly growing. Census 2011 found 25,198 non-Irish nationals who were born in Ireland, with two-thirds of the total aged under five years (CSO, 2012); see also Chapter 6.

Educational outcomes for Irish and non-Irish adults are presented in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 presents recent findings on the performance of 15-year-old immigrant children in Irish schools, using new data from the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2012. Achievement is an important indicator of academic performance of migrant students in Irish schools. Box 3.1 discusses access to education for migrant children and adults, and includes policy updates since the 2012 Integration Monitor.

### 3.1 EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR ADULTS IN IRELAND

#### 3.1.1 Highest Educational Attainment

Table 3.1 presents the highest educational attainment by nationality for the working population (15–64 age group) according to QNHS Q1 2013 data. The table distinguishes the Irish and non-
Irish groups, and also distinguishes the non-EU groups according to the classification described in Chapter 2. Education rates are presented across four education levels: no formal to lower secondary, upper secondary, post-leaving certificate and third level. As discussed in previous Integration Monitors, it is important to note that (a) immigrants are mainly grouped in the younger age cohorts, and (b) there is a strong age gradient in educational attainment in Ireland: older Irish people are generally less qualified than younger Irish people. These factors should be considered when comparing third-level attainment of Irish and non-Irish nationals.

Irish nationals have the largest proportion of low educational achievers, with 27.9 per cent having no formal/lower secondary education, compared with 14.8 per cent of non-Irish nationals. The proportions of Irish and non-Irish nationals with upper secondary and post-leaving certificate education are very similar. A larger proportion of non-Irish nationals have third-level education (44.8 per cent) compared with Irish nationals (34.1 per cent); as noted above, this could be related to the age gradient in the educational attainment of Irish nationals.

In terms of national group differences, most non-Irish groups report a higher proportion with third-level education, only the EU12 group have a lower proportion with third-level education (32.5 per cent), than Irish nationals (34.1 per cent). However, EU12 nationals have a higher proportion of post-leaving certificate qualifications (16.7 per cent) than Irish nationals (12.2 per cent). As noted in previous Integration Monitors, this may partly represent education systems and cultures in central European countries such as Poland, where vocational qualifications play a greater role.

The EU13 group report the highest proportion of respondents with third-level education (70.8 per cent). The non-EU group also tend to have high levels of third-level qualifications. These findings may reflect the influence of immigration policy: Ireland’s policy on labour migration is to meet all labour and skills needs from within the enlarged EEA as far as possible, and to limit non-EEA labour migration to that of the most highly skilled and hard to find workers (Quinn, 2010). The Asian group is particularly highly qualified (68.5 per cent have third-level education) and includes a large proportion of medical workers – in 2011 Indian and Filipino nationals accounted for more than half of all non-Irish workers in the human health and social work sector (CSO, 2012). The North America, Australia and Oceania group also report a high proportion with third-level education (59.2 per cent). Nearly half of the ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of the World’ group (47.5 per cent) have third-level education. The proportion of the African group with third-level education (38.2 per cent) is also higher than the proportion of Irish nationals (34.1 per cent).

| TABLE 3.1 | HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY NATIONALITY Q1 2013 |
|-----------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Irish     | 27.9% (25.8%)                | 12.2% (12.7%)   | 34.1% (44.8%)   | 2,550.1         |
| Non-Irish | 14.8%* (27.7%)               | 12.7% (12.7%)   | 44.8%* (44.8%)  | 406.8           |
| Of which: |                               |                 |                 |                 |
| UK        | 23.5% (19.9%)                | 13.1% (13.1%)   | 43.5%* (43.5%)  | 79.3            |
| EU13      | 4.8%* (17.6%)                | 6.8%* (6.8%)    | 70.8%* (70.8%)  | 36.4            |
| EU12      | 13.6% (37.2%)                | 16.7%* (16.7%)  | 32.5% (32.5%)   | 164.8           |
| Africa    | 17.7%* (30.7%)               | 13.5% (13.5%)   | 38.2% (38.2%)   | 35.5            |
| North America, Australia and Oceania | 7.3%* (29.4%) | 4.0% (4.0%) | 59.2%* (59.2%) | 11.3 |
| Asia      | 11.4%* (14.9%)               | 5.3%* (5.3%)    | 68.5%* (68.5%)  | 49.7            |
| Rest of Europe and Rest of the World | 15.4%* (25.6%) | 11.5% (11.5%) | 47.5%* (47.5%) | 29.9 |
| All       | 26.1% (26.1%)                | 12.3% (12.3%)   | 35.6% (35.6%)   | 2,956.9         |

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2013 (15–64 age group).
Notes: * denotes that the indicator for the group is significantly different from Irish nationals at p≤0.05. Proportions exclude ‘other/not stated’; this proportion is negligible for Irish nationals but higher for non-Irish nationals. ‘Third level’ includes non-honours degrees and honours degrees or above.
Figure 3.1 presents the proportion of the 25 to 34 age group with tertiary education (the non-EU category is combined in this chart because the numbers are smaller for this group). Overall, just under half (49.9 per cent) of Irish nationals aged 25 to 34 have tertiary education, compared with just over half (50.4 per cent) of non-Irish nationals aged 25 to 34. The difference is much smaller among this age group than for the working-age population, although still statistically significant.

**Figure 3.1** SHARE OF 25–34 AGE GROUP WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION Q1 2013

There are substantial differences between the non-Irish groups aged 25 to 34 in their levels of tertiary education. EU13 nationals have the highest proportion with third-level education (73.8 per cent), and the non-EU group report the second highest proportion (65.1 per cent), closely followed by UK nationals, of whom 61.2 per cent have third-level education. EU12 nationals are the group with the lowest proportion with tertiary education (38.1 per cent) of any national group, as was the case in the 2012 Integration Monitor.

### 3.1.2 Early School Leavers among Adult Immigrants

Overall rates of completion of upper secondary education in Ireland have increased over the past decade, and successive cohorts of school leavers have been less likely to leave school with qualifications lower than the leaving certificate (Department of Education and Skills, 2014). The proportion of Irish early school leavers has declined by 3 per cent since the 2011 Integration Monitor, which is consistent with trends in retention in second-level education in Ireland reported by the Department of Education. Over the eleven years from 1996 to 2006, there has been a continuous gradual improvement in the leaving certificate retention rate, with an increase of almost 9 per cent over the period (Department of Education and Skills, 2012).

Estimates of the proportion of the 20 to 24 age cohort defined as early leavers are now lower than the European average (CSO, 2014a).

**Table 3.2** presents the share of early school leavers by nationality in the 20 to 24 age group. Early school leavers are defined as the proportion of the population aged 20 to 24 who have progressed no further than lower second-level education and who are not engaged in further education or training at the present. Early leaving rates are seen as a key indicator of educational disadvantage. Note that most non-Irish nationals aged 20 to 24 will have received qualifications, or left school early, in their home countries, although some will have attended secondary school in Ireland.

The table presents the proportion of the 20 to 24 age group with no formal to lower secondary education, who have not been a student or apprentice in the past four weeks. A slightly higher proportion of non-Irish nationals are early school leavers (8.7 per cent) than Irish nationals (6.4 per cent), although the difference is not statistically significant. Within the non-Irish category the EU12 (9.3 per cent) and non-EU (9.0 per cent) groups report similar proportions of early school leavers. The numbers of cases are too small to report the proportion of early school leavers within the UK and EU13 groups.

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64 Although the recommended Zaragoza indicator is 18 to 24 years, we have kept this Integration Monitor consistent with recent years, where data was limited to the 20 to 24 age group.

65 This differs somewhat from the Eurostat definition. Eurostat defines an early leaver from education and training as a person aged 18 to 24, recorded in the Labour Force Survey, whose highest level of education or training attained is ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) 0, 1, 2 or 3c short; who received no education or training in the four weeks preceding the survey. A key factor is that any qualifications acquired do not permit access to third-level education. This may be a misleading indicator of the number of early school leavers for non-Irish nationals, as it may be difficult to differentiate between short vocational courses and longer ones. A significant proportion of qualifications are vocational in many Central and Eastern European countries, and these qualifications may be missclassified. Therefore, we calculate an indicator of the proportion with no formal to lower secondary education, excluding those with education level 3c short. Creating a comparable measurement of education across countries is a very difficult undertaking as courses vary to a substantial degree between countries and sometimes even within countries (Schneider and Kogan, 2008).

66 Using the Eurostat definition of early school leavers, i.e. including those with short vocational qualifications (ISCED 3c), results in a much higher proportion of early school leavers among the EU12 group.
The education of children of immigrants, raised and educated in the country of residence, is a major integration outcome and is considered a benchmark for integration at large (OECD, 2013). Young people make up a growing proportion of Ireland's increasingly diverse population, with one in seven children in Ireland coming from a migrant background, and an estimated 24,312 children born outside Ireland are registered in Irish second-level schools (MRCI, 2013). The Irish education system has become more diverse in terms of nationality, language, ethnicity and religious affiliation in both primary and second-level schools (Byrne et al., 2010; Darmody et al., 2012). A number of studies have highlighted the difficulties in dealing with these changes (Smyth et al., 2009; Gilligan et al., 2010; Darmody et al., 2011b). Box 3.1 describes access to education for non-Irish nationals, and resources available to support them, it also describes changes in access to third-level education for non-EU students, and patronage of Irish schools.

A body of international research in the United States and Western Europe has been concerned with the performance of immigrant students in schools, and how this compares with native students’ performance (Heath et al., 2008). Issues such as country or region of origin feature strongly in this research, as does duration in the host country and the impact of educational achievement on later labour market performance.

How do immigrant students compare with Irish students in terms of academic achievements? This section draws on recently published data from the OECD’s PISA, an international survey of 15-year-old students that takes place every three years. This is the recommended data source for assessing migrant achievement proposed at the ministerial conference in Zaragoza (see Appendix 2). There is also a brief discussion of findings on international tests at primary level (PIRLS and TIMSS) at the end of the section.

PISA assesses students’ literacy in science, mathematics and reading. Fifteen year olds are the target group because this age marks the end of compulsory schooling in many countries. In 2012 PISA was administered in 65 countries, including all 34 OECD members. In all countries students sat print-based tests of mathematics, reading literacy and science, and completed background questionnaires; and in sub-sets of countries, including Ireland, sub-samples of students also completed computer-based tests of mathematics and digital reading (Perkins et al., 2013). ‘Literacy’ is used to emphasise the ability to apply knowledge, rather than simply to reproduce facts that have been studied in a curriculum. As in PISA 2003, mathematics was the main focus of the 2012 assessment.

In Ireland, 5,015 15 year olds in 182 schools took part in PISA 2012. There was a significant increase in the percentage of participants from immigrant backgrounds, from 3.4 per cent in 2003 to 9.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of early school leavers at lower secondary level %</th>
<th>Total population (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU13</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2013 (20–24 age group). Note: – estimates are deemed too small for publication purposes due to reliability concerns.
per cent in 2012. In particular, the proportion of immigrant students who speak a language other than English or Irish increased from 0.7 to 4.5 per cent of the total student cohort between 2003 and 2012. The percentage of immigrant students in Ireland is about the same as the OECD average, just over one in ten (Perkins et al., 2013).

While PISA was designed for cross-national comparisons and is widely used to compare immigrant and native student outcomes, Song and Robert (2010) stress that countries vary substantially in the composition of the migrant population. For example, immigrant test scores can be affected by the level to which the immigrant students resemble the cultural and linguistic aspects of their host country members. Although it is not possible to address all these weaknesses here, distinguishing students by linguistic background will go some way to addressing these concerns. Of the 9.6 per cent of students in Ireland classified as immigrants in 2012, just over half spoke Irish or English at home (5.1 per cent) and the rest spoke other languages (4.5 per cent).

Table 3.3 presents the results for mean print reading and print mathematics scores for immigrants and natives in 2012. In print reading, immigrant students with another language scored significantly lower than either Irish native students or students from an English-speaking immigrant background. Immigrants who speak a language other than English achieved a mean score of 505.8 in print reading, native students achieved a mean score of 526.5 in print reading, and immigrant students who speak English/Irish at home achieved a similar mean score of 529.3. Immigrants with English/Irish achieved a mean score in print mathematics of 508.4, followed by the Irish group with a mean score of 503.5, immigrants with another language achieved the lowest mean score of 499. However, the differences in mathematics are small and not statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3 MEAN PRINT READING AND MATHEMATICS SCORES IN PISA 2012 BY IMMIGRANT LANGUAGE/STATUS, 15 YEAR OLDS IN IRELAND (PAPER-BASED DOMAINS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irish</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrant with English or Irish</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrant with other language</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perkins et al. (2013), Table A5.4. Note: * indicates significantly different from Irish natives.

Table 3.4 presents the mean computer-based scores for digital reading and mathematics. As well as the traditional print-based assessment of these domains, countries in PISA 2012 were given the option of participating in an additional computer-based assessment of reading and mathematics. A smaller sample of 2,396 young people completed these assessments (the full sample, 5,015, completed the print-based assessments).

There is no significant difference between either of the immigrant groups in computer-based reading or mathematics. In terms of mean digital reading scores, Irish students achieved the highest score (523.3), closely followed by migrants who speak another language (522.9). Migrants with English or Irish had the lowest mean score of 512.5. Immigrants with another language attained the highest computer-based mathematics scores (507.9), followed by the Irish group (494.4) and then migrants with English or Irish (489.9). These differences are not statistically significant, although note the small group size in the computer-based tests.

---

67 10.1 per cent of students in Ireland are classified as immigrant students in PISA 2012; however, when language and immigrant status are considered together, this percentage changes to 9.6 per cent due to missing data.
68 Due to relatively small numbers of students in the immigrant groups, large standard errors could render large differences as insignificant.
Overall, there are differences in group performances between print-based and computer-based tests. While there are no significant differences between Irish and immigrant students in mathematics scores using either medium, immigrants from a non-English-speaking background have a (somewhat) lower mean score than Irish natives in print, but not in digital, reading. This may be related to the different nature of the tests, which also reflects the nature of print and digital reading. The print reading tests contain a higher proportion of continuous text types, for example, and the digital reading requires more non-sequential reading [see Perkins et al., 2013, Chapter 1]. There may also be differences between immigrant and Irish children in their use of technology, which may be linked to performance in computer-based tests. Further examination of this would require detailed investigation.

