

No. 111  
WORKER PRIORITIES, TRUST IN MANAGEMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR WORKERS' PARTICIPATION  
C. T. Whelan  
December, 1982

*The  
Economic and Social  
Research Institute*

---

WORKER PRIORITIES, TRUST IN  
MANAGEMENT AND PROSPECTS  
FOR WORKERS' PARTICIPATION

CHRISTOPHER T. WHELAN

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
COUNCIL, 1982-1983

- \*T. K. WHITAKER, M.SC. (ECON.), D.ECON.SC., LL.D., *President of the Institute.*
- \*J. F. MEENAN, M.A., B.L., *Chairman of the Council.*  
R. D. C. BLACK, PH.D., *Professor, Department of Economics, The Queen's University, Belfast.*  
F. B. CHUBB, M.A., D.PHIL., *Professor, Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin.*
- \*SEAN CROMIEN, B.A., *Second Secretary, Department of Finance.*  
G. DEAN, M.D., F.R.C.P., *Director, Medico-Social Research Board.*  
N. J. GIBSON, B.SC. (ECON.), PH.D., *Professor, Department of Economics, The New University of Ulster, Coleraine.*  
PATRICK A. HALL, B.E., M.S., DIP.STAT., *Director of Research, Institute of Public Administration.*
- \*W. A. HONOHAN, M.A., F.I.A.  
THE MOST REV. JAMES KAVANAGH, M.A., S.T.L., *Bishop of Zerta.*
- \*KIERAN A. KENNEDY, M.ECON.SC., B.PHIL., PH.D., *Director of the Institute.*  
MICHAEL J. KILLEEN, B.A. (MOD.), B.COMM., D.P.A., *Chairman, Industrial Development Authority.*  
T. P. LINEHAN, B.E., B.SC., *Director, Central Statistics Office.*
- \*P. LYNCH, M.A., M.R.I.A.  
CHARLES McCARTHY, PH.D., B.L., *Professor of Industrial Relations, Trinity College, Dublin.*
- \*EUGENE McCARTHY, M.SC. (ECON.), D.ECON.SC., *Director, Federated Union of Employers.*  
JOHN J. McKAY, B.SC., D.P.A., B.COMM., M.ECON.SC., *Chief Executive Officer, Co. Cavan Vocational Education Committee.*  
D. NEVIN, *General Secretary, Irish Congress of Trade Unions.*  
THE MOST REV. J. NEWMAN, M.A., D.PH., *Bishop of Limerick.*
- \*TOMÁS F. Ó COFAIGH, *Governor, Central Bank.*  
REV. E. F. O'DOHERTY, M.A., B.D., PH.D., *Professor, Department of Logic and Psychology, University College, Dublin.*  
I. Ó FIONNGHALAIGH, *Secretary, Department of Labour.*  
D. P. O'MAHONY, M.A., PH.D., B.L., *Professor, Department of Economics, University College, Cork.*  
JAMES O'MAHONY, B.A., B.COMM., D.P.A., *Secretary, Department of Agriculture,*  
LABHRAS O NUALLAIN, D.ECON.SC., *Professor of Economics, University College, Galway.*  
B. PATTERSON, B.A., M.I.I.E., A.I.P.M., *Director General, Irish Management Institute*  
REV. L. RYAN, M.A., D.D., L.PH., *Director, Department of Social Studies, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth.*
- \*W. J. L. RYAN, M.A., PH.D., *Professor of Political Economy, Trinity College, Dublin.*  
T. WALSH, M.AGR.SC., PH.D., D.SC., M.R.I.A., *Director, ACOT.*
- \*REV. C. K. WARD, B.A. S.T.L., PH.D., *Professor, Department of Social Science, University College, Dublin.*
- \*NOEL WHELAN, B.COMM., M.ECON.SC., PH.D., *Vice-President, European Investment Bank, Luxembourg.*

\*Members of Executive Committee.

WORKER PRIORITIES, TRUST IN  
MANAGEMENT AND PROSPECTS  
FOR WORKERS' PARTICIPATION

*Copies of this paper may be obtained from The Economic and Social Research Institute  
(Limited Company No. 18269). Registered Office: 4 Burlington Road, Dublin 4.*

Price IR£6.50

*(Special rate for Students IR£3.25)*

Christopher T. Whelan is a Research Officer at The Economic and Social Research Institute. The Paper has been accepted for publication by the Institute, which is not responsible for either the content, or the views expressed therein.

**WORKER PRIORITIES, TRUST IN  
MANAGEMENT AND PROSPECTS  
FOR WORKERS' PARTICIPATION**

**CHRISTOPHER T. WHELAN**

**THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
DUBLIN, 1982**

**ISBN 0 7070 0053 X**

### *Acknowledgements*

Earlier drafts of this paper benefited from the critical comments of my ESRI colleagues, Richard Breen and Gerard Hughes, and from those made by various government departments, by Niamh Hardiman and Keith Thurley and by the external referee. I retain full responsibility for all interpretations found in the paper and for any errors it may contain.

## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>General Summary</i>	1
<i>Introduction</i>	7
Prospects for Workers' Participation. What Workers want from Work. Discretion Power and Attitudes to Management. Skill Organisation and Management – Worker Relationships. The Social Content of Workers' Participation.	
<i>Chapter</i>	
1 <i>Work Priorities and the Design of Work</i>	10
Assumption Regarding Workers' Motivation. Variations in Work Priorities: Constraint and Choice. Job Satisfaction and Priorities: Measurement Procedures. Statistical Procedures and Results. Conclusions.	
2 <i>Discretion, Power, Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation</i>	24
Discretion and Power: The Role of Social Scientists. Control Strategies and Worker Resistance. Power, Discretion and Trust. Development of Measures. Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Socio-economic Group. Absolute Levels of Trust in Management and Support for Workers' Participation. Bivariate Results Relating to Scales of Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation. Conclusions.	
3 <i>Discretion, Organisation and Worker Management Relationships</i>	65
Class, Organisation and the Consequences of Skill. White Collar Unionisation, Deskilling and Trust in Management, Multivariate Analysis of Determinants of Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation. Conclusions.	
4 <i>The Social Content of Workers' Participation</i>	76
Prospects for Workers' Participation. Workers' Participation, Power and the Role of Trade Unionism. Conclusions.	
<i>References</i>	87
<i>Appendix A</i>	
The Sample: Methodology and Outline.	92

## LIST OF TABLES

<i>Table</i>		<i>Page</i>
1	Zero Order Correlations of Job Satisfaction Measures.	14
2	Multiple Regression Solutions for Estimating the Effects of Socio-Economic Group and of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Satisfaction on Overall Job Satisfaction.	15
3	Unstandardised and Standardised Regression Coefficients of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Satisfaction as Predictors of Overall Job Satisfaction by Socio-Economic Group.	16
4	Multiple Regression Solutions for Estimating the Effects of Age Group and of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Satisfaction on Overall Job Satisfaction.	17
5	Unstandardised and Standardised Regression Coefficients of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Satisfaction as Predictors of Overall Job Satisfaction by Age Group.	18
6	Multiple Regression Solutions for Estimating the Effects of Number of Dependants and of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Satisfaction on Overall Job Satisfaction.	19
7	Unstandardised and Standardised Regression Coefficients of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Satisfaction as Predictors of Overall Job Satisfaction by Number of Dependants.	20
8	Means and Standard Deviations of Attitudinal Items Relating to Trust in Management and Workers' Participation.	36
9	Correlations between Attitudinal Items Relating to Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation.	36
10	Attitudinal Items Relating to Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation: Oblique Factor Matrices.	37
11-18	Attitudinal Items Relating to Trust in Management and Workers' Participation by Socio-Economic Group.	39-42
19	Absolute Levels of Trust in Management.	46
20	Absolute Levels of Support for Workers' Participation.	46
21	Relationship of Comparative Evaluation of Management's	

	Treatment of Workers in One's Own Company/Organisation to Institutionalised Trust in Management.	47
22	Trust in Management by Occupational Strata.	48
23	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Occupational Strata.	49
24	Trust in Management by Complexity of Work with Data Required by the Job.	50
25	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Complexity of Work with Data Required by the Job.	50
26	Trust in Management by Complexity of Interaction with People Required by the Job.	51
27	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Complexity of Work with People Required by the Job.	52
28	Trust in Management by Complexity of Work with Objects Required by the Job.	52
29	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Complexity of Work with Objects Required by the Job.	54
30	Trust in Management by Closeness of Supervision.	54
31	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Closeness of Supervision.	55
32	Trust in Management by Experience of Unemployment.	55
33.	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Experience of Unemployment.	55
34	Trust in Management by Trade Union Membership.	56
35	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Trade Union Membership.	56
36	Trust in Management by Social Origins: Three Way Anova.	57
37	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Social Origins: Three Way Anova.	58
38	Trust in Management and Attitudes to Participation by Social Origins.	59
39	Decomposition Table for Figure 1.	60
40	Trust in Management by Educational Qualifications and Age Group: Two Way Anova.	62
41	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Educational Qualifications and Age Group: Two Way Anova.	63
42	Trust in Management by Complexity of Work with Objects	

	excluding those whose Work Involves No Significant Interaction with Objects.	66
43	Trust in Management by Socio-Economic Group and Trade Union Membership: Two Way Anova.	68
44	Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Socio-Economic Group and Trade Union Membership: Two Way Anova.	68
45	Multiple Regression Analysis of Determinants of Trust in Management.	72
46	Multiple Regression of Determinants of Attitudes to Workers' Participation.	74

### LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Figure</i> 1:	Path Diagram Relating Social Origins to Proportion of Friends in Non-Manual Occupations.	61
------------------	--	----

## *General Summary*

### *Worker Attitudes and Values and Prospects for Workers' Participation*

This report gives the results of an inquiry based on a sample of almost 900 male employees who were resident in the Dublin area in 1977.<sup>1</sup> The results show that workers are decisively in favour of increased opportunities for employees to have a significant influence on the manner in which their own tasks are organised and the way in which their organisations are run. Less than one in four of those interviewed in this study felt that giving workers more say in running their firms would not make things any better, and those who were willing to register the strongest level of agreement constituted less than one per cent of the sample. The number willing to accept that managers know what is best for the firm and that workers should do what they are told was almost identical, as was the intensity of agreement.

There was no significant variation across socio-economic group in response to the previous questions. However, other questions relating to participation did produce a more differentiated pattern of responses. Thus, while almost three-quarters of semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers think that management should give workers a lot more freedom to organise their work in their own way, this is true of less than half of the higher white collar group. Similarly, while four out of ten of the lower manual group feel that most decisions taken by managers and supervisors would be better if they were taken by the workers themselves, only one in ten of the professional, managerial and administrative group expresses agreement. Statements which have fairly obvious implications for "management's right to manage" produce the sharpest variations in response while those which are couched in terms which suggest influence rather than control are more likely to draw general support. In any event, whatever reservations the upper socio-economic groups have, their attitudes cannot be characterised as authoritarian and the fact that the overall ratio between positive and negative responses is approximately two and a half to one provides significant encouragement for supporters of workers' participation.

The work values of the employees included in this study would also seem to provide considerable grounds for optimism for those who argue that jobs

1. Details of the sampling procedure are provided in Appendix A. The complete questionnaire is available in Whelan (1980).

should be redesigned to allow for greater complexity and discretion. Given the choice, the vast majority of employees would opt for jobs which give them the chance to use skills and exercise initiative. If workers express satisfaction with jobs which, to the external observer, appear devoid of such opportunities, it is not because they do not need or want work which is intrinsically rewarding, but because they are judging their jobs in terms of what they believe to be realistically available to people like themselves.

The question which must be faced is why, given such positive dispositions, participative ideas have been given so few concrete expressions. One part of the answer lies in the existence of other values and attitudes which help to produce a much less straightforward picture. Thus, workers are concerned about extrinsic rewards such as pay and security in addition to the actual nature of the work they carry out and the relative importance of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards varies significantly across the life cycle. At the stage of the life cycle where responsibilities for dependants are greatest and financial demands most pressing, extrinsic rewards are the most powerful influence on job satisfaction. Furthermore, the idea that further increases in extrinsic rewards became unimportant once a certain absolute level of reward has been achieved cannot be sustained. Satisfaction is relative: workers compare their own situation with that of significant others. This fact helps to explain why the widespread view that manual workers are preoccupied with pay and security, while white collar workers are predominantly concerned with the intrinsic content of the work, is seriously misleading. Workers are concerned with both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards and it is their relative situation on both dimensions which is crucial. Attempts to redesign jobs to provide greater opportunities for participation can have an impact on both dimensions. Furthermore, such effects may not be restricted to those directly involved in the scheme but may extend to those who are concerned to maintain their relative positions.

Schemes to introduce increased workers' participation necessarily involve some attempt to change the nature of the current relationships between managers and managed. The prospects of success must, at least in part, depend on the degree of trust which is characteristic of existing worker-management relationships. In this study highly positive attitudes towards workers' participation were found to go together with class related attitudes which, by any standards, are indicative of strikingly low levels of trust in management. Thus, seven out of ten manual workers were of the opinion that most managements will try to put one over on workers if they get the chance, and almost half the lower white collar group were in agreement. Almost three out of four manual workers considered that most managements are interested in people only for what they can produce. On this occasion

over half the lower white collar group offered support for this view. Manual workers and the lower non-manual group also felt that full teamwork in firms is impossible because workers and management are really on opposite sides and almost two out of five of the professional, managerial and administrative group expressed at least some degree of agreement. Among the lower socio-economic groups the ratio of negative to positive responses approaches three to one.

Furthermore it is those who are most in favour of workers' participation who are most distrustful of management. It would be possible to construct a measure of workers' participation in such a manner that the foregoing would not hold true. However, in order for the participation items to be independent of evaluations of management it would be necessary to operate with a conception of workers' participation which had no necessary implication for management's right to manage. It is difficult to see what practical relevance such a measure might have.

#### *Work Design and the Social Meaning of Work*

In considering the prospects for workers' participation it is not sufficient to consider how those who are subject to management think about work and management. It is equally important to understand that the way work is designed provides a source of information about the manner in which superordinates think about those who are under their control. Trust and distrust may be manifested not only in terms of personal interaction but by means of the roles, rules and relations which workers are subjected to. Thus, a worker who observes himself to be subject to close supervision and tight co-ordination may see these procedures as a reflection of the view of his superordinates that he cannot be trusted to perform in accordance with their goals and values. The distrust of management shown by such workers may in part, at least, be based on that perception.

It is those workers who are most closely supervised and whose work offers least opportunity for the exercise of skills who are most distrustful of management. Consequently, it is not surprising that the job-enrichment approach, which is based on the thesis that increasing skill by increasing discretion, work variety and complexity of decision making, will bring about improved worker-management relationships, has gained wide support. This approach has, however, been rejected, on the one hand, "because workers are not really interested", and, on the other, "because management are so authoritarian that it would prove impossible to implement the requisite changes". The view expressed here, though, is that the job-enrichment approach is defective not for the foregoing reasons but because it neglects the social and political aspects of skill. The evidence available in this study does show that

those who were least closely supervised and whose jobs involved the greatest degree of complexity of interaction with data and people were most trustful of management. However, complexity of work with objects produces no such effect and when other class related factors are controlled for neither do the other measures. Such findings cast considerable doubt on the thesis that increased discretion and complexity *per se* will produce improved worker/management relationships. The evidence points to the importance of the manner in which discretion is achieved and the extent to which it is legitimated by superordinates. It is perhaps too extreme to suggest that job enrichment can only work on management's terms. However, it is true that the impact of changes in discretion has to be understood in the context of control systems which are, to a significant degree, a consequence of the existing balance of power between interest groups within the organisation.

The central theme of this paper is that class related factors are significant not only in shaping wants and expectations but in determining their practical consequences. The implications of the findings reported in this study are not that workers are uninterested in, or unaffected by, changes in work organisation, but rather that (i) discretion is intimately related to power, and (ii) that it is difficult to formulate proposals for changes in work organisation which do not have implications for both intrinsic and extrinsic job rewards and for the relative position of different groups of employees. Given this, it is difficult to see how changes could be implemented other than through established collective bargaining procedures. Furthermore, there is evidence available to suggest that there may be definite limits to any strategy which concentrates attention entirely at the enterprise level. Thus, while the responses to the questions relating to *management in general* showed levels of distrust which were extremely high, less than one in ten of the sample think that their own management's treatment of workers is below average. A worker's relative evaluation of his own management does have an effect on his attitudes to management in general, but the limited nature of the effect is such that work experiences with one's current management cannot provide a complete answer.

The significance of factors going beyond the individual organisation cannot be denied. It is interesting to note that while closeness of supervision and complexity of work do not affect trust in management independently of the individual's current class situation, factors such as father's occupational stratum and the proportion of a respondent's close friends who are in non-manual occupations do have significant independent effects. The significance of factors such as social origins and friendship patterns, together with the fact that the evaluation on which they have a significant impact is that of *management in general*, indicates that worker/management relationships are

influenced not only by the individual's personal experience of work but by an understanding of the wider class structure which is derived, at least in part, from the experience of kin and friends. It is also necessary to stress that the reaction of trade unions to workers' participation at any level is not purely a consequence of factors internal to the enterprise but is influenced by wider factors relating to trade union structure and to conceptions of the appropriate role of a trade union and, more generally, the trade union movement as a whole.

### *Workers' Participation, Power and the Role of Trade Unions*

The strategies which trade unions pursue are not independent of those adopted by other actors in the industrial relations system. In general, increases in interest in workers' participation have gone together with attempts to incorporate trade unions into institutional arrangements designed to cope with problems of inflation and unemployment. The available evidence suggests that workers' participation legislation and formal agreements on democracy have involved attempts to accommodate labour within capitalist economies and have, as such, reflected the exercise of power by workers as much as they facilitate it. Furthermore, it would appear that once a specific participation scheme is introduced its further development depends, to a large extent, on the mobilising efforts of the unions involved, on their ideological orientation and their organisational history and cohesion. Thus, attempts to separate discussion of the prospects for workers' participation from the role which trade unions play, seek to play, and which others wish them to play in the wider political system are unrealistic.

The successful pursuit of workers' participation as a general strategy would appear to require what has been described as a substitution of political exchange for economic exchange. This strategy implies an under exploitation of short term market power. The gains that may be received are in terms of political power which may in turn be viewed as strengthening the capacity for the achievement of future benefits. The question of whether this is a desirable trade union strategy is clearly a political rather than a factual one. There are undoubtedly many who would argue that the primary purpose of a trade union is permanent opposition rather than the transformation of authority structures. In any event there are difficulties involved in pursuing such a strategy in Ireland which stem from the interrelated factors of trade union members' consciousness and the structure of the trade union movement.

The evidence presented in this study demonstrates that Irish trade unionists display extremely high levels of distrust of management but that this lack of trust is not a consequence of a systematic questioning of the criteria underlying the distribution of job rewards which could be described as class

conscious. However, a predominant concern with restricted comparabilities rather than with the wider structure of inequalities does little to inhibit industrial conflict and makes movement from economic exchange to political exchange more difficult. Political exchange strategies, and most particularly, incomes policies raise the possibility that an interpretation gap may arise between the hierarchy and at least some section of the rank and file. Trade unions have to be capable of convincing their members or be strong enough to resist immediate pressure. Judged in these terms, the Irish situation, with a multiplicity of unions, a variety of bargaining strategies and the need for the Irish trade union leadership to be circumspect to make sure it is followed by rank and file membership, provides conditions which are far from ideal in encouraging the adoption and successful pursuit of the kind of political role necessary for full realisation of the possibilities inherent in workers' participation schemes. One can accept that individual trade union members will approve changes in trade union structure only to the extent that they expect them to be better suited to the achievement of objectives such as security of employment, security of income and improvement of working and living standards. However, it is necessary to emphasise that workers' wants are not confined to extrinsic rewards. They also want jobs which are more interesting and which offer greater opportunities for discretion and, more generally, to have a greater say in running the work organisations in which they spend a great part of their lives. The achievement of such objectives would require trade union involvement at a variety of levels. However, it is unlikely that trade unions will be able, or be permitted, to play such a role except as part of a wider political involvement.

### *Conclusions*

The relationships between discretion, power and trust provide a variety of possibilities and difficulties at task, enterprise and industrial relations system levels. If progress with regard to workers' participation is considered to be disappointing it is not because workers are naturally indifferent or that management is naturally authoritarian. Rather, when the issue of workers' participation, as a general strategy, is pursued it raises questions relating not only to the organisation of tasks but, more generally, regarding both the division of labour and the distribution of rewards. In any event, we hope it has been made clear that current structures for the control of work cannot be seen to reflect simply what workers want from work.

## *Introduction*

### *Prospects for Workers' Participation*

In endeavouring to provide some evaluation of the prospects for workers' participation it will be necessary to consider distinct but related sets of questions. The best way to introduce what follows is to outline briefly the nature of these questions.

- (1) Perhaps the most obvious question relates to the extent to which employees and more particularly critical sub-groups of employees are in favour of participation. To consider just one possibility – are managers' and supervisors' attitudes so authoritarian that it is pointless to pursue the topic?
- (2) While attitudes to participation might seem the obvious starting point the question of "to what purpose workers wish to participate" is perhaps more fundamental. *What* do workers want and expect from work? What factors contribute to job satisfaction? What role can participative structures play in increasing satisfaction?
- (3) *Why* do workers' values and expectations take on a particular pattern? Can one move from the choices which workers make to conclusions about the prospects for workers' participation? If not, what sorts of intervening factors must be taken into account? Do the complicating factors relate to constraints on freedom of choice with regard to work values, or to obstacles to the concrete expression of such values or to both?
- (4) Even if one presumes a strong desire for participation and work values favourable to such developments one must consider the separate question of the climate of relations between management and workers. If management takes the initiative, are workers likely to see it as an attempt by management to "put one over on them"?
- (5) What aspects of work and class and situations are likely to affect the degree of trust existing between management and workers? More particularly, are participative schemes which increase discretion, work variety and complexity likely to lead to improved management-worker relationships?
- (6) Finally, it is necessary to consider what sort of conditions are likely to prompt participation initiatives and to evaluate their likely consequences for the industrial relations system.

### *What Workers Want From Work*

The starting point of the chapter that follows is a consideration of what workers want from work. The position one adopts on this issue has a crucial influence on one's approach to the question of workers' participation. The available evidence suggests that even among Irish researchers and teachers there exists a considerable variety of views. In considering the most influential of these we argue that notions of hierarchies of needs which are at the root of certain approaches to workers' participation are less than useful. The reason for this is that satisfaction is relative rather than absolute. Job satisfaction and work priorities have to be understood by locating them within the structured set of social inequalities which condition their development. One has to be concerned not just with the choices workers make but the conditions within which they make such choices.

