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Industrialisation, Class Formation and Social Mobility in Ireland

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INDUSTRIALISATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

Few societies have changed so rapidly and so radically as has the Republic of Ireland since 1960. Success in the form of State initiatives to promote industrialisation brought a more general promise that the fruits of independence would finally be realised. The associated expectations and excitement were captured in the catch phrase of the 1960s `the rising tide that would raise all boats'. Such a sanguine view of the relationship between economic growth and social mobility was, until recently, shared by the bulk of sociologists.

In fact, as Goldthorpe (1985: 554) concludes, the evidence on which such confident conclusions regarding the relationship between economic growth, industrialisation and social mobility are based is "confused and uncertain". In the literature of the late 1950s and 1960s the discussion of mobility in industrial societies was linked with the question of whether American society was distinctive in the amount of social mobility it displayed. The conclusion reached by Lipset and Bendix (1959) and Blau and Duncan (1967) was that economically advanced societies had in common a level of mobility which is, by any reckoning, high. To explain the strikingly similar "total vertical mobility rates", Lipset and Bendix sought factors universal throughout industrial societies. Among the most important processes inherent in all modern social structures which they argue have a direct effect on the rate of social mobility, two in particular are

of importance: (i) changes in the number of available vacancies, and (ii) changes in the legal restrictions pertaining to potential opportunities. The first makes the point that industrial societies are those with expanding economies which need increasing numbers of workers in higher-level professional, administrative and managerial positions. The second points to the fact that the family firm gives way to the bureaucratic enterprise with its formal methods of selection, where education becomes a more significant determinant of occupational position than occupational inheritance (Heath, 1981, 38-39). Emphasis on shifts in occupational structure directs attention to absolute mobility rates. On the other hand, highlighting the trend towards universalism, that is, towards the application of standards of judgement or decision-making which derive from considerations of rationality and efficiency and which are detached from the particular values or interests of different membership groups, leads to a focus on relative rates.

The evidence from the CASMIN analysis (which overcame many of the problems associated with previous work on comparative mobility) is that relative mobility rates show only limited cross-sectional variability. Consequently, increases in absolute mobility associated with economic development must be primarily an outcome of structural effects. However, as Goldthorpe (1985: 558-559) stresses, such effects are exerted in different ways. One basic

distinction is between "shift" and "compositional" effects. Shift effects refer to consequences of change in the "shape" of the structure within which mobility is being observed. Compositional effects arise from the fact that different classes have different inherent propensities for immobility. Three main conclusions emerge from the CASMIN analysis.

(i) Absolute rates are a great deal more variable than relative ones.

(ii) While shift effects are often generated by economic development, at comparable levels of economic development the importance of shift effects can vary enormously.

(iii) There is no evidence that shift effects on mobility will steadily increase with economic development or that their importance is closely correlated with prevailing rates of economic growth.

It is important in attempting to understand class structural change, Goldthorpe stresses, to stop treating structural factors as merely a nuisance.

> `... insufficient weight has been given to the large variations in the speed, rhythm and phrasing of such change'. (Goldthorpe, 1985: 560)

This conclusion holds even though it is by no means clear how amenable such structural factors are to accounts which are couched in theoretical rather than historical terms.

THE IRISH CASE

In an earlier work we have stressed that while the core

processes that formed the change to Ireland's class structure are typical, their sequencing was not (Breen, *et al.*, 1990). While the decline of the agricultural sector is crucial in promoting structural mobility, the actual pattern of decline and its association with other structural changes is quite variable (Goldthorpe, 1985: 561). Late and rapid industrialisation meant that the massive decline in opportunities for agricultural employment could not be compensated for by alternative opportunities in Ireland. Emigration filled the gap. The class structure today reflects the selective process of emigration to Britain as much as it does growth in new opportunities (Walsh, 1990; Hughes and Walsh, 1976; Hannan, 1970).

The main dynamic of class change until the 1960s was the mass exodus from the land. Between 1926 and 1961 the percentage of gainfully occupied males in agriculture fell from 58 per cent to 43 per cent. This was counterbalanced by growth among the non-manual middle class and the non-agricultural working class (Breen, *et al.*, 1990: 54-56). Those changes, however, occurred within the context of a decline in the total of gainfully occupied males from 950,000 in 1926 to 820,000 in 1961. The broad stability of the class structure over this period was largely attributable to emigration.