Has the relative performance of migrant students changed since PISA 2009? Table 3.5 presents a direct comparison of the scores on print reading and mathematics for the two years. While migrants from a non-English speaking background differed significantly in both reading and mathematics in PISA 2009, there is a difference only in reading in 2012. Also, the difference between the Irish and migrant students from a non-English-speaking background in print reading is much smaller in 2012 than it was in 2009. Whether this is because of increasing duration in the education system of migrants from a non-English-speaking background in 2012 compared with 2009, or a difference in the composition of the group (country of origin, income, social class, education of parents), or some other factors relating to the nature of the tests, is not clear from the information presented here, but would certainly be an interesting question for further investigation. Another interesting question is whether there has been a fall in the proportion of these students achieving level 1 or lower in the test? As reported in the 2012 Integration Monitor, a significantly higher proportion of non-English-speaking migrant students than Irish students were achieving level 1 proficiency in PISA 2009 in Ireland. This information is not yet available for PISA 2012.

While the PISA indicator was the one proposed at the ministerial conference in Zaragoza, it is also interesting to review outcomes for students with a migrant background earlier in their school careers. In March and April 2011 Irish primary pupils took part in two large international comparative studies of achievement: PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) and TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study). The results showed that pupils whose home and school languages differed performed less well on the reading, mathematics and science assessments. English as an Additional Language (EAL) pupils were outperformed by native speakers on all three domains – the gap is smallest in mathematics and largest in science [Eivers, 2013].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3.4</th>
<th>MEAN COMPUTER-BASED READING AND MATHEMATICS SCORES IN PISA 2012 BY IMMIGRANT LANGUAGE/STATUS, 15 YEAR OLDS IN IRELAND (COMPUTER-BASED DOMAINS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Digital reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>523.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant with English or Irish</td>
<td>512.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant with other language</td>
<td>522.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perkins et al. (2013), Table A 5.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3.5</th>
<th>MEAN PRINT READING AND MATHEMATICS SCORES BY IMMIGRANT LANGUAGE/STATUS, PISA 2009 AND PISA 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(%) of students</td>
<td>Print reading score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>501.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant with English or Irish</td>
<td>499.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant with other language</td>
<td>442.7*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Perkins et al. (2010) and Shiel et al. (2010) for 2009 figures; Perkins et al. (2013) for 2012.
Note: * indicates significantly different from Irish natives.
3.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

The majority of non-Irish nationals came to Ireland as adults and, therefore, had completed their education outside Ireland. Among the adult population, a higher proportion of non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals have third-level qualifications. It is important to note that immigrants are mainly grouped in the younger age cohorts, furthermore there is a strong age gradient in educational attainment in Ireland where older Irish people are generally less qualified than younger Irish people. When looking at the 25 to 34 age group we find this difference subsides, with very similar proportions (around 50 per cent) of Irish and non-Irish nationals having tertiary education.

Non-Irish nationals vary substantially in their educational attainment, the EU12 group report the lowest proportion of third-level education. The EU13 and Asian groups are particularly highly qualified. In terms of earlier school leavers, a slightly higher proportion of non-Irish nationals (8.7 per cent) than Irish nationals (6.4 per cent) count as early leavers using our definition, but the difference is not statistically significant.

Turning to the reading and mathematics achievements of non-Irish and Irish students, we looked at findings from PISA 2012. Ireland has experienced high levels of immigration in recent years and the number of students in PISA categorised as immigrants increased from 3.4 per cent in 2003, to 8.0 per cent in 2009, and again to 9.6 per cent in 2012. The mean test scores of 15-year-old migrant and non-migrant students depict an interesting story. In print reading, students from a non-English-speaking background score on average lower than Irish students. Migrants from an English-speaking background do not differ from Irish students in mean reading achievement. In mathematics, there are no differences between Irish students and immigrant students. What is particularly interesting for this Monitor is that the gap in mean achievement between Irish 15 year olds and those from an immigrant non-English speaking background has narrowed since 2009.

BOX 3.1 ACCESS TO EDUCATION

The Irish education system is made up of primary, second-level, third-level and further education. State-funded education is available to Irish citizens at all levels and to non-Irish citizens at primary and secondary levels, or until aged 18. The situation of access to third-level education is different. Third-level tuition costs vary greatly depending on the institution, course of study and, most critically, the residency status of the student.

Non-EEA nationals are typically required to pay much higher university fees than EEA nationals, and these fees may be prohibitive for many. In July 2013 the Minister for Education and Skills announced that non-EEA students, legally living in Ireland, who acquire EEA citizenship during the course of their study will no longer have to pay full fees. For students who do not have such citizenship, the Minister requested the Higher Education Authority to establish and report on the practices currently operated by individual higher education institutions in charging different rates of fees. The Minister further recommended that the non-EU rate of fees should be charged only to international students (with permission to remain on a student visa) and not to non-EEA nationals and their dependants who are legally resident in the EU, although he acknowledged this decision lay in the remit of individual institutions (Department of Education and Skills, 2013a).

Most Irish primary schools (around 90 per cent) are privately owned, under the patronage of the Catholic Church and publicly funded through the Department of Education and Skills. There is also a small but growing number of multidenominational primary schools administered by the Educate Together patron body and by the Community National Schools. The post-primary or second-level sector comprises voluntary secondary, vocational and community/comprehensive schools. Voluntary secondary schools are privately owned and managed. Vocational schools are established by the State and are administered by the Education and Training Boards. The rest are managed by boards of management of differing compositions (Darmody and Smyth, 2013).

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70 See www.education.ie for information on the education system in Ireland; www.inis.gov.ie for information on immigration requirements, and www.citizensinformation.ie for more general information.

School patronage is relevant to migrant students, many of whom are not from a Catholic background, given the dominance of the Catholic Church in school patronage in Ireland. There have been a number of developments in school patronage in recent years at both primary and post-primary levels. In June 2011 the Minister for Education and Skills announced that 20 new post-primary schools were to be established by 2017, and Educate Together has been officially recognised by the Department of Education and Skills as a second-level patron (Darmody and Smyth, 2013). The Report of the Forum on Patronage and Pluralism in the Primary Sector was published in April 2012 (Coolahan et al., 2012). In June 2012 an action plan was launched in response to this report, and in April 2013 the Minister for Education and Skills announced that 23 towns would see a change in patronage of primary schools. Following on from this report, a consultation process on religious and cultural inclusion in primary schools was held, which is expected to inform a White Paper in 2014 (Department of Education and Skills, 2013b).

In March 2014 the Government approved the drafting of the Education (Admission to Schools) Bill 2014. This new legislation aims to ensure that the enrolment process in all primary and post-primary schools is inclusive, transparent and fair. This development follows a discussion paper on school enrolment and subsequent consultation (see 2012 Integration Monitor).

Supports for immigrants in schools

The Intercultural Education Strategy was launched in September 2010. It is relevant to all levels of education, from preschool to higher education (Department of Education and Skills, 2010). A key support for migrant children in Irish schools is the provision of English language tuition. Most of this support is delivered through specialised English as an Additional Language (EAL) teachers. Since the academic year 2012/13 assignment of teachers for special needs education and language support has been combined and is based on the total number of students in the school: additional language support hours are provided in schools with a high concentration of students requiring English language support. Other supports include the distribution of language assessment kits to primary and post-primary schools, in-service provision for language support teachers, guidelines on EAL for all teachers, and a booklet on intercultural education in both primary and post-primary schools.

In the academic year 2011/12 €69 million was spent on EAL in schools. It is not possible to update this figure for 2012/13 as reforms to the allocation system involved combining resources for special needs education and language support. EAL is now part of the General Allocation Model (GAM) and schools are not required to report on how their GAM allocation is deployed. Thus, it is no longer possible to monitor spending on English language tuition in schools. It is also a problem for monitoring the Intercultural Education Strategy, given that spending on EAL is a large part of financial resources devoted to that strategy.

English language provision for adults

In July 2013 the Minister for Education and Skills announced the establishment of 16 new Education and Training Boards (ETBs), to replace the 33 Vocational Education Committees, as part of the reform of further education and training at local level. ETBs provide a substantial number of English courses, through a number of different programmes. These are funded by the Department of Education and Skills, although exact spending figures were not available. English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) is provided by the ETBs as part of the adult literacy services. Over 11,000 participants, including refugees, asylum seekers and migrant workers, availed of ESOL tuition provided free of charge as part of this service in 2012. Over 100,000 people have availed of this tuition since 2003.

ETBs also provide English language tuition under the Back to Education Initiative (BTEI). Almost 1,500 participants availed of tuition as part of the BTEI programme in 2012. Government funding was ceased for the Adult Refugee Programme at the end of 2012, and places are now available for adult refugees on mainstream ESOL courses run by the ETB sector.

Another programme providing English classes to migrants is the ‘Fáilte Isteach’ project, run by Third Age Foundation, which involves older people volunteering their time to teach conversational English to new migrants. There are approximately 58 Fáilte Isteach branches throughout the country. Every week 580 volunteers teach more than 1,700 students from over 63 countries. In 2013 Fáilte Isteach received the European Language Label – formerly known as the European Award for Languages. OPMI provided nearly €485,000 in funding to Fáilte Isteach between 2008 and 2012. In 2013 a grant of €126,420 was made.

72 In order to aid the process, an independent advisory group, the ‘New Schools Establishment Group’, was set up to assist the Minister (Department of Education and Skills, 2013b).
75 A regularly updated comprehensive website on accessing intercultural materials has also been developed: www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/usefullinks-irish-DepartmentEducationportal.
76 The additional allocation is based on the number of General Allocation Model/EAL classroom posts in schools in the 2012/13 school year, and was updated to reflect changes in the number of classroom posts.
79 Precise costings of the scheme are not available because data is not collected separately and would depend on the length and intensity of the ESOL tuition (Department of Education and Skills, March 2014).
80 See the 2012 Integration Monitor for more information on this.
81 www.integration.ie/website/omi/omiwebv6.nsf/page/FY260022A030AD180257576003DB18F.
Average income continued to fall between 2010 and 2011 in Ireland, while the percentage of the population at risk of poverty and the deprivation rate rose (CSO, 2013). This was in the context of an economic crisis, mass unemployment and a series of austerity measures. This chapter examines whether the same is true for non-Irish nationals, and whether particular national groups differ in their experience. The focus of this chapter is broadly on social inclusion, and specifically on income, poverty, health and home ownership.

The indicators in this chapter come from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The EU-SILC is the survey used to provide annual estimates of household income and poverty in Ireland, and is very well suited to doing so. It is indeed the only ongoing survey data that can be used to estimate income, poverty and deprivation in Ireland accurately. It is also harmonised across Europe, which means it is a very good source of comparative data on these indicators. A disadvantage for analysing migrants’ income and poverty is that, while very well designed to measure income and living conditions, the EU-SILC was not specifically designed to survey non-Irish nationals. As noted in the 2010 Integration Monitor, the EU-SILC 2008 sample under-represents migrants. This is less true of later waves of the survey, as the sampling frame was changed for 2009 and subsequent surveys. The sample size of migrants is just over 1,000 in 2011, but gets smaller when we disaggregate groups. For all the indicators in this chapter we run statistical tests to be sure that the differences observed in the sample reflect differences in the population. In some cases the differences between groups may look substantial but are not statistically significant because of the small numbers in the group or groups. The number of cases in the sample is also indicated in each table.

In earlier Integration Monitors we noted how the ‘non-EU’ category was a particularly diverse group. An innovation in this chapter is that, for income, poverty and health, we disaggregate the non-EU group for the first time. Estimates are now presented for the Asian, African and ‘Rest of the World’ groups. This last category is particularly diverse, but the new distinction allows us to unpack some of the differences between Asian, African and other nationals.

The latest available EU-SILC data are from 2011, relating to the 12 months prior to the interview, so the indicators refer to varying 12-month periods between 2010 and 2011, depending on the date of the interview. The labour market indicators reported in Chapter 2 are from 2013. Income and, more
particularly, low levels of income are often used as indicators of an individual’s ability or inability to participate in society: so too is material deprivation.

Section 4.1 presents income and poverty measures by nationality. Section 4.2 considers self-reported health. Health problems may limit participation in society and social integration. For migrants, home ownership is sometimes seen as a measure of investment in the receiving country, a longer term indicator of integration as well as of economic capacity. Section 4.3 considers home ownership. The conclusion summarises and reflects on data needs in the area. Box 4.1 describes access to social services in Ireland, with a focus on whether provision differs for migrants.

4.1 INCOME AND POVERTY

4.1.1 Household Income

This chapter replicates the method used by the CSO to measure poverty. First, all income in each household – received by each person and from various sources [employment, social transfers, interest on savings] – in the 12 months prior to the date of interview is pooled. Tax and social insurance contributions are also summed to household level and subtracted from the gross household income to calculate the total disposable household income. This aggregated disposable household income is then assigned to each individual. Thus, all members of the same household are treated as having the same standard of living.

The analysis is based on all individuals (i.e. adults of working and retirement age and children). The median disposable income is then estimated – the median income or income midpoint is the value of income that divides the sample in half after it has been ranked by income.85 This CSO analysis focuses on median income for the whole population. This Integration Monitor further adds to this by estimating the median income for Irish nationals and non-Irish nationals, and then for national groups, according to the nationality reported by the individual.86 All estimates are weighted to be representative of the population. After weighting, non-Irish nationals make up 10.6 per cent of the sample used for the analysis. The estimates for median disposable household income by nationality group, the first Zaragoza indicator in this chapter, are presented in Table 4.1.

Households are of different sizes and have different needs, depending on the number of adults and children living in them, so household income is typically adjusted to account for this variation. This adjustment is called an equivalence scale. In this analysis the national equivalence scale used by the CSO is adopted, which assigns a value of 1 for the first adult, 0.66 for any additional household members aged 14 and over and 0.33 for any children under 14.87 The disposable household income is divided by the equivalence scale value to calculate the equivalised income for each individual. This is the standard CSO adjustment for measuring poverty in Ireland and has been adopted in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) poverty measure.88 Estimates of the median equivalised income for Irish and non-Irish nationals and for different national groups are presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 clearly shows that the median disposable household income, at €41,700 per year, is higher for Irish nationals than for non-Irish nationals (€36,600). In fact, median disposable household income for non-Irish nationals is approximately 87 per cent of that for Irish nationals.89 This is slightly lower than the proportion reported in the 2011 Integration Monitor (89 per cent).

The overall figure for non-Irish nationals hides considerable variation between the groups. The median household income for the EU13 nationals is actually higher than the Irish level of median income, as is the median disposable income for Asian nationals. The median disposable income for the UK, EU12 and ‘Rest of the World’ categories is lower than for Irish nationals. The median disposable income of African nationals is lower than the Irish median income, although the difference is not statistically significant.