### *Discretion, Power and Attitudes to Management*

Throughout the rest of the paper we will be attempting to demonstrate that class factors are crucial, not only in shaping workers' wants and expectations, but also in determining the manner in which they are given concrete expressions. The likely success of worker participation schemes cannot be predicted solely from what workers want from their jobs or the way in which they understand work, although such priorities are, of course, relevant to any attempt to assess what is possible. The existing design, organisation and institutional and legal context of work imply certain values and preferences as against others. It is necessary to consider, in addition to the personal meanings which workers attribute to their work situation, the manner in which the principles underlying the design of work have developed and, within that context, develop an appreciation of the way in which management-worker relationships are understood. Thus in Chapter 2 we have attempted to move beyond questions relating to the desire for discretion to an examination of the relationships between discretion, power and trust.

### *Skill, Organisation and Management-Worker Relationships*

In Chapter 3 the argument is developed for locating work discretion and complexity within the broader framework of management-worker relationships. The available evidence, it will be argued, points to the importance of appreciating that the consequences of particular work experiences cannot be adequately comprehended independently of the wider class structure in which they appear. In particular, complexity or discretion divorced from class situation appear to have little impact on workers' general response to management. This finding raises questions with regard to attempts to change the quality of management-worker relationships by schemes which are directed

mainly at altering the technical content of work.

*The Social Context of Workers' Participation*

In Chapter 4 the implications of the results presented in the previous chapter for the prospects for a variety of forms of workers' participation are considered. The evidence presented in this paper and that available from other inquiries points to the need to consider the potential for, and likely impact of, work restructuring and other forms of workers' participation in the light of the realities of the distribution of power within organisations and in the wider society. In particular, it is argued that in the current economic and political circumstances attempts to separate discussion of the prospects for workers' participation from the role which trade unions play, are asked to play, and seek to play in the wider political system have become increasingly unreal.

## Chapter 1

### *Work Priorities and the Design of Work*

#### *Assumptions Regarding Workers' Motivation*

We have already given considerable attention to the problems of workers' priorities in a previous publication (Whelan, 1980). We are returning to the question because the assumptions one makes regarding workers' motivation have such a significant influence on the way in which one approaches the questions of workers' participation and because such a variety of views have been promoted.

Murphy and Walsh (1978) provide evidence of the contrasting views which can be found among Irish researchers and teachers. Thus there were those who felt that people were happy with money and job security. Money, they observed, can be a great solace and can make up for a lot of boredom and machine tending. Others took the view that people at work at all levels are very interested in the quality of their lives at work and in ways of improving it.

These views reflect the diversity of positions to be found in the literature. We do not intend to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on workers' motivation. However, a brief consideration of some of the most general positions is necessary. Almost all theorists distinguish between intrinsic factors (independence, achievement, curiosity) and extrinsic factors (wages, security, working conditions). For present purposes it will be sufficient to compare the following broad approaches:

- (i) those which suggest intrinsic factors are of primary importance for all workers;
- (ii) those which argue that the intrinsic components of the job are most important for some groups of workers, such as white collar or highly educated workers, but not for others.

The academic approach to work motivation with which practising managers are most familiar is that of American social psychologists such as Argyris, McGregor, Likert and, in particular, Herzberg. Their approach is psychological in that they analyse occupational attitudes and behaviour in terms of personality needs. They are universalistic in that they maintain that there are certain needs shared by workers of all types and levels and that their

responses to the work situation can be explained in terms of the extent to which it satisfies such needs. The needs which are considered to be paramount relate to intrinsic factors.

All of these authors were influenced greatly by Maslow's view of human motivation in which motives are conceptualised as hierarchically organised, beginning with simple needs for survival and security and ending with the need for self actualisation. Following this model Herzberg developed a theory which was extremely important in influencing applied work relating to job enrichment. For Herzberg the determinants of job satisfaction are separate and distinct from the determinants of job dissatisfaction. The occurrence of, for example, advancement or recognition which are incentives intrinsic to the performance of the work itself leads to satisfaction with one's job but their absence does not lead to dissatisfaction. Conversely, factors like poor company policy and administration are a potent source of dissatisfaction, but not important sources of job satisfaction. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction are thus envisaged as separate dimensions, both determined by the operation of quite distinct sets of factors. Herzberg's theory has been seen as providing a theoretical foundation for job-enrichment programmes. However, detailed reviews of the relevant research<sup>2</sup> show that the evidence supporting the two-factor theory is not sufficient to undermine those studies which demonstrate variation in wants and expectations. It is to such variation that we will now turn our attention.

#### *Variations in Work Priorities: Constraint and Choice*

Among those social scientists who, in contrast to the social psychologists referred to above, emphasise the significance of variation in work priorities there remain different views of (i) the nature of such variations and (ii) the source or sources of such diversity as exists. Furthermore, as will become clear, the position one adopts on sources will almost certainly influence one's conclusion regarding the character of variation in work values. The most widespread view couples a "dispositional" perspective with an emphasis on the significance of the manual/non-manual divide. Dispositional explanations involve reference to inner states, dispositions or attitudes of the individual; situational explanations rely on external, environmental characteristics. Dispositional explanations have been employed to "explain" high levels of job satisfaction at the lower end of the occupational scale. Manual workers are seen to respond to their jobs in primarily extrinsic terms and non-manual primarily in intrinsic terms. Gruenberg (1980) observes that the specific

2. Vroom (1964), Dunnette *et al.* (1967), King (1970), Locke (1969), Wall and Stephenson (1970), and Schneider and Locke (1971).

reasons given for the absence of concern with intrinsic factors among manual workers varies with the particular author. Among the reasons are:

- (i) a failure to develop a need for rewarding work (Blauner, 1964);
- (ii) having central life interests that revolve around family interaction or consumption (Dubin, 1956);
- (iii) possessing values which stress activity rather than self expression on the job.

All of these explanations have what Gruenberg describes as a strong volitional trust. Thus, manual workers are seen to make choices in line with their priorities. However, we wish to argue that the understanding of work priorities given by the dispositional perspective is seriously deficient because it fails to locate such priorities in the broader social context within which they develop. Situational factors are crucial.

The problems associated with any effort to analyse workers' priorities begin with the difficulties involved in deciding how to establish the existence of priorities. It might appear that the most obvious course would be to observe the choices which employees make. An alternative is to proceed by means of survey research to examine the effects on overall job satisfaction or dissatisfaction of intrinsic and extrinsic job components. However, neither approach is devoid of problems.

The problems which can arise through an emphasis on choice can be illustrated by an examination of *The Affluent Worker* study (Goldthorpe *et al.*, 1968). This study has frequently been presented as a major piece of evidence supporting the thesis that many manual workers choose to develop work preferences which involve a predominant concern with economic rewards. Goldthorpe *et al.* (1968) found that although many of the workers in their study disliked the intrinsic content of the tasks they performed, this did not produce any noticeable dissatisfaction with the firm as an employer or with management and supervisors.

Most of the workers had chosen their jobs from a variety of alternatives. However, it still remained true that a significant proportion expressed a preference for some previous jobs. Such preferences were generally related to intrinsic factors, to superior opportunities for greater autonomy, variety and responsibility. The extrinsic rewards such as pay and securities of their current jobs were seen to offer compensation for its intrinsic unattractiveness. The workers were not immune to intrinsic deprivations. It was certainly not a case of the workers' dispositions operating like a "local anaesthetic: they can see the wound but feel no pain".<sup>3</sup>

3. Daniel (1969), p. 372.

*The Affluent Worker* study was carried out in Luton at a time of almost full employment. However, even in such situations workers' preferences are not necessarily the decisive element in job allocation. A variety of conditions must be met before this is so. Blackburn and Mann (1979) in their study in the early 'seventies of the unskilled labour market in Peterborough, which did contain a reasonable variety of types of employment, found that the general structure of the labour market was predominantly hierarchical. Jobs which were better than most on one characteristic tended also to be better on others. The degree of congruence between workers' priorities and job characteristics was low. It follows from this evidence that an understanding of the manner in which goals derived from dispositions or orientations can be achieved is not possible without taking into account the objective constraints of the labour market. The importance of constraints on choice became even more obvious when one considers the wider stratification structure. Some workers can trade intrinsic benefits for extrinsic, or extrinsic for intrinsic, while others are not in a position to engage in such trade-offs and there are those who do not have to make such choices. In particular higher level white collar workers can have both high material rewards and satisfying work. What we wish to stress is that the behaviour choices and attitudes of workers only makes sense when they are adequately located in the wider social system within which they occur.

#### *Job Satisfaction and Priorities: Measurement Procedures*

Implicit in the argument up to this point is the view that job satisfaction can be adequately measured only if the frames of reference through which workers evaluate their objective conditions are taken into account. In this study overall job satisfaction and satisfaction with pay, security, interest and freedom to decide how to do the work, were measured by having respondents locate both their current level of reward and what they felt they were entitled to on an eleven point scale. The natural logarithm of the ratio of actual to equitable was calculated for each dimension thus providing a measure of satisfaction in terms of justice evaluation.<sup>4</sup> A measure of intrinsic satisfaction was obtained by calculating the average level of satisfaction with how interesting the work was and the degree of freedom afforded to decide how to carry out the work. Similarly, extrinsic job satisfaction was measured by averaging satisfaction with pay and security. The correlations of all pairs of items are reported in Table 1. The criteria adopted to evaluate importance is the extent to which intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction are related to overall job satisfaction.

4. See Whelan (1980), Chapter 3 for further details.

Table 1: *Zero order correlations of job satisfaction measures*

	<i>Pay</i>	<i>Security</i>	<i>Freedom</i>	<i>Interest</i>	<i>Overall</i>
<i>Pay</i>		.36	.22	.22	.37
<i>Security</i>			.33	.19	.34
<i>Freedom</i>				.34	.43
<i>Interest</i>					.49
N = 887					

### *Statistical Procedures and Results*

Attention can now be turned to tests of specific hypotheses relating to variations in priorities. As has already been observed dispositional explanations have frequently been invoked to explain the high levels of satisfaction reported by workers at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Such workers, it is argued, report satisfaction because their needs are in fact satisfied. They have no interest in intrinsic rewards and give them relatively little weight in assessing overall satisfaction with their jobs. If workers from lower socio-economic groups have values which differ from those in the higher socio-economic groups, then in attempting to predict overall job satisfaction from socio-economic group and intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction, one would expect a particular statistical interaction between (i) socio-economic group and (ii) the effects of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction. More precisely one would expect the effect of intrinsic satisfaction on overall job satisfaction to increase with socio-economic standing and the effect of extrinsic satisfaction to decrease.

These hypotheses can be tested by examining the results presented in Table 2. The socio-economic group classification employed in this analysis has been described in detail previously and is as follows:<sup>5</sup>

- Professional, Administrative and Managerial
- Inspectional Supervisory and Routine Non-Manual
- Skilled Manual
- Semi-skilled and Unskilled Manual

The procedures used are as follows. First job satisfaction is regressed on three of the socio-economic group categories, omitting the semi-skilled and unskilled manual group, who become the reference category of the analysis. The resulting coefficients measure the net impact of membership in a par-

5. Whelan (1980), Chapter 2.

Table 2: Multiple regression solutions for estimating the effects of socio-economic group and of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction on overall job satisfaction (N = 881)

Predictor	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Socio-economic group</i>					
Unskilled and semi-skilled manual <sup>a</sup>	-.26	-.26	-.03	-.04	-.04
Skilled manual	.02	-.03	-.02	.00	.00
	(.02)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(.00)	(.00)
Clerical	.09***	-.03	-.03	-.02	-.02
	(.14)	(-.05)	(-.04)	(-.02)	(-.03)
Professional and managerial	.09***	-.06	-.06	-.07*	-.07
	(.11)	(-.07)	(-.07)	(-.08)	(-.09)
<i>Source of job satisfaction</i>					
Intrinsic		.64***	.62***	.63***	.63***
		(.49)	(.48)	(.49)	(.49)
Extrinsic		.28***	.28***	.25***	.25***
		(.27)	(.27)	(.24)	(.24)
<i>Interaction terms</i>					
<i>Intrinsic:</i>					
<i>Socio-economic group</i>					
Unskilled and semi-skilled manual			.62 <sup>b</sup>		.63 <sup>b</sup>
			(.48)		(.49)
Skilled manual			.08		.04
			(.04)		(.02)
Clerical			-.02		-.04
			(-.02)		(-.02)
Professional and managerial			-.03		-.04
			(.00)		(-.01)
<i>Extrinsic X:</i>					
<i>Socio-economic group</i>					
Unskilled and semi-skilled manual				.25 <sup>b</sup>	.25 <sup>b</sup>
				(.24)	(.24)
Skilled manual				.09	.08
				(.07)	(.06)
Clerical				.06	.06
				(.03)	(.03)
Professional and managerial				-.17	-.17
				(-.05)	(-.05)
Multiple R <sup>2</sup>	.017	.393	.394	.397	.398
Increment in R		.376	.001	.004	.005
F - Ratio of increment	5.0	272.46	0.43	1.85	0.96
Degrees of freedom	3,877	2,875	3,872	3,872	6,869
P	.025	.001	NS	NS	NS

Note: Number in parentheses = standardised regression coefficients.

a. Since this is the reference group, the effect is measured by the intercept.

b. This is the reference effect measured by the intrinsic or extrinsic variable.

\*P<.05 \*\*P<.025 \*\*\*P<.01.

ticular socio-economic group, as compared with respondents in the lowest point of the socio-economic group hierarchy. Then intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction are added in order to assess the extent to which each of these sources of satisfaction affects overall job satisfaction when socio-economic group is controlled. Finally, a number of interaction terms are added, allowing the effects of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction to vary for each socio-economic group in order to see whether such interactions add significantly to the predictive power of the equation. In Column 1 of Table 2 socio-economic group is shown to have a statistically significant but substantively modest effect on job satisfaction. The contrast is essentially between manual and white collar workers with the former being somewhat more dissatisfied. In Column 2 intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction, not surprisingly, are shown to be powerful predictions of overall satisfaction. The impact of socio-economic group is shown to be entirely attributable to differences in intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction associated with socio-economic group.

In Columns 3 through 5 three interaction models are estimated. From Column 3 it can be seen that there is no significant interaction between intrinsic satisfaction and socio-economic group. Intrinsic satisfaction has a substantial impact on job satisfaction that does not vary by socio-economic group. Similarly, it is clear from the results presented in Column 4 that extrinsic satisfaction has an important influence on job satisfaction which does not vary across socio-economic group. Including both sets of interaction terms in the same equation, as in Column 5, does not alter these conclusions in any way.

These effects can be seen most clearly by adding the effects associated with each socio-economic group in Column 5 to the reference effect associated

Table 3: *Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction as predictors of overall job satisfaction by socio-economic group*

	<i>Unstandardised</i>		<i>Standardised</i>		<i>Intrinsic/ Extrinsic</i>
	<i>Intrinsic</i>	<i>Extrinsic</i>	<i>Intrinsic</i>	<i>Extrinsic</i>	
Unskilled and semi-skilled manual	.63	.25	.49	.24	2.04
Skilled manual	.67	.33	.53	.30	1.77
Inspectional, supervisory and routine non-manual	.59	.31	.45	.27	1.67
Professional, administrative and managerial	.59	.08	.45	.19	2.37

Table 4: Multiple regression solutions for estimating the effects of age group and of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction on overall job satisfaction (N = 880)

Predictor	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age group					
18-29 <sup>a</sup>	-.24	-.07	-.05	-.09	-.07
30-44	.03 (.05)	.00 (.00)	-.04 (-.06)	.04 (.06)	.01 (.02)
45-54	.06 (.07)	.01 (.01)	-.01 (-.02)	.03 (.03)	.01 (.02)
55+	.11*** (.13)	.05 (.05)	.05 (.05)	.05 (.06)	.05 (.06)
Sources of job satisfaction					
Intrinsic		.69*** (.48)	.69*** (.54)	.63*** (.48)	.72*** (.56)
Extrinsic		.27*** (.25)	.28*** (.27)	.20*** (.19)	.18*** (.17)
Interaction terms					
Intrinsic X:					
18-29			.69 <sup>b</sup> (.54)		.72 <sup>b</sup> (.56)
30-44			-.28*** (-.12)		-.42*** (-.18)
45-54			-.13 (-.04)		-.16 (-.05)
55+			.05 (.02)		.11 (.04)
Extrinsic X:					
18-29				.20 <sup>b</sup> (.19)	.18 <sup>b</sup> (.17)
30-44				.18*** (.12)	.29*** (.19)
45-54				.07 (.03)	.11 (.04)
55+				.00 (.00)	-.09 (-.03)
Multiple R <sup>2</sup>	.013	.393	.399	.402	.418
Increment in R <sup>2</sup>		.386	.006	.009	.025
F - Ratio of increment	4.0	415.01	2.89	4.37	6.21
Degrees of freedom	3,876	2,874	3,871	3,871	6,868
P	.05	.001	.05	.01	.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses = standardised coefficients.

a. Since this is the reference group, the effect is measured by the intercept.

b. This is the reference effect measured by the intrinsic or extrinsic variable.

\*P<.05 \*\*P<.025 \*\*\*P<.01.

with unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers as in Table 3. Examination of the ratio of extrinsic to intrinsic standardised coefficients for each of the groups shows that there is little variation and certainly no clear pattern of decline in the size of the ratio as one moves up the socio-economic hierarchy.

The significance of these results can be illuminated by examining variations

in priorities across age groups. In Table 4 a number of regression models similar to those already presented in Table 2 are estimated. The 18-29 age group is taken as the reference category. The results presented in Column 1 show that age has a statistically significant but modest effect on job satisfaction with younger workers being less satisfied. From Column 2 it can be seen that this effect is due to differences in intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction. However, the most important findings are those reported in Columns 3 through 5. The inclusion of terms for the effects of the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction with age categories produces a significant increase in the variance explained by the additive model. Those in the middle age groups and in particular those in the 30-44 age groups place a greater valuation on extrinsic rewards and a correspondingly lower valuation on intrinsic rewards. Again these effects can be best illustrated by adding the effects associated with each age group to the reference affect associated with the 18-29 age group in the equation shown in Column 5. These results are shown in Table 5. By calculating the ratio of the standardised intrinsic coefficient to the standardised extrinsic coefficient for each of the age groups we can obtain a useful summary of the variations in the effects of intrinsic and extrinsic components which are formally represented by the interaction terms in Equation 5 of Table 4. The values of the intrinsic/extrinsic ratio exhibit a pronounced curvilinear pattern by age group. Thus the higher values of the ratio indicating a particular emphasis on intrinsic rewards occur among the *youngest* and the *oldest* age groups. Such a pattern clearly suggests the possibility that the effects we are measuring are not a consequence of age as such but of position in the life cycle. As we have observed elsewhere financial demands and responsibilities falling upon a worker generally increase, if not with marriage, then certainly with the arrival of children. In addition to the extra expense created by children, the wife's opportunities for contributing to the family income are limited. It has been shown that family cycle effects on disposable income are very similar for all occupational strata.<sup>6</sup> Thus

Table 5: *Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction as predictors of overall job satisfaction by age group*

	<i>Unstandardised</i>		<i>Standardised</i>		<i>Intrinsic/ Extrinsic</i>
	<i>Intrinsic</i>	<i>Extrinsic</i>	<i>Intrinsic</i>	<i>Extrinsic</i>	
18-29	.72	.18	.56	.17	3.29
30-44	.30	.47	.38	.36	1.06
45-54	.56	.29	.51	.21	2.43
55+	.83	.09	.60	.15	4.0

6. Rottman *et al.* (1982).

position in the life cycle is clearly associated with a number of factors which significantly influence a worker's financial resources, needs and responsibilities. Perhaps the most obvious factor is the number of dependants for whom he must provide financial support. The results set out in Table 6 show that the effect of intrinsic satisfaction on overall job satisfaction decreases with number of dependants and the effect of extrinsic satisfaction increases. Once again a useful summary description of the relevant intrinsic term

Table 6: *Multiple regression solutions for estimating the effects of number of dependants and of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction on overall job satisfaction (N = 878)*

Predictor	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Number of dependants</i>					
None <sup>a</sup>	-.25	-.08	-.05	-.09	-.07
1-3	.08*** (.13)	.03 (.05)	.00 (.01)	.02 (.04)	.01 (.01)
More than 3	.06* (.08)	.01 (.02)	-.02 (-.02)	.08 (.11)	.05 (.07)
<i>Sources of job satisfaction</i>					
Intrinsic		.62*** (.48)	.73*** (.57)	.63*** (.48)	.76*** (.59)
Extrinsic		.29*** (.26)	.29*** (.27)	.21*** (.20)	.18*** (.17)
<i>Interaction terms</i>					
<i>Intrinsic X:</i>					
<i>Number of dependants</i>					
None			.73 <sup>b</sup> (.57)		.76 <sup>b</sup> (.59)
1-3			-.23*** (-.11)		-.21*** (-.10)
More than 3			-.20* (-.07)*		-.37*** (-.14)
<i>Extrinsic X:</i>					
<i>Number of dependants</i>					
None				.21 <sup>b</sup> (.20)	.18 <sup>b</sup> (.17)
1-3				-.04 (-.02)	.02 (.01)
More than 3				.29*** (.17)	.38*** (.22)
Multiple R <sup>2</sup>	.013	.392	.399	.409	.420
Increment in R <sup>2</sup>		.379	.007	.017	.028
F - Ratio of increment	5.6	272.27	5.22	12.52	10.49
Degrees of freedom	2,875	2,873	2,871	2,871	4,869
P	.025	.001	.01	.01	.01

Note: Numbers in parentheses = standardised regression coefficients.

a. Since this is the reference group, the effect is measured by the intercept.

b. This is the reference effect measured by the intrinsic or extrinsic variable.

\*P<.05 \*\*P<.025 \*\*\*P<.01

effects can be obtained by referring to the fact that, as shown in Table 7, the value of the ratio of the standardised intrinsic coefficient to the standardised extrinsic coefficient for the group with no dependants is over three times greater than the corresponding figure for those with more than three dependants.

Table 7: *Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction as predictors of overall job satisfaction by number of dependants*

	<i>Unstandardised</i>		<i>Standardised</i>		<i>Intrinsic/ Extrinsic</i>
	<i>Intrinsic</i>	<i>Extrinsic</i>	<i>Intrinsic</i>	<i>Extrinsic</i>	
None	.76	.18	.59	.17	3.47
1-3	.55	.20	.49	.18	2.72
More than 3	.39	.56	.45	.39	1.15

### *Conclusions*

The results presented provide no evidence of significant variation by socio-economic group with regard to the importance of intrinsic and extrinsic job factors. Feelings of deprivation with regard to intrinsic job rewards are of equal significance for unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers as for professional and managerial workers. It is true, as we have shown elsewhere, that positive attachment to work is much higher among the higher socio-economic groups. It is also true that employees at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy who are engaged in manual or routine work generally report themselves as satisfied with their jobs.