Such stability contrasts with rapid changes after 1960. Between 1961 and 1985 males in agriculture as a percentage of all gainfully occupied males fell from 49 to 20 per cent. By

1985, employed professionals formed some 17 per cent of the work-force, more than tripling their representation since 1951; skilled manual employees also grew markedly over that period from 10 to 20 per cent of the work-force. The number of `lower´ middle-class workers also increased but less dramatically from 14 to 22 per cent. Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers made up nearly one-quarter of the work-force in 1951 and 12 per cent in 1985.

The swiftness of its class transformation sets Ireland apart from the experience of most other countries. An orderly consolidation in which decline in opportunities in traditional sectors is compensated for by the gradual expansion of alternative opportunities is the antithesis of the Irish experience over recent decades. While some aspects of the post-1950 changes, such as the contraction of the agricultural labour force and the expansion of the white-collar sector, were continuous processes, most changes were not. In the 1950s the spectre of emigration overshadowed all trends by reducing the size of the male labour force by one-seventh. The real growth in skilled manual and junior white-collar work only commenced in the 1960s and continued unabated through the 1970s. Small farmers, agricultural labourers, and unskilled manual workers had a combined decline of 259,000 over the full 30-year period, with the heaviest losses concentrated in the early part of that period. The upper white-collar and skilled manual worker categories ultimately expanded by 120,000 but their pre-1961

increase was virtually nil. So there were no opportunities to compensate for the massive losses in traditional forms of work.

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN IRELAND

Census data allow us to reconstruct the context within which the structural sources of mobility in Ireland evolved. However, there are limits to the conclusions which can be drawn from such data. An examination of the actual pattern of intergenerational mobility requires that we draw on survey data. Up to this point, analysis of social mobility in Ireland has been based on data sources which do not take us beyond the early 'seventies (Breen and Whelan, 1985; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1987a, 1987b; Hout, 1989; Hout and Jackson, 1986; Whelan and Whelan, 1984). There are obvious limitations imposed by reliance on such data in order to assess the impact of industrialisation on social mobility in Ireland.

(i) The changes in class structure which occurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s were just as substantial as those occurring in the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, between 1971 and 1985 the proportion of males at work in agriculture fell from one-third to one-fifth while the number at work in non-manual occupations rose from three out of ten to four out of ten.

(ii) Employment creation in the 1970s had particularly distinctive features. By far the largest area of employment growth in the 1970s was in services:

employment here grew by 136,000 between 1971 and 1981. However, the bulk of this (85,000) jobs was in the public sector (Sexton, 1982: 36).

(iii) In the period of the 1960s and early 1970s the role of manpower policy was seen to be in training the labour force and generally facilitating the efficient matching of the supply of, and demand for, labour. In the mid-1970s, employment subsidies were introduced as were training and temporary employment schemes to combat unemployment. In the 1980s manpower policy had, for all intent and purposes, become employment policy.

(iv) By the early 1970s it was not yet possible to observe the impact of the introduction of free education in 1967. In 1970, 70 per cent of all 15 year olds were remaining in school. By 1985 this had risen to over 94 per cent.

(v) Finally, while in 1971 six per cent of males were unemployed, by 1985 this had risen to close to twenty per cent.

Thus, while on the surface the relationship between economic growth and occupational change looks rather similar for the 1960s and 1970s, somewhat different causal influences were at work. In the 1960s there was a small net change in employment, the decline in agriculture being offset by growth, particularly in the manufacturing and public sector.

However, in the 1970s, growth in manufacturing and building slackened and the government responded through measures intended to give extra impetus to economic growth and in the late 'seventies through the use of the public sector as a vehicle for the creation of jobs.

In this paper we will draw on data from the ESRI 1987 Survey of Income and Life-Style to provide a more up-to-date analysis of Irish social mobility patterns. The analysis that follows will relate exclusively to males. The data available in the ESRI survey is particularly suitable for analysis of the implications of different choices concerning the appropriate unit of analysis in mobility studies, and it is our intention to look at this question in considerable detail in our future work. However, the traditionally low levels of participation in the labour force by married women in Ireland reinforces our view that focusing on the mobility experience of men is unlikely to be misleading so far as the study of *class* mobility is concerned. Our analysis is based on a nationally representative sample of 2,394 men aged between 20 and 65.