After adjusting income for the size and composition of the household, the median equivalised yearly income for non-Irish nationals is still significantly lower than it is for Irish nationals. Group differences largely follow the pattern for disposable income. The median equivalised income for EU13 and Asian nationals is higher than it is for Irish nationals, and

85 The median income is not as sensitive to outliers (very high and very low incomes), which is why it is presented instead of the mean income.

86 Note that individuals in multinational households may have the same income but be assigned a different national group in the table. An alternative would be to assign all individuals to the nationality of the household head, but this would under-represent some nationalities in mixed nationality households.

87 This is based on assumptions about economies of scale in larger households. Different equivalence scales have different assumptions about household needs.

88 See www.socialinclusion.ie/poverty.html for further details.

89 Median equivalised income is presented here. We estimate the same mean equivalised income per individual as the CSO (2013): €21,440.
this difference is significant. UK and EU12 median equivalised income is lower than for Irish nationals. The median equivalised income of those from the ‘Rest of the World’ is also lower, although the difference is not significantly different. The median equivalised income of the non-EU group as a whole also does not differ significantly from Irish nationals. Comparing 2010 and 2011, there has been a noticeable decline in median incomes for most groups. For EU nationals the pattern is broadly similar to that in 2010. Median incomes are lower for UK and EU12 nationals than for Irish nationals. The median income for the EU13 group is higher than for Irish nationals. Median incomes for the non-EU group as a whole have risen since 2010. Here we expand previous analyses and look at the variation within the non-EU group and find variation within the group: median incomes for the Asian group tend to be higher, whereas median incomes for the African and ‘Rest of the World’ groups are lower, although the group differences are not always statistically significant.

### 4.1.2 Poverty Rates
From a social inclusion point of view it is perhaps more salient to focus on those at the bottom of the income distribution and those experiencing financial hardship and poverty, as opposed to differences in median incomes. The two indicators proposed at Zaragoza are the at risk of poverty rate and the consistent poverty rate.

The at risk of poverty measure is an official poverty indicator used by the Irish Government, as well as the EU. The poverty threshold used to assess the population at risk of poverty is set at 60 per cent of median equivalised income. This is a relative income poverty measure, as the threshold is set as a proportion of all the incomes in the population. Thus, the threshold changes each year, depending on incomes in that year: for 2011 this was €10,889 per year (CSO, 2013). This poverty threshold is slightly lower than in 2010, as the median equivalised income has fallen (see Section 4.1.1). Indeed, the poverty threshold has been falling since 2008 (CSO, 2013).

Table 4.2 presents the proportion of different national groups whose income falls below this threshold. It has been repeatedly argued that income poverty

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### Table 4.1 Yearly Household Income and Household Equivalised Income 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disposable household income (median)</th>
<th>Equivalent (needs adjusted) income (median)</th>
<th>No. of individuals in each group (unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>41,696</td>
<td>18,318</td>
<td>9,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>36,437</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>32,447</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU13</td>
<td>53,002</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>34,637</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU</td>
<td>47,273</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>52,708</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>36,508</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the World</td>
<td>35,243</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>40,997</td>
<td>18,148</td>
<td>11,005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC 2011, weighted.

Notes: Equivalised income is income adjusted for the size and composition of the household, see text for further details. * signals that the group median is significantly different from the Irish median at p≤0.05; n.s. indicates that the difference is not statistically significant in this sample (using the non-parametric median test).
measures alone can provide an incomplete picture about families and individuals most seriously affected by lack of income (Whelan et al., 2003). In response to this, a measure of deprivation is also widely used to capture the impact on quality of life of lack of resources. This is a combination of 11 items measuring the enforced lack of items such as food, clothing and heat, as well as being unable to participate in family and social life. Individuals count as deprived if their household lacks two or more of the 11 items. ‘Enforced lack’ is important here: households are only counted as being deprived if they report not having/doing something because they could not afford it, not because they do not want to do it, as people may have different preferences or priorities. If a person does not heat the house or eat meat/chicken or a vegetarian equivalent because they do not want to, they will not count as deprived. This index has been incorporated into the NAPs to supplement the income poverty measure. Proportions deprived for different national groups are presented in Table 4.2.

Combining income poverty and this deprivation measure gives a measure of consistent poverty. Those individuals in consistent poverty are defined as those who are (1) at risk of poverty and (2) living in households that lack two or more of these basic items. Estimates of consistent poverty are also presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 shows that the overall at risk of poverty rate is 16 per cent of the total population in 2011, as estimated by the CSO (2013). The rate is similar for non-Irish nationals (15.5 per cent) and Irish nationals (16 per cent), and the difference is not significant.

Typically, the immigrant poverty rate is higher than that of the native-born and, by international standards, the lack of a gap between the immigrant and native income poverty rate in Ireland in 2011 is unusual (OECD, 2012). This is in the context of a relatively high poverty rate among the Irish population.

The differences between the Irish at risk of poverty rate and the rate for all the individual groups varies quite considerably, but most of the differences are not statistically significant (see Table 4.2). These groups are too small to allow us to be confident that the differences in the sample reflect real differences in the population. The one exception is that the at risk of poverty rate is significantly lower for the EU13 group than for Irish nationals.

We now estimate deprivation and consistent poverty rates, which are typically more stable measures of social exclusion due to lack of resources. In 2011, 24.5 per cent of the population were deprived, in the sense that they lacked two or more of the basic items described above. A markedly higher proportion of non-Irish nationals were deprived (31.7 per cent), which is significantly different from the deprivation rate for Irish nationals (23.7 per cent).

There is variation in deprivation rates between national groups: a relatively low proportion of EU13 and Asian nationals were deprived, although the differences between them and Irish nationals are not statistically significant. By contrast, a much higher proportion of UK, EU12 and African nationals were deprived than the Irish group (see Table 4.2.). These three groups stand out as having high rates of deprivation, particularly the African group.

Further investigation (not reported in Table 4.2) into the depth of deprivation, using the proportion deprived of three or more items, shows that while a much smaller proportion of UK and EU13 nationals were deprived of three or more items (22 per cent and 21 per cent respectively), this was not true of the African group: 36 per cent of whom were deprived of three or more items, compared with 15 per cent of Irish nationals. This suggests that the African group are particularly deprived relative to others.

As was the case in 2010, the most commonly reported indicators for the deprived group, whether Irish nationals or non-Irish nationals are: ‘unable to afford to replace any worn-out furniture’ and ‘unable to afford a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight for entertainment’. People experiencing financial difficulties cut down on these items before heating and food.

As shown in Table 4.2, the proportion who are consistently poor (i.e. both at risk of poverty and deprived) was 6.9 per cent in 2011 (see also CSO, 2013). There is variation in deprivation rates between national groups: a relatively low proportion of EU13 and Asian nationals were deprived, although the differences between them and Irish nationals are not statistically significant. By contrast, a much higher proportion of UK, EU12 and African nationals were deprived than the Irish group (see Table 4.2.). These three groups stand out as having high rates of deprivation, particularly the African group.

Further investigation (not reported in Table 4.2) into the depth of deprivation, using the proportion deprived of three or more items, shows that while a much smaller proportion of UK and EU13 nationals were deprived of three or more items (22 per cent and 21 per cent respectively), this was not true of the African group: 36 per cent of whom were deprived of three or more items, compared with 15 per cent of Irish nationals. This suggests that the African group are particularly deprived relative to others.

As was the case in 2010, the most commonly reported indicators for the deprived group, whether Irish nationals or non-Irish nationals are: ‘unable to afford to replace any worn-out furniture’ and ‘unable to afford a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight for entertainment’. People experiencing financial difficulties cut down on these items before heating and food.

As shown in Table 4.2, the proportion who are consistently poor (i.e. both at risk of poverty and deprived) was 6.9 per cent in 2011 (see also CSO, 2013). There is variation in deprivation rates between national groups: a relatively low proportion of EU13 and Asian nationals were deprived, although the differences between them and Irish nationals are not statistically significant. By contrast, a much higher proportion of UK, EU12 and African nationals were deprived than the Irish group (see Table 4.2.). These three groups stand out as having high rates of deprivation, particularly the African group.

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Those seeking protection living in direct provision are excluded from this survey. It would be difficult to include such people in measures of income poverty as their income takes the form of an allowance, and food and accommodation are provided directly, but it seems reasonable to assume that if they were included with non-EU nationals the income poverty rate of this group would be somewhat higher, even though those seeking protection only made up about 5 per cent of non-EU nationals at this time.

2011). The rate of consistent poverty for non-Irish nationals (7.4 per cent) was slightly higher than for Irish nationals (6.8 per cent), but this difference is not statistically significant. Consistent poverty rates, combining both income poverty and deprivation, were higher for UK and African nationals than for the Irish group, although the differences are not statistically significant given the small numbers involved.

Consistent poverty was higher for the non-EU group than for the native Irish in 2010, but this was not the case, on average, for the non-EU group in 2011. Analysis shows that this is partly explained by variation within the group: the Asian group had lower rates of deprivation and consistent poverty than the African group. Further research is needed to investigate the mechanisms underlying deprivation, i.e. whether it is linked to lack of employment, in-work poverty, family size/composition or other characteristics of the households. As seen in Chapter 2, for example, the employment rate for the Asian group is much higher than for the African group, and unemployment among Asians is much lower (Table 2.1).

### TABLE 4.2 AT RISK OF POVERTY, DEPRIVATION AND CONSISTENT POVERTY RATES 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At risk of poverty (under the 60% median poverty line) (%)</th>
<th>Deprivation (enforced lack of two or more items) (%)</th>
<th>Consistent poverty (at risk + deprived) (%)</th>
<th>No. of individuals (unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish 16.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish 15.5</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK 20.5</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU13 6.2</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12 13.5</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU 17.9</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian 16.9</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African 12.6</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the World</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All 16.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11,005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC 2011, weighted.
Notes: * signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p≤0.05; # signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p≤0.1; n.s. indicates that the difference is not statistically significant in this sample.

This section compares the health of Irish and non-Irish nationals. It is based on a self-assessed measure of health status – ‘How good is your health in general?’ – with five possible responses ranging from very good to poor. This measure is frequently used in research in the area and has been found to be a good predictor of mortality and use of healthcare (Burstrom and Fredlund, 2001). Individuals from different socio-economic groups may vary in how they assess their health, as may those from different parts of the world (see Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004).

Table 4.3 shows the share of the population aged 16 and over perceiving their health status as ‘good’ or ‘very good’, which is a key Zaragoza indicator. Around four-fifths (82.4 per cent) of the population report their health to be very good or good, and non-Irish nationals record significantly better health than Irish nationals. This was also the case using the 2008, 2009 and 2010 data in previous Integration Monitors. Almost 91 per cent of non-Irish nationals reported good health in 2011, compared with just under 83 per cent of the Irish sample.

93 Those seeking protection living in direct provision are excluded from this survey. It would be difficult to include such people in measures of income poverty as their income takes the form of an allowance, and food and accommodation are provided directly, but it seems reasonable to assume that if they were included with non-EU nationals the income poverty rate of this group would be somewhat higher, even though those seeking protection only made up about 5 per cent of non-EU nationals at this time.
UK nationals living in Ireland are, once again, an exception to the general pattern of better health among non-Irish nationals: for UK nationals their self-assessed health (81 per cent) was rather similar to that of Irish nationals in 2011. These group differences are very similar to those found in previous analyses (2011, 2012, 2013 Integration Monitors), using EU-SILC data, and also the 2007 Survey of Lifestyle, Attitudes and Nutrition (Nolan, 2012). A special module of the QNHS on health status and health service utilisation in 2010 also found that non-Irish nationals were more likely to rate their health as good or very good compared with Irish nationals. This module found that non-Irish nationals were less likely to use health services in general, and that a larger proportion of non-Irish nationals (42 per cent) than Irish nationals (20 per cent) had neither a medical card nor private health insurance (CSO, 2011, Table 1).

One factor that is likely to be linked to better self-reported health among non-Irish nationals is age. With the exception of UK nationals, non-Irish nationals tend to be considerably younger than Irish nationals: the mean age of non-Irish nationals aged 16 and over is 36, compared with a mean age of 46 for Irish nationals. In particular, EU12 nationals are younger (mean age 32). Another explanation is the ‘healthy immigrant’ effect, whereby the health of immigrants, particularly recent immigrants, is better than comparable native-born individuals (Nolan, 2012). Nolan (2012) argues that the effect of being an immigrant in her study is relatively small after accounting for age, gender, education and household income, which play a much greater role in determining health outcomes. Most non-Irish nationals, with the exception of UK nationals, are recent immigrants. It is not yet clear whether this pattern of difference will remain or if non-Irish nationals will become more like Irish nationals as they stay in Ireland longer.

4.3 HOME OWNERSHIP
The share of migrants owning their home, as opposed to renting it, is another indicator of migrant integration proposed at Zaragoza. This section presents home ownership for different national groups. House prices in Ireland grew very rapidly during the economic boom (Fahey and Duffy, 2007).
In 1994 the average price of a new house in Ireland was just under €72,000; by 2007 the average price of a new house was €332,000, an increase by a factor of 4.6.\(^{94}\) In late 2006/early 2007 house prices peaked; prices then fell rapidly as the market collapsed (Department of the Environment and Local Government, 2010). By Quarter 2 of 2011, during the time of the 2011 EU-SILC survey, the average price for a new house in Ireland was €232,000.

Table 4.4 presents home ownership rates for private households in 2011. Home owners include both those who own their home completely, as well as those who own their house with a mortgage. Other types of tenancy include private rented, voluntary or local authority housing. Following convention, home ownership rates are presented at household level. Nationality is assigned on the basis of the person who answered the household questionnaire, i.e. the household reference person.\(^{95}\) The non-EU group is also combined.

Table 4.4 shows very substantial differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals in terms of home ownership: 76 per cent of Irish household respondents owned their homes in 2010, compared with 26.6 per cent of non-Irish household respondents – this difference is statistically significant. The rate of home ownership fell for both groups: the respective figures were 78 per cent and 28 per cent in 2010. National groups vary considerably in terms of owning their own homes. Households with a UK national as the household reference person were more likely to own their own house than other non-Irish groups, although, at 60.8 per cent, the UK nationals’ rate is still considerably lower than that for Irish nationals. The lowest rate of home ownership, as in previous years, is among EU12 nationals: 6.6 per cent of these households owned their homes in 2011 (up from 3 per cent in 2010). Around 35 per cent of non-EU household respondents owned their house in 2011 (up from 30 per cent in 2010).