The disparity between what appears to be objectively unrewarding nature of work and the levels of satisfaction reported by those at the lower end of the socio-economic hierarchy have encouraged explanations in terms of the failure to develop a need for work which is intrinsically rewarding or the existence of central life interests outside the work situation. We have argued here that even if the existence of such different value systems could be established they would have to be *understood* in terms of situational factors. In fact, while as we have shown elsewhere,<sup>7</sup> there are significant variations in the extent to which socio-economic groups are positively attached to, or enjoy, their work and while it is also true that the levels of reward which they consider themselves to have a right to are clearly different, the evidence presented here shows that their responses to experience of what they regard as inequitable treatment are substantially the same. Even if the experiences which

7. Whelan (1980), Chapter 4.

a worker values most take place outside the work situation it does not follow that he will be unconcerned with the quality of his working life. It can also be shown that explanation of the lack of variation in reported job satisfaction across socio-economic groups requires no reference to differential needs. The available evidence shows that workers' answers to job satisfaction questions are given in the context of an awareness of a series of personal and social constraints. They respond in terms of what "people like them" might *realistically* expect. Questions which invite respondents to put aside such constraints, such as those which ask respondents what they would do if they could start their working life again, or if they would like their children to follow in their footsteps, do produce significant variations in reported satisfaction by socio-economic groups. The kind of comparison evoked by a particular question has a significant influence on the respondent's evaluation of his objective situation.

The absence of significant differences in job reward priorities across socio-economic groups does not imply that class factors are unimportant in understanding job satisfaction. The effect of objective working conditions are mediated by the meanings which those experiencing them attribute to them. The need to take these meanings into account is clearly illustrated by the fairly negligible relationships between objective job rewards and job satisfaction. We have previously argued in detail that such meanings can, to a significant extent, be explained by employees' perceptions and evaluations of the distribution of occupational rewards.<sup>8</sup> The meanings which workers attach to such rewards are, to a large extent, a consequence of their location in the class system, their generally accurate perceptions of this system and the absence of any significant degree of structured conflict regarding the manner in which work rewards are distributed between socio-economic groups.

We have stressed the complexities of job satisfaction and, in particular, that a failure to locate worker priorities in their broader social context can be extremely misleading. We must also emphasise the rewards to be derived from developing an adequate conceptual framework before attempting the measurement or prediction of job satisfaction are by no means purely academic. This can be quite clearly illustrated by comparing the prognosis we offer from a consideration of workers' priorities with regard to the likely success of job-enrichment schemes, with those offered by a variety of other authors. It is quite clear that we are in a position to reject the argument made by authors such as Strauss (1963) that emphasis on intrinsic job satisfaction is an imposition of academics' middle class values on manual

8. Whelan (1980), Chapter 3.

workers and a refusal to accept their preferential emphasis on financial rewards. However, it is still possible to accept that argument for the importance of the intrinsic content of work have frequently been presented in an overstated and naïve fashion. Thus the United States Health, Education and Welfare's Task Force Report (1973) *Work in America* argues without qualification that:

What workers want most, as more than 100 studies in the past 20 years show, is to become masters of their immediate environment and to feel that their work and they themselves are important, the twin elements of self-esteem (*Work in America*, p. 13).

More recently Gruenberg (1980) has argued for a hierarchy of needs the opposite of that suggested by Maslow (1943) in which there is no threshold for the importance of self-realisation in work, but where there is an upper threshold for the importance of subsistence needs. His data do not suggest that workers must learn to appreciate, or need, intrinsic satisfaction, but are much more compatible with the idea that workers must learn to value extrinsic rewards as sources of satisfaction from work. They do this, it is suggested, when intrinsic rewards are relatively unavailable but remain responsive to increases in intrinsic rewards. Gruenberg concludes that these findings are much more in line with the advocacy of job-enrichment programmes oriented to expanding and enriching the work experience than with the traditional labour union goals of increasing extrinsic rewards.

Our own results support the commonsense view that both intrinsic and extrinsic factors affect satisfaction. The meanings which respondents attributed to their jobs suggested the possibility of considerable success with job-enrichment programmes which involve building into jobs greater scope for personal achievement and its recognition, more challenging and responsible work and more opportunity for individual advancement and growth. All of the sub-groups examined exhibited a significant degree of concern with the intrinsic content of their work. Employees have little choice but to spend a great deal of their lives at work and, even in the absence of positive attachment to their work, the vast majority of them are still concerned about the nature of the tasks they must perform. However, these findings cannot be taken as supporting the view that workers' priorities are such that job-enrichment schemes are sure to succeed. Workers are concerned about intrinsic *and* extrinsic aspects of their jobs, about pay as well as how interesting their work is, and the position taken here is that they actively seek satisfaction on both dimensions, although there are significant variations particularly across the life cycle in the relative importance of intrinsic and extrinsic

factors. The reason why notions of hierarchies of needs are less than useful is because satisfaction is relative rather than absolute. Satisfaction involves maintaining a position relative to significant others rather than achieving a particular level of reward, as such. Rather than upper and lower thresholds, what one is faced with is socially determined expectations. Workers learn what to expect from their jobs, and the importance of satisfying such expectations with regard to both intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions is related to situational factors such as position in the life cycle.

Throughout the rest of the paper we will be attempting to demonstrate that class related factors are crucial not only to shaping workers' wants and expectations but also in determining the manner in which they are given concrete expression. It is necessary to emphasise that workers' preferences are only one part of the picture. The existing design, organisation, institutional and legal context of work also imply certain values and preferences as against others. The likely success of job-enrichment schemes, and, in fact, all worker participation schemes cannot be predicted solely from worker priorities and work meanings, although such priorities and meanings are relevant to assessing what is possible. If we are to go beyond this we must consider the manner in which the principles underlying the design of work have developed and, within that context, develop an appreciation of the way in which management-worker relationships are understood. We must move beyond discretion and the desire for discretion to a consideration of the socially structured relationships between discretion, power and trust.

## Chapter 2

### *Discretion, Power, Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation*

#### *Discretion and Power: The Role of Social Scientists*

There have been considerable variations over time in the extent to which social scientists have been concerned with the actual content of jobs. Thus, as Blackler and Brown (1978) observe, in the years between the development of time and motion study and the revelation of the Hawthorne studies, social scientists played a very minor role in job design. Work design was essentially the concern of industrial engineers. Social scientists had little to offer management other than suggestions of marginal modifications suggested by studies of fatigue and monotony. Hawthorne it seemed might change all that.

The experiments carried out at the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric, located outside Chicago, in the mid-1920s developed out of the research of industrial psychologists into the effect on workers of such environmental factors as lighting, rest pauses, heating, etc., and in particular their relationship to fatigue and monotony. In order to explain their results the investigators were increasingly forced to take social factors into account. The three main stages of the research were:

- (i) A study of a small group of female workers, selected on the basis of friendship choices and put to work in a special room, the relay assembly test room, attempting unsuccessfully to relate output to hours of work and rest pauses.
- (ii) As the puzzling results seemed to have something to do with employees' attitudes and preoccupations, an extrinsic interviewing programme which increasingly used non-directive methods was launched in order to discover "what's on the workers' mind". The interviews led to the "discovering" of among other things, restrictions of output and sanctions against rate busters.
- (iii) The observation of the Bank Wiring group for a period of six months which confirmed the existence of a complex "informal" organisation group control over levels of output, falsification of records and subjection of rate busters to ostracism and physical intimidation.

The early interpretation of the Hawthorne studies paid little attention to the hostilities and survival techniques observed. Instead, the finding that workers formed groups with elaborate norms and customs was stressed and the beginnings of the model of the factors as a social system was stressed.<sup>9</sup> "Social man" replaced "economic man". Although there has been considerable controversy concerning both the quality of the evidence provided by this research and the appropriate interpretation, nevertheless this "human relations" interpretation was enormously important in influencing the direction of subsequent inquiries and practical interventions. As Blackler and Brown (1978) observe, since "social man" had needs which clearly were not met by the jobs designed by industrial engineers, social scientists, even if not proposing complete alternatives to such designs, might have been thought to be in position to assert the relevance of their expertise for job design.

In retrospect it is clear that the reality failed to live up to the promise. For social science in its new guise made little impression upon the traditional organisation and design of work, based upon the principles of division of labour, fragmentation and control. Management and industrial engineers took note of what social science had to say because it seemed to offer a way of making the traditional system even more effective. (Blackler and Brown, 1978, p. 13)

By far the greatest research effort and resources was focused on examining the influence of workers' attitudes and behaviour of the structure and quality of inter-personal relationships. This research took the form predominantly of an examination of the relationship between such factors as styles of supervision and leadership and group cohesiveness, morale and productivity.

It is from a perspective which is critical of such research that Braverman (1974) argues for the importance of Taylorism. Taylor, he is at pains to emphasise, dealt with the fundamentals of the organisation of the labour process and control over it. The basic principles of scientific management as set out by Braverman are:

- (i) Dissociation of the labour process from the skills of the workers.
- (ii) Separation of conception from execution.
- (iii) Use of monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the labour process and its mode of execution.

9. See Perrow (1972), Chapter 3.

Later psychological and sociological schools were left to deal with the adjustment of the worker to the system designed by the industrial engineers.

Work itself is organised according to Taylorian principles while personnel departments and academics have busied themselves with the selection, training, manipulation, pacification and adjustment of "manpower" to suit the work so organised. Taylorism dominates the world of production, the practitioners of "human relations" and "industrial psychology" are the maintenance crew for human machinery. (Braverman, 1974, p. 87.)

During the 1950s and 1960s there was a re-emergence of interest by social scientists in job design. Herzberg and McGregor questioned the efficacy of the strategy of concentrating on social needs. Satisfaction of social needs would simply result in a pursuit of satisfaction at a higher level. Thus Herzberg, in particular, argued that jobs needed to be redesigned to allow for the possibility of personal growth and development. Jobs had to be "enriched" in a manner which would fundamentally alter the opportunities for achievement, growth, recognition and responsibility within them. Concern with job-redesign has been couched in the language of "self-fulfilment" and "personal development". However, a failure to give adequate consideration to the nature of the relationship between discretion and power has led to accusations that its exponents are like their predecessors "the servants of power".<sup>10</sup>

The essential aspects of this critique are, as summarised by Blackler and Brown,<sup>11</sup> that job enrichment is essentially a management control device and that such control is made possible by focusing concern on marginal issues while the legitimacy and appropriateness of the present organisational structure are treated as unproblematic. Management, it is argued, want involved work forces but only if this can be achieved without threatening the right to control. Herzberg himself is quoted counselling against participation on the grounds that there is no telling where it might lead.

Not surprisingly proponents of job enrichment have been reluctant to accept the validity of such criticisms. However, their ability to defend themselves against such "external" criticisms from sociologists and political scientists has been weakened by a series of "internal" criticisms from people working within the traditions of the job redesign movement. Among the characteristics of such research identified by Blackler and Brown in their

10. Baritz (1961).

11. Blackler and Brown (1978), pp. 30-37.

comprehensive review of such criticisms are the following:

- (i) The studies suggest missionary zeal. The publication of positive results only, and the employment of poor research designs are characteristic.
- (ii) A lack of respect for precise evaluation is common.
- (iii) The criteria used in evaluation studies usually relate to organisational efficiency rather than psychological growth (Blackler and Brown, pp. 37-44).

Such criticisms need not imply that job redesigners are intentionally manipulative. Rather than engaging in moral condemnation it will be more fruitful to attempt to understand the interactions between theory, power and practice in the job design field. The importance of the manner in which one conceptualises such relationships is demonstrated by the fact that depending on the line of thought one follows Taylorism can be considered either as a failed ideology or as representing the basic principles of work down to the present day.<sup>12</sup> The former view, as Littler (1978) argues, is associated with a failure to understand that "ideologies" or "models" cannot be treated as if they could be arranged along one dimension. The reason for lack of equivalence is that some ideologies have greater structural implications than others. The popular notion that Taylorism has been superseded by later schools of psychology or sociology is a myth. To appreciate this argument one must consider what Littler refers to as the institutionalisation of the different idea systems. Thus, Taylorism, it is argued, does not need to exist as a separate school because the knowledge and understanding derived from Taylorism was institutionalised within industry in terms of the practices and training of industrial and production engineers. Or, as Braverman puts it, its fundamental teachings became the bedrock of all work design.

#### *Control Strategies and Worker Resistance*

Braverman's emphasis on the distinction between the design of the work process and adjustment to it serves the useful function of exposing the limitations of the "succession of ideas" approach to the history of job design. However, by drawing too sharp a distinction between design and adjustment Braverman himself falls prey to a form of historical romanticism. Burawoy (1978) has described Braverman as setting "the separation of conception and execution in motion, marching it through the history of capitalism

12. Littler (1978), p. 186.

13. Burawoy (1978), p. 295.

and casting resistance to the winds".<sup>13</sup> Deskilling for Braverman, he observes, is far from being a smooth linear tendency, since the degradation of work creates its own counter-tendencies. However, these barriers are cast aside as surely as they are set up. It has been suggested that to present the development of scientific management as a shift from a simple craft system to Taylorism is to "bathe the early period of capitalism with a roseate hue" (Littler, 1978, p. 195). Such a position ignores the importance of internal contract systems and conflicts and exploitation between skilled and unskilled workers which mar the image of paradise.<sup>14</sup> As a consequence, Littler (1978, 1980) suggests he fails to understand that Taylorism must be understood as a particular type of control system directed against particular forms of worker resistance. Taylor, Littler argues, was concerned to destroy the solidarity of work groups and to undermine the relationships between the foreman and workers, and the internal contractor and workers.

The essential point which Littler draws from his analysis is that the development of new structures of control are in important respects shaped by the dynamics intrinsic to the existing structures of control and the need to maintain conflict within acceptable bounds. This point can be developed by examining the inadequacies of Braverman's treatment of worker resistance. Braverman places a great deal of importance on the uncertainty and variability which labour power presents to the employer. The problem of management is that of reducing this uncertainty by capturing control over the labour process. However, as Friedman (1977) observes, there are two quite different sources of labour power variability. Labour power is variable because (i) individual human beings are intelligent and are guided by subjective states and (ii) because workers actively build organisations to resist managerial authority. Braverman, Friedman argues, makes too strict a division between the design of the work process which he sees as controlled by engineers and those functions of selection, training, manipulation, pacification and adjustment of the labour force. Management, he argues, is not a two tier process where work organisation designed by engineers is sacrosanct and primary and the exercise of managerial counter pressure to worker resistance is secondary, both are managerial problems and are measured in terms of profits. If the costs of scientific management are too great, alternative strategies will be tried and these may involve changes in the organisation of work processes.<sup>15</sup> Thus Braverman's dismissal of the concern of conventional streams of social with worker adaptation is a little too hasty.<sup>16</sup> We would now like to develop

14. Monds (1976).

15. Friedman (1977), pp. 80-82.

16. Fox (1974), p. 95.

the issues of power, discretion and worker adjustment employing the framework of Fox (1974) which draws on precisely those studies dismissed by Braverman.

### *Power, Discretion and Trust*

The discretionary content of work roles requires that decisions or judgments be made by the person occupying such a role. As Fox stresses, the question immediately presents itself "in the light of whose interests, values and goals will the decision be made"? This problem is particularly pressing in the case of occupants of high discretion roles because of the rather lengthy time span of discretion which characterises such roles. Thus the consequences of decisions which have adverse consequences for the organisation may only become evident after a great many have been made. Power enables superordinates to minimise their dependence on subordinates by excluding them from decision making in respect of issues, ranging from job design to organisational objectives. In the terms Fox employs it allows a minority to manifest distrust of a majority. Fox stresses that men manifest trust and distrust and perceive others as responding in a similar manner towards themselves not only in terms of personal interaction but also in terms of rules, roles and relations which they impose on others or have imposed on themselves.

From this perspective it is apparent that dependency relationships are power relationships. Since discretion can never be completely programmed out of any work role workers always have a resource available which, to at least some minimal extent, can promote dependency relationships. The effectiveness of work-to-rule tactics demonstrates that management must always rely, at least to some extent, on the initiative of workers. While this is true, there are, of course, very substantial variations in the extent to which work roles permit the exercise of discretion. Fox postulates two syndromes of defining features which may be seen as characterising two sharply contrasting work patterns. These he refers to as the low discretion and high discretion syndromes. These syndromes, it must be stressed, are presented as ideal types. They are standards of reference to which real life situations more or less approximate.

The highly prescribed low discretion work role pattern is comprised of five elements:

- (a) A perceived disposition on the part of superordinates to behave as if a role occupant cannot be trusted, of his own volition, to perform according to their goals and values.
- (b) The imposition as a consequence of close personal supervision, specific impersonal rules, or other forms of systematic control.

- (c) The imposition, too, of tight coordination through externally applied standardized routines and schedules, thereby ruling out the open unrestricted communication and interaction patterns more appropriate to certain kinds of problem solving.
- (d) An assumption that failures or inadequacies of performance result from negligence or insubordination; and
- (e) A tendency for conflict to be conducted on a group basis through bargaining, with an acknowledged divergence of interests and the exercise of gamesmanship and other characteristics of negotiation. (Fox, 1974, p. 73)

In contrast to this, occupants of high discretion roles are presumed to have a personal commitment to an occupational calling and to the goals and values of the organisation. Consequently close supervision and/or detailed regulation by specific impersonal rules are considered inappropriate. The emphasis is on a free flow of ideas, suggestions, criticism and consultative discussion. Furthermore, failures and inadequacies are seen to be a consequence not of neglect or perversity but of low quality exercise of judgement. Disagreements are resolved not by bargaining but by "problem solving" behaviour where the emphasis is on assembling information, working new alternatives or persuasion.

Are the emergence of the high and low discretion syndromes an automatic consequence of a particular form of the division of labour? Do low discretion roles necessarily imply low trust relations and high discretion roles high trust relations? The answer to each of these questions is no. It is possible for lower level participants in an organisation to display a willingness to trust the leadership out of a conviction that the goals pursued and the means employed to pursue them were such that they could approve of them. Thus, the procedures by which discretion is restricted to a minority may be judged by subordinates to be based on legitimate task related principles rather than arising as a consequence of an arbitrary exercise of power. In the absence of such a corporate commitment occupants of low discretion roles are likely to perceive those roles not in terms of functional necessities but merely as a means devised by management to serve its own objective. There may also exist discretionary roles which management may tolerate although they consider them unacceptable on technical grounds. Such a situation exists where management considers that the capacity for disruption of a group is such that any attempt to redefine their roles would not be a profitable exercise. In such circumstances management is constrained to accommodate itself to the exercise of a significant degree of discretion by those whom it does not

wholly trust to exercise this discretion in the light of organisational goals. Such a situation Fox notes accords with the paradoxical usage of the term "trust", a usage which in the phrase "We've got to trust them" means in fact, "We don't trust them but feel constrained to submit to their discretion".<sup>17</sup> Thus, both values and sources of power other than discretion may influence the relationship between discretion and trust.

In the analysis which follows we will examine the relationships between discretion, trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation among the sample of male employees chosen for this study. An adequate understanding of the empirical relationships which emerge will require that we return to the questions of power and legitimacy. More precisely it will be essential that such relationships are rooted in the occupational stratification system. In the remainder of this chapter attention will be concentrated on (i) the development of measures of discretion, trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation, (ii) a description of the absolute levels of trust in management and support for workers' participation, and (iii) an examination of a series of bivariate relationships between these attitudinal variables and a variety of occupational and socio-demographic variables. In the chapter that follows we will employ multivariate techniques to explore the complexities of the relationships between class, discretion, trust in management and attitudes to participation.

#### *Development of Measures*

The indicators of job discretion employed in this study were closeness of supervision, complexity of work with data, complexity of work with objects and complexity of work with people. *Closeness of supervision* was measured by means of a four point Guttman scale with high scores indicating closer supervision. The scale was derived from the following set of items.

- (1) How much control does your direct supervisor exercise over your work?
 

Does he decide what you do and how you do it?	1
Does he decide what you do but let you decide how you do it?	2
Do you have some freedom to decide later what to do and how to do it?	3
Are you your own boss within the general policies of the company/organisation?	4
- (2) When he wants you to do something does your supervisor usually:

17. Fox (1974), p. 95.

discuss it with you?	1
or	
just tell you?	2
(3) Is this <i>always</i> what happens?	
Yes	1
No	2
(4) Is the speed at which you work controlled <i>mostly</i>	
by the speed of machinery?	1
by your boss or supervisor?	2
by your work group?	3
by the amount of work to be done?	4
by yourself?	5

Items (1) and (4) and items (2) and (3) combined were dichotomised at scores of three or above. The coefficient of reproducibility was .93 and the coefficient of scalability .70.

The measures of complexity were developed from a set of open-ended questions. The coding frames employed (Kohn, 1969) have been described in detail elsewhere. The classification system involved in each case is set out below. Employees were allocated to the highest category relevant to their jobs.

*Complexity of Work with Data Required by the Job*

- (1) No significant relationship
- (2) Reading instructions
- (3) Comparing
- (4) Copying
- (5) Computing
- (6) Compiling
- (7) Analysing
- (8) Co-ordinating
- (9) Synthesising

*Complexity of Work with People Required by the Job*

- (1) No significant relationship
- (2) Receiving instructions/helping
- (3) Serving
- (4) Speaking/signalling
- (5) Diverting
- (6) Supervising

- (7) Instructing
- (8) Negotiating
- (9) Mentoring

*Complexity of Work with Objects Required by the Job*

- (1) No significant relationship
- (2) Handling
- (3) Feeding/offbearing
- (4) Tending
- (5) Manipulating
- (6) Driving/operating
- (7) Operating/controlling
- (8) Precision working
- (9) Setting up

*Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation*

The following items, although they were not presented to respondents in the order set below were used to develop measures of trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation.

- (1) Full teamwork in firms is impossible because workers and management are really on opposite sides.
- (2) Most managements will try to put one over on workers if they get the chance.
- (3) Most major conflicts between management and workers are caused by agitators and extremists.
- (4) Most companies could afford to pay their workers more without doing their profits any great harm.
- (5) Most managements are interested in people only for what they can produce.
- (6) Most decisions taken by managers and supervisors would be better if they were taken by the workers themselves.
- (7) Management should give workers a lot more freedom to organise their work in their own way.
- (8) Managers know what is best for the firm and workers should do what they are told.
- (9) Giving workers more say in running their firms would not make things any better.

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the statements, and how strongly they felt about them on the following scale.