CLASSES AND CLASSIFICATION CONCEPTS

Our approach to the analysis of social mobility in Ireland draws on Goldthorpe's (1987) model of the mobility process. Under this model, patterns of mobility are shaped by three factors operating alongside structural influences. These are the relative desirability of different class destinations; the resources available to individuals within

each origin class which help them gain access to more desirable destination classes; and barriers to movement between classes. Typically we think of resources as "economic, cultural and social resources" (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1987a: 64) while barriers to mobility would include the necessity to own the means of production, educational and other qualifications needed for entry into the occupations that comprise a class grouping; and so forth.

The Goldthorpe framework for class analysis is operationalised through a threefold procedure. First, respondents are placed in occupational groups according to the content of their jobs; second, they are given an employment status that reflects their social relationships at work. In both cases the categories and definitions used are those adopted in Britain by the Registrar General for the analysis of official statistics. Finally, a social class position is obtained for each individual by cross-classifying the relevant occupational title and employment status (Marshall, 1990: 55). In our case we started with occupations coded according to the Irish Census Classification, and with an employment status variable comparable to the British one. Since we lacked the resources to conduct a full scale recoding of occupations according to the British procedures mapped the Irish occupational codes on to the British 1970 OPCS scheme. Where we felt that an occupation coded according to the Irish Census classification could not be unambiguously allocated a code in the OPCS classification and where is was

felt that this could affect the respondents' ultimate allocation to a class category, coding was carried out on the basis of the original information in the questionnaire. Thus, as Ganzeboom and Uttle (1988) have put it, we have attempted to mimic the Goldthorpe class schema.

Goldthorpe's procedures bring together within each class position occupations whose incumbents share similar market and work situations. Hence, class categories are made up of occupations whose members are typically comparable in terms of their sources and levels of income, their degree of economic security, their chances of economic advancement and their degree of autonomy in performing work tasks and roles. It is inadequate to think of the schema as deriving solely from the Weberian market based tradition. The classification is based on an understanding of the importance of the development of class relations in advanced industrial societies and the nature of control in such organisations (Goldthorpe, 1982: 167-168, Marshall, 1990, Kurz and Mueller, 1987: 421-422).

The range of classes distinguished in the CASMIN analysis is set out in Table 1. The most detailed classification distinguishes eleven classes. Frequent use is also made of the seven class schema which is also reproduced in Table 1. In the analysis which is reported in this paper and that by Breen and Whelan in this volume a couple of additional distinctions are made at various points, the first sub-division involves separating out the non-skilled manual

group from the unskilled while the second involves breaking down farmers into three categories on the basis of farm size.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

CHANGES IN THE CLASS STRUCTURE 1973-87:

Origins and Destinations

In Table 2 we provide a comparison of the origin and destination distributions of classes in Ireland in 1973 and 1987. For origins the decline in agriculture is the most striking trend. The percentage in the small employer and self-employed categories also declines, as does the figure for agricultural workers. All other categories display increases in their relative sizes, with a particularly substantial increase occurring for technicians and skilled manual workers. Comparison with the results reported by Goldthorpe (1987:331) indicates that there is a clear tendency for the Irish profile to come closer to that of other European countries, particularly Sweden, and to a lesser extent France. In fact, the degree of dissimilarity between the Irish distributions at different points in time is as great as that between Ireland in 1987 and Sweden and France.

Focusing on destinations we find that the two classes which exhibit a decline over the period are farmers (from 22 to 10 per cent) and farm labourers (seven to three per cent). Substantial growth is evident among the Professional, Administrative and Managerial class and also the Skilled

Manual/Technical class and the Non-skilled Manual class. Little change is evident elsewhere. Comparing the Irish data with the other countries, the Irish distribution in 1987 comes very close to that for France, and to a lesser extent, Sweden.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

Taking origins and destination together the evidence available from the CASMIN project shows that England, with extremely low percentages in agriculture for both distributions, lies at one end of the continuum, while the Eastern European countries are at the other extreme. Ireland lies in the middle with France and Sweden but has relatively low percentages in the professional and managerial group. The evidence from the 1987 Survey points to the convergence of class marginal distributions in Ireland towards a pattern quite common in industrial societies in the early 1970s. Consequently, whatever differences we observe between the Irish mobility pattern in 1987 and that of such societies will be less open to explanations in structural terms than would have been the case in 1973.

Absolute Mobility Rates

The degree of mobility that is observed in any society depends on the number, size and character of the class categories distinguished. A comparison of results for 1973 and 1987 leads to the conclusion, which holds across a variety of class schemas, that there has been a significant increase in the level of absolute social mobility in Ireland;

in the case of the seven class schema the rise is from 58 per cent to 63 per cent; or in other words the percentage remaining immobile in their class of origin had declined from 42 per cent to 37 per cent. Of the Western European countries in the 1970s only Sweden displays a decisively higher level.