This pattern of group differences in home ownership is broadly similar to that observed in previous Integration Monitors (2010, 2011, 2012), although with a small increase in home ownership, particularly among non-EU households. It is not clear from the current analysis if this is because these households have been living in Ireland for longer, or a result of compositional changes within the non-EU group (e.g. in terms of age, nationality or income) or due to other factors.

As noted by the OECD (2012), the large difference in tenure status between immigrant and native-born populations may reflect the fact that many migrants have arrived in Ireland relatively recently.\(^{96}\) Previous Integration Monitors discuss factors that might explain the lower levels of home ownership among non-Irish nationals. Lower home ownership rates among non-Irish nationals may well reflect preferences for rental property or home-buying norms and traditions in the immigrants’ country of origin. Some individuals may view their stay in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality*</th>
<th>Home owners (%)</th>
<th>No. of households (unweighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>3,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Irish</td>
<td>26.6 *</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>60.8 *</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>6.6 *</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU</td>
<td>34.9 *</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>70.4 *</td>
<td>4,333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC 2011, weighted.

Notes: EU13 estimates are not presented as the number of households is very low. For similar reasons, the Asian, African and ‘Rest of the World’ groups are not presented separately but combined into a ‘non-EU’ category. 1 The questions on home ownership were answered by the person who answered the household questionnaire, and that person’s nationality is used. * signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p≤0.05.


\(^{95}\) We assume there to be negligible differences between the nationality of the household head and the person who answered the household questionnaire, we call the ‘household respondent’ in the discussion.

\(^{96}\) Large differences are also found in Finland, Greece and Italy (2012).
Ireland as relatively short term. EU12 nationals show much higher rates of mobility than other migrant groups (see Chapter 1) and this is consistent with rates of home ownership that are higher among non-EU nationals than among EU12 nationals (Table 4.4). In the case of non-EU nationals, they may intend to stay in Ireland, but have only a temporary residence permission, which may make it very difficult to get a mortgage to buy a house.\textsuperscript{97} Financial constraints may also be particularly salient in a recession: people experiencing unemployment, job insecurity and poverty may not be able to afford homes in Ireland or may not want to take on a long-term financial commitment, particularly given the recent volatility in the Irish housing market.

4.4 SUMMARY OF INCLUSION INDICATORS

This chapter finds that non-Irish nationals as a whole had a lower median disposable household income and a lower median needs-adjusted income in 2011. The at risk of poverty and consistent poverty rates did not differ significantly between non-Irish nationals and Irish nationals. However, the rates of deprivation were higher for non-Irish nationals.

Variations between the groups of non-Irish nationals are interesting. In particular, EU13 nationals and Asian nationals are characterised by higher median incomes and (typically) lower poverty and deprivation rates. By contrast, UK, EU12 and ‘Rest of the World’ nationals had lower median incomes. They also had high deprivation rates, particularly the African group, although poverty rates did not differ significantly from the Irish rate.

Comparing 2010 and 2011, differences in disposable incomes between Irish and non-Irish nationals were similar and income fell for both groups. The at risk of poverty rate was slightly higher for non-Irish nationals in 2010, but this is not the case in 2011. Consistent poverty rates are also not significantly different, although this may be linked to the size of the sample: a larger sample may yield more statistically robust differences. Deprivation is significantly higher for non-Irish nationals than for Irish nationals, as was the case in 2010.

Differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals are much more marked in the cases of health and home ownership, although here there has been little change over time. Non-Irish nationals in general continue to report better health outcomes, with the exception of UK nationals. Patterns of self-reported health are very similar to those observed in previous Integration Monitors.

Home ownership is much lower among non-Irish than Irish nationals. Home ownership in 2011 was particularly low among EU12 nationals, even though they generally have secure residence status in Ireland. Among non-EU nationals, most of whom do not have long-term residence rights, the proportion who own their homes is lower than among Irish nationals, but at 35 per cent, is significantly higher than the proportion of EU12 nationals who own their homes (under 7 per cent).

Measuring income and poverty is an important component of monitoring integration. The EU-SILC is potentially an excellent cross-national dataset for comparing income and poverty rates among immigrants across Europe. However, the small sample size is a considerable constraint for monitoring integration. Oversampling immigrants in the EU-SILC data would improve the reliability of the analysis, and also allow researchers to say more about group differences. The additional resources needed to fund oversampling would provide us with greater insights into the income and poverty of the non-Irish population.

It should also be noted that the EU-SILC is a household sample, and to the extent that social exclusion is not measured among those living in care homes, among asylum seekers in direct provision or among the homeless, some of the most excluded in Irish society will not be captured in this analysis.
BOX 4.1 ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES

Social welfare
The social welfare system is administered by the Department of Social Protection. It is divided into the following main types of payments.
- Social insurance payments
- Social assistance or means-tested payments
- Universal payments.

To qualify for social insurance payments an individual must have made the necessary number of social insurance (PRSI) payments for the scheme in question and satisfy other certain conditions. Social assistance payments are made to those who do not have enough PRSI contributions to qualify for the equivalent social insurance-based payments.

EU law requires that EU nationals are treated equally to Member State nationals in regard to accessing social welfare. In practice, national administrative rules lead to differing levels of access. This is evidenced in Ireland by the application of a habitual residency condition to social assistance payments and to child benefit, which means that applicants must show they are both resident in, and have a proven close link to, Ireland. The Department of Social Protection (2013) assesses the following:
- Length and continuity of residence in Ireland
- Length and purpose of any absence from Ireland
- Nature and pattern of employment
- Applicant’s main centre of interest
- Intentions to live in Ireland as it appears from the evidence.

The evidence used for each factor depends on the facts of the individual case and the final decision reached is to some extent subjective. There have been some criticisms of the subjectivity of the decision-making process (FLAC, 2012).

Health services
There is universal access to public health care in Ireland, although costs may apply (e.g. for GP services). Medical card holders may access certain public health services free of charge in Ireland. Entitlement to medical cards is means-tested regardless of nationality. Asylum applicants living in direct provision are entitled to a medical card, as are refugees and those with leave to remain.

The Health Service Executive’s National Intercultural Health Strategy (HSE, 2008) finished at the end of 2012.

Whilst there is no new strategy planned, the HSE’s Intercultural Health Governance group has the remit to review those recommendations remaining to be implemented and to assess how they can be put into practice. This group meets on a regular basis and its terms of reference include guiding, supporting and monitoring the implementation of national policies/strategies in relation to intercultural health (HSE, 2013).48

Housing services
Local authorities in Ireland are the main provider of social housing for people who need housing and cannot afford to buy a home. Local authority housing is allocated according to housing need, and rents are based on ability to pay. Rent supplement is available for those in private rented accommodation who cannot afford to meet their housing costs.

The Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government has reviewed access to social housing for immigrants and issued revised guidelines in 2012 on access to social housing supports for non-Irish nationals.49 Generally speaking, all EEA nationals may be considered for assessment for social housing support from housing authorities if they are in employment/self-employed in the State; if they are not currently working/employed because they are temporarily unable to work because of illness/accident; or if they are recorded as involuntarily unemployed after having been employed for longer than a year, and they are registered as a job-seeker with Department of Social Protection and FÁS.

A non-EEA national with at least five years’ reckonable residence and a valid current stamp, or with any length of reckonable residence and a valid current stamp extending to potentially permit five years’ residence, is eligible on residence grounds to be considered for social housing support.

New asylum applicants are housed within the direct provision, where they receive food, accommodation and a payment of €19.10 plus €9.60 per child per week. Asylum applicants may not receive rent supplement. For further details, see Joyce and Quinn (2014).

The immigrant population in Ireland has seen unprecedented change since the publication of the 2010 Integration Monitor and now comprises a large group of naturalised migrants who share the same rights and responsibilities as Irish citizens by birth or descent.

Between 2005 and the end of 2013 over 72,500 non-EEA adults acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation. The number of non-EEA adults who acquired citizenship through naturalisation almost doubled between 2010 and 2011 and more than doubled again between 2011 and 2012. Provisional data indicate that the number of certificates of naturalisation issued to non-EEA adults levelled off at just under 18,000 in 2013.

The rapid growth of this section of the Irish population has been closely tracked in the annual Integration Monitors. We estimate that almost one-third of the adult population of ‘non-EEA migrant origin’ had adopted Irish citizenship at end-2012. This group has enhanced opportunities for integration by virtue of unfettered access to institutions, goods and services, as well as the potential for active participation in the democratic process. The final report to the European Commission on Using EU Indicators of Immigrant Integration notes:

> When immigrants take up and use equal rights and responsibilities, they send a strong signal to themselves and others about their sense of belonging in the country. Beyond this symbolic value, this process can improve immigrants’ social, economic, and political participation, the public’s perceptions of immigrants, and the democratic legitimacy of the state. ([European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013](#))

The remarkable statistics included in this chapter reflect the fact that Ireland has entered a phase of the migration cycle in which more and more migrants are becoming eligible for naturalisation. In addition, the past three years have seen significant improvements in the administration of policy regarding naturalisation. Most notably a large backlog of applications has been processed and waiting times for most new applications have been reduced.

Regrettably, progress has not been made in providing access to a transparent long-term residence status, reflected in the declining long-term residence indicator provided in Section 5.2.1. The provision of a long-term residence status with ‘transparent rules, clearly articulated expectations and predictable benefits for law-abiding immigrants’ ([European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013](#)).
Commission, 2004) is of critical importance in creating adequate conditions for access and participation for migrants. Citizenship cannot be a prerequisite for integration. The possibility exists that non-EEA migrants in Ireland will choose naturalisation as the only available means of gaining a viable long-term residence status. The lack of widely accessible long-term residence status therefore impacts particularly negatively on people whose countries do not allow dual citizenship.104

Three indicators were suggested at the Zaragoza ministerial conference for the purpose of measuring integration in the active citizenship domain: the share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship; the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and the share of immigrants among elected representatives. This chapter presents the calculation of these indicators based on the best available national data. Data constraints mean that in the Irish context the indicators may be calculated only for the non-EEA population aged 16 and over. However, sex and nationality information on the entire non-EEA group (all age groups) who naturalised in 2012 is also provided below.

It should be noted that the citizenship and long-term residence indicators do not allow us to directly compare the outcomes for Irish and non-Irish nationals; instead, they describe the context and the opportunities for integration.

5.1 Citizenship

The increased numbers of certificates for naturalisation arise from rising numbers of applications (9,000 valid applications105 were received in 2010, increasing to 18,300 in 2011, 19,900 in 2012 and 12,500 up to the end of August 2013)106 and the fact that a large backlog of applications for naturalisation has been reduced. Approximately 22,000 applications were awaiting decision in March 2011, but the number had fallen to approximately 8,500 applications pending a decision in December 2013.107 Currently, 95 per cent of all valid applications are approved (Department of Justice and Equality, 2013b).

The 2010 Integration Monitor noted significant delays in processing applications for citizenship through naturalisation. However, by January 2014 over 70 per cent of citizenship applications were being processed within six months. Since June 2011 certificates of naturalisation are delivered to citizens at citizenship ceremonies and 84 such ceremonies had been held by January 2014.108 The introduction of an improved application form in June 2011 has contributed to fewer invalid applications being made. Since 2011 OPMI has funded the New Communities Partnership’s Citizenship Application Support Service, which assists migrants to fill in applications for citizenship.109

The number of certificates issued to non-EEA nationals by age group and nationality is shown in Table 5.1. During 2012 almost 24,200 citizenship certificates were issued to non-EEA nationals. This represents a fourfold increase on the total number issued in 2010.110 The number of certificates issued to non-EEA children increased from 590 to 3,973 between 2011 and 2012, or an increase from 6 per cent of the total issued to non-EEA nationals in 2011 to 16 per cent in 2012.

The number of certificates issued to EEA nationals remains relatively low at 965 in 2012 or 4 per cent of the 25,132 certificates of naturalisation issued in the year.111

### Table 5.1 Citizenship Certificates Issued to Non-EEA Nationals by Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-EEA nationals aged under 16</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>3,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EEA nationals aged 16+</td>
<td>4,969</td>
<td>9,529</td>
<td>20,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,009</td>
<td>10,119*</td>
<td>24,167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: INIS, Eurostat. Notes: Non-EEA data include persons recorded as ‘stateless’: three in 2011; six in 2012. * A further 263 certificates were issued to persons whose nationality was not readily available in 2011.

104 For example China does not allow dual citizenship, while India allows dual citizenship only under certain circumstances.
105 ‘Valid applications’ refers to those applications accepted for processing, i.e. they were correctly completed and included the required supporting documentation.
106 Minister for Justice and Equality, parliamentary question, 18 September 2013.
108 Speech delivered by the Minister for Justice and Equality on 20 January 2014 at a Citizenship Ceremony held in the Convention Centre, Dublin. 
110 Provisional data from INIS.
111 Data from INIS.
5.1.1 Profile of All Non-EEA Nationals Who Acquired Citizenship in 2012

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide additional information on non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship through naturalisation during 2012. Table 5.2 shows that almost 3,000 more females than males acquired citizenship in the period.

Table 5.3 lists the top ten nationalities of total non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship by naturalisation in 2011 and 2012. The top three countries of nationality in 2012 – Nigeria, Philippines and India – accounted for half of all non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship by naturalisation.

More than four and a half times as many Nigerian nationals naturalised in 2012 as in 2011, and the number of Filipino nationals who naturalised more than doubled in the same period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality of applicant</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Nationality of applicant</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>1,755</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>Nigerian</td>
<td>5,702</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>3,848</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>2,625</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>1,291</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Chinese (incl. Hong Kong)</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Hasse</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>South African Hasse</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese (incl. Hong Kong)</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Moldovan</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3,267</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6,695</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,119</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,167</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INIS, Eurostat.

5.1.2 Citizenship Indicators

In the annual Integration Monitor we take advantage of the most accurate available data on the stock of migrants in Ireland: administrative data collected by the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) and the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB). We use this data to report two citizenship indicators. Note that the calculation of these indicators is limited to the population aged 16 and over of non-EEA origin, because that is the group required to register with INIS/GNIB.

First, in order to gain a sense of the overall changes in the population, we report a cumulative share of non-EEA nationals who have ‘ever’ acquired citizenship, expressed as a proportion of the total estimated immigrant population. This share takes a long-term perspective and is consistent with the approach used in previous Integration Monitors. We estimate the total immigrant population to be

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112. Note that these tables include data on non-EEA nationals aged under 16 years, which were unavailable in previous Integration Monitors.