Very Strongly Agree	Strongly Agree	Agree	Half and Half	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Very Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The first five items are clearly intended to serve as indicators of the employee's evaluations of management. As the references to "management in general" suggest, the point of reference was intended to be wider than the management in an individual's current organisation. We may distinguish analytically between three levels of trust:

- (i) institutionalised trust which is a consequence of the general structure of roles, rules and relations;
- (ii) trust in the management of one's own company or organisation; and
- (iii) trust in a particular manager.

The second type of trust which can obviously have a significant influence on institutionalised trust was dealt with in this study by including the following specific question.

How do you think management's treatment of workers in your own company/organisation compares with management in other companies/organisations you know?

Extremely Good	Very Good	Fairly Good	About Average	Fairly Poor	Very Poor	Extremely Poor
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The relationships between the first and second levels will be examined in our subsequent analysis.

Trust relating to the personal level is beyond the scope of a sociological study of the kind undertaken here. However, some consideration of the relationship between personal trust and institutionalised trust should clarify the nature of the institutionalised dimension for which we do hope to provide an adequate indicator. Fox develops the point that low or high trust at the personal level can affect the way in which men structure their behaviours at the institutionalised level. Thus, the rules, roles and permissible forms of interaction may be influenced not only by a manager's, or his superordinates', beliefs about men in general but also by those relating to specific men. Similarly, where shop stewards particularly distrust an individual manager

they may be especially anxious to formalise rules and procedures. It is important to be aware of the limits we have set to our analysis. However, it is equally important to appreciate the extent to which the personal and institutionalised levels are distinct. Thus a manager or supervisor

... may consider that although he personally trusts some subordinates and distrusts others, he would lose more than he gained by trying to discriminate and must extend to all the same degree of institutionalized trust or distrust. The personal trust felt by a shop steward or trade union officer towards an employer or manager may not mitigate the institutionalized distrust through which they seek to limit his discretion on issues important to them. (Fox, 1974, p. 105)

An examination of the content of Items (6) to (9) should make it clear that while the items were primarily intended to serve as indicators of attitudes to workers' participation, it would be implausible to expect responses to them to be independent of trust in management. In order for the participation items to be independent of evaluations of management it would have been necessary to have constructed items operating with a conception of workers' participation which had no necessary implications for management's right to manage. While it would be possible to employ such a conception of participation based on a non-zero sum view of influence, it was considered that such a measure would prove less interesting and useful than the one it was hoped to construct. However, we will return to the question of varieties of workers' participation in a subsequent section.

In order to develop the measures required it is necessary to examine the interrelationships among the nine variables. Before conducting this analysis the scoring for Items (2), (4) and (5) were reversed in order to ensure that identical scores indicated responses which were, in substantive terms, similarly positive or negative. With these reversals the means and standard deviations of the items were as shown in Table 8. The correlations between the variables are set out in Table 9. An examination of this table shows that there are problems with the fifth item. The wording of this statement was that "Most major conflicts between management and workers are caused by agitators and extremists". The item was intended to serve as one of the indicators of trust in management. However, the correlation of this item with the other items which were intended to tap this underlying dimension, i.e., Items (1), (2), (3), (4) is in each case near to zero. The item has its highest correlations -.19 and -.17 with Items (6) and (8) respectively. These items were intended to relate primarily to attitudes to workers' participation. We can offer no

Table 8: *Means and standard deviations of attitudinal items relating to trust in management and workers' participation*

	Mean	Standard deviation
(1)	3.77	1.47
(2)	3.65	1.27
(3)	3.59	1.41
(4)	4.70	1.18
(5)	4.36	1.45
(6)	4.52	1.29
(7)	3.44	1.25
(8)	4.42	1.10
(9)	3.40	1.28
N	883	

Table 9: *Correlations between attitudinal items relating to trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1)	1.00000	-0.21669	0.38943	-0.18201	0.00380	-0.11376	0.23521	-0.06126	0.27223
(2)		1.00000	-0.41941	0.36845	-0.07548	0.11872	-0.34016	0.18776	-0.32725
(3)			1.00000	-0.35526	0.04232	-0.20176	0.42567	-0.15516	0.52723
(4)				1.00000	-0.08752	0.26896	-0.34180	0.24518	-0.34197
(5)					1.00000	-0.18762	0.02657	-0.16505	-0.00713
(6)						1.00000	-0.05238	0.21671	-0.18709
(7)							1.00000	-0.14542	0.33981
(8)								1.00000	-0.15700
(9)									1.00000

plausible explanation of this pattern of relationships and consequently the item has been excluded from the subsequent analysis.

The next stage of our analysis was to perform a factor analysis of the remaining eight items using the PA2 method in the SPSS package. This method provides inferred factors in that the underlying assumption is that the observed correlations are largely the result of some underlying regularity in the data. It is assumed that the observed variable is influenced by a number of determinants some of which are shared by the other variables while others are not. That part of the variable which is determined by the shared influences is referred to as common, while the remainder is labelled unique. The cor-

relation between the variables is assumed to be due to the common factors. With the PA2 method initial estimates of the communalities are given by the squared multiple correlation between a given variable and rest of the variables in the matrix. A two-factor solution with the factors correlated was hypothesised prior to the analysis. The first and second factors of the unrotated solution, which were the only factors to have an eigen value in excess of one, accounted for 36.3 and 14.0 per cent of the common variance respectively. The results of the oblique rotation are set out in Table 10. The pattern matrix brings out more clearly the clusters of variables than does the structure matrix.

The square of a pattern coefficient represents the direct contribution of a given factor to the variance of a variable. However, a factor may also contribute to a given variable indirectly through the correlated factor. The structure matrix consists of the correlations of the variables with the factors. The interpretation of the factors presents no difficulties since the results are in line with the hypothesised structure. The item which is clearly the highest loading item on the first factor is that which suggests that "management will try to put one over on workers if they get the chance" which is a relatively unambiguous indicator of trust in management. The next highest loading is for the statement that "managements are interested in people only for what

Table 10: *Attitudinal items relating to trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation: oblique factor matrices*

	<i>Pattern matrix</i>		<i>Structure matrix</i>	
	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>
(1) Full teamwork in firms is impossible because workers and management are really on opposite sides	.49	.07	.45	-.18
(2) Most managements will try to put one over on workers if they get the chance	.84	.05	.81	-.38
(3) Most companies could afford to pay their workers more without doing their profits any great harm	.52	-.06	.55	-.33
(4) Most managements are interested in people only for what they can produce	.58	-.08	.63	-.39
(6) Most decisions taken by managers and supervisors would be better if they were taken by the workers themselves	-.44	.19	-.54	.41
(7) Managements should give workers a lot more freedom to organise their work in their own way	-.24	.50	-.50	.63
(8) Managers know what is best for the firm and workers should do what they are told	.00	.41	-.22	.42
(9) Giving workers more say in running their firms would not make things any better	.03	.47	-.21	.45

they can produce". The items referring to profits and teamwork which imply the absence of shared goals are next in line. In addition, two of the items which were primarily intended to serve as indicators of attitudes to workers' participation also load negatively on this factor. This is consistent with our earlier suggestion that at least some of the items referring to participation would elicit responses determined by evaluations of management. Thus, there is no difficulty in labelling the first factor as *Trust in Management*. The second factor is also clearly interpretable, the only items loading significantly are the four items relating to participation, justifying the label *Attitudes to Workers' Participation*. There is a negative correlation of  $-.52$  between the two factors. Thus, those who trust management least are most in favour of workers' participation. Using the factor score coefficients from this analysis two scales representing the dimensions of *Trust in Management* and *Attitudes to Workers' Participation* were constructed. In the vast bulk of the analysis these scales will be employed. However, given the intrinsic interest of the items it was felt that it would be useful to consider the responses to the initial items before proceeding to analyses involving the scales. Given the limitations of single item analysis, care will be exercised to ensure that the conclusions presented are consistent with the results available from multivariate analysis regarding both the dimensions underlying the particular responses and the relationships of other variables to these dimensions.

#### *Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation by Socio-economic Group*

In Tables 11 to 18 both the overall response levels and variation by socio-economic groups are set for each of the items. Almost half the respondents agreed with the statement that "full teamwork in firms is impossible because workers and management are really on opposite sides" while just about one in seven are undecided. The percentage in agreement ranges from 52 per cent of skilled manual workers to 38 per cent of the professional, managerial and administrative group. While it is the skilled manual group who express the highest level of agreement, it is semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers who contain the sub-group with the strongest feeling on this matter, with over one-quarter of them indicating strong or very strong agreement with the "opposite sides" view. When one turns to the responses to the statement that "most managements will try to put one over on workers if they get the chance", it is noticeable that the absolute level of agreement is not particularly different from that found on the first item. However, the variations by socio-economic group are a great deal more striking. Almost three-quarters of the semi-skilled and unskilled manual employees agree with this statement. This compares with almost 70 per cent of the skilled manual group, just less than

Table 11: "Full teamwork in firms is impossible because workers and management are really on opposite sides"

	<i>Professional managerial and administrative</i>	<i>Other white collar</i>	<i>Skilled manual</i>	<i>Semi-skilled and unskilled manual</i>	<i>All</i>
	%	%	%	%	%
Very strongly agree	6.8	6.5	5.6	14.0	7.8
Strongly agree	5.5	11.3	11.7	11.7	10.5
Agree	25.3	28.0	34.6	22.9	28.3
Half and half	13.7	13.1	16.0	17.9	14.9
Disagree	37.0	31.0	24.7	27.4	29.6
Strongly disagree	8.2	7.1	2.6	3.4	5.4
Very strongly disagree	3.4	3.0	4.8	2.8	3.5
N	146	336	231	179	892

Chi square 38.4 P < .005, Contingency coefficient .20.

Table 12: "Most managements will try to put one over on workers if they get the chance"

	<i>Professional managerial and administrative</i>	<i>Other white collar</i>	<i>Skilled manual</i>	<i>Semi-skilled and unskilled manual</i>	<i>All</i>
	%	%	%	%	%
Very strongly agree	3.4	3.9	13.8	16.3	8.9
Strongly agree	2.1	6.3	10.3	19.1	9.2
Agree	18.6	37.4	44.4	37.1	36.1
Half and half	20.7	16.8	9.1	11.8	14.4
Disagree	39.3	28.1	17.7	14.0	24.4
Strongly disagree	12.4	5.4	3.0	1.1	5.1
Very strongly disagree	3.4	2.1	1.7	0.6	1.9
N	145	334	232	178	889

Chi square 131.9, P < .001, Contingency coefficient .37.

Table 13: "Most companies could afford to pay their workers more without doing their profits any great harm"

	Professional managerial and administrative	Other white collar	Skilled manual	Semi-skilled and unskilled manual	All
	%	%	%	%	%
Very strongly agree	1.4	5.1	9.5	12.3	7.1
Strongly agree	4.8	7.8	14.7	17.3	11.0
Agree	19.9	42.3	49.6	46.9	41.5
Half and half	21.2	19.2	12.9	15.1	17.1
Disagree	41.1	22.2	10.3	7.8	19.3
Strongly disagree	9.6	3.0	1.7	0.6	3.3
Very strongly disagree	2.1	0.3	1.3	0.0	0.8
N	146	333	232	179	890

Chi square 150.4,  $P < .001$ , Contingency coefficient .38.

Table 14: "Most managements are interested in people only for what they can produce"

	Professional managerial and administrative	Other white collar	Skilled manual	Semi-skilled and unskilled manual	All
	%	%	%	%	%
Very strongly agree	3.4	5.1	10.8	14.5	8.2
Strongly agree	4.1	8.4	15.1	15.6	10.9
Agree	38.4	40.9	47.8	45.3	43.2
Half and half	21.2	17.0	16.8	8.4	14.3
Disagree	26.7	24.5	11.6	14.5	19.5
Strongly disagree	3.4	3.0	2.6	1.7	2.7
Very strongly disagree	2.7	1.2	1.3	0.0	1.2
N	146	335	232	179	892

Chi square 73.6,  $P < .001$ , Contingency coefficient .28.

Table 15: "Most decisions taken by managers and supervisors would be better if they were taken by the workers themselves"

	<i>Professional managerial and administrative</i>	<i>Other white collar</i>	<i>Skilled manual</i>	<i>Semi-skilled and unskilled manual</i>	<i>All</i>
	%	%	%	%	%
Very strongly agree	1.4	0.9	4.7	5.6	2.9
Strongly agree	0.0	4.8	6.0	10.1	5.4
Agree	8.9	10.1	22.8	25.1	16.2
Half and half	9.6	18.5	29.3	24.6	21.1
Disagree	50.7	52.1	29.7	29.6	41.5
Strongly disagree	19.9	11.3	4.3	3.9	9.4
Very strongly disagree	9.6	2.4	3.0	1.1	3.5
N	146	336	232	179	893

Chi square 151.0, P < .001, Contingency coefficient .38.

Table 16: "Management should give workers a lot more freedom to organise their work in their own way"

	<i>Professional managerial and administrative</i>	<i>Other white collar</i>	<i>Skilled manual</i>	<i>Semi-skilled and unskilled manual</i>	<i>All</i>
	%	%	%	%	%
Very strongly agree	3.4	5.1	9.1	10.1	6.8
Strongly agree	15.2	10.4	15.1	14.5	13.2
Agree	30.3	43.6	49.1	48.0	43.8
Half and half	25.5	22.7	13.4	14.0	19.0
Disagree	20.0	16.1	11.2	10.1	14.3
Strongly disagree	3.4	1.5	1.3	3.4	2.1
Very strongly disagree	2.1	0.6	0.9	0.0	0.8
N	145	335	232	179	891

Chi square 48.0, P < .001, Contingency coefficient .27.

Table 17: "Managers know what is best for the firm and workers should do what they are told"

	Professional managerial and administrative	Other white collar	Skilled manual	Semi-skilled and unskilled manual	All
	%	%	%	%	%
Very strongly agree	0.7	2.7	0.9	0.6	1.5
Strongly agree	4.1	2.4	0.9	3.4	2.5
Agree	17.1	18.5	18.5	26.8	19.9
Half and half	20.5	22.6	24.1	20.1	22.2
Disagree	37.0	37.2	34.9	30.2	35.2
Strongly disagree	11.6	9.8	10.3	12.3	10.8
Very strongly disagree	8.9	6.8	10.3	6.7	8.1
N	146	336	232	179	893

Chi-square 21.9 P = .24.

Table 18: "Giving workers more say in running their firms would not make things any better"

	Professional managerial and administrative	Other white collar	Skilled manual	Semi-skilled and unskilled manual	All
	%	%	%	%	%
Very strongly agree	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.9
Strongly agree	2.1	2.1	3.0	0.6	2.0
Agree	21.2	23.3	17.7	25.7	22.0
Half and half	15.8	17.3	19.0	17.3	17.5
Disagree	51.4	48.4	45.3	43.6	47.1
Strongly disagree	7.5	6.3	10.3	8.4	8.0
Very strongly disagree	1.4	1.8	3.9	3.4	2.6
N	146	335	232	179	892

Chi-square 15.0 P = .66.

half of the lower white collar group and a little less than a quarter of the upper white collar employees. Looking at these results from the opposite direction it is striking that a little over one in seven of the lower level manual workers disagree with this estimate of management's likely behaviour. The next item involved the assertion that "most companies could afford to pay their workers more without doing their profits any great harm". Almost three-fifths of the sample expressed their agreement. The variation across socio-economic groups was similar to that observed for the previous item. Perhaps the clearest picture of the results may be obtained by highlighting the fact that little more than one in four of the lower white collar employees, one in seven of the skilled manual workers and one in twelve of the semi-skilled and unskilled manual group rejected this view. The overall figure of 62 per cent agreeing with the suggestion that "most managements are interested in people only for what they can produce" adds to the picture of deep rooted cynicism arising from our previous results. The response by socio-economic group is somewhat less varied. It is still true, however, that the proportion of upper white collar workers registering disagreement is twice that in the lower manual group where only one in six express this view.

The next two items to be considered are those which in the factor analysis loaded on both of the dimensions of "trust in management" and "attitudes to workers' participation", with the first item having its longest loading on the former factor while the second item loads most substantially on the latter factor. Less than a quarter of the sample agree with the argument that "most decisions taken by managers and supervisors would be better if they were taken by the workers themselves", while over half disagree. Once again, however, there are significant differences by socio-economic group. Over two-fifths of semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers agree with the statement; a proportion which is somewhat greater than that disagreeing. By way of contrast, we can observe that only one in ten of the professional, managerial and administrative employees indicate agreement while eight out of ten of this group respond negatively. It is also interesting to note that the pattern of responses for the lower white collar group is much nearer to that of the higher non-manual group on this item than on any of the other items discussed at this point. The second item in this set which suggests that "management should give workers a lot more freedom to organise their work in their own way" draws support from over three-fifths of the sample. Almost three-quarters of manual workers respond positively compared with slightly less than half of professional, managerial and administrative employees. The results presented in these two tables show that the degree of agreement with the statement that "most decisions taken by managers and supervisors would be better if they were taken by the workers themselves" is much

lower than with the suggestion that "management should give workers a lot more freedom to organise their work in their own way". It is also true that variation by socio-economic group is more substantial in the former case. This is clearly a consequence of the fact, which is apparent from our examination of Tables 11 to 18, that variation by socio-economic group is greater in the responses to questions which are predominantly indicators of trust in management than for those which mainly tap attitudes to participation. Put another way, the extent to which an item which manifestly refers to participation is also a measure of trust in management will affect the degree of variation by socio-economic group and consequently the overall level of support.

The final items to be discussed are those which load almost solely on the "attitudes to participation" factor and which draw rather similar levels of support. Approximately half of the respondents disagree with the statements that "managers know what is best for the firm and workers should just do what they are told" and "giving workers more say in running their firms would not make things any better". There are no significant variations in response pattern by socio-economic group for either item. In fact the professional, managerial and administrative group were most likely to register disagreement. Thus, whatever their reservations about usurpation of managerial prerogative might be these do not translate into support for an explicitly authoritarian approach.

#### *Absolute Levels of Trust in Management and Support for Workers' Participation*

Overall, these results suggest low levels of trust in management with rather sharp variations by socio-economic group. They also indicate that there exists fairly strong support for workers' participation which is much less strongly related to socio-economic group and where the association which does exist is influenced by the extent to which the individual items have implications for managerial or supervisory prerogatives. Given the intrinsic interests of the questions relating to absolute level of "trust in management" and "attitudes to participation" it seemed desirable to develop some indices of absolute levels of evaluation. However, it must be recognised that there are serious obstacles to the development of such scores. Our analysis to this point illustrates a point made by Baker *et al.* (1980) that all of the items in a set do not tap an attitude with equal intensity. Thus, identical scores on different items do not necessarily imply the same degree of favourability. Thus, the mid-point of the possible scores on an item cannot be identified with the psychological neutral point and, as Baker *et al.*, stress, the ability to define the psychological neutral point is crucial if percentage pro or anti

a particular group or phenomenon are to be quoted. The procedure we have employed avoids rather than surmounts such difficulties. However, it would appear to have the advantage that there can be little ambiguity regarding the degree of precision afforded by the measures. Each of the eight items already discussed were treated as measuring that dimension on which it had the highest loading in the factor pattern matrix. Thus the dimensions were represented as follows:

*Trust in Management*

- (1) Full teamwork in firms is impossible because workers and management are really on opposite sides.
- (2) Most managements will try to put one over on workers if they get the chance.
- (3) Most companies could afford to pay their workers more without doing their profits any great harm.
- (4) Most managements are interested in people only for what they can produce.
- (6) Most decisions taken by managers and supervisors would be better if they were taken by the workers themselves.

*Attitudes to Participation*

- (7) Management should give workers a lot more freedom to organise their work in their own way.
- (8) Managers know what's best for the firm and workers should do what they're told.
- (9) Giving workers more say in running their firms would not make things any better.

On the first set of items agreement was equated with a negative response and disagreement was registered as positive. With regard to the second set, agreement with the first item and disagreement with the second and third items were taken as positive responses. Disagreement with the first item and agreement with the second and third items were classified as negative. A response of "half and half" was equated with neutrality on all of the items. This procedure is fairly crude and it has the obvious limitations that as a consequence of allocating each of the items to one dimension exclusively, the indices which emerge are less closely related to each other than the factors previously identified. However, despite this, the results presented in Tables 19 and 20 do provide a relatively clear picture. In Table 19 the impression provided by the previous cross tabulations of particular low levels of trust in management is given added substance. Overall, negative responses

Table 19: *Absolute levels of trust in management*

	<i>Number of positive responses</i>	<i>Number of neutral responses</i>	<i>Number of negative responses</i>	<i>Total number of responses</i>	<i>N</i>
Professional, managerial and administrative	2.01	0.86	2.13	5.0	145
Other white collar	1.47	0.85	2.68	5.0	331
Skilled manual	1.17	0.78	3.04	5.0	231
Semi-skilled and unskilled manual	1.14	0.78	3.08	5.0	178
All	1.41	0.82	2.78	5.0	885

Table 20: *Absolute levels of support for workers' participation*

	<i>Number of positive responses</i>	<i>Number of neutral responses</i>	<i>Number of negative responses</i>	<i>Total number of responses</i>	<i>N</i>
Professional, managerial and administrative	1.68	0.61	0.71	3.0	145
Other white collar	1.70	0.62	0.68	3.0	334
Skilled manual	1.88	0.56	0.55	3.0	232
Semi-skilled and unskilled manual	1.77	0.51	0.72	3.0	179
All	1.76	0.58	0.66	3.0	890

are twice as frequent as positive responses. Only among the higher white collar group does the number of positive responses come near to matching the magnitude of the negative reactions while among manual workers the ratio of negative to positive approaches three to one. On the other hand, Table 20 shows a ratio of over two and a half to one of positive to negative responses.

#### *Bivariate Results Relating to Scales of Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation*

Thus far, in terms of presentation of substantive results, attention has been concentrated on findings relating to individual questions presented in the form of percentages. However, such an approach has limitations which relate to the extent to which individual items serve as adequately reliable indicators of underlying dimensions, and the difficulties involved in coping with questions of inter-relationships between more than two variables. At this point, therefore, attention will be focused on the scales relating to trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation, the development of

which has already been described. The remainder of this chapter will deal with a number of bivariate relationships and the one that follows will extend the analysis in order to develop an adequate understanding of the complexity of class effects.

The first set of results relating to trust in management, set out in Table 21, is intended to clarify the meaning of the measure. Distinctions have previously been drawn between three levels of trust which it might be useful to set out once again:

- (i) institutionalised trust which is a consequence of the general structure of work roles, rules and relations;
- (ii) trust in the management of one's own company or organisation;
- (iii) trust in a particular manager.

