

The impact of Irish budgetary policy by disability status

Budget Perspectives 2023

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Introduction

- Strong culture of distributional impact assessment in Ireland
 - "Poverty proofing" since 1997
 - Social & Poverty Impact Assessment framework for budgetary cycles
- SWITCH tax-benefit model
 - a partnership between ESRI & government departments
- Equality budgeting
 - Gender budgeting (Doorley et al., 2018, funded by PBO)



Importance of disability budgeting

- Equality budgeting by disability status
- Disability is associated with higher risk of poverty and decreased standard of living (Gannon, 2005; Cullinan et al., 2011)
- Working-age disability relatively constant over time
 - 15% in 2004 to 13% in 2019 (Kelly & Maitre, 2021)
- Important as no in-built indexation rules in Irish tax and welfare policy



Trends in disability-related welfare payments

- In line with international trends, Disability Allowance caseload has risen dramatically
 - 89,000 recipients in 2007, 147,000 by 2019
- 3rd largest social welfare payment by expenditure in 2019: €1.7 billion
 - 1st=State contributory pension (€5.6bn), 2nd=Child Benefit (€2.1bn)
- Callaghan (2017): 40% of rise in Disability Allowance growth
 2012 2016 attributable to:
 - Population growth
 - Illness Benefit becoming a fixed-duration scheme in 2009



Defining disability

- Medical model: classifies individuals with disabilities as having an impairment which precludes them from mainstream social activities
- Social model: societal barriers as a limiting factor rather than the medical diagnosis
- Definition, based on available data
 - 1. Based on labour force status- "Disabled or/and unfit to work"
 - 2. In receipt of disability-related social welfare payments
 - Disability Allowance, Invalidity Pension or Illness Benefit
- Better measurement of working-age disability



Rates of payment 2007 - 2019

- Working-age social welfare payments cut during the austerity period
 - Increased by €5 in Budget 2017, 2018 and 2019
- Disability Allowance matched Jobseeker's Allowance rates throughout 2007-2019
 - does not foster disproportionately weak financial incentives to work
- Earned income is also tapered less aggressively under Disability Allowance than Jobseeker's Allowance



Financial incentives to be in full-time employment




Replacement rate analysis

- SWITCH microsimulation model
- 2019 Irish SILC RMF and 2019 tax-benefit system
- Replacement rate:
 - Ratio of out-of-work income to in-work income
 - Higher -> weaker incentive to be in-work
- Caveat:
 - Assume individuals out of work join labour market at the minimum wage



People with a disability have higher replacement rates





A profile of individuals and households affected by disability



People with a disability still work and earn less than those without a disability

	Not affected by disability			Affected by disability		
	2007	2019	Change %	2007	2019	Change %
No. individuals (000's)	3,709	4,029	9	635	935	47
Average age	50.7	48.5	-4	41.9	46.3	11
Employed (16-65)	78.8	83.9	7	41.8	42.8	2
Unemployed (16-65)	4.3	4.0	-7	3.9	3.7	-7
Inactive (16-65)	13.6	9.6	-29	50.4	50.2	0
Average weekly hours worked, in- work	37.0	35.5	-4	34.0	34.7	2
Average hourly wage, in-work	18.7	25.7	37	14.3	21.6	51

Authors' calculations using EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data for 2007 and 2019.



Market income has grown faster for households affected by disability, partly due to increased work by household members

		affecte disabilit	-	Affected by disability		
	2007	2019	Change %	2007	2019	Change %
No. of households	1779	2083	17	301	400	33
Average no. household members	3.0	2.7	-9	2.9	3.2	11
Average no. children	0.8	0.8	-10	0.7	8.0	12
Average no. workers	1.3	1.3	-3	1.0	1.2	19
Average weekly hours worked by hh	48.8	46.5	-5	35.6	43.4	22
Average hourly wage in hh	15.4	22.4	45	14.1	21.3	51
Average market income	3942	4633	18	2320	3393	46
Average disposable income	3811	3995	5	3276	3970	21

Authors' calculations using EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data for 2007 and 2019.

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Equality budgeting




Method

- Estimate three income distributions using EUROMOD, the harmonised EU tax-benefit model
 - 2007, 2019
 - counterfactual 2019 if redistribution was same as 2007
- Disposable income changes 2007-19 separated into
 - Earnings changes (pre-tax and transfer)
 - Tax and welfare policy changes (compared to indexed policy)



Disposable income of households not affected by disability grew less than market income due to tax and welfare policy




Authors' calculations using EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data.



Households affected by disability experienced higher income growth but were more negatively affected by welfare policy

Components of the change in disposable income for households affected by disability 2007-2019



Authors' calculations using EUROMOD linked to EU-SILC data.



Discussion



Discussion

- The number of people and households affected by disability has grown by up to one-half since 2007
- The average wage of workers with a disability has grown but lags that of workers without a disability
- Members of households affected by disability worked more in 2019 than in 2007
 - Households affected by disability have experienced faster earnings growth than others



Discussion

- Households affected by disability are more reliant on welfare payments
- Cuts/freezes to payments affect them more, particularly given their higher cost of living.
- Future attempts to equality-proof budgetary policy should consider that welfare changes disproportionally affect households with disabilities
 - role for SWITCH model