113. At the time of publication of the suggested indicators at Zaragoza it was noted that there was ‘currently no unified view among Member States on indicators in the area of active citizenship. Member States’ views differ in relation to the different views, goals and regulatory frameworks of integration policies in the respective Member States.’ One suggested indicator was the share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship.

114. It is anticipated that the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill will include provision for the registration of non-EEA minors. The possibility of the introduction of interim arrangements for registration of non-EEA children, pending enactment of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, was also raised in the Policy Document on Non-EEA Family Reunification (INIS, 2013).
the number of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over holding ‘live’ immigration permissions, plus the number of non-EEA nationals who ‘ever’ acquired Irish citizenship (i.e. from 2005 until the reference year).\footnote{Note that due to these built-in assumptions the figures will always increase.}

As Table 5.4 shows, some 31.3 per cent of the estimated adult immigrant non-EEA population in Ireland had naturalised by end-2012.

The second indicator is a simplified share of the number who acquired citizenship in the reference year to the number of non-EEA nationals holding ‘live’ immigration permissions. This share has the advantage of allowing for more direct year-on-year comparisons to be drawn. It is also more closely aligned to the methodology used by Eurostat in the pilot study on integration indicators (Eurostat, 2011).

As Table 5.4 shows, the ratio of the total number of immigrant non-EEA adults holding ‘live’ permissions in 2012 to those adults who acquired citizenship in 2012 was 16.8 per cent.

The final report on Using EU Indicators of Immigrant Integration notes that a naturalisation indicator is a: . . . reliable and meaningful measure of the outcomes of policies and of other key contextual factors, such as immigrants’ motivation to naturalise, duration of residence, and settlement in the country. This indicator opens an important debate about the importance of these policies and other factors. Multiple measures of naturalisation complete the picture of citizenship acquisition. (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.4</th>
<th>CITIZENSHIP INDICATORS 2009–2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cumulative ratio</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who ‘ever’ acquired citizenship*</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total estimated ‘immigrant population’ of non-EEA origin aged 16 and over**</td>
<td>154,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of estimated ‘immigrant population’ of non-EEA origin aged 16 and over who ‘ever’ acquired citizenship</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual citizenship acquisition rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over who acquired citizenship in reference year</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over holding ‘live’ immigration permissions</td>
<td>134,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-EEA nationals holding ‘live’ permissions in reference year (aged 16 and over) who acquired citizenship in reference year</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INIS, Eurostat.
Notes: NA signals data not available; * data available from 2005 until reference year; ** derived by adding the number of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over holding ‘live’ immigration permissions (in the form of GNIB registration stamps) to the number of non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship between 2005 and reference year; † excludes 217 cases in respect of which nationality is not readily available.
Taken together, the two indicators reported in Table 5.4 chart very significant changes in Ireland’s population over the past three or four years. Taking a long-term perspective, the proportion of the estimated adult population of immigrant origin that has naturalised has more than doubled between 2009 and 2012. Ireland’s population now includes a substantial group of people of migrant origin who have made a long-term commitment to Ireland by taking Irish citizenship. As in previous Integration Monitors, the following caveats apply: it is not known how many people naturalised prior to 2005 as reliable records do not exist; and it is not known how many people who naturalised subsequently left the State.\textsuperscript{116,117}

The annual citizenship acquisition rate indicates very substantial increases in the numbers of non-EEA adults naturalising each year. Expressed as a ratio of the number of non-EEA adults who naturalised during the year to the resident non-EEA adult population, this indicator shows that year-on-year the ratio doubled between 2010 and 2011, and doubled again between 2011 and 2012.

5.1.3 Issues Regarding Naturalisation in Ireland

Due to the fact that migrants aged under 16 are not required to register with the GNIB, non-EEA children have faced problems proving sufficient reckonable residence in the State for the purposes of making a naturalisation application. Migrant Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI, 2013) notes that two amendments to the rules on naturalisation applications, introduced in 2012, have significantly improved this situation: young adults between the ages of 18 and 23 who entered the State as minor dependants of their parents can apply for naturalisation using the residency stamps of their parents as proof of residency prior to the age of 16. In addition, the children of at least one naturalised Irish citizen parent, who have been legally resident in the State for three years, may now apply to naturalise on that basis.

As of July 2013 non-EEA nationals who acquire EEA citizenship during their college course are not required to pay full tuition fees, provided that they have been resident for three of the previous five years (Department of Education and Skills, 2013a). MRCI (2013) stress that residency, not citizenship, should be the basis for access to higher education by the children of legally resident non-EEA nationals.

In 2013 the ACIT (Access to Citizenship and Its Impact on Immigrant Integration) Handbook for Ireland was published by the Migration Policy Group and the Immigrant Council of Ireland. Funded under the EIF, this project had the goal of increasing understanding of how law, implementation and other factors affect citizenship acquisition. The 2008 data used in the handbook predate the significant improvements made to the naturalisation procedure in Ireland (as argued by the Minister for Justice and Equality in response to the publication of the handbook – Department of Justice and Equality, 2013b). Overall, the handbook states that Ireland’s legal regime is more inclusive than that found in most EU countries, with fewer obstacles in law to ordinary naturalisation, evidenced in straightforward residence requirements and the absence of formal language, civic knowledge and economic resource requirements. The handbook observes that Ireland’s favourable naturalisation law is undermined by unfavourable implementation procedures; in particular the far-reaching nature of the Minister for Justice and Equality’s discretion in granting or refusing applications is highlighted, as well as the fact that Ireland is the only one of the pre-enlargement EU15 Member States without a clear right of appeal of naturalisation decisions. It is also argued that despite the fact that Ireland imposes no statutory economic requirement for naturalisation, the naturalisation procedure ‘involves an implicit economic requirement based on non-reliance on social assistance and the ability to be self-supporting in future’ (Migration Policy Group and Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2013).

\textsuperscript{116} The stock figure used includes certain groups of non-EEA nationals, such as students, intra-company transferees and trainees, whose residence in Ireland does not count as ‘reckonable residence’ when applying for naturalisation. Such groups are included in the estimate because it is a matter of national policy whether or not their residence counts towards eligibility for naturalisation. To exclude them would conflate the ‘policy outcome’ with ‘policy output’ within the indicator. A similar approach was adopted in the Eurostat pilot study.

\textsuperscript{117} Any naturalised Irish citizen who will be living outside Ireland for a period and who wants to retain Irish citizenship now has to register annually and declare their intention to retain Irish citizenship.
BOX 5.1 ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship through naturalisation
An application for a certificate of naturalisation is considered under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, as amended. Foreign nationals living in Ireland may apply to the Minister for Justice and Equality to become an Irish citizen if they are over 18, or a minor who was born in the State after 1 January 2005. The applicant must have been of good character and have had a period of one year’s continuous reckonable residence in the State immediately before the date of application and, during the previous eight years, have had a total reckonable residence in the State amounting to four years. The applicant must intend in good faith to continue to reside in the State after naturalisation and make a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State. Applicants are usually required to have been ‘self-supporting’, i.e. not dependent on social welfare for the three years prior to application. Periods spent in Ireland as, for example, an asylum applicant or a student are not considered when calculating reckonable residence.

There is now a legal obligation on the State to provide reasons for a refusal of an application for naturalisation. However, there is no mechanism for challenging a refusal of an application. Irish citizenship may be withdrawn no matter how long a person has been an Irish citizen (although not if it would make them stateless).

Citizenship through birth or descent
The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 provides that only children born to Irish citizen parent(s) automatically become Irish citizens. A child born on the island of Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 is entitled to Irish citizenship if they have a British parent, or a parent who is entitled to live in Northern Ireland or the Irish State without restriction on their residency. Other foreign national parents of children born on the island of Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 must prove that they have a genuine link to Ireland (evidenced by being resident legally for at least three of the previous four years) in order for their child to claim Irish citizenship.

Irish citizens may hold the citizenship of another country without giving up their Irish citizenship.

5.2 LONG-TERM RESIDENCE

Long-term residence is a secure migration status offered to migrants who have legally and continuously resided in the host country for a requisite period of time, often five years. Typically the status offers migrants treatment more equal to citizens of the host country, without requiring them to adopt the nationality of the country. EU Directive 2003/109/EC, concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, states that the integration of ‘third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the Member States is a key element in promoting economic and social cohesion’. Ireland has not opted in to Directive 2003/109/EC. In the absence of a statutory scheme (expected to be included in the forthcoming Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill) an administrative long-term residence is open to employment permit holders (and their dependent spouses) and scientific researchers only. See Box 5.2 for a description of access to long-term residence in Ireland.

5.2.1 Long-Term Residence Indicator

The share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence was agreed by the EU Member States as a core indicator of integration outcomes. In this Integration Monitor we report an annual ratio of non-EEA nationals holding long-term residence in the period from 2010 to 2012 to the number of ‘live’ immigration permissions held by non-EEA nationals in the same years (see Table 5.5). The ratio of non-EEA nationals holding a long-term residence permit to all non-EEA adults with an immigration permission to be in the State fell again

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118 See www.inis.gov.ie and www.citizensinformation.ie for more general information.
119 Following the judgment in the case of Mallak [2012] IESC 59.
120 If children are born outside Ireland their parent or grandparent must have been born in Ireland for them to qualify automatically for citizenship. See www.inis.gov.ie for further information.
121 Under the terms of the protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Ireland does not take part in the adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title IV of the EC Treaty unless Ireland opts in to the measure. Ireland has given an undertaking to opt in to measures that do not compromise the Common Travel Area with the UK.
123 In previous Monitors we reported a cumulative rate, which in 2011 cannot be sufficiently disaggregated to exclude renewals.
year-on-year from 6.0 per cent to 4.8 per cent in 2012. [This calculation excludes persons granted ‘permission to remain without condition as to time’, see Box 5.2.]. Some 474 new long-term residence permits were issued in 2012. Provisional data indicate that the number of new long-term residence permits issued fell again to 249 in 2013.124

### Table 5.5 Long-Term Residence Indicator 2010–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-EEA adults holding long-term residence in reference year</td>
<td>8,367</td>
<td>7,721</td>
<td>5,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of non-EEA nationals holding ‘live’ permissions in reference year (aged 16 and over)</td>
<td>133,232</td>
<td>128,104</td>
<td>120,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of non-EEA adults holding long-term residence in reference year to non-EEA nationals holding ‘live’ permissions in reference year (aged 16 and over)</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INIS, Eurostat.

The fall in long-term residence permits issued appears to be closely associated with the increase in naturalisation certificates issued. In the 2012 Integration Monitor we reported that INIS attributed the decline in the number of long-term residence permits issued partly to the fact that certain resources have been redeployed to deal with the backlog of citizenship applications. However, Table 5.6 shows that new applications fell steeply, from 2,415 applications in 2010 to 288 in 2013 (the latter figure is provisional). Some of this decline may reflect increased loss of employment in recent years: migrants must accrue 60 months of employment before applying for long-term residence.

### Table 5.6 Applications for Long-Term Residence 2010–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New applications for long-term residence in reference year</td>
<td>2,415</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INIS; 2013 data are provisional.

### 5.2.2 Issues Related to Long-Term Residence in Ireland

The Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2010, which included provision for the first Irish statutory long-term residence status, was not enacted. It has been indicated that a revised Bill will be introduced and enacted later in 2014 (Department of Justice and Equality, 2014a). Although the exact content of the revised Bill is unknown, it is likely to include provision for a long-term residence status.

The EU Directive on long-term residents, in which Ireland does not participate, provides that participating States must recognise long-term resident status of all non-EEA migrants after five years of continuous legal residence. Long-term residents receive a permanent residence permit, which is valid for at least five years and is automatically renewable. Under the Directive, a long-term resident can expect equal treatment to nationals as regards access to, and conditions of, employment, education, welfare benefits, social assistance, etc. Long-term residents also enjoy enhanced protection against expulsion. An equivalent transparent and widely accessible long-term residence status is not yet in place in Ireland. The Integration Centre (2013), in its Roadmap to Integration, calls for the existing administrative long-term residence scheme to be made more widely available to immigrant groups other than employment permit holders and for the possibility of permanent residence to be introduced.
Ireland does not yet have a statutory long-term residence status. The current administrative scheme allows persons who have been legally resident in the State for a continuous period of five years or more on the basis of an employment permit (and their dependent spouses), and scientific researchers, to apply for a five-year residency extension. They may also then apply to work without the need to hold an employment permit. A €500 fee for processing applications under this scheme was introduced in 2009. This long-term residency scheme is available to those who are still in employment and to those with an employment permit who, having completed five years’ work, have been made redundant.

The green card as introduced (see Box 2.1) was intended to lead directly to the granting of long-term residence. Given the delays in enacting the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, the Department of Justice and Equality introduced an interim administrative scheme in August 2010, whereby the holders of green cards for two years, or former holders of green cards who were granted stamp 4 for 12 months, may be granted a stamp 4 permission for a further two years. The stamp 4 issued entitles the holder to work in the State without an employment permit. This is subject to the applicant complying with previous immigration and employment permit conditions and being ‘of good character’.

Non-EEA nationals who have lived in Ireland for at least eight years and who are of ‘good character’ may be permitted to remain in Ireland ‘without condition as to time’. They receive a stamp 5 registration on their passport and can work without an employment permit (Becker, 2010). Between January and December 2012 just under 1,500 stamp 5 registrations were ‘live’ in the State.

5.3 CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Ireland’s political system is generally deemed to be inclusive and to offer favourable conditions for migrant integration. See, for example, MIPEX 2011 (Huddleston et al., 2011). A UNHCR (2014) report notes that Ireland is unusual in having easy access to politicians, representatives and institutions in general. Irish citizenship is required in order to stand or vote in general elections, but all residents in Ireland, regardless of nationality, may stand and vote in local elections. Rules on voting and standing in elections in Ireland are discussed in more detail in Box 5.3.

Ahead of the local and European elections scheduled to take place on 23 May 2014, efforts are under way to raise awareness of migrant voting rights. Dublin City Council launched a poster campaign in 17 languages, and the Department of the Environment published an information leaflet. NGOs, including The Integration Centre and Nasc, have launched an online awareness campaign entitled ‘Your Ireland, Your Vote’, which seeks to inform people with a migrant background about their entitlement to vote, how to register and the role of local government. Forum Polonia has supported Polish people in contesting the 2014 local elections and launched a campaign entitled: ‘Vote! You Are at home’.

The Integration Centre argues that the funds available to NGOs to promote migrant voter registration and participation are much reduced since the last local elections in 2009, when several large-scale campaigns by NGOs and local authorities received State funding. A research report published in the period suggests that there is a perception among political parties that immigrants are unlikely to vote in the 2014 local government elections (Fanning et al., 2014). It is argued that this perception has undermined commitments to integration within political parties and that very few immigrant candidates have been selected by Irish political parties for the upcoming local government elections.