In Table 21 the relationship between respondents' evaluations of how "management's treatment of workers in their own company or organisation compares with that in others" to the measure of trust in management which has been developed is set out. The scores on the trust in management scale have been standardised, thus the mean of the scale is zero. However, since it was developed using an oblique rotation the standard deviation does not equal one. Positive scores indicate a high level of trust in management and vice versa. It is clear from the table that evaluation of the ways in which one's own management deals with employees has a significant effect on institutionalised trust. The scale score declines consistently across categories

Table 21: *Relationship of comparative evaluation of management's treatment of workers in one's own company/organisation to institutionalised trust in management*

<i>Evaluation of one's own management</i>	<i>Average score on trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Extremely good	.27	(139)
Very good	.22	(240)
Fairly good	.05	(220)
About average	-.23	(193)
Fairly poor	-.51	(47)
Very poor	-.76	(24)
Extremely poor	-1.16	(14)
All respondents	.00	(877)
ETA-squared	.11	
F	18.2	

$P < .001$ .

from .27 in the case of those who consider their relative performance to be extremely good to -1.16 for those who deem it to be extremely poor. The proportion of variance in institutionalised trust explained by this relationship is 11 per cent. While this effect is substantial there clearly remains a great deal of variation in institutionalised trust in management which cannot be accounted for by factors which are specific to respondents' current organisations. Factors which might explain such differences will be examined in the remainder of the section. However, for the moment it is interesting to note the contrast in terms of overall response patterns between the question relating to relative evaluation of one's own management and those items which load highly on the trust in management factor. Thus, while the responses to the latter show levels of distrust of management which appear high by any standards, less than one in ten of the sample think that their own management's treatment of workers is below average. Once again this illustrates the limitations of explaining reactions to management in general by reference to experiences with their current management.

In moving beyond factors specific to a worker's present job, it is clear from our previous discussion that class differences are likely to be of primary importance. It will be useful to start our consideration of role of class by examining variations across the detailed eight category classification of occupational strata. From Table 22 it can be seen that almost 18 per cent of the variance in trust in management is accounted for by variations across

Table 22: *Trust in management by occupational strata*

	<i>Average score on trust in management</i>	<i>N</i>
Higher, professional, administrative and managerial	.72	(70)
Lower professional, administrative and managerial	.50	(74)
Inspectional, supervisory and other non-manual higher grade	.25	(119)
Inspectional supervisory and other non-manual lower grade	-.26	(127)
Routine non-manual	-.07	(84)
Skilled manual	-.28	(231)
Semi-skilled manual	-.48	(113)
Unskilled manual	-.42	(65)
ETA-squared	.179	
F	27.3	

$P < .001$ .

occupational strata. The scores on the scale range from .72 for the highest white collar group to -.48 for semi-skilled manual workers. Although the scores do not form a perfect hierarchy according to occupational strata, deviation from such a hierarchy is minor. The aggregated differences for socio-economic groups do show significant differences between each of the groups in the expected direction. It is interesting to note, however, that the routine non-manual workers occupy a position which is almost equidistant from those of the lower white collar supervisory group and the skilled manual group. The results relating to attitudes to workers' participation set out in Table 23 show a similar trend with, however, a considerably lower level of association. Occupational strata accounts for four and a half per cent of the variance and scores range from -.29 for the higher professional, administrative and managerial group to .15 for skilled manual workers.

The relationships of trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation to occupational strata and socio-economic groups are capable of a variety of interpretations. The central question which we wish to pursue is the importance of work discretion and complexity in comparison with other class related factors. Looking first at the relationship between complexity of work with data and trust in management, it can be seen from Table 24 that there is a significant relationship between the variables. In terms of the postulated hierarchy of discretion, the scores range from 1.01 for those whose work involves synthesising, that is, integrating analyses of data to discover facts and/or develop knowledge, concepts or interpretations, to -.26 for those whose work involves no significant relationship with data. However, it should be noted that the sub-group expressing greatest distrust of manage-

Table 23: *Attitude to workers' participation by occupational strata*

	<i>Average score on attitudes to workers' participation scale</i>		<i>N</i>	
Higher, professional, administrative and managerial	-0.29	}	-0.20	(70)
Some professional, administrative and managerial	-0.11		(74)	
Inspectional, supervisory and other non-manual higher grade	-0.02	}	-0.08	(119)
Inspectional, supervisory and other non-manual lower grade	-0.20		(127)	
Routine non-manual	.00			(84)
Skilled manual	.15			(231)
Semi-skilled manual	.11	}	.12	(113)
Unskilled manual	.13		(65)	
ETA-squared	.045			
F	5.92			

$P < .001$ .

ment were those for whom the highest category relevant to their jobs was "copying", i.e., transcribing, entering or posting data which suggests that this activity may occupy a lower place in the workers' evaluative hierarchy than in the scale. The relationship of complexity of work with data to attitudes to workers' participation, although weaker, is still significant. The results presented show a range of scores from  $-.27$  for the group whose work involves the greatest degree of complexity to  $.11$  for those whose jobs require no significant handling of data.

Table 24: *Trust in management by complexity of work with data required by the job*

	<i>Average score on trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Synthesising	1.01	(9)
Co-ordinating	0.64	(71)
Analysing	0.46	(62)
Compiling	0.15	(197)
Computing	0.15	(29)
Copying	-0.45	(53)
Comparing	0.04	(51)
Reading instructions	-0.15	(80)
No significant relationship	-0.26	(327)
ETA-squared	.129	
F	16.12	

$P < .001$ .

Table 25: *Attitudes to workers' participation by complexity of work with data required by the job*

	<i>Average score on attitudes to workers' participation scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Synthesising	-.27	(9)
Co-ordinating	-.27	(90)
Analysing	-.11	(51)
Compiling	-.03	(53)
Computing	-.26	(29)
Copying	.17	(197)
Comparing	-.08	(62)
Reading instructions	.02	(71)
No significant relationship	.11	(9)
ETA-squared	.036	
F	4.01	

$P < .001$ .

Complexity of interaction with people required by the job is also strongly related to trust in management. However, the pattern of results evident in Table 26 suggests that complexity is not the sole explanation of variation across the categories. This can be shown by comparing the scores of that group whose work involves mentoring, i.e., dealing with individuals in terms of their total personality in order to advise, counsel and/or guide them in terms of professional principles, with those for whom the highest relevant category is negotiating. The score of the former group is .08 while that of the latter is .61. The supervisory group also has a slightly higher score than those who are involved in instruction. Thus, differences are related not only to complexity but also to involvement in managerial and supervisory roles. Variations in degree of complexity of interaction with people are, however, extremely relevant. This can be confirmed by noting that the range of differences between the aforementioned groups is still significantly smaller than that between these groups on average and, for example, workers for whom the level of interaction required by their jobs does not go beyond receiving instructions or orders from supervisors. The nature of the interaction with people required bears a similar, if weaker, relationship to attitudes to workers' participation. The scores shown in Table 27 vary from -.27 for those whose work involves negotiation to .14 for those limited to receiving instructions.

Complexity of work with objects required by the job is also related to trust in management. However, in this case the major contrast would appear to be

Table 26: *Trust in management by complexity of interaction with people required by the job*

	<i>Average score in trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Mentoring	.08	(29)
Negotiating	.61	(82)
Instructing	.29	(39)
Supervising	.33	(154)
Diverting	.17	(48)
Speaking/signalling	.08	(194)
Serving	-.19	(90)
Receiving instructions/helping	-.36	(164)
No significant relationship	-.29	(85)
ETA-squared	.122	
F	15.18	

$P < .001$ .

Table 27: *Attitudes to workers' participation by complexity of work with people required by the job*

	<i>Average score on attitudes to workers' participation scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Mentoring	.00	(29)
Negotiating	-.27	(82)
Instructing	.03	(39)
Supervising	-.18	(154)
Diverting	-.12	(48)
Speaking/signalling	.09	(191)
Serving	.07	(140)
Receiving instructions/helping	.14	(164)
No significant relationship	.09	(185)
ETA-squared	.042	
F	4.77	

$P < .001$ .

Table 28: *Trust in management by complexity of work with objects required by the job*

	<i>Average score in trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
No significant relationship	.35	(324)
Setting up	-.06	(33)
Precision working	-.06	(95)
Operating-controlling	-.45	(15)
Driving-operating	-.26	(96)
Manipulating	-.27	(79)
Tending	-.33	(21)
Feeding-offbearing	-.23	(51)
Handling	-.21	(167)
ETA-squared	.097	
F	11.7	

$P < .001$ .

between workers whose work involves no significant interaction with objects, who have an average score of .35 and of the other groups whose scores are negative. It is also interesting to note that those workers expressing greatest distrust of management are those involved in "operating-controlling". Operating-controlling is defined in the following terms: starting, stopping, controlling, and adjusting the progress of machines or equipment designed

to fabricate and/or process objects or technology. Operating machines involves setting up the machine and adjusting the machine or material as the work progresses. Controlling equipment involves observing gauges, dials, etc., and turning valves and other devices to control such factors as temperature pressure, flow of liquids, speed of pumps and reaction of materials. Several variables are involved and adjustment is more frequent than in tending. Although the numbers involved are extremely small the fact that this group was most hostile to management is suggestive in the light of previous discussions of the relationship between the technological structure of the workplace and worker management relations and job satisfaction. We can draw here on Mann's (1973a) discussion of the work of Woodward in England, Touraine in France and Blauner in the United States who were the principal writers concerned with analysing the technological determinants of work attitudes and behaviour. As Mann observes, all three worked from a typology of technology which is threefold. Phase A comprises traditional craft operations. Phase B involves standardisation of the product and large batch production or mass production on assembly lines. In Phase C manual operations are taken over by the machine. Most factories at this stage are involved in continuous process production. Where chemical reactions inside the machinery form the product, workers have to develop new skills in order to take care of complex and expensive machinery thus increasing job satisfaction. The worker regains freedom of movement and his task is linked to that of other workers and supervisors. However, one of the important findings of the *Affluent Worker* study was that failure of technological variation of this sort to explain variations in worker-management relations and job satisfaction. The evidence presented here, although based on small numbers, that workers involved in operating-controlling tasks were *most* distrustful of management does provide support for critiques of the determining role of technology. It also raises the possibility of a significant discrepancy between "experts' " evaluations of the possibilities offered by such work and the manner in which workers experience it. As can be seen from Table 29, complexity of work with objects is related to attitudes to workers' participation in a manner which is consistent with the results already presented although the level of association is not statistically significant.

Trust in management varies systematically across the categories of the closeness of supervision scale. From Table 30 it can be seen that the score of .34 of those who are least closely supervised compares with -.34 for those most closely supervised. It is also those who are subject to the tightest supervision who are most in favour of workers' participation.

It has been demonstrated that both discretion and a variety of measures of work complexity are, with the qualifications outlined, significantly related

Table 29: *Attitudes to workers' participation of complexity of work with objects required by the job*

	<i>Average score on attitudes to workers' participation scale</i>	<i>N</i>
No significant relationship	-.12	(324)
Setting up	.04	(33)
Precision working	.06	(95)
Operating-controlling	.18	(15)
Driving-operating	.07	(96)
Manipulating	.12	(79)
Tending	.13	(21)
Feeding-offbearing	.16	(51)
Handling	.02	(167)
ETA-squared	.022	
F	2.44	

$P < .01$

Table 30: *Trust in management by closeness of supervision*

		<i>Average score in trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>Closeness of supervision</i>			
Scale	Scores		
<i>Low</i>			
	1	.34	(191)
	2	.12	(302)
	3	-.11	(336)
	4	-.34	(130)
<i>High</i>			
ETA-squared		.097	
F		30.6	

$P < .001$ .

to trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation. However, before offering any causal interpretation of such relationships it is necessary to examine the effects of a number of other class related variables. The first such variable to be considered is experience of unemployment. Although the skewed distribution of unemployment experience sets limits to its effect of unemployment experience on both of the scales, it still remains quite clear from Tables 32 and 33 that those who have been most frequently

Table 31: *Attitudes to workers' participation by closeness of supervision*

		<i>Average score in trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
<b>Closeness of supervision</b>			
Scale	Scores		
<b>Low</b>			
	1	-.11	(191)
	2	-.03	(302)
	3	-.02	(236)
	4	.24	(130)
<b>High</b>			
ETA-squared		.097	
F		30.6	

P &lt; .001.

Table 32: *Trust in management by experience of unemployment*

		<i>Average score in trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Never unemployed		.09	(671)
Unemployed once		-.15	(124)
Unemployed more than once		-.42	(81)
ETA-squared		.031	
F		14.0	

P &lt; .001.

Table 33: *Attitudes to workers' participation by experience of unemployment*

		<i>Average score in trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Never unemployed		-.06	(671)
Unemployed once		.14	(124)
Unemployed more than once		.27	(81)
ETA-squared		.025	
F		11.27	

P &lt; .001.

unemployment are most negative in their reactions to management and most positively disposed towards the idea of workers' participation. Trade union membership is another factor significantly related to evaluation of management and participation. As can be seen from Tables 34 and 35 there is a difference between trade unionists and non-trade unionists of .47 on the trust in management scale and .24 on the attitudes to workers' participation scale.

Table 34: *Trust in management by trade union membership*

	<i>Average score in trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Trade union members	-.15	(607)
Non-trade union members	.32	(276)
ETA-squared	.061	
F	57.4	

$P < .001$ .

Table 35: *Attitudes to workers' participation by trade union membership*

	<i>Average score on attitudes to workers' participation scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Trade union members	.08	(607)
Non-trade union members	-.16	(276)
ETA-squared	.026	
F	23.3	

$P < .001$ .

Another factor which we felt it might be interesting to examine was respondents' social origins. This question is examined in Tables 36 and 37 in a relatively simple manner by dichotomising father's occupation and respondents' first and current occupations into manual and white collar. The really interesting finding is that in relation to both trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation, father's occupation is significant while the worker's first occupation is not. The patterns can, perhaps, be seen best in the slightly less conventional presentation in Table 38. Irrespective of whether the worker's current occupation is manual or white collar, there is a difference in scores on the trust in management scale of approximately .20

Table 36: *Trust in management by social origins: 3 way Anova\**

	<i>Father manual</i>		<i>Father non-manual</i>		<i>All Respondents</i>
	<i>First job manual</i>	<i>First job non-manual</i>	<i>First job manual</i>	<i>First job non-manual</i>	
Current job manual	-.40 (260)	-.49 (26)	-.22 (107)	-.10 (12)	-.35 (405)
Current job non-manual	.14 (76)	.19 (91)	.32 (66)	.40 (236)	.30 (469)
	Father manual -.20 (453)		Father non-manual .21 (421)		
	First job manual -.19 (509)		First job non-manual .26 (365)		
Source of variation	SS	F	P		
Main effects	101.1	49.3	<.001		
1. Current job	41.1	59.8	<.001		
2. First job	0.2	0.3	>N.S		
3. Father's job	7.6	11.1	<.001		
2 Way interactions					
1 x 2	0.3		N.S		
1 x 3	0.1		N.S		
2 x 3	0.1		N.S		
3 Way interactions	0.2		N.S		
Total	697.6				

\*Figures in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 37: Attitudes to workers' participation by social origins: 3 way Anova\*

	<i>Father manual</i>		<i>Father non-manual</i>		<i>All Respondents</i>
	<i>First job manual</i>	<i>First job non-manual</i>	<i>First job manual</i>	<i>First job non-manual</i>	
Current job manual	.15 (260)	.49 (26)	.00 (107)	.20 (12)	.14 (405)
Current job non-manual	-.04 (76)	-.02 (91)	-.23 (66)	-.15 (236)	-.12 (469)
	Father manual .10 (45)		Father non-manual -.11 (469)		
	First job manual .04 (509)		First job non-manual -.06 (368)		
Source of variation	SS	F	P		
Main effects	19.7	6.6	<.001		
1. Current job	9.4	9.4	<.05		
2. First job	1.8	4.8			
3. Father's job	4.8	4.8	<.001		
			N.S		
2 Way interactions	1.5		N.S		
1 x 3	0.0		N.S		
1 x 2	1.5		N.S		
2 x 3	0.0		N.S		
3 Way interactions	0.2		N.S		
Total	425.3				

\*Figures in parentheses are cell frequencies.

Table 38: *Trust in management and attitudes to participation by social origins*

Fathers	Occupation		Trust in management		Attitudes to participation	
	First	Current				
W*	W	W	.40 } .32 }	.38	-.15 } -.32 }	-.17
W	M	W	.19 } .14 }	.17	-.02 } -.04 }	-.03
M*	W	W	-.10 } -.22 }	-.21	.20 } .00 }	.02
M	M	W	-.49 } -.40 }	-.41	.49 } .15 }	.18

\*W = White collar

M = Manual

between those whose fathers were manual workers and those whose fathers were white collar employees. A similar pattern of differences of only slightly lesser magnitude emerges on the attitudes to workers' participation variable.

One possible explanation of the differential impact of father's occupational stratum and respondent's stratum at first job stage relates to the extent to which they serve as indicators of shared social experiences which are relevant to the attitudes in question. The social relationships which we would expect to have greatest significance are those which are most closely determined by the stratification system. The basis of the relational approach to social stratification is that people choose to interact with those at about the same level of the hierarchy. However, not all social interaction reflects choice and it is, therefore, necessary to identify the social relationships which are likely to have greatest explanatory power. Stewart *et al.* (1980) note that occupations of fathers, fathers-in-law, closest friends and next door neighbours have been employed in studies concerned with establishing a measure of social stratification from relational data. However, a certain lack of coherence in the results arose from merging the different relationships into one data set. In this study respondents were asked to provide occupational information regarding their four closest friends and the four neighbours they knew best. Our results confirmed the conclusion from previous studies that occupation of friends was the superior indicator. The measures we have employed are the proportion of friends and neighbours who were in non-manual occupations. Occupational strata accounts for 42 per cent of the variance in the proportion of friends in white collar occupations compared with 30 per cent of the variance in the case of neighbours. Choice of neighbourhood, as Stewart *et al.*, note, is largely determined by the current economic situation and thus

one finds higher stratum younger employees living beside older lower stratum workers.

Returning to the question we raised concerning the relationship between the relative effects of father's occupational stratum and respondent's occupational stratum at first job stage, this question can be pursued by examining the path analysis set out in Figure 1 and Table 39. Path analysis is primarily a method of decomposing and interpreting linear relationships among a set of variables by assuming that a causal order among these variables can be established and that relationships among these variables are causally closed. The assumption about causal order or direction is explicitly represented by the direction of the arrows in Figure 1. The causal ordering of father's occupation stratum → occupational stratum at first job → current occupational stratum → proportion of friends who are in non-manual occupations is unproblematic. However, the assumption that the relationships between the set of variables are linear is not strictly justified. The departures from linearity, however, are modest and will not affect the substantive conclusions drawn. We have, therefore, scored each of the occupational variables from one to eight, with the highest occupational strata receiving the lowest score and vice versa. From Figure 1 it can be seen that father's occupational stratum has a greater *direct* effect on the proportion of friends in non-manual occupations than occupational stratum at first job, not surprisingly the strongest effect is that of current occupational stratum. From Table 39 it is clear that while first occupation has the lowest direct effect on friendship patterns it has the largest *indirect* effect by means of its influence on current occupational level. The relationship of father's occupational stratum to the proportion of friends who are non-manual is also, to a considerable degree, a consequence of the manner in which it influences the respondent's first and current occupational levels. However, to a much greater extent than occupational

Table 39: *Decomposition table for Figure 1*

<i>Bivariate relationship</i>	<i>Total correlation</i>	<i>Direct</i>	<i>Indirect</i>	<i>Total causal</i>	<i>Non-causal</i>
X3 X4	.42	.42	None	.42	None
X2 X4	.43	.17	.26	.43	None
X1 X4	-.47	-.20	-.27	-.47	None
X2 X3	.68	.61	None	.61	.07
X1 X3	-.53	-.10	-.31	-.41	-.12
X1 X2	-.67	-.51	None	-.51	-.16

X4 = Father's occupational stratum


X3 = Respondent's occupational stratum at first job

X2 = Respondent's current occupational stratum

X1 = Proportion of respondent's friends who are in non-manual occupations.

Figure 1

Path Diagram Relating Social Origins to Proportion of Friends in non-manual occupations



- 4 = Fathers occupational strata
- 3 = Respondents' occupational stratum at first job
- 2 = Respondents' current occupational stratum
- 1 = Proportion of friends in non-manual occupations

stratum at first level it has an independent effect on choice of friends. This pattern of findings strongly suggests that the relatively greater independent effects of father's stratum on trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation might well be due to the manner in which it determines shared social experiences. Thus, all three variables will be included in our final multivariate analysis.

The final pair of variables to be considered in this section are educational qualification and age group. The reason the effects of these variables are examined together is because to treat them separately would lead to an underestimation of the effects of both factors. The more highly qualified a worker is the more likely he is to be positive towards management and negative towards worker's participation. The older a worker is the more likely this pattern of attitudes becomes. However, older workers are, in general, less well educated than their younger counterparts. Thus, when examining the relationship of either of these variables to the attitude in question it is necessary to take account of the other. In examining the results set out in Tables 40 and 41 it should be kept in mind that the fact that our sample is a sample of employees has an effect on the relationship between age group and education. The percentage in the 18-29 age group with third level qualification appears low because it misses out on those who

Table 40: *Trust in management by educational qualification and age group: two way Anova*

	<i>Third level</i>	<i>Leaving certificate</i>	<i>Intermediate or group certificate</i>	<i>Primary certificate or less</i>	<i>Total</i>
18-29	.37 (38)	-.01 (96)	-.42 (70)	-.54 (70)	-.20 (274)
30-44	.65 (63)	.24 (42)	.19 (66)	.31 (125)	.08 (296)
45-54	.58 (23)	.17 (26)	.35 (29)	-.21 (95)	.05 (173)
55+	.90 (17)	.26 (16)	.43 (19)	-.11 (82)	.14 (134)
<i>Total</i>	.59 (141)	.10 (180)	.01 (184)	-.28 (372)	
Sources of variation	Sum of squares	F	P		
Main effects	109.8	18.3	<.001		
Educational qualification	94.2	31.4	<.001		
Age group	28.7	9.6	<.001		
2 Way interaction	7.1	6.8	NS		
<i>Total</i>	699.4				

Table 41: *Attitudes to workers' participation by educational qualification and age group: two way Anova*

	<i>Third level</i>	<i>Leaving certificate</i>	<i>Intermediate or group certificate</i>	<i>Primary certificate or less</i>	<i>Total</i>
18-29	-.01 (38)	.07 (96)	.25 (70)	.24 (70)	.15 (274)
30-44	-.17 (63)	-.03 (42)	-.09 (66)	.15 (125)	.00 (296)
45-54	-.05 (23)	-.03 (26)	-.42 (29)	-.00 (95)	-.08 (173)
55+	-.49 (17)	-.19 (16)	-.28 (19)	-.11 (82)	-.19 (134)
<i>Total</i>	-.14 (141)	.01 (180)	-.03 (184)	.07 (372)	
Sources of variation	Sum of squares	F	P		
Main effects	20.6	7.4	<.001		
Educational qualification	28.3	6.0	<.001		
Age group	15.8	11.4	<.001		
2 Way interaction	7.1	1.4	NS		
<i>Total</i>	699.4				

are continuing their education. The percentage in the other categories are consequently inflated. The data presented in Table 40 confirms our previous statements regarding the relationship of education qualification and age group to trust in management. There is a difference of scores of .87 between those with third level qualifications and those whose qualification level is, at best, primary certificate. There is also a difference of .34 between the youngest and oldest age group. However, the combined effect of the variables is greater than that suggested by examining their individual effects. Thus, there is a difference of 1.44 between the oldest most highly educated group and the youngest least educated group. In the case of attitudes to participation the score of the latter group is .73 higher than that of the former. With regard to attitudes to participation it is interesting to note that age has a stronger effect than educational qualification. In a cross-sectional study it is not possible to establish decisively whether the differences across age groups in relation to both these attitudes are a consequence of age *per se* or of membership of a particular cohort. Will the responses of the younger group change with age, or do the results indicate a shift in attitudes? The fact that the effect of age group is not due to educational differences increases the possibility that it is a reflection of the manner in which the major social

changes of the last twenty years have resulted in a decline in the willingness to give or the expectation of receiving deference and in an increase in participative values.

### *Conclusions*

In the previous chapter it was found that both manual and non-manual workers were concerned about the intrinsic content of their jobs. In this chapter the evidence presented show strong support for workers' participation. This support, however, goes together with very high levels of distrust of management. Those who are most in favour of participation are most distrustful of management. There are significant variations across socio-economic groups most particularly with regard to trust in management. Thus, over 70 per cent of manual workers think that "most managements will put one over on their workers if they get the chance". The variation across socio-economic group was much less pronounced with regard to attitudes to workers' participation. Manual workers were more likely to be in favour of workers' participation. However, the responses to the individual items showed that where the items did not appear to have obvious implication for "managements' right to manage" the higher white collar group were just as likely to support them.

Not surprisingly in view of the effect of socio-economic group the measures of discretion and complexity developed were positively related to trust in management. Thus, the results were consistent with the notion, implicit in the job-enrichment approach, that greater opportunities for self actualisation produced improved management-worker relationships. However, those who are critical of the job-enrichment approach because of its neglect of power might find comfort in the fact that discretion and complexity were negatively related to support for participation.

Furthermore, a variety of other class related factors including non-work situation variables such as social origins and friendship patterns were also found to be significantly related to both trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation. However, the form of analysis employed in this chapter does not permit one to deal with the causal relevance of each of the components. It is on this question that attention will be focused in the chapter that follows.

## Chapter 3

### *Discretion, Organisation and Worker-Management Relationships*

#### *Class, Organisation and the Consequences of Skill*

In this chapter we wish to develop our understanding of the consequences of discretion and complexity. The job enrichment model involves what Blackburn and Mann (1979) have referred to as a "technicist" view of skill. Skill is seen simply as technique, a combination of manual and mental capacities. The job enrichment approach is based on the view that increasing skill by increasing discretion, work variety and complexity of decision making would improve worker-management relationships. Blackburn and Mann, as do many others, argue that such a view grossly neglects the social and political aspects of skill.<sup>18</sup>

It is interesting that Braverman, operating from an ideological position far removed from the exponents of job enrichment, has also been criticised for considering skills purely in technical terms. Rubery (1978) in his critique of Braverman's deskilling thesis attempts to show the limitations of considering skill in such terms. Braverman, Rubery argues, views the decline in skills essentially from a craft perspective; before the advents of mechanisation and scientific management, craft workers could control the work process. This analysis, Rubery notes, is then extended to other types of workers, with Braverman arguing that most workers had more opportunity in the past to determine their speed of work and to use judgement and knowledge. Thus, farm labourers are cited as a group traditionally classed as unskilled but requiring a great deal of knowledge and experience to carry out their tasks. However, as Rubery stresses, this skill did little to improve their bargaining position. What Rubery is anxious to point out is that analysis of skill involves simultaneously the analysis of work organisation. What may have been crucial for the mass of workers in relationships with their employers was not whether mechanisation and scientific management decreased their opportunities to use judgement and knowledge but how they affected their bargaining opportunities. The ability of semi-skilled factory workers to organise to inflict losses on their employers was superior.<sup>19</sup>

18. Blackburn and Mann (1979), p. 291.

19. Acceptance of the relevance of worker organisation does not necessarily involve the acceptance of Turner's (1962) argument that workers are skilled or unskilled according to whether or not entry to their occupations is deliberately restricted and not in the first place on the nature of the occupation itself. For more detailed theoretical discussion of manual skills see Blackburn and Mann (1979) and Lee (1981).

This debate is interesting in view of our findings on the relationship of complexity of work with objects to trust in management. In the previous chapter we concluded that complexity of work with data, people and objects were positively associated with trust in management. In fact in one important respect this conclusion is misleading. The positive association between complexity of work with objects and trust in management is produced solely by the division between those whose work involves no significant interaction with objects and all others. As can be seen from Table 42, when the former are excluded from the analysis, there is no significant relationship. The question arises as to why some types of skill should encourage positive management relationships while others do not. The answer, we will suggest, lies in the relationship between discretion, organisation and power. Giddens (1973) suggests that the market is intrinsically a structure of power in which the possession of certain attributes puts some grouping of individuals at an advantage relative to others. He uses the term "market capacity" to refer to all forms of relevant attributes which individuals may bring to the bargaining encounter. Giddens identifies three forms of market capacity in relation to which mobility closure may exist: ownership of property in the means of production; possession of educational or technical qualifications and possession of manual labour power.<sup>20</sup> Parkin (1979) employs the term "social closure" in a related fashion to cover forms of collective social action designed to maximise claims to rewards and opportunities. He distinguishes between

Table 42: *Trust in management by complexity of work with objects excluding those whose work involves no significant interaction with objects*

	<i>Average score in trust in management scale</i>	<i>N</i>
Setting up	-.06	(33)
Precision working	-.06	(95)
Operating-controlling	-.45	(15)
Driving-operating	-.26	(96)
Manipulating	-.27	(79)
Tending	-.33	(21)
Feeding-offbearing	-.23	(51)
Handling	-.21	(167)
Eta-squared	.010	
F	0.8	

P N.S.

20. Giddens (1973), p. 103.

exclusionary and usurpatory closure. The former involves singling out certain social or physical attributes as the justificatory basis of exclusion and the consequent creation of a social category of ineligible. Metaphorically it represents, as Parkin observes, the use of power in a "downward" direction. Usurpatory closure, on the other hand, is a consequence of, and a collective response to, exclusionary closure; it involves collective attempts by the excluded to obtain a greater share of resources and thus represents the use of power in an upward direction.<sup>21</sup>

Discretion achieved by usurpatory closure, by definition, lacks legitimation from above. Exclusionary closure may or may not be legitimated. Certain exclusionary practices may be maintained in their current form only by usurpatory closure, since the strategies are not mutually exclusive. Manual workers' strategies are predominantly usurpatory and where they are exclusionary they tend to be less likely than those of white collar workers to be legitimated as purely task related, as illustrated by the volume of accusations relating to restrictive practices. In addition, exclusionary manual strategies are almost invariably conducted on a collective basis. Complexity of work with objects is predominantly an attribute of manual occupations while complexity of work with data and people is characteristic of predominantly non-manual occupations. The fact that it is the former which bears no relationship to trust in management gives substance to the view that skill *per se* does not produce particular kinds of management-worker relationships. Rather, it appears that the manner in which discretion is achieved and the extent to which the power which discretion confers is legitimated by superordinates are crucial.

#### *White Collar Unionisation, Deskilling and Trust in Management*

The relationship between skill, organisation and trust in management can be explored further by examining the joint effects of trade union membership on trust in management. From Table 43 it is clear that both trade union membership and socio-economic group have significant independent effects on trust in management. Across each socio-economic group trade union members show significantly lower levels of trust. It is interesting to note that, although the two-way interaction term is not statistically significant, the differences between trade union and non-trade union members is actually greater for the white collar groups than for the manual group. A similar pattern exists in relation to attitudes to workers' participation as can be seen from Table 44. In the light of our concern with the effects of complexity, this finding is particularly interesting because a number of authors employing a Marxist

21. Parkin (1979), Chapters 4 and 5.

Table 43: *Trust in management by socio-economic group and trade union membership: two-way Anova*

	<i>Trade union members</i>	<i>Non-trade union members</i>	<i>Total</i>
Professional, managerial and administrative	.47 (68)	.73 (76)	.60 (144)
Inspectional, supervisory and routine non-manual	.02 (195)	.40 (135)	.17 (330)
Skilled manual	-.30 (200)	-.13 (31)	-.28 (231)
Semi-skilled and unskilled manual	-.46 (144)	-.44 (34)	-.46 (178)
<i>Total</i>	-.15 (607)	.32 (276)	
Source of variation	SS	F	P
Main effects	129.30	49.3	< .001
Trade union membership	11.5	17.5	< .001
Socio-economic group	86.7	44.0	< .001
Two-way interaction	2.8	1.4	< .232
<i>Total</i>	706.0		

Table 44: *Attitudes to workers' participation by socio-economic group and trade union membership: two way Anova*

	<i>Trade union members</i>	<i>Non-trade union members</i>	<i>Total</i>
Professional, managerial and administrative	-.09 (68)	-.29 (76)	-.19 (144)
Inspectional, supervisory and routine non-manual	.02 (195)	-.23 (135)	-.08 (330)
Skilled manual	.17 (200)	.05 (31)	.15 (231)
Semi-skilled and unskilled manual	.11 (144)	.16 (34)	.12 (178)
<i>Total</i>	.08 (607)	-.16 (276)	
Source of variation	SS	F	P
Main effects	20.1	10.8	< .001
Trade union membership	4.6	9.9	< .001
Socio-economic group	9.2	4.6	< .001
Two-way interaction	1.9	1.3	< .001
<i>Total</i>	428.5		

perspective have viewed the growth in white collar unionism as a consequence of a process of proletarianisation. Crompton (1976, 1979, 1980) has attempted to demonstrate that changing patterns of white collar unionisation can be explained by the proletarianisation of white collar workers which

... may occur in two ways: (1) the unproductive labour process may in Braverman's terms be 'de-skilled'; that is 'conception' splits off from 'execution' and work is reduced to a series of fragmented repetitive operations; (2) the extent to which the white collar worker carries out the function of capital may be progressively reduced (1979, p. 467).

This process of proletarianisation is reflected in the changing "market" and "work" situations of white collar workers. Crompton (1979) attempts to apply this analysis to the insurance industry in Britain. In the case of this industry the application of "modern managerial techniques coincided" with the introduction of computers. She argues that the available evidence supports the view that much work within the insurance industry has been "de-skilled" and control concentrated at higher levels and that this change in class situation is an important factor in understanding the growth and nature of white collar trade unionism. However, the evidence on the effect of electronic data processing to which Crompton refers, as she admits at a number of points, is open to conflicting interpretations, Kelly's (1978) concern with the contradictory nature of the findings in his review of the relationship between mechanisation and white collar unionism seems somewhat more appropriate. More importantly as Heritage (1980) points out Crompton offers no evidence that it is groups such as female workers on whom the impact of whatever degree of proletarianisation has occurred will fall most heavily are more likely to unionise. Thus, on the basis of the available evidence there seems insufficient reason to dispute Bain's (1970) claim that exponents of the proletarianisation thesis have exaggerated both the extent and the effects of office mechanisation and automation. Bain concluded that even those office workers who have felt their impact have not been as adversely affected as is commonly imagined. Furthermore, he emphasised that even if such effects emerged in the future they would not necessarily encourage unionisation. Thus, he stresses that it has not been those white collar workers such as clerks and office machine operators who have been most ready to join unions but those such as draughtsmen and journalists.

Crompton, in fact, provides little evidence to counter the case made by Lockwood (1958) and Bain (1970) for the crucial importance of the change in the typical work situation of the white collar worker from one charac-

terised by association with authority and a lack of bureaucratisation to a situation where employees are treated not as individuals but as members of categories. The degree of bureaucratisation is significantly related to employment concentration. Under a bureaucratised system, terms and conditions of employment as well as promotion prospects are determined not by the personal consideration and sentiments of superiors but by rules which apply impersonally to all members of a designated category. As Bain observes, once an employee understands that the rules apply to him as a member of a group rather than as an individual, it does not involve a great step for him to decide that the most effective way of changing them in his favour is by collective rather than individual bargaining.

The reason for pursuing the causes of white collar unionism was in order to understand the nature of the relationship between such membership and trust in management and attitudes to participation. There is no reason to expect that white collar trade union membership *per se* or the personal characteristics of trade union membership should produce such an effect. The preceding argument undermines the claim that skill *per se* or, more precisely in this case, deskilling can provide an adequate explanation. Just as the causes of white collar trade unionism cannot be reduced to changes in skill levels but relate to changes in a wider set of control relationships, so too the consequences of white collar unionism are more plausibly interpreted not as a consequence of proletarianisation, but of experience of such control systems. Thus, the relationship of white collar unionism to trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation provides further support for the argument that the consequences of skill cannot be abstracted from the wider power relationships.

#### *Multivariate Analysis of Determinants of Trust in Management and Attitudes to Workers' Participation*

In this section we wish to consider simultaneously the effects of a variety of variables on trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation. The analysis will involve the following variables.

- X14 Father's occupational stratum
- X13 Respondent's age
- X12 Highest educational qualification
- X11 Occupational stratum at first job
- X10 Respondent's correct occupational stratum
- X9 Evaluation of management in present company/organisation
- X8 Complexity of work with data
- X7 Complexity of work with people

- X6 Closeness of supervision
- X5 Experience of unemployment
- X4 Trade union membership
- X3 Proportion of friends who are in non-manual occupations
- X2 Trust in management
- X1 Attitudes to workers' participation

In each case the scores for occupational strata range from one in the case of the highest stratum to eight for the lowest. Highest educational qualification scores range from one for those who have a third level qualification to four for those with primary certificate or less. Trade union membership was scored as a dummy variable with one indicating trade union membership. Experience of unemployment is also treated as a dummy variable with a score of one indicating some experience of unemployment. Evaluation of management in one's own company/organisation in comparison with management in other companies/organisations was scored one for "extremely good" through to seven for "extremely poor". The multiple regression of variables X14 to X3 on trust in management is set out in Table 45. Including occupational stratum and a number of variables relating to complexity of work, experience of unemployment, trade union membership and social origins all of which are known to be related to each other, increases the likelihood for each variable of concluding that is not significantly related to trust in management. If one wished to obtain a more precise measure of both the direct and indirect effects of each of the variables a path analytic procedure would be more appropriate. However, with the number of variables involved here such a procedure would prove rather cumbersome and in any event the more interesting question, we would argue, is the extent to which each of the variables affects trust in management independently of location in the class system. From Table 45 it emerges that, not surprisingly in view of its modest correlation with the other independent variables in the analysis, evaluation of the management in one's own company or organisation is most significantly related to trust in management. More interestingly, current occupational stratum has a decidedly significant impact despite the variety of related variables included in the equation. Neither complexity of work with data or people nor freedom from supervision is statistically significant. On the other hand, experience of unemployment, trade union membership and the proportion of the respondent's friends who are in non-manual occupations and father's occupational stratum are significantly related to trust in management, even when the respondent's current position in the occupational stratification system is controlled. Both age and highest educational qualification are also related to trust in management with the youngest and least educated respon-

Table 45: Multiple regression analysis of determinants of trust in management

	(Standardised coefficients)
X14	-.06* (1.9)
X13	.11**** (3.6)
X12	-.09** (2.0)
X11	.01 (0.2)
X10	-.19**** (3.3)
X9	-.21**** (8.1)
X8	.01 (0.3)
X7	-.03 (0.7)
X6	-.04 (1.1)
X5	-.06* (1.8)
X4	-.12**** (3.9)
X3	.08* (1.9)
R <sup>2</sup>	.291
F	28.9
N	858

Figures in parentheses relate to t values

\*P<.05 \*\*P<.025 \*\*\*P<.005 \*\*\*\*P<.001.

dents expressing the lowest levels of trust.

Before examining these results in more detail it will be useful to consider the pattern relating to the determinants of attitudes to workers' participation. However, it is necessary first to give careful consideration to the nature of the relationship between trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation. The measures of these variables employed in this analysis were, as has already been explained, derived from the factor analysis of a set of eight items. From the beginning it was understood that responses to the items which were primarily intended to serve as indicators of attitudes to workers' participation would also be influenced by attitudes to management. Thus, on this basis it was clearly necessary that the rotated solution should

be of the oblique variety. However, as Nie *et al.* (1975) points out, one of the difficulties with oblique solutions is that none of the objective methods designed so far produce the best indisputable terminal solution. Thus, the SPSS OBLIQUE procedure can be manipulated to provide a variety of solutions as follows:

<i>Value of Delta</i>	<i>Type of Solution</i>
Any positive value less than or equal to 1	Extremely correlated solution
0	Fairly correlated solution
-.5 to +.5	Less correlated solution

The value of delta used in the oblique rotation was 0 and the observed correlation between the two factors was -.52. Since this correlation was determined in part by the method employed it cannot be taken as an objective indication of the relationship between the two variables. In this study, because of our desire to examine a variety of other aspects of working conditions and attitudes, a relatively small number of items were employed to measure the relevant dimensions. If one had sufficient items it would be possible, despite the conceptualisation underlying the construction of the items, to construct measures of each of the dimensions without any overlap of items without causing any significant distortion of the underlying variables. However, to have done so in this case would have led to serious distortion. Thus, it is not possible to provide an unambiguous estimate of the correlation between trust in management and attitude to workers' participation. What can be done, however, is to examine how it varies under different types of solutions. Of the four types of solutions available to us, only two would seem to provide any relevant information given our dilemma. In view of the reasoning underlying the development of the measures it would make little sense to adopt an almost orthogonal solution. While the extremely correlated solution cannot provide any relevant evidence, what is relevant, though, is that the "less correlated" solution produces a correlation between the factors of -.43. Thus, there would seem to be reasonable justification for arguing that the substantive conclusions reached employing the measures derived from the "moderately correlated" solution will not be misleading. In any event it should be clear at this stage what is involved in employing such measures.

With this in mind the results set out in Table 46 can now be examined. From this table it emerges, not surprisingly, that trust in management is the most significant determinant of attitudes to workers' participation. The influence of class related factors on attitudes to workers' participation

Table 46: *Multiple regression analysis of determinants of attitudes to workers' participation*

	(Standardised coefficients)
X14	.04 (1.4)
X13	-.08*** (2.8)
X12	-.10** (2.5)
X11	-.01 (0.2)
X10	-.08 (1.7)
X9	-.01 (0.2)
X8	-.02 (0.6)
X7	-.03 (0.9)
X6	-.05 (1.7)
X5	.07 (2.5)
X4	.05* (1.8)
X3	-.01 (0.0)
X2	-.70 (23.7)****
R <sup>2</sup>	.479
F	59.7
N	858

Figures in parentheses relate to t values

\*p<.05 \*\*p<.025 \*\*\*p<.005 \*\*\*\*p<.001.

operates to a large extent through their effect on trust in management. However, experience of unemployment and trade union membership are significantly related to attitudes to participation independently of trust in management. Age and highest educational qualification are also statistically significant with younger and more highly qualified respondents being most in favour of participation, when the foregoing factors were controlled for current occupational stratum and closeness of supervision, whose zero-order correlations with workers' participation were positive, were related to the participation variable in a negative fashion.

### *Conclusions*

The results of the multivariate analysis confirm the picture given by earlier results that the circumstances particular to an individual's own place of employment, as reflected by the relative evaluations of one's company/organisation have a significant influence on trust in management and attitudes to workers' participation. The significance of this finding should not be obscured by the fact that the primary focus of this study is on other factors. However, it remains true that in the preceding equations relative evaluation of one's own place of employment accounts for a maximum of 10 per cent of the variance in trust in management and five per cent of the variance in attitudes to workers' participation. Thus, the significance of factors going beyond the individual organisation cannot be denied.

In examining the results set out in Tables 45 and 46 it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the nature of these equations means that rather stringent tests of significance are being imposed on those variables which can be thought of as components of class situation. Nevertheless, it is still extremely interesting that while such factors as educational qualifications, father's occupational stratum, trade union membership and the proportion of respondent's close friends who are in non-manual occupations have a significant impact on trust in management independently of current class situation, this is not true for either of the measures of complexity examined, nor for closeness of supervision. These results again suggest the importance of appreciating that the consequences of particular work experiences cannot be adequately appreciated independently of the wider class structure within which they occur. In particular, it is necessary to emphasise that the complexity or discretion divorced from class situation appear to have little impact on workers' general response to management. Thus, attempts to change the quality of management-worker relationships by job-enrichment schemes directed mainly at altering the technical content of the work are unlikely to be successful. In examining the findings relating to the effects of complexity of work with objects on trust in management we suggest that it was necessary to take into account the manner in which discretion is achieved and the extent to which the power which discretion confers is legitimised by superordinates. The significance of factors such as social origins and friendship patterns taken together with the fact that the evaluation which they influenced was that of *management in general* points to the fact that worker-management relationships are influenced not only by the individual's personal experience of work but by an understanding of the wider class system which is derived, at least in part, from the experience of kin and friends.

## Chapter 4

### *The Social Context of Workers' Participation*

#### *Prospects for Workers' Participation*

In this chapter we wish to consider the implications which the findings reported in this study have for the possibilities of a variety of forms of workers' participation. We will deal first with those results which might suggest an optimistic prognosis. All of the sub-groups examined in this study displayed considerable concern with the intrinsic content of their jobs. In fact, with the exception of those with the highest number of dependants the intrinsic dimension was the best predictor of overall satisfaction. It is quite clear that the vast majority of employees, given the choice, would opt for jobs which provide an opportunity to use skills and exercise discretion. The fact that workers in lower socio-economic groups express satisfaction with jobs which by any objective criteria appear to offer little opportunity for self-expression is not because their dispositions are such that they do not need or want rewarding work. It is a *consequence* of constraint rather than *choice*. An employee's current job situation is evaluated in comparison with what is realistically available.