UNHCR (2014) highlighted the importance of volunteering to refugees, as a platform for creating
and sustaining social and ethnic-community bridges, as a tool to improve English language skills and as a space for skills learning – skills that could then be transferred to other spheres of life. During 2013 the International Organization for Migration, in collaboration with the Dublin City Volunteer Centre, published a guide to assist organisations interested in involving migrant volunteers as well as those who want to promote diversity and enhance cultural awareness through volunteering. The guide arose from the Grassroots Integration through Volunteering Experiences (GIVE) project, an EU-funded project that seeks to enhance migrant participation (International Organization for Migration Mission in Ireland, 2013).

UNHCR (2014) also identified a lack of data on how refugees engage in political debates and take up membership of a political party. English language proficiency and political and cultural knowledge were all identified as prerequisites to civic and political involvement. Earlier research is quoted, which suggested that although refugees are often aware of their right to vote, few exercise this right (UNHCR, 2014).

NGO the New Communities Partnership, in collaboration with Dublin’s four local authorities, launched A Practical Guide to Assisting Integration for Local Authorities aimed at promoting participation of migrant communities in local authority structures (O’Connor, 2013).

OPMI has recently started to track migrant representation on national, regional and local bodies, committees, etc.131

5.3.1 Political Participation Indicator

The recommended Zaragoza indicator of integration in this domain is the share of immigrants among elected representatives. As there have been no local elections since June 2009, the political participation indicator remains unchanged. Four immigrants were elected in the 2009 local elections; they originated from Nigeria, Netherlands, Russia and Lithuania. There are 1,627 local authority members in Ireland (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, 2009) and this gives a share of 0.2 per cent. A total of 37 migrant candidates stood in the 2009 local elections, of which 14 originally came from Nigeria and eight from Poland, with the result that 10 per cent of immigrant candidates were elected (Mutwarasibo, 2011).

The last general election, in which only Irish and UK citizens had a vote, took place in February 2011. Out of 564 candidates nationwide,132 one candidate was originally from Libya, one from Cameroon and two were from Nigeria (Mutwarasibo, 2011). None were elected.133

At the time of writing, an estimated 30 migrant candidates were running in the 2014 local elections.134

BOX 5.3 ACCESS TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Ireland is a parliamentary democracy. The Oireachtas (parliament) includes two houses: Dáil Éireann (the house of representatives) and Seanad Éireann (the senate). Each of the Dáil’s 166 members is called a Teachta Dála (TD), and has been directly elected by the people through a general election. General elections must be held at least once every five years (the most recent one took place in February 2011). By-elections are held if a TD dies or resigns.

Only Irish and UK citizens may vote in general elections. UK nationals may do so by virtue of reciprocal voting rights in Ireland and the UK. Only Irish citizens may stand at general elections or vote in referenda. European citizens may vote in European elections if they first de-register in their home Member State.

Local elections are also held at maximum five-year intervals to elect councillors to local authorities. There are 114 local authorities in Ireland comprising: 29 county councils, 5 city councils, 5 borough councils and 75 town councils.135 All residents – Irish, EU and non-EU – may vote or stand in local elections.

To vote, an individual’s name must have been entered on the electoral register. The city and county councils compile a register of electors every year. In order to be included in the register a person may have to provide proof of identity.136

131 See www.integration.ie.
133 It is difficult to be definitive on whether or not general election candidates have a migrant background. It depends on whether a candidate wants this to be known, as all are Irish or UK citizens. Some may also be second-generation migrants.
134 Adrian Kavanagh blog: http://adriankavanaghelections.org/.
135 From June 2014 town and borough councils will be closed and city and county councils will merge in three areas: Waterford (city and county), Limerick (city and county) and Tipperary (north and south county).
136 See www.checktheregister.ie.
5.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP

At the end of 2013 Ireland’s population comprised an estimated 72,500 naturalised adults of non-EEA origin, each of whom now shares the rights and responsibilities of Irish citizens by birth or descent. This development is unprecedented in scale and can only facilitate the integration of the people concerned. However, the acquisition of citizenship cannot be seen as a panacea, or as broadly equivalent to integration in the active citizenship domain. In relation to refugees, UNHCR stresses the impact of the refugee’s previous experiences in his or her country of origin, during the asylum process, or upon granting of protection status, on later participation in civic and political life. ‘In practical terms, citizenship and having an Irish passport is instrumental to determine how refugees position themselves in Irish society, although the hurdle of belonging is difficult to overcome’ (UNHCR, 2014).

The relationship between declining numbers of long-term residence permits being issued and rapidly increasing numbers of naturalisations warrants closer attention from policymakers. It is possible that at least some new Irish citizens opted for naturalisation because they did not deem the current long-term residence scheme to be a viable option.

The choice to take Irish citizenship through naturalisation, which is acknowledged to be a ‘solemn personal undertaking’ and a ‘life-altering event’ for recipients and their families, could be compromised by the fact that it remains the only long-term immigration status, accessible to all, with clearly defined rights and entitlements attached.

137 Speech delivered by the Minister for Justice and Equality on 20 January 2014 at a Citizenship Ceremony held in the Convention Centre, Dublin.
Many analysts argue that the outcomes of the second generation should be the benchmark by which integration is judged (OECD, 2012). The relatively recent nature of Irish immigration means that many children in Ireland were born abroad, yet this is probably less true of very young children. In many countries there may be substantial populations of immigrant children, as immigrants often migrate at a stage in the life course when people form families (UNICEF, 2009). Census data indicate that an increasing proportion of Eastern European nationals in Ireland are living in families, this is particularly true of the Polish population (CSO, 2012). This chapter uses new data from the Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) study to examine the lives of three-year-old children born of immigrant parents in Ireland, and looks at how these compare with the lives of Irish children.

There is growing attention in Ireland on the issue of migrant children in Irish schools and the challenges faced by the Irish education system in dealing with national and linguistic diversity (Devine, 2005; Smyth et al., 2009). Qualitative studies focus on the experience of migrant children (Devine et al., 2008) and inter-ethnic relations (Curry et al., 2011) and other studies look at the distribution of children across schools (Byrne et al., 2010). A recent study considers the experience of nine-year-old children in Irish schools, and how the educational experience of the children of immigrants compares with that of Irish children (McGinnity et al., 2012). A number of studies that focus on school-age immigrant children encompass broader themes such as identity, language, well-being and risk (Darmody et al., 2011a, 2011b).

Summarising research on immigrant children in the United States, Zhou (1997) argues that the research shows that the children’s progress in adapting to American society largely depends on: what their parents bring to the country in terms of money, education, job skills; the social conditions their families left and enter into (where they live, their parents’ income); and cultural patterns including values, family structure and social ties. Much less is known about younger migrant children and their families in Ireland. A report on the GUI study presents a comprehensive picture of the lives of three year olds and their development, but does not distinguish immigrant children (Williams et al., 2013). This chapter offers the first analysis of this data that compares a range of outcomes relating to health, diet, families, childcare, work and financial strain for
immigrant and non-immigrant children and their families.

The GUI study offers an excellent opportunity to examine the lives of three-year-old children born of immigrant parents in Ireland, and looks at how these compare with the lives of Irish children (Williams et al., 2013). The GUI is a large nationally representative longitudinal study and has the child at its centre. It is a rich dataset, with a range of different indicators, based on a sample of almost 10,000 three year olds in 2011. A significant proportion of these children (around 15 per cent) have immigrant mothers [see Section 6.1 for details on the data and the definition of immigrant mothers].

Age three is an important stage in child development. Many three year olds are healthy, although some health problems can emerge (Hansen and Joshi, 2007). What children eat can vary remarkably across homes (Williams et al., 2013). The family is still very much at the centre of the children’s lives, and forms the context from which they will develop and explore their world. Section 6.2 looks in more detail at the influence of the child’s family (household structure, mother’s education).

Three year olds in Ireland do not go to school, but many attend some form of non-parental childcare or preschool. Section 6.3 looks at who is caring for the three year old, the mother’s employment and levels of financial strain.

Section 6.4 examines the children’s overall health, use of healthcare and diet. Are there significant differences between the children of immigrants born in Ireland and Irish children in terms of health, family and income? Do these differences vary by national group?

By considering a broad range of indicators in different life domains, this special chapter allows us to assess in what ways the lives of three year olds of immigrant origin differ from those born to Irish mothers. Note that while the charts in this chapter are based on a large sample of three year olds in Ireland, they are descriptive. Children and their families will vary by many other characteristics that will affect outcomes, not just by their parents’ place of birth, and readers should bear this in mind. Even within the country groupings used, there is a great variety of countries of origin. Indeed, while we frequently refer to the group as immigrant children, they are more precisely the children of immigrants. The reasons for this, and how we define the group, are outlined in Section 6.1.

6.1 DEFINING THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE GUI INFANT COHORT

6.1.1 The GUI Study

The analysis in this chapter is based on the Infant Cohort of the GUI study, a nationally representative sample of just over 11,100 children and their families. The infants were all born between December 2007 and May 2008 and were randomly selected from the Child Benefit Register. Interviews were conducted when these children were aged nine months, and then again at three years old (Williams et al., 2013).138 This chapter is based on the 9,793 children and their families, re-interviewed between December 2010 and June 2011, when the children were three. As is typical in surveys of this nature, the sample was re-weighted to ensure that the information is representative of three year olds in Ireland who were resident in Ireland at nine months.139

6.1.2 Defining Immigrants in the Study

Typically in research of this nature, young immigrant children are identified according to the background of their family or primary caregiver. Immigrant primary caregivers, the vast majority of whom are mothers, are those who are born abroad and who define themselves as ethnically not Irish.140 Using this definition, Irish primary caregivers comprise 85 per cent of the caregivers of three year olds in this sample: and the remaining 15 per cent are immigrants.141

138 This study is based on the researcher micro file from the Infant Cohort, Wave 2 (at 3 years), of GUI, made available through the CSO and the Department of Children and Youth Affairs.

139 The reweighting corrects for infants present at Wave 1 but who had moved abroad by Wave 2 [see Williams et al., 2013 for further details]. The sample does not include children who had not been resident in Ireland when the first interview took place.

140 Their ethnicity could be White non-Irish, African, Asian, Other [as in the Census]. A very small proportion of primary caregivers are either fathers or others. In this chapter the word ‘mother’ is used to denote primary caregiver.

141 An alternative definition would be to take account of the father’s ethnicity as well. This is not possible for children who do not have their father present, therefore the mother’s origin is used. Some studies count children as immigrants if either parent is not a native of the host country [e.g. UNICEF, 2009].
For many of the outcomes investigated we are also interested in country of origin, which is taken as the mother’s place of birth. Immigrant mothers come from a wide range of countries. For analysis purposes we divided the immigrant group into: UK; Western Europe, excluding UK and Ireland (EU13); EU Eastern Europe (EU12); Africa; Asia; and ‘Rest of the World’ (e.g. United States, Canada, Australia, non-EU Eastern Europe and South America). This grouping allows distinctions by region of origin, and is reasonably consistent with country groupings from Chapters 2 and 3. The exception is the ‘Rest of the World’ category, where the number of cases does not permit further disaggregation, and so those from English-speaking countries (e.g. United States, Canada, Australia) are merged with those from non-EU Eastern Europe (e.g. Ukraine, Russia) and Latin America (e.g. Brazil).142 Figure 6.1 shows the proportions in each group, the data is weighted to be representative.

Figure 6.1 shows that almost 86 per cent of the mothers in the sample are Irish, following the definition described above. Another 5.5 per cent are EU Eastern European (one-third of the immigrant sample) and almost 3 per cent are of African origin (one-fifth of the immigrant sample). Mothers born in Asia account for 2.2 per cent of mothers (15 per cent of the immigrant sample), with UK mothers accounting for 2 per cent (13 per cent of immigrant mothers) and mothers from the ‘Rest of the World’ accounting for 1.4 per cent (9 per cent of immigrant mothers). The smallest group is mothers from Western Europe (EU13), who account for just 1.2 per cent of mothers.

![Figure 6.1: Place of Birth of Immigrant Mothers (Weighted) 2011](image)

Source: Own calculations based on the GUI Infant Cohort, Wave 2.

It should be noted that as a sample of mothers, this differs from a sample of all immigrants in Ireland in a number of ways. For example, the mean age of mothers in the sample is 34 years, compared with the mean age of 45 for those over 16 years old reported in Chapter 4. Also, selection into motherhood may vary across immigrant groups, depending on life stage of migration, migration motives and intentions to stay. Throughout this chapter, as in others, we run statistical tests to check that we can be confident about the differences between groups, given the size of the groups in the sample.

142 An alternative definition would be based on ethnicity, with the categories: White Irish, White Other, Black, Asian and Other (mixed race). One issue here is that the vast majority of immigrants to Ireland are White, so some further disaggregation of ‘White Non-Irish’ would be necessary for meaningful analysis. While this could be done using place of birth, there is a remaining issue of how to classify ‘mixed race’, a group too small to classify separately. Analyses using this alternative classification suggest there are not large differences between the groups.
6.2 CHILD’S FAMILY

This section focuses on the child’s family, which plays an extremely important role in the life of any three-year-old child. For immigrant children, we are interested in the resources the child’s family brought with them to Ireland and their resources in Ireland.

Previous research has shown that the living arrangements of children, in particular whether they are living with one or two parents, may influence the quality of life and developmental outcomes of young children. McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) note that children in one-parent families may do less well on a number of developmental indicators than children living with two parents, although the causes of this may be complex and related to financial resources, parental stress, and time and energy available for parenting. Whether a child is growing up with a sibling or siblings may also affect their quality of life and the time their parents can devote to them.

Figure 6.2 presents basic information on the family the child is living in, i.e. whether the child lives with one or two parents, and whether the child has any siblings. It shows that while most three year olds are living in a family with two parents and at least one other child, there is also variation by country group in terms of family structure. In other Western countries, immigrant children are often more likely to be living in larger families than native children are (UNICEF, 2009). This is not evident from Figure 6.2; in fact, it is generally more common for non-Irish groups to live with two parents and no siblings, compared with Irish children. Family size in Ireland is larger than the European average, and being an only child is not so common: this may be part of the reason why immigrant children are less likely than their Irish counterparts to have siblings at age three. Having no siblings is most common among EU Eastern Europeans, where one-third of children are ‘only children’ living with two parents at age three; this may reflect fertility patterns in Eastern Europe.