The work values of the employees in our study would seem to provide considerable encouragement for those who argue that jobs should be re-designed to provide greater opportunities for worker involvement in decision making. Furthermore, a significant majority of employees were in favour of workers' participation. For many this support included acceptance of the idea that management should give workers a lot more freedom to organise their work in their own way and that, in fact, most decisions taken by managers and supervisors would be better if they were taken by the workers themselves. While white collar workers were significantly less likely to hold such views, particularly the latter, it remains true that only a minority of them felt that managers know what is best for the firm and that workers should do what they are told or that giving workers more say in running their firms would not make things any better. Thus the attitudes of the higher socio-economic groups while reflecting concern for supervisory and managerial prerogatives are far from authoritarian.

The question which must be posed is why, given the existence of such positive attitudes, have participative ideas had such a limited impact on the

way in which work is organised?<sup>22</sup> One part of the answer may be in the co-existence with the positive values and attitudes referred to of other responses to the work situation which produce a considerably more complicated pattern. Thus, workers are concerned about extrinsic as well as intrinsic rewards and at that stage of the life cycle where financial demands and responsibilities are greatest the former are the more potent determinants of overall job satisfaction. In addition, since satisfaction is quite clearly relative, rather than absolute, notions of hierarchies of motives, where intrinsic factors become the sole concern once certain absolute levels of extrinsic rewards have been achieved, are less than helpful. It is also necessary to keep in mind the fact that highly positive attitudes towards workers' participation go together with what, by any standards, are notably low levels of trust in management. Furthermore it is those who are most in favour of workers' participation who are most distrustful of management.

In considering the prospects for workers' participation it is necessary to go beyond what workers want and expect and focus on the social meanings which are implicit in the design of work. Trust and distrust are manifested not only in terms of personal social interaction but also in terms of the rules, roles and relations which are imposed on others. From this perspective discretion is seen as a source of power and superordinates' ability to minimise discretion is a consequence of power. It is true that the evidence available in this study showed that those who were least closely supervised and those whose jobs involved the greatest degree of complexity of interaction with data and people were most trustful of management. However, complexity of work with objects produced no such effect and when other class related factors were controlled for, neither did the other measures. Such findings cast considerable doubt on the thesis that increased discretion and complexity *per se* will produce improved worker-management relationships. The evidence points to the importance of the manner in which discretion is achieved and the extent to which it is legitimated by superordinates. It is perhaps too extreme to suggest that job enrichment can only work on management's terms. However, it is true that the impact of changes in discretion has to be understood in the context of control systems which are, to a significant degree, a consequence of the existing balance of power between interest groups within the organisation.

22. There are of course a number of examples of participative structures in the public sector. Under the provisions of the Worker Participation (State Enterprises) Act 1977 there are worker directors on the Boards of seven State-sponsored bodies. Worker directors are also to be found in other public sector bodies and discussions are in progress with the unions under the provisions of the National Understanding about worker participation issues in the public service. However, on the basis of the available evidence it appears reasonable to conclude that worker involvement in job design and other aspects of work organisation reform is not extensively developed in Ireland.

The central theme of this paper has been that class related factors are significant not only in shaping wants and expectations but in determining their practical consequences. The implications of the findings reported in this study are not that workers are uninterested in, or unaffected by, changes in work organisation but rather that (i) discretion is intimately related to power and (ii) that it is difficult to formulate proposals for changes in work organisation which do not have implications for both intrinsic and extrinsic job rewards and for the relative position of different groups of employees. Given this, it is difficult to see how changes could be implemented other than through established collective bargaining procedures. It is interesting to consider the support for the conclusions drawn here from other studies of workers' participation in Ireland. The Department of Labour's (1980) discussion paper on *Workers' Participation* notes how work reorganisation can have an impact on wage systems and on skill and demarcations issues.<sup>23</sup> In view of this it is not surprising that it recommends that arguments on the reform of work organisation should be formulated whenever possible through the existing collective bargaining and recognised consultative arrangements. The report of Murphy and Walsh (1978) of the Irish Productivity Centre provides further support for the views set out here. The projects undertaken by the Participation Unit of the IPC employed joint committees "to establish and build up trust between workers". The report points out that in medium-sized companies it can take up to eighteen months or more to move from committee stage to first impact on shop floor. In older companies, it is suggested "there is often a considerable build up of prejudices and misconceptions which must be aired before any real work can be done".<sup>24</sup> The Department of Labour discussion document recognises that:

Any form of direct participation (such as job rotation, job enlargement, semi-autonomous group working, work restructuring and flexible working hours) which gives employees more discretion in running their own jobs and controlling their work situation must entail some erosion of management prerogative and of necessity, represent some decentralisation and devolution of existing managerial functions (paragraph 4.18).<sup>25</sup>

Finally, in the company referred to earlier, while it was generally felt that the short term outcomes had been successful in the majority of cases, doubts were expressed regarding the ability to sustain these improvements over time

23. Department of Labour, 1980, p. 48.

24. Murphy and Walsh *op cit.*, p. 75.

25. Department of Labour, *op cit.*, p. 46.

without further changes occurring. The discussion of the relationships between discretion, power and trust set out in this paper is echoed in the following conclusion:

It seems likely that if job restructuring is to succeed as a strategy for changing the nature of organisations and increasing the amount of harmony between those organisations and the people who work in them it will have to be accompanied by explicit shifts in values from the top of the organisation down; and it will have to be processed as a strategy through the organisation (Murphy and Walsh, 1978, p. 96).

In this section we have been concerned to explain the discrepancy between the promise held out for the introduction of participative structures and the reality of the marginal position in our industrial relations system occupied by such structures. In part this has been achieved by considering additional evidence on work values and attitudes to management thus producing a more ambiguous picture. We have also tried to show that what might at first glance appear to be contradictory subjective reactions to the work situation are a response by employees to their work experiences and to what have been referred to as the social meanings inherent in the manner in which work is designed. We have attempted to emphasise constraint even more than choice and to stress the importance of the objective organisation of work as well as workers' experience of it. In doing so we have attempted to move away from the oversimplified notion that evaluating prospects for workers' participation is primarily a matter of understanding what workers' values and wants are and the choices which follow from such dispositions. Thus, for example, Gruenberg's argument, from the fact that workers place a high value on intrinsic reward to an implied critique of labour unions whose primary goal is that of increasing extrinsic rewards, lacks credibility.<sup>26</sup> Why do trade unions adopt particular strategies? In attempting to answer this question in relation to workers' participation the first point which must be stressed is that the reaction of trade unions to workers' participation at any level is not purely a consequence of factors internal to the enterprise but is influenced by wider factors relating to trade union structure and to conceptions of the appropriate role of a trade union and, more generally, the trade union movement as a whole. Furthermore, critics such as Gruenberg fail to consider the argument made by Mann (1973b) that the concentration of trade unions on economic rewards is, in large part, a consequence of the fact that historically

26. Gruenberg (1980), p. 268.

employers have been more willing to play that particular bargaining game than to make concessions of managerial prerogative of control.

*Workers' Participation, Power and the Role of Trade Unionism*

The previous discussion illustrates the point that the strategies which trade unions pursue are not independent of those adopted by other actors in the industrial relations system. In general, increases in discussion and activity on workers' participation have gone together with attempts to incorporate trade unions into institutional arrangements designed to cope with problems of inflation and unemployment. The available evidence suggests that workers' participation, legislation and formal agreements on democracy have involved attempts to accommodate labour within capitalist economies and have, as Batstone (1976) suggests, reflected the exercise of power by workers as much as they facilitate it.<sup>27</sup> The general picture in Europe, Batstone reports, is one where workers generally support the existence of participative systems but are seldom satisfied with their achievement. Worker directors, for example, are generally thought to have had a marginal effect.<sup>28</sup> Stephens' (1980) examination of worker participation suggests that once a specific participation scheme is introduced its further development depends to a large extent on the mobilising efforts of the unions involved, their ideological orientation and their organisational history and cohesion. Batstone similarly emphasises that worker directors need to constitute a part of a larger system for the democratisation of work relations; they need to be integrated into a set of institutions which operate at a variety of levels.<sup>29</sup> The evidence available from Murphy and Walsh's (1981, 1982) reports on the operation of the worker director schemes in the semi-state bodies supports this view. Their report showed clear evidence of positive attitudes towards the idea of having worker directors coupled with diffuse expectations of the role they should play.

It would thus appear that if one attempts to separate discussion of the prospects for workers' participation from the role which trade unions play, seek to play and which others wish them to play in the wider political system, it becomes increasingly unreal. Goldthorpe (1981) notes that perceptions of the difficulties involved in accommodating trade unionism within free market capitalism have taken a cyclical form. Early twentieth century notions of incompatibility were replaced by the view that trade unions by successful industrial and political representations of their members would play a crucial role in the civil integration of the working class.<sup>30</sup> Goldthorpe, however,

27. Batstone (1976), p. 39.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

30. Goldthorpe (1981), p. 22.

suggests that this post-war liberal view was in error in assuming that:

... the integration of labour movements into the pluralist institutional structure — and any associated decline in working-class consciousness and in the appeal of socialist ideology — was necessarily a development favouring greater social harmony and cohesion. (Goldthorpe, 1981, p. 23).

In fact, as Goldthorpe stresses, it is as unions have established themselves institutionally within the capitalist system that their compatibility with this system has become most problematic.

The situation in Ireland provides support of Goldthorpe's argument. Associated with major changes in the occupational structure (Rottman and O'Connell, 1982), there has been a significant increase in trade union membership. In 1979 there was a total membership of approximately 499,000 which compares with the figure of 172,100 recorded in 1945. The 1979 figure represented 65 per cent of all employees with the figure being a good deal higher for manufacturing. In 1978 the proportion of employees in this country who were members of trade unions was third highest of the member states of the EEC. The rate of increase from 49 per cent in 1970 to 65 per cent in 1978 was the highest of the nine countries. There has also been a substantial increase in the membership of white collar unions — defined as unions whose membership consisted almost entirely of office, distributive and professional workers. The membership of these unions increased by 77,000 or approximately 97 per cent between 1966 and 1979.<sup>31</sup> These figures do not take into account the significant numbers of white collar employees who are members of general unions. A significant majority of these employees express a considerable distrust of management but this lack of trust is not a consequence of a systematic questioning of the criteria underlying the distribution of job rewards which could be described as class conscious.

The conclusion regarding class consciousness which is drawn from Whelan's (1980) examination of variations in evaluations of the justness of the distribution of job rewards does not imply the absence of disagreement relating to the distribution of job rewards between the major employee socio-economic groups.<sup>32</sup> Thus, over one-eighth of the higher white collar group think the unskilled manual workers are overpaid. While less than one in twenty of semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers agree. More than one in seven of the professional, managerial and administrative groups suggest that

31. Commission on Industrial Relations.

32. *Op cit.*, pp. 66-67.

tradesmen and other skilled manual workers are paid too much. One in four skilled manual workers are of the opinion that clerical and similar office workers are overpaid and almost one in five of other manual workers agree. Most significantly, 35 per cent of skilled manual workers and 28 per cent of semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers think that managers should earn less. However, an understanding of the evaluations of the reward *criteria* which underlie the assessments of the situations of specific groups requires that one examines not isolated evaluations but the relationships between evaluations. An evaluation of such criteria which could be described as class conscious would require a recognition that the existing criteria are such that there is an inevitable opposition of interest between certain groups. A manual worker might consider that too much weight is given to criteria such as responsibility, education, scarcity, etc., which favour higher white collar workers and/or that too little weight is given to factors such as physical effort, unpleasant working conditions, unsocial hours, etc., which would favour manual workers. It is possible, however, for such evaluations to be closely related or entirely independent. The existence of negative relationships between the evaluations of the situations of distinct socio-economic groups is consistent with an understanding that the favourable situation of one group is necessarily at the expense of the other. In fact, the available evidence provided no support for the existence among any of the socio-economic groups of such an understanding of the reward system.

We have previously rejected the idea that these results can be explained as simply being a consequence of a perception of an over-riding conflict between employees as a whole and certain non-employee groups. The absence of socially structured disagreement of a kind adequate to indicate conflict consciousness regarding the distribution of pay between employee socio-economic groups can be taken as an indication of some reasonable underlying level of consensus regarding the *criteria* which should determine the distribution between socio-economic groups. Of course, the fact that this value consensus cannot be explained by reference to conflicts between employees and non-employee groups should not be taken to imply that such conflicts are not perceived to exist. Clearly, the controversy in recent years regarding the distribution of the burden of taxation and the related demonstrations provide ample evidence that strong feelings are held on such issues. The fact that almost 60 per cent of our respondents thought that most companies could afford to pay their workers more without doing their profits any great harm is a clear indication of the division which exists. It is not possible to provide further direct evidence from the survey on this issue. However, considerable light can be shed on employees' reactions to the distribution of rewards within employee socio-economic groups and an indication provided of how

the consequences of such evaluations are not as limited as might at first be imagined.

No clear evidence could be found for the existence of value consensus regarding the manner in which job rewards should be distributed *within* socio-economic groups. In fact, it is quite clear from the available evidence that employees are extremely unwilling to legitimate situations where they consider themselves to be under-rewarded in comparison with their occupational groups, or where they think that their occupational group is relatively deprived in comparison with their socio-economic group. This finding can be explained by the fact that such employees are likely to feel that their own inputs and those of their occupational groups are at least equal to those typical of their occupational and socio-economic groups respectively. Perhaps, not surprisingly, there is no evidence here of pragmatic acceptance of market outcomes. Irish strike statistics demonstrate clearly that restricted reference groups are no guarantee of industrial peace. Korpi and Shalev (1978) examined the characteristics of industrial conflict in eighteen capitalist democracies from 1946-1976 and provisionally identified a number of patterns. At one extreme were Norway, Sweden and Austria, all of whom experienced an enormous decline in worker mobilisation in industrial conflict. At the other extreme were Ireland, the USA and Canada with no long run decline in strike involvement and where the long duration of strikes has contributed to giving them very high relative volumes of strikes in the period.

Korpi and Shalev's classification of Ireland with the North American countries appears to be, in part, based on an underestimation of trade union membership. Furthermore, there is, of course, no implication that they will follow similar paths in the future. It does, however, illustrate quite clearly the point that the absence of conventional class structured politics, no more than limited reference groups, provides no guarantee of industrial peace. The fact that conflicts between buyers and sellers of labour are manifested primarily within the employment context may, in important respects, be seen to be a consequence of the weakness rather than the strength of the labour movement.

In Sweden, Norway and Austria where strike involvement is low, the labour movement is highly mobilised both industrially and politically with a considerable degree of integration between the two wings. The union movement is highly co-ordinated and organisationally centralised and participates in economy wide bargaining with employers and extensive public policy bargaining. The strategies pursued by unions in these countries has involved what Pizzorno (1978) describes as the substitution of political exchange for economic exchange. The strategy implies an under-exploitation of short-term market power. The gains that may be received are in terms of political power

which in turn may be viewed as strengthening the capacity for the achievement of future benefits. Some of the difficulties that are involved in such a strategy have been raised by Durkan *et al.*, in their reviews of the Irish economy. The essence of most income policies, Durkan *et al.*, argue is an attempt to affect the cost structure of firms.<sup>33</sup> The improvement in the cost position of firms is reflected in increased profitability. The hope is that increased profitability will lead, in the first instance, to increased employment and then increased investment. However, Durkan *et al.*, stress that workers have no assurance that increased profitability will lead to either or both of these desirable end results and even if it does, the question of ownership of assets created by wage restraints must be settled. As Mathews and Fox (1981) note these difficulties have been used to dispute the view that a trade-off exists between employment and wages and to justify the goal of maximising wages for those currently in employment. Durkan *et al.*, however, by recognising the conflict between significantly reducing unemployment and increasing the earnings of those already in employment are led to raise issues which take one from the sphere of economic exchange to political exchange.

The trade union strategy implicit in Durkan *et al.*'s discussion of incomes policy has been described as "no moderation without participation".<sup>34</sup> However, political exchange strategies raise the possibility that an "interpretation gap" may arise between the hierarchy and at least some section of the rank and file.<sup>35</sup> Trade unions have to be capable of convincing their members or be strong enough to resist immediate pressure. Thus, the structure of the trade union movement is of considerable significance. There is little need to spell out in any detail the situation in Ireland regarding the multiplicity of unions, the variety of bargaining strategies and the general agreement on the need for the Irish trade union leadership to be circumspect to make sure it is followed by the rank and file membership (Schregle (1975)). O'Brien (1981) has discussed the problem of internal discipline in relation to the development of national wage agreements. In practice, he notes the only penalties which Congress can impose on affiliates which act in contravention of its policies are apt to be either negligible and ineffective or substantial and counter productive. Both external and internal threats to Congress efforts to develop and implement a consensus on wage rounds have the same roots O'Brien suggests.

Both turn on the fact that life outside Congress (and for the

33. Durkan *et al.*, June 1975, December 1977, March 1979.

34. Crouch (1979), p. 46.

35. Pizzorno (1978).

unofficial striker inside Congress) has tended to be less constrained than life for the self-disciplined members of unions in Congress. (O'Brien, 1981, pp. 161-162.)

Thus, despite the role noted by O'Brien,<sup>36</sup> played by the Executive Council of the ICTU in favour of a centralised approach to wage bargaining, the structure of the Irish trade union movement is not particularly conducive to stability of corporatist structures. It is in this context that O'Brien argues for a state strategy which would strengthen the power of Congress against the alternative of attempting to diminish the power and influence of trade unions.

It is clear that Irish trade union structures are far from ideal in encouraging the adoption and successful pursuit of the kind of political role necessary for full realisation of the possibilities inherent in worker participation schemes. Of course, there will be many who are willing to argue that trade unions' primary function is, and should be, collective bargaining rather than the transformation of authority structures and that current trade union structures reflect the wishes of the members. Clearly, one is dealing here not simply with questions of fact but also of political judgement. Furthermore, one has no difficulty in accepting Schregle's point that individual trade union members will approve changes in trade union structure only to the extent that they expect them to be better suited to the achievement of objectives such as security of employment, security of income and improvement of working and living standards. However, it is necessary to emphasise that workers' wants are not confined to extrinsic rewards; they do wish to have jobs which are more interesting and which offer greater opportunities for discretion and, more generally, to have a greater say in running the work organisations in which they spend a great part of their lives. We have argued that the achievements of such objectives would require trade union involvement at a variety of levels. However, it is unlikely that trade unions will be able to, or be permitted to, play such a role except as part of a wider political involvement.

### *Conclusions*

We hope it has been made clear that current structures for the control of work cannot be seen to simply reflect what workers want from work. The relationships between discretion, power and trust provide a variety of possibilities and difficulties at task, enterprise and industrial relations system levels. If progress with regard to workers' participation is considered disappointing and this, of course, involves value judgements, it is not because

36. See also Roche (1982).

workers are naturally indifferent or management naturally authoritarian. It is rather, that when the issue of workers' participation as a general strategy is pursued, it leads to questions concerning not just the organisation of tasks but also the more general problems relating to division of labour and the distribution of rewards. Furthermore, in circumstances where manifest distrust of motives exists it raises the challenge of developing new political arrangements relating to the conduct of industrial relations.

## REFERENCES

- ARGYRIS, C., 1971. *Management and Organizational Development*, New York: McGraw Hill.
- BAIN, G.S., 1970. *The Growth of White Collar Unionism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- BAIN, G.S., DAVID COATES and VALERIE ELLIS, 1973. *Social Stratification and Trade Unionism*, London: Heinemann.
- BAKER, T.J., D.F. HANNAN, D.B. ROTTMAN and B.M. WALSH, 1980. "Critique of ESRI Paper No. 97", in Davis *et al.*, *Some Issues in the Methodology of Attitude Research*, Dublin: ESRI, Policy Research Series No. 3.
- BARITZ, L., 1961. *The Servants of Power*, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.
- BATSTONE, E., 1976. *Industrial Democracy and Worker Representation at Board Level: A Review of the European Experience in Industrial Democracy*, HMSO.
- BLACKBURN, R.M. and M. MANN, 1979. *The Working Class in the Labour Market*, London: Macmillan.
- BLACKLER, F.M. and C.A. BROWN, 1978. *Job Design and Management Control: Studies in British Leyland and Volvo*, Saxon House.
- BLAUNER, R., 1964. *Alienation and Freedom*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- BRAVERMAN, H., 1974. *Labour and Monopoly Capital*, New York: Monthly Review Press.
- BURAWOY, M., 1978. "Towards a Marxist Theory of the Labour Process: Braverman and Beyond", *Politics and Society*, Vol. 8, pp. 247-312.
- CROMPTON, R., 1976. "Approaches to the Study of White Collar Unionism", *Sociology*, Vol. 10, No. 3.
- CROMPTON, R., 1979. "Trade Unionism and the Insurance Clerk", *Sociology*, Vol. 13, No. 3.
- CROMPTON, R., 1980. "The Double Proletarianization Thesis", *Sociology*, Vol. 14, No. 3.
- CROUCH, C.J., 1979. "The State and Liberal Democracy", in C.J. Crouch (ed.), *State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism*, London: Croom Helm.
- CROZIER, M., 1964. *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*, London: Tavistock.

- DANIEL, W.W., 1969. "Industrial Behaviour and Orientation to Work — A Critique", *Management Studies*, October.
- DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, 1980. Worker Participation. A Discussion Paper, Dublin: Stationery Office.
- DUBIN, R., 1956. "Industrial Workers' Worlds: A Study of 'Central Interests'", *Social Problems*, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 131-142.
- DUNNETTE, M.D., J.P. CAMPBELL and M.D. HAKEL, 1967. "Factors Contributing to Job Satisfaction in Six Occupational Groups", *Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance*, Vol. 2, pp. 143-174.
- DURKAN, J., F. KIRWAN and B. MENTON, 1975. *Quarterly Economic Commentary*, Dublin: ESRI, June.
- DURKAN, J., and J.G. KEENAN, 1977. *Quarterly Economic Commentary*, Dublin: ESRI, December.
- DURKAN, J., B.J. MENTON and B. O'LOUGHLIN, 1979. *Quarterly Economic Commentary*, Dublin: ESRI, March.
- FOX, A., 1973. "Industrial Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology" in J. Child (ed.), *Man and Organization*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
- FOX, A., 1974. *Beyond Contract: Work Power and Trust Relations*, London: Faber and Faber.
- FOX, A., 1976. "The Meaning of Work, Open University, Occupational Categories and Cultures", 1, *People and Work*, Milton Keynes.
- FRIEDMAN, A., 1977. *Industry and Labour*, London: Macmillan.
- GIDDENS, A., 1973. *The Class Structure of Advanced Societies*, London: Hutchinson.
- GOLDTHORPE, J.H., D. LOCKWOOD, F. BECHOFFER and J. PLATT, 1968. *The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- GOLDTHORPE, J.H., 1981. *Problems of Political Economy After the End of the Post-War Period*, Oxford: Nuffield College.
- GRUENBERG, B., 1980. "The Happy Worker: An Analysis of Educational and Occupational Differences in Determinants of Job Satisfaction", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 86, No. 2.
- HERITAGE, J., 1980. "Class Situation, White Collar Unionization and the 'Double Proletarianization Thesis': A Gommaent", *Sociology*, Vol. 14, No. 2.
- HERZBERG, F., B. MAUSNER, P.O. PETERSON and D.F. CAPWELL, 1957. *Job Attitudes: A Review of Research and Opinion*, Pittsburgh.
- HERZBERG, F., B. MAUSNER and B. SYNDERMAN, 1959. *The Motivation to Work*, Wiley.
- HYMAN, R., 1977. "Occupational Structure, Collective Organization and

- Industrial Militancy", in Crouch and Dizzano (eds.), *The Resurgence of Class Conflict since 1968*, Vol. II, London: Macmillan.
- KELLY, A., 1978. "The Unionization of the White Collar Employee", *Administration*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 77-94.
- KING, N., 1970. "Clarification and Evaluation of the Two-Factor Theory of Job Satisfaction", *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 74, pp. 18-31.
- KOHN, M.L., 1969. *Class and Conformity. A Study in Values*, Illinois: Pupils' Press.
- KORPI, W., 1978. *The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- KORPI, W., and M. SHALEV, 1979. "Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist Societies", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 164-187.
- LEE, D.J., 1981. "Skill, Craft and Class: A Theoretical Critique and a Critical Case", *Sociology*, Vol. 15, No. 1.
- LITTLER, C.R., 1978. "Understanding Taylorism", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2.
- LITTLER, C.R., 1980. "Subcontract and Systems of Indirect Control", in D. Dunkerly and G. Soloman (eds.), *The International Yearbook of Organizational Studies*, London: Macmillan.
- LOCKE, E.A., 1969. "What is Job Satisfaction?", *Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance*, Vol. 4, pp. 309-336.
- LOCKE, E.A., 1976. "The Nature and Causes of Job Satisfaction", in M.D. Dunnette (ed.), *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, New York: Rand and McNally.
- LOCKWOOD, D., 1958. *The Blackcoated Worker: A Study in Class Consciousness*, London: Allen and Unwin.
- MANN, M., 1973a. *Workers on the Move*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- MANN, M., 1973b. *Consciousness and Action Among Western Working Class*, London: Macmillan.
- MASLOW, A.H., 1943. "A Theory of Human Motivation", *Psychological Review*, No. 50, pp. 370-396.
- MATTHEWS, A., and R. FOX, 1981. "Talk Power Not Pence", *Left Perspective*, pp. 5-9.
- MONDS, J., 1976. "Workers' Control and the Historians: A New Economism", *New Left Review*, No. 97.
- MURPHY, T., and D. WALSH, 1978. *National Survey of New Forms of Work Organization*, Dublin: Irish Productivity Centre.
- MURPHY, T., and D. WALSH, 1981 and 1982. *The Worker Direction and His Impact on the Enterprise*, The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.

- NIE, NORMAN H., *et al.*, 1975. *SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences* (Second Edition), New York: McGraw-Hill.
- O'BRIEN, J.F., 1981. *A Study of National Wage Agreements in Ireland*, Dublin: ESRI, Paper No. 104.
- PARKIN, F., 1979. *Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique*, London: Tavistock Publications.
- PERROW, C., 1972. *Complex Organisations*, London: Scott, Foresman and Company.
- PIZZORNO, ALESSANDRO, 1978. "Political-Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict", in C.J. Crouch and A. Pizzorno, *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe*, London: Macmillan.
- REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1981. Dublin: Stationery Office, P1. 114.
- ROCHE, BILL, 1982. "Social Partnership and Political Control: State Strategy and Industrial Relations in Ireland", in Mary Kelly, Liam O'Dowd and James Wickham (eds.), *Power Conflict and Inequality*, Dublin: Turoe Press.
- ROTTMAN, D.B., D.F. HANNAN and N. HARDIMAN, M.M. WILEY, 1982. *The Distribution of Income in the Republic of Ireland: A Study in Social Class and Family-Cycle Inequalities*, Dublin: ESRI, Paper No. 109.
- ROTTMAN, D., and P. O'CONNELL, "Changing Structures of Irish Society", *Administration*, (forthcoming).
- RUBERY, J., 1978. "Structured Labour Markets, Worker Organisation and Low Pay", *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 17-36.
- SCHNEIDER, J., and E.A. LOCKE, 1971. "A Critique of Herzberg's Incident Classification Scheme and a Suggested Revision", *Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance*, Vol. 6, pp. 441-457.
- SCHREGLE, J., 1975. *Restructuring of the Irish Trade Union Movement*, Geneva: ILO.
- STEPHENS, E.H., 1980. *The Politics of Workers' Participation*, New York: Academic Press.
- STRAUSS, G., 1963. "Some Notes on Power Equalization", in M.J. Leavitt (ed.), *The Social Science of Organizations*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- STEWART, A., K. PRANDY and R.M. BLACKBURN, 1980. *Social Stratification and Occupations*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- TURNER, H.A., 1962. *Trade Union Growth, Structure and Policy*, London: Allen and Unwin.
- UNITED STATES HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE'S TASK REPORT, 1973. *Work in America*, Report of a Special Task Force to

- the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- VROOM, V.H., 1964. *Work and Motivation*, London: John Wiley and Sons.
- WALL, T.D., and G.M. STEPHENSON, 1970. "Herzberg's Two Factor Theory of Job Attitudes: A Critical Evaluation and Some Fresh Evidence", *Industrial Relations Journal*, December.
- WHELAN, B.J., 1979. "RANSAM: A Random Sample Design for Ireland", *The Economic and Social Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 169-174.
- WHELAN, C.T., 1976. "Orientations to Work: Some Theoretical and Methodological Problems", *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, pp. 142-158.
- WHELAN, C.T., 1980. *Employment Conditions and Job Satisfaction: The Distribution, Perception and Evaluation of Job Rewards*, Dublin: ESRI, Paper No. 101.

## APPENDIX A

### *The Sample: Methodology and Outcome*

A combination of reasons which included both cost and the need to ensure that our questions would be meaningful to all of our respondents determined that our sample be restricted to male full-time employees in Dublin.

Originally, we had thought in terms of sampling by organisation. The kind of sample required would have involved selecting a small number of workers from a large number of organisations. However, it became clear quite early in the study that the kind of information which would make sampling by organisation feasible would not be readily available in the vast majority of organisations. Quite apart from the difficulties one would anticipate in obtaining co-operation, the cost of assembling such information would be prohibitive. Thus, the procedure set out below was followed.

The target population in the present study was employed males resident in the 14 Dublin Dail constituencies. It was decided to use the RANSAM sample selection procedure (Whelan, 1979) to select a random sample of named respondents from the electoral register and then to exclude all those found to be ineligible (females, retired, self-employed, etc.). The RANSAM system operates by selecting a set of geographical clusters of names – in this case 100 clusters of 50 names each – and also allows one to stratify these clusters on the basis of certain indices of social status. In the present study the index chosen was the percentage of the gainfully occupied population in each cluster (area) employed in the labouring and transport occupations. The clusters to be sampled were listed in ascending order of this variable and a systematic sample selected from this list. Within each selected cluster a systematic sample of 50 names was chosen.

Detailed tabulations, which confirm that both the response rate and the representativeness of the achieved sample were satisfactory, have been published elsewhere (Whelan, 1980).

## Books

*Economic Growth in Ireland: The Experience Since 1947*

Kieran A. Kennedy and Brendan Dowling

*Irish Economic Policy: A Review of Major Issues*

Staff Members of ESRI (eds. B. R. Dowling and J. Durkan)

*The Irish Economy and Society in the 1980s (Papers presented at ESRI  
Twenty-first Anniversary Conference)*

Staff Members of ESRI

*The Economic and Social State of the Nation*

J. F. Meenan, M. P. Fogarty, J. Kavanagh and L. Ryan

*The Irish Economy: Policy and Performance 1972-1981*

P. Bacon, J. Durkan and J. O'Leary

## Policy Research Series:

1. *Regional Policy and the Full-Employment Target*

M. Ross and B. Walsh

2. *Energy Demand in Ireland, Projections and Policy Issues*

S. Scott

3. *Some Issues in the Methodology of Attitude Research*

E. E. Davis *et al.*

4. *Land Drainage Policy in Ireland* Richard Bruton and Frank J. Convery

## Broadsheet Series:

1. *Dental Services in Ireland*

P. R. Kaim-Caudle

2. *We Can Stop Rising Prices*

M. P. Fogarty

3. *Pharmaceutical Services in Ireland*

P. R. Kaim-Caudle

assisted by Annette O'Toole and Kathleen O'Donoghue

4. *Ophthalmic Services in Ireland*

P. R. Kaim-Caudle

assisted by Kathleen O'Donoghue and Annette O'Toole

5. *Irish Pensions Schemes, 1969*

P. R. Kaim-Caudle and J. G. Byrne

assisted by Annette O'Toole

6. *The Social Science Percentage Nuisance*

R. C. Geary

7. *Poverty in Ireland: Research Priorities*

Brendan M. Walsh

8. *Irish Entrepreneurs Speak for Themselves*

M. P. Fogarty

9. *Marital Desertion in Dublin: an exploratory study*

Kathleen O'Higgins

10. *Equalization of Opportunity in Ireland: Statistical Aspects*

R. C. Geary and F. S. Ó Muircheartaigh

11. *Public Social Expenditure in Ireland*

Finola Kennedy

12. *Problems in Economic Planning and Policy Formation in Ireland,  
1958-1974*

Desmond Norton

13. *Crisis in the Cattle Industry*

R. O'Connor and P. Keogh

14. *A Study of Schemes for the Relief of Unemployment in Ireland*

R. C. Geary and M. Dempsey

*with Appendix*

E. Costa

15. *Dublin Simon Community, 1971-1976: an Exploration*

Ian Hart

16. *Aspects of the Swedish Economy and their relevance to Ireland*

Robert O'Connor, Eoin O'Malley and Anthony Foley

17. *The Irish Housing System: A Critical Overview*  
T. J. Baker and L. M. O'Brien
18. *The Irish Itinerants: Some Demographic, Economic and Educational Aspects*  
M. Dempsey and R. C. Geary
19. *A study of Industrial Workers' Co-operatives*  
Robert O'Connor and Philip Kelly
20. *Drinking in Ireland: A Review of Trends in Alcohol Consumption, Alcohol Related Problems and Policies towards Alcohol*  
Brendan M. Walsh

**Geary Lecture Series:**

1. *A Simple Approach to Macro-economic Dynamics* (1967)  
R. G. D. Allen
2. *Computers, Statistics and Planning-Systems or Chaos?* (1968)  
F. G. Foster
3. *The Dual Career Family* (1970)  
Rhona and Robert Rapoport
4. *The Psychosonomics of Rising Prices* (1971)  
H. A. Turner
5. *An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Measurement of Utility or Welfare* (1972)  
J. Tinbergen
6. *Econometric Forecasting from Lagged Relationships* (1973)  
M. G. Kendall
7. *Towards a New Objectivity* (1974)  
Alvin W. Gouldner
8. *Structural Analysis in Sociology* (1975)  
Robert K. Merton
9. *British Economic Growth 1951-1973: Success or Failure?* (1976)  
R. C. O. Matthews
10. *Official Statisticians and Econometricians in the Present Day World* (1977)  
E. Malinvaud
11. *Political and Institutional Economics* (1978)  
Gunnar Myrdal
12. *The Dilemmas of a Socialist Economy: The Hungarian Experience* (1979)  
János Kornai
13. *The Story of a Social Experiment and Some Reflections* (1980)  
Robert M. Solow
14. *Modernisation and Religion* (1981)  
P. L. Berger

**General Research Series:**

1. *The Ownership of Personal Property in Ireland*  
Edward Nevin
2. *Short-Term Economic Forecasting and its Application in Ireland*  
Alfred Kuehn
3. *The Irish Tariff and The E.E.C.: A Factual Survey*  
Edward Nevin
4. *Demand Relationships for Ireland*  
C. E. V. Leser
5. *Local Government Finance in Ireland: A Preliminary Survey*  
David Walker
6. *Prospects of the Irish Economy in 1962*  
Alfred Kuehn
7. *The Irish Woollen and Worsted Industry, 1946-59: A Study in Statistical Method*  
R. C. Geary

8. *The Allocation of Public Funds for Social Development* David Walker
9. *The Irish Price Level: A Comparative Study* Edward Nevin
10. *Inland Transport in Ireland: A Factual Study* D. J. Reynolds
11. *Public Debt and Economic Development* Edward Nevin
12. *Wages in Ireland, 1946-62* Edward Nevin
13. *Road Transport: The Problems and Prospects in Ireland* D. J. Reynolds
14. *Imports and Economic Growth in Ireland, 1947-61* C. E. V. Leser
15. *The Irish Economy in 1962 and 1963* C. E. V. Leser
16. *Irish County Incomes in 1960* E. A. Attwood and R. C. Geary
17. *The Capital Stock of Irish Industry* Edward Nevin
18. *Local Government Finance and County Incomes* David Walker
19. *Industrial Relations in Ireland: The Background* David O'Mahony
20. *Social Security in Ireland and Western Europe* P. R. Kaim-Caudle
21. *The Irish Economy in 1963 and 1964* C. E. V. Leser
22. *The Cost Structure of Irish Industry 1950-60* Edward Nevin
23. *A Further Analysis of Irish Household Budget Data, 1951-52* C. E. V. Leser
24. *Economic Aspects of Industrial Relations* David O'Mahony
25. *Psychological Barriers to Economic Achievement* P. Pentony
26. *Seasonality in Irish Economic Statistics* C. E. V. Leser
27. *The Irish Economy in 1964 and 1965* C. E. V. Leser
28. *Housing in Ireland: Some Economic Aspects* P. R. Kaim-Caudle
29. *A Statistical Study of Wages, Prices and Employment in the Irish Manufacturing Sector* C. St. J. O'Herlihy
30. *Fuel and Power in Ireland: Part I. Energy Consumption in 1970* J. L. Booth
31. *Determinants of Wage Inflation in Ireland* Keith Cowling
32. *Regional Employment Patterns in the Republic of Ireland* T. J. Baker
33. *The Irish Economy in 1966* The Staff of The Economic Research Institute
34. *Fuel and Power in Ireland: Part II. Electricity and Turf* J. L. Booth
35. *Fuel and Power in Ireland: Part III. International and Temporal Aspects of Energy Consumption* J. L. Booth
36. *Institutional Aspects of Commercial and Central Banking in Ireland* John Hein
37. *Fuel and Power in Ireland: Part IV. Sources and Uses of Energy* J. L. Booth
38. *A Study of Imports* C. E. V. Leser
39. *The Irish Economy in 1967* The Staff of The Economic and Social Research Institute
40. *Some Aspects of Price Inflation in Ireland* R. C. Geary and J. L. Pratschke
41. *A Medium Term Planning Model for Ireland* David Simpson

42. *Some Irish Population Problems Reconsidered* Brendan M. Walsh  
43. *The Irish Brain Drain* Richard Lynn  
44. *A Method of Estimating the Stock of Capital in Northern Ireland Manufacturing Industry: Limitations and Applications* C. W. Jefferson  
45. *An Input-Output Analysis of the Agricultural Sector of the Irish Economy in 1964* R. O'Connor with M. Breslin  
46. *The Implications for Cattle Producers of Seasonal Price Fluctuations* R. O'Connor  
47. *Transport in the Developing Economy of Ireland* John Blackwell  
48. *Social Status and Inter-Generational Social Mobility in Dublin* Bertram Hutchinson  
49. *Personal Incomes by County, 1965* Miceal Ross  
50. *Income-Expenditure Relations in Ireland, 1965-1966* John L. Pratschke  
51. *Costs and Prices in Transportable Goods Industries* W. Black, J. V. Simpson, D. G. Slattery  
52. *Certain Aspects of Non-Agricultural Unemployment in Ireland* R. C. Geary and J. G. Hughes  
53. *A Study of Demand Elasticities for Irish Imports* Dermot McAleese  
54. *Internal Migration in Ireland with Appendix* R. C. Geary and J. G. Hughes  
55. *Religion and Demographic Behaviour in Ireland with Appendix* B. M. Walsh  
56. *Views on Pay Increases, Fringe Benefits and Low Pay* R. C. Geary and J. G. Hughes  
57. *Views on Income Differentials and the Economic Situation* H. Behrend, A. Knowles and J. Davies  
58. *Computers in Ireland* H. Behrend, A. Knowles and J. Davies  
59. *National Differences in Anxiety* F. G. Foster  
60. *Capital Statistics for Irish Manufacturing Industry* Richard Lynn  
61. *Rural Household Budget — Feasibility Study* C. W. Jefferson  
62. *Effective Tariffs and the Structure of Industrial Protection in Ireland* Silé Sheehy and R. O'Connor  
63. *Methodology of Personal Income Estimation by County* Dermot McAleese  
64. *Further Data on County Incomes in the Sixties* Miceal Ross  
65. *The Functional Distribution of Income in Ireland, 1938-70* Miceal Ross  
66. *Irish Input-Output Structures, 1964 and 1968* J. G. Hughes  
67. *Social Status in Dublin: Marriage, Mobility and First Employment* E. W. Henry  
68. *An Economic Evaluation of Irish Salmon Fishing, I: The Visiting Anglers* Bertram Hutchinson  
R. O'Connor and B. J. Whelan

69. *Women and Employment in Ireland: Results of a National Survey*  
Brendan M. Walsh assisted by Annette O'Toole
70. *Irish Manufactured Imports from the UK in the Sixties: The Effects of AIFTA*  
Dermot McAleese and John Martin
71. *Alphabetical Voting: A Study of the 1973 General Election in the Republic of Ireland*  
Christopher Robson and Brendan M. Walsh
72. *A Study of the Irish Cattle and Beef Industries*  
Terence J. Baker, Robert O'Connor and Rory Dunne
73. *Regional Employment Patterns in Northern Ireland*  
William Black and Clifford W. Jefferson
74. *Irish Full Employment Structures, 1968 and 1975*  
E. W. Henry
75. *An Economic Evaluation of Irish Salmon Fishing II: The Irish Anglers*  
R. O'Connor, B. J. Whelan, and A. McCashin
76. *Factors Relating to Reconviction among Young Dublin Probationers*  
Ian Hart
77. *The Structure of Unemployment in Ireland, 1954-1972*  
Brendan M. Walsh
78. *An Economic Evaluation of Irish Salmon Fishing, III: The Commercial Fishermen*  
B. J. Whelan, R. O'Connor, and A. McCashin
79. *Wage Inflation and Wage Leadership*  
W. E. J. McCarthy, J. F. O'Brien and V. G. Dowd
80. *An Econometric Study of the Irish Postal Service*  
Peter Neary
81. *Employment Relationships in Irish Counties*  
Terence J. Baker and Miceal Ross
82. *Irish Input-Output Income Multipliers 1964 and 1968*  
J. R. Copeland and E. W. Henry
83. *A Study of the Structure and Determinants of the Behavioural Component of Social Attitudes in Ireland*  
E. E. Davis
84. *Economic Aspects of Local Authority Expenditure and Finance*  
J. R. Copeland and Brendan M. Walsh
85. *Population Growth and other Statistics of Middle-sized Irish Towns*  
D. Curtin, R. C. Geary, T. A. Grimes and B. Menton
86. *The Income Sensitivity of the Personal Income Tax Base in Ireland, 1947-1972*  
Brendan R. Dowling
87. *Traditional Families? From Culturally Prescribed to Negotiated Roles in Farm Families*  
Damian F. Hannan and Louise Katsiaouni
88. *An Irish Personality Differential: A Technique for Measuring Affective and Cognitive Dimensions of Attitudes Towards Persons*  
E. E. Davis and Mary O'Neill
89. *Redundancy and Re-Employment in Ireland*  
Brendan J. Whelan and Brendan M. Walsh
90. *A National Model for Fuel Allocation — A Prototype*  
E. W. Henry and S. Scott

91. *A Linear Programming Model for Irish Agriculture*  
Robert O'Connor, Miceal Ross and Michael Behan
92. *Irish Educational Expenditures — Past, Present and Future*  
A. Dale Tussing
93. *The Working and Living Conditions of Civil Service Typists*  
Nóirin O'Broin and Gillian Farren
94. *Irish Public Debt*  
Richard Bruton
95. *Output and Employment in the Irish Food Industry to 1990*  
A. D. O'Rourke and T. P. McStay
96. *Displacement and Development: Class, Kinship and Social Change in Irish Rural Communities*  
Damian F. Hannan
97. *Attitudes in the Republic of Ireland relevant to the Northern Ireland Problem: Vol. I: Descriptive Analysis and Some Comparisons with Attitudes in Northern Ireland and Great Britain* E. E. Davis and R. Sinnott
98. *Internal Migration Flows in Ireland and their Determinants*  
J. G. Hughes and B. M. Walsh
99. *Irish Input-Output Structures, 1976*  
E. W. Henry
100. *Development of Irish Sea Fishing Industry and its Regional Implications*  
R. O'Connor, J. A. Crutchfield, B. J. Whelan and K. E. Mellon
101. *Employment Conditions and Job Satisfaction: The Distribution, Perception and Evaluation of Job Rewards*  
Christopher T. Whelan
102. *Crime in the Republic of Ireland: Statistical Trends and their Interpretation*  
David B. Rottman
103. *Measures of the Capital Stock in the Irish Manufacturing Sector, 1945-1973*  
R. N. Vaughan
104. *A Study of National Wage Agreements in Ireland*  
James F. O'Brien
105. *Socio-Economic Impact of the Construction of the ESB Power Station at Moneypoint, Co. Clare*  
R. O'Connor, J. A. Crutchfield and B. J. Whelan
106. *The Financing of Third-level Education*  
A. C. Barlow
107. *An Input-Output Analysis of New Industry in Ireland in 1976*  
E. W. Henry
108. *Social Insurance and Absence from Work in Ireland*  
Gerard Hughes
109. *The Distribution of Income in the Republic of Ireland: A Study in Social Class and Family-Cycle Inequalities*  
D. B. Rottman, D. F. Hannan, N. Hardiman and M.M. Wiley
110. *The Economic and Social Circumstances of the Elderly in Ireland*  
B. J. Whelan and R. N. Vaughan
111. *Worker Priorities, Trust in Management and Prospects for Workers' Participation*  
Christopher T. Whelan

Printed in the Republic of Ireland by  
Criterion Press Limited, Dublin