**Figure 6.2** FAMILY TYPE OF 3 YEAR OLDS BY COUNTRY GROUPING 2011

Source: Own calculations based on the GUI Infant Cohort, Wave 2.
Note: The difference between Irish children and EU Eastern European and African children in terms of family type is statistically significant; all other groups do not differ significantly in terms of family type.
Lone parenthood is more common among African mothers, where just over one-quarter are lone parents, compared with 15 per cent of Irish mothers. Conversely, the proportions of lone-parent mothers from Western Europe and the ‘Rest of the World’ are very low indeed.

In terms of resources, the educational qualifications of the child’s mother is important for a number of reasons. Qualifications are likely to be associated with the level of financial resources available in the household. Parental educational qualifications are also strongly linked to children’s educational success. Figure 6.3 presents the educational qualifications of mothers by country of origin groupings. Educational qualifications are divided into three categories: lower secondary or less; leaving certificate or equivalent; and third-level degree and non-degree qualifications.

With the exception of mothers from the UK, who show a similar pattern to Irish mothers, there is a general tendency for immigrant mothers to be more highly educated than Irish mothers. This is particularly true for Western European mothers, just under 80 per cent of whom have a third-level qualification. Qualifications are also high among mothers from the ‘Rest of the World’ (over 70 per cent of whom have third-level qualifications) and Asia (over 60 per cent); this compares with just over 50 per cent of Irish mothers.

African and EU Eastern European mothers have lower rates of third-level qualifications, but in both cases around 40 per cent have acquired a leaving certificate or equivalent. The UK group has the highest proportion of mothers having no qualifications (leaving certificate or less). While these findings are for the mothers of three year olds, the patterns are broadly similar to those reported in Chapter 3 (see, for example, Table 3.1).

**Figure 6.3 Educational Qualifications of Mothers by Country Grouping 2011**

Source: Own calculations based on the GUI Infant Cohort, Wave 2.
Note: The difference between the educational qualifications of mothers from Western Europe, Africa, Asia and the ‘Rest of the World’ is statistically significant (p≤0.05); the difference between the qualifications of mothers from the UK and Eastern Europe and Irish mothers is not statistically significant.
In terms of age, the overall mean in the sample and the mean age for Irish mothers of three year olds is 34 years. The mean age of mothers from Africa and the ‘Rest of the World’ is also 34. On average, Western European mothers tend to be slightly older (mean age 36) and EU Eastern European mothers younger (mean age 31). The mean age of Asian mothers is 33, and of UK mothers is 35.

6.3 CARE ARRANGEMENTS, MOTHER’S EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE FAMILY

An increasing number of studies have highlighted the benefits of preschool education for the children of immigrants (Haskins and Tienda, 2011). This is particularly true if their home environment is characterised by low parental education and limited English skills. Figure 6.4 presents the proportion of three year olds in non-parental childcare for eight hours or more each week from different country groupings. While just over 50 per cent of children are using non-parental childcare at this age, the proportion is higher for the children of Western European mothers (57 per cent) and much lower for EU Eastern European and African children (around 35 per cent), falling to only one in four Asian children (25 per cent). This finding is related to differences in the employment patterns of mothers, discussed below.

![Figure 6.4: Child in non-parental care for 8 hours plus per week 2011](image)

Source: Own calculations based on the GUI Infant Cohort, Wave 2.

Note: The difference between the proportion of children in childcare from Ireland and children from EU Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia is statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05); other group differences are not statistically significant.

Non-parental childcare comprises relative care, typically grandparents in Ireland; non-relative care, typically a childminder or nanny, but also friends and neighbours; and centre-based care, which includes crèches and playschools. Home-based care can be in either the carer’s home or the child’s home (see McGinnity et al., 2013a for further details of measuring childcare type in the GUI Infant Cohort). The results are presented in Figure 6.5 for the children of Irish mothers and the children of immigrants.
The employment of mothers has risen rapidly in the past 20 years in Ireland (see McGinnity et al., 2013a).

Immigrant children are also less likely than Irish children to be in non-relative care (18 per cent and 24 per cent respectively). However, two-thirds of immigrant children are in centre-based care, whereas just over half of Irish children are. The lower proportion of immigrant children in non-relative care may relate to the highly unregulated nature of non-relative care in Ireland. A large proportion of childminders and nannies are unregulated, and most carers are recruited by word of mouth. Without being embedded in local social networks, immigrant parents may lack information about the availability of childminders. Of course, immigrant parents may have a preference for centre-based care for a variety of reasons: on average, qualifications of centre-based carers are higher than those of home-based carers (McGinnity et al., 2013a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour force status</th>
<th>Irish mothers</th>
<th>Immigrant mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity leave</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Labour force status is an important indicator of resources. In Figure 6.6, labour force status is categorised into three groups: ‘employed’, comprising employed, self-employed and those on maternity leave; ‘home duty’, i.e. mothers at home looking after their children; and ‘other’, including students, unemployed, long-term sick and those not allowed to work for immigration-related reasons. In terms of labour force status, Irish mothers are similar to Western Europeans, with over 50 per cent of them at work when their child was aged three.¹⁴⁵ All other non-Irish groups report significantly lower levels of employment, and higher levels of mothers recording home duties. These findings clearly follow a similar pattern to the proportion of children in non-parental care presented in Figure 6.4. Part of the lower employment rates among immigrant mothers may be to do with preferences and/or different attitudes towards mothers of

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¹⁴⁵ The employment of mothers has risen rapidly in the past 20 years in Ireland (see McGinnity et al., 2013a).
preschool children working in countries of origin. However, it may also be linked to the cost of childcare in Ireland, which is among the highest in the OECD, in the context of very low state financial support for childcare (McGinnity et al., 2013a). McGinnity et al. (2013a) find that relative care is much more common among low-income mothers. For low-income immigrant mothers, relative care may not be an option if the extended family lives abroad, and they may not be able to afford the high costs of paid childcare if they have low earnings potential. This would be an interesting topic for further investigation, particularly given international concerns about the low employment rate of immigrant women (UNICEF, 2009; Bijl and Verweij, 2012).

Some immigrant mothers record higher proportions in the ‘other’ category, notably African, EU Eastern Europe and UK mothers. To what extent these mothers are unemployed, students or in another category would require further investigation, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.

FIGURE 6.6 LABOUR FORCE STATUS OF MOTHERS BY COUNTRY GROUPING 2011

Source: Own calculations based on the GUI Infant Cohort, Wave 2. Note: The difference in the labour force status of mothers from Ireland and from the UK, Eastern Europe, Africa and the ‘Rest of the World’ is statistically significant (p<0.05); the difference in the labour force status of mothers from Ireland and those from Western Europe and Asia is not statistically significant.

One concern about the children of immigrants is how the financial resources of the family, in particular financial strain, may negatively impact both current well-being and later development. Previous research has shown that immigrants, in spite of relatively high educational qualifications, are not reaching occupational positions commensurate with their skills (Barrett and Duffy, 2008). We use a measure of financial strain to investigate financial difficulties, this relies on the respondents’ self-assessment, but research has found that it correlates well with objective living conditions (Whelan et al., 2001).

A number of recent studies have shown an increase in financial strain for families with children in the recession. Williams et al. (2013), using the GUI data, highlight a substantial increase in the proportion of families reporting financial difficulties between the two waves of the study, 2008 and 2011. In examining the impact of austerity measures in the period from 2008 to 2012 by family type, Callan et al. (2012) find that couples with children, or couples with two earners without children, show the greatest proportionate fall in income.
What about the financial strain on immigrant families? Mothers were asked how easy or difficult it is to make ends meet. Figure 6.7 presents this by country grouping for the responses with some difficulty, with difficulty, and with great difficulty. It shows that 60 per cent of Irish mothers recorded difficulty making ends meet. This relatively high proportion is likely to be due to a combination of labour market recession, high unemployment and austerity measures (see McGinnity et al., 2014, for a summary of austerity measures).

Figure 6.7 presents another indicator of financial well-being based on family income. Income from all sources is pooled and then adjusted for family size, in a similar way to that described in Chapter 4. This needs-adjusted income is then divided into five quintiles, and Figure 6.8 shows the proportion of families in different national groups falling into different quintiles.

The proportion reporting financial difficulties was higher for a number of immigrant groups – somewhat higher for EU Eastern European and Asian mothers, and much higher for African mothers. African mothers recorded very high levels of financial strain, with just over 80 per cent reporting difficulty in making ends meet. Over 20 per cent of African mothers report great difficulty making ends meet. A somewhat lower proportion of Western European mothers recorded financial difficulties: mothers from the UK and the ‘Rest of the World’ were similar to Irish mothers in this indicator.

Figure 6.8 shows that the total sample is distributed evenly across the five quintiles. We ask is this true when we break the sample down further within the groups? For Irish families, more than one-fifth are found in the top income quintile (22 per cent); this is also true of UK and Western European families (24 per cent and 29 per cent respectively). Conversely, a much higher proportion of African families are found in the lowest income quintile (47 per cent), and a somewhat higher proportion of EU Eastern European families (27 per cent) and Asian families (28 per cent) are in this quintile. The higher proportions of some national groups in the lowest income quintile is broadly in line with the responses on difficulties.
making ends meet, although the indicators differ somewhat. The evidence presented in Figure 6.7 on difficulties making ends meet is a subjective question indicating financial strain, whereas income quintile is based on the household’s actual (needs-adjusted) income.

Note that income quintiles only measure differences between groups within the sample, i.e. the benchmarks are set within the sample. If all families with three year olds tend to have lower incomes than all families in Ireland, this will not be captured by this measure.

FIGURE 6.8  INCOME QUINTILE BY COUNTRY GROUPING 2011

Source: Own calculations based on the GUI Infant Cohort, Wave 2.
Note: The distribution of income across quintiles differs significantly between Irish families and those from Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia; the distribution across quintiles does not differ significantly from Irish families for other national groups.

6.4  CHILD’S HEALTH AND DIET

Health is important as a measure of well-being and quality of life for children and their parents. Poor health, in particular chronic illness, can also have an impact on developmental outcomes [Geist et al., 2003]. The GUI study asked mothers to rate their child’s overall health. Many health surveys use a self-rated question as it is quick, simple and has been found to give a reliable indicator of health compared with objective measures of health [Bowling, 2005].

Figure 6.9 presents the proportion of mothers rating their children as ‘very healthy’ (as opposed to: healthy but a few minor problems; sometimes quite ill; or almost always unwell) by country groupings. The majority of children in the sample are rated ‘very healthy’, regardless of country group. The children of UK mothers are rated less healthy than the children of Irish mothers, although the difference is small. Other country groups do not differ significantly from Irish children.
Even where there is no difference in overall health ratings, there may be differences in use of healthcare facilities and medication between Irish and immigrant mothers. Figure 6.10 presents the proportion of three year olds who had received antibiotics in the previous 12 months by country group (antibiotics are only available on prescription from a medical professional, and a charge applies for GP visits unless the family holds a means-tested medical card). Again we see very modest differences between the groups. The only immigrant group to differ significantly from the Irish group is the children of Asian mothers.

Source: Own calculations based on the GUI Infant Cohort, Wave 2.
Note: The difference in the proportions of Irish children and children from Asia is statistically significant for this indicator ($p \leq 0.05$), the differences in the proportions of Irish children and children from the other groups are not statistically significant.
Comparing the average number of GP visits in the year shows a similar pattern, with Asian mothers reporting fewer visits, on average, than Irish mothers (2.0 per year by Asian mothers and 2.6 by Irish mothers), while all other immigrant groups do not differ from Irish mothers. Given the proportions rated ‘very healthy’ in Figure 6.9, it is not that Asian mothers rate their children as more healthy, but rather they seem to visit GPs less often and receive antibiotics less often. Whether this is related to health utilisation practice, or preference, or the type of illness the children had would require further investigation.

A special module of the QNHS on health service utilisation in 2010 found that non-Irish nationals were much less likely to own private medical insurance than Irish nationals, and a greater proportion of non-Irish nationals (42 per cent) had neither private health insurance nor a medical card than Irish nationals, for whom the proportion was 20 per cent (CSO, 2011). The proportion of non-Irish nationals with a medical card (34 per cent) was not so different from Irish nationals (29 per cent). However, medical card coverage and private health insurance, both of which are associated with health service use, may vary substantially within national groups.

There has been increasing interest in the diet of young children in recent years in Ireland (Williams et al., 2013). Diet is related to other health outcomes, particularly obesity (Layte and McCrory, 2011). It is also strongly influenced by parental environment at this age. In the GUI study diet is measured by parental record of the child’s food consumption in the previous 24 hours. Parents were given a list of 15 types of food and drink, and asked whether the child had consumed that particular food/drink once, more than once or not at all. Figure 6.11a presents the proportion of Irish and immigrant children consuming the foods once, or more than once, in the previous 24 hours. Figure 6.11b presents the same information for drinks.

The items listed in Figure 6.11a represent a broad range of foods – high and low fat, energy dense and fruit and vegetables. Immigrant children are more likely to have consumed fresh fruit, raw vegetables and low-fat dairy products than Irish children, although they are also more likely to have consumed chips, sweets and biscuits/cakes. Immigrant children are less likely to have consumed burgers/hot dogs and full-fat dairy products than Irish children.

**FIGURE 6.11A** PERCENTAGE OF IRISH AND IMMIGRANT 3 YEAR OLDS CONSUMING VARIOUS FOODS AT LEAST ONCE IN THE PAST 24 HOURS 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Item</th>
<th>Irish children</th>
<th>Immigrant children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biscuits, doughnuts, cake</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-fat cheese/yoghurt</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-fat cheese/yoghurt</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisps or savoury snacks</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweets</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot Chips or French Fries</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburger, Hot Dog</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Vegetables</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooked Vegetables</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Fruit</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on the GUI Infant Cohort, Wave 2.

Note: The difference in the proportions of Irish children and immigrant children is statistically significant (p<0.05) for the following indicators: fruit, raw vegetables, hamburgers, chips, sweets, full-fat and low-fat dairy products and cake; the difference in the proportions is not significant for cooked vegetables and crisps.
Figure 6.11b presents similar comparisons for drinks. Here we find that while a high proportion of all three year olds consume water, a higher proportion of immigrant children (90 per cent) have done so at least once in the previous 24 hours.

Immigrant children are less likely than Irish children to have consumed fizzy drinks or cordials. They are also less likely to have consumed full-cream milk, and more likely to have consumed low-fat milk.

FIGURE 6.11B PERCENTAGE OF IRISH AND IMMIGRANT 3 YEAR OLDS CONSUMING VARIOUS DRINKS AT LEAST ONCE IN THE PAST 24 HOURS 2011

Source: Own calculations based on the GUI Infant Cohort, Wave 2.
Note: The difference in the proportions of Irish children and immigrant children is statistically significant ($p \leq 0.05$) for all the indicators shown.

What can be said about the consumption of food and drink between Irish and immigrant children? Figure 6.12 attempts to summarise this information by using a scale of dietary quality [see McCrory and Layte, 2012]. In this, the items above are combined, where high-fat, energy-dense foods such as burgers, chips, crisps, biscuits, sweets, fizzy/diet drinks and cordials and full-fat milk are given low scores (negative values) and fruit, vegetables, low-fat dairy products and water are given high scores (positive values). The scale is then divided into ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’, where high is typically healthier.\(^{148}\)

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\(^{148}\) The measure of dietary quality was partitioned into tertiles.
Figure 6.12 shows how children of mothers from Western Europe, EU Eastern Europe and the 'Rest of the World' are much more likely to be in the 'high' end of the diet scale than Irish children. Children from other immigrant groups – UK, Africa, Asia – do not differ from Irish children. Overall, a higher proportion (40 per cent) of immigrant children are more likely to be in the 'high' diet quality category than Irish children (30 per cent). Of course, diet patterns are strongly related to income, education and social class. As earlier sections have shown, these vary by immigrant groups, so it would be interesting to investigate whether these differences remain after controlling for these factors; this analysis is beyond the scope of the present chapter.

6.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS AT 3

Using a large sample of three year olds in Ireland, this chapter has presented a range of indicators of the health, families, care and financial situation of Irish and immigrant children.

In terms of family structure, immigrant children are more likely to be 'only' children at three years old than Irish children. EU Eastern European mothers in particular are more likely to have one child than two or more.

Immigrant mothers are more likely to have a third-level qualification than Irish mothers, in particular mothers from Western Europe, Asia or the 'Rest of the World'. To what extent this advantage translates to the second generation remains to be seen.

In spite of their generally higher level of education, immigrant mothers are less likely to be in employment than Irish mothers, with the exception of mothers from Western Europe and the 'Rest of the World'. Related to this, immigrant children are less likely to be in non-parental childcare for eight hours or more per week. Once again the exception is the children of Western European mothers. Where immigrant children are in non-parental childcare, they are much more likely to be in centre-based care than in the care of a relative. The lack of an extended family living in Ireland may make it more difficult to
combine work and caring for immigrant mothers, especially those with lower earning power, this is in the context of low state support for childcare in Ireland.

Financial strain, which has increased with the recession, tends to be higher among immigrant families, particularly those of African origin, but also those of EU Eastern European and Asian origin. A much higher proportion of African families also have equivalised incomes in the lowest income quintile.

There are rather small differences in terms of overall health, antibiotic use and diet between Irish and immigrant children. If anything, immigrant three year olds have healthier diets than Irish three year olds, particularly those whose mothers are from Western Europe, EU Eastern Europe or the ‘Rest of the World’.

As noted at the outset, these findings are descriptive. Further research would be required to investigate how these differences are linked to factors such as how long the child’s family has been in Ireland, the family’s financial resources/socio-economic status and the educational resources of the mother, among other factors. The GUI study would be excellently suited to such research.

This chapter gives only a few examples of the breadth of indicators available on the GUI study. Further work could compare both cognitive and language outcomes between Irish and immigrant three year olds, as well as physical development, socio-emotional development, parenting and neighbourhood characteristics: this data provides excellent potential for investigating the integration of the second generation.
The main focus of this Monitor is on integration outcomes. This chapter briefly reflects on some of the policy issues to emerge from this report, and on some implications for future data collection.

Following very rapid immigration of non-Irish nationals to Ireland accompanying the economic boom, there are some indications that Ireland may be entering a new phase in terms of migration and integration. The inflow of immigrants is clearly far behind the 2007 peak, but a substantial proportion of the population now living in Ireland is of non-Irish origin (12 per cent non-Irish in the 2011 Census). There have also been changes in that non-Irish population. For example, there is now a significant minority of migrants of non-EEA origin who are Irish citizens (Chapter 5). There has also been a rise in the proportion of non-EU nationals who own their homes (Chapter 4). There is an increasing proportion of families among the migrant population: this rise has been most marked among Eastern European migrants. These changes underline the need for a long-term proactive approach to policy regarding integration, and for integration monitoring. As Collett and Petrovic (2014) argue, if mainstreaming integration policies are to be effective, they need to be accompanied by monitoring outcomes for migrants. Change in the non-Irish population also raises questions about how to identify migrants and measure their outcomes, if a significant minority are now Irish citizens.

7.1 POLICY ISSUES

In the employment domain, Chapter 2 shows that a key issue of concern is that the rate of unemployment among non-Irish nationals is higher than among Irish nationals. Although Ireland is currently emerging from a deep recession, it is important that programmes are implemented to ensure that vulnerable groups are integrated and their skills needs targeted. Targeted labour market and education programmes that focus on providing equal employment opportunities, and offer retraining, education, and language and cultural supports, are vital for ensuring that legally resident immigrants have an equal chance to participate in the labour market and avoid long-term unemployment.

In education, Chapter 3 discusses how the achievement gap in English reading for 15 year olds who are not from an English-speaking background was lower in 2012 than that reported for 2009, but still present. No data have been released yet from PISA on the proportion of immigrants achieving the basic proficiency level 1 or below in English reading in 2012. In order to plan effectively, policymakers...
need to know what proportion of second-level students require English language tuition and the requisite budget requirement; the proportion of students from a migrant background exiting the Irish education system with lower secondary qualifications or less; and whether there are differences in achievement between Irish students and those from a migrant background in state exams. The merging of English language support with special needs education means monitoring of the budget allocation for teaching English as an additional language is no longer possible. The ongoing lack of a clearly defined strategy for English language provision for adults is also problematic, given the role of language in labour market integration and in integration more generally.

There have been some positive developments in the area of fees for third-level education. Non-EEA students, even if they have lived in Ireland for some time, typically pay much higher (full) fees. However, as of July 2013 non-EEA nationals who naturalise during their college course are not required to pay full tuition fees. The Minister for Education has also argued that non-EU fees should be charged to international students only (and not, for example, to the children of non-EEA migrant workers in the State), but acknowledged that this lies issue beyond his direct control.

Chapter 5 shows a rapid rise in the size of the naturalised population in the last few years, due to increased applications as well as improvements in the processing of applications. While ongoing issues remain (such as the absence of administrative appeal), this recent progress in processing naturalisation applications is very positive. Regarding family reunification for non-EEA nationals, increased transparency following the recent publication of guidelines is also a positive development.

Continued delays in enactment of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill mean that Ireland remains without a statutory long-term residence permission. The problems regarding limited access to the current administrative scheme, identified in the 2010, 2011 and 2012 Integration Monitors, persist, as do uncertainties about the exact nature of conditions attached to the status. Chapter 5 also argues that the relationship between declining numbers of long-term residence permits being issued and rapidly increasing numbers of naturalisations warrants closer attention from policymakers.

Evidence both from Chapter 6 on the families of three year olds and from Chapter 4 on the total population suggests that financial difficulties vary across national groups, but that for some non-Irish groups, deprivation, low income and financial difficulties are relatively high. This finding is particularly true for the African group, where levels of deprivation and financial strain are high among the whole population and particularly among mothers.

The low rate of employment among migrant mothers – with the exception of mothers of EU13 origin who are very highly educated – merits closer analysis. One issue is differences between migrant groups in terms of attitudes to mothers working. Another is that the high costs of childcare in Ireland may be particularly problematic for migrant families, given the low availability of relatives as sources of regular non-parental childcare. The introduction of the free preschool year in January 2010, with the associated very high take-up, may be especially relevant for migrant children (see McGinnity et al., 2013a). Given international literature on the potential benefits of preschool education for migrant children being even greater than for native children, monitoring the participation of migrants in preschool education would seem particularly important.

Chapter 1 documents stability in the funding of the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration over the last few years, in the context of a substantial drop in funding since 2008. Immigration may have fallen, but there are no indications that the proportion of migrants living in Ireland has fallen. In fact, if anything, the indications are that immigrants are here to stay. In this context, the Government’s recent commitment to beginning discussions on a new, updated and strengthened integration strategy geared to present conditions is very timely, assuming such a strategy is matched with sufficient resources. There is also cause for concern regarding resources devoted to migrant integration among civil society in Ireland: several philanthropic foundations, which have played an important role in funding in the area of integration, will be winding down their activities in the coming years. Substantial restructuring of the
non-governmental sector is currently under way and it is not clear how essential supports and services for migrants will be carried out in future.

7.2 ISSUES FOR FUTURE DATA COLLECTION

At EU and OECD levels, the issue of monitoring the integration of immigrants has received increasing prominence. The value of such monitoring will only be as good as the evidence and data on which it is based.

One issue is how well non-Irish nationals are represented in social surveys. To be confident that we are representing the situation of non-Irish nationals accurately and monitoring change over time, we need to be sure that they are appropriately represented in the surveys we are using, however challenging this may be. This is particularly important for EEA nationals, who do not appear in any administrative statistics. Refugees also do not appear on administrative statistics, nor are they identified on survey data. Also, surveys do not collect data from those in residential homes, direct provision centres and the homeless – all of whom may be particularly disadvantaged.

In the short term, it is very important that continued efforts be made to encourage the participation of non-Irish nationals in the EU-SILC and the QNHS, which are the major sources of information on income, poverty and the labour market in Ireland. In particular, any future changes in methodology, such as moving from face-to-face interviews to telephone surveys, would need to recognise the potential impact on migrant response rates, especially migrants with poor language skills.

In the medium term, immigrant or ethnic minority boost samples, as conducted in many other European countries, would go a long way to addressing the problem of small sample sizes. These could be part of ongoing large-scale surveys such as the QNHS or the EU-SILC, or surveys such as the European Social Survey. The data would be of considerable benefit to the accurate monitoring of integration in Ireland.

In terms of recording immigrants in official statistics, the fact that non-EEA nationals aged 16 and under are not required to register (with the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service or the Garda National Immigration Bureau) is an ongoing problem. Registration of under 16s is necessary to allow the residence of such children to be officially documented; facilitating access to long-term residence and naturalisation in the future. Significant improvements have been made in the accuracy and availability of administrative statistics on immigration in recent years and the absence of data on children is the key remaining gap.

The immigrant population has changed significantly in Ireland, even since the 2010 Integration Monitor. There is now a sizeable group of immigrants with Irish citizenship, and measuring integration on the basis of nationality will miss an increasing number of naturalised citizens. In fact, any statistics on the basis of nationality will miss an important proportion of the population it is designed to measure. There is an increasingly urgent need for new indicators in this area. One possibility is to use a more durable measure such as ethnicity or ancestry (as in the United States or Australia) to measure integration, to include both naturalised citizens and second-generation immigrants [Waters, 2014]. Another suggestion, discussed at European level, is to include a question on standard social surveys (QNHS, EU-SILC) about each parent’s country of birth. In any case, the increasingly permanent nature of migration in Ireland means researchers and policymakers working on integration need to think carefully about whose outcomes they are measuring and how they should do this.

As noted at the outset, this is the last in a series of four Integration Monitors, and, as far as we are aware, the future of monitoring integration in Ireland is unclear. In order to properly respond to the ongoing changes in Irish society, both positive and negative, and to plan for future change, it is imperative to monitor the integration of immigrants into Irish society on an ongoing and timely basis.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX 1

COMMON BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

1 Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
2 Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.
3 Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.
4 Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.
5 Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.
6 Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration.
7 Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.
8 The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.
9 The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.
10 Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation.
11 Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.
### DEFINITION OF INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1  Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>Proportion of population of working age (15–64) who are employed.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>Proportion of labour force (employed plus unemployed) of working age (15–64) who are unemployed.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
<td>Proportion of adults of working age (15–64) who are in the labour force (employed and unemployed).</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employment rate</td>
<td>Proportion of employed population who are self-employed (that is working in his or her own business, professional practice or farm for the purpose of making a profit).</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2  Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Highest educational attainment</td>
<td>Share of population aged 15 to 64 with third-level, post-leaving certificate, upper secondary and no formal/lower secondary education.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of 25–34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment*</td>
<td>Share of 25 to 34 year olds with tertiary [third-level] education.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of early leavers from education and training*</td>
<td>Share of population aged 20 to 24 with no more than lower secondary education and not currently in education.</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey (QNHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in reading and mathematics* (PISA)</td>
<td>Mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in reading and mathematics by immigrant status using PISA test scores.</td>
<td>PISA 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3  Social inclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Median net income</td>
<td>Median net income – median net [household and equivalised] income of the immigrant population and the Irish population.</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At risk of poverty rate</td>
<td>At risk of poverty rate – share of population with net disposable income of less than 60 per cent of national median.</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent poverty rates</td>
<td>Proportion of population both [1] at risk of poverty and [2] living in households that lack two or more basic items such as food, clothing or heat.</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good</td>
<td>Share of population aged 16+ perceiving their health status as good or very good.</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of property owners to non-property owners among immigrants and the total population</td>
<td>Percentage of property owners among immigrant and Irish household respondents.</td>
<td>EU-SILC 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4  Active citizenship</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants that have acquired citizenship (best estimate)</td>
<td>Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population who have acquired citizenship [best estimate].</td>
<td>Department of Justice and Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits</td>
<td>Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population granted long-term residence [best estimate].</td>
<td>Department of Justice and Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of immigrants among elected representatives*</td>
<td>Share of immigrants among elected local representatives.</td>
<td>Immigrant Council of Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Employment and unemployment are defined in this table and elsewhere in this report using the standard International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) definitions. People are defined as employed if they have worked for pay in the week preceding the survey interview for one hour or more, or who were not at work due to temporary absence (i.e. sickness or training). Unemployed persons are those who did not work in the week preceding the interview, but were available to start work in the next two weeks and had actively sought work in the previous four weeks. ILO unemployment estimates differ from both the live register of unemployment and from the individual’s own self-assignment of his or her principal economic status.

* indicates where definitions of the indicators differ slightly from those proposed at Zaragoza, based on data constraints. Share of 25 to 34 year olds with tertiary educational attainment instead of the share of 30 to 34 year olds with tertiary educational achievement; share of early leavers from education and training aged 20 to 24 instead of 18 to 24; mean achievement scores for 15 year olds in reading and mathematics instead of the proportion of 15 year olds achieving level 1 or under in the PISA assessment tests; share of immigrants among elected local representatives instead of share of immigrants among elected representatives.
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