Class Composition

Discussion of absolute levels of mobility leads fairly directly to consideration of issues of social closure and class formation. In dealing with such issues, what matters is not so much the degree of inequality in class mobility chances but the outcome of those chances in terms of class composition (Goldthorpe, 1987:46). In Table 3 we set out some selected cross-national comparisons. An examination of the results for the professional, managerial and administrative group or service class shows that in Ireland, as with other countries, the most striking feature is not the extent of social closure but the degree of heterogeneity of the origins from which they are drawn. Ireland is distinctive among Western European nations in having a relatively high inflow from the agricultural classes and a below average contribution from the industrial working class, i.e., technicians and manual classes. This pattern can be compared with England where a particularly high proportion come from the industrial working class and France which is distinctive because of the degree of self-recruitment and recruitment from the self-employed. Relatively little change has taken

place since 1973 with a slight increase in the inflow from the industrial working class occurring and a corresponding decline in the inflow from the agricultural classes taking place.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

When we turn to the industrial working class, an obvious point of comparison is England where this class forms a self-recruiting block in which three-quarters of its members may be reckoned as second generation. In Ireland in 1987 almost two-thirds were second-generation despite the fact that almost one-quarter come from agricultural classes. Thus, only in England is self-recruitment substantially higher. Eighty per cent of recruitment to the industrial working class in Ireland is drawn from small farmers, agricultural labourers and the industrial working class. Between 1973 and 1987 a significant increase in self-recruitment occurred, matched by a corresponding drop in recruitment from the *petit bourgeoisie*.

Within the industrial working class the percentage of skilled manual workers coming from farm backgrounds almost doubled - increasing from 4 per cent to 18 per cent, while their inflow to the non-skilled manual group fell from 24 per cent to 16 per cent. This change is particularly significant because the skilled manual group increased by close to fifty per cent during this period.

Small employers and the self-employed in Ireland have particularly high inflows from farming, with one-third of

their members originating in this group. In this respect, Ireland comes closest to Sweden and can be distinguished from England, which has a particularly large inflow from the industrial working class, and France, where there are very high levels of self-recruitment. In Ireland between 1973 and 1987 there was a dramatic decline in the level of self-recruitment to these classes and a corresponding increase in recruitment from the industrial working class. If we combine the two groups we find that in 1973 32 per cent had been self-recruited compared with 15 per cent in 1987: the corresponding percentages for inflow from the industrial working class are 20 and 37 per cent.

The clerical class in Ireland comes closest to France, mainly because of similar figures for recruitment from farming but, as in England, there is a high inflow from the industrial working class. Between 1973 and 1987 the share of recruitment from the former class declined while that from the latter increased. Finally, in Ireland, as in France, recruitment into farming from non-farming backgrounds is extremely rare.

To summarise, by 1987 in Ireland

(i) the service class was a heterogeneous group;

(ii) small employers and the self-employed displayed a significant decline in the level of self-recruitment and had become a relatively heterogeneous block;

(iii) the industrial working class displayed high

levels of self-recruitment even when the substantial inflow from agricultural classes is taken into account.

Class Mobility Chances: Outflow Patterns

In moving from an inflow to an outflow perspective we become concerned with class mobility chances or with the probability of men of given class origins being found in particular class destinations. In Table 4 we present the detailed information for outflow from our eleven-class schema for 1973 and 1987. Selected cross-national comparisons relying on the CASMIN seven-class schema are set out in Table 4. This shows a remarkable degree of similarity in the two Irish surveys in the outflows from the Professional, Managerial and Administrative classes; and also in mobility from the industrial working classes. At both points in time just over half of those from service class origins were found in this class and just over one-fifth in the industrial working class. These figures are quite typical of those for other Western European countries in the early 1970s. When we direct our attention to men from industrial working class origins, we find that one in nine are located in the service class and seven out of ten have remained intergenerationally stable. The Irish figures for immobility are comparatively high, with only the FRG, of the Western European countries, reaching this level, and with Sweden coming eight percentage points lower. It is, however, the extremely low levels of long range intragenerational upward mobility which give the

Irish pattern a quite distinctive character. All of the other countries have outflows from the industrial working class to the service class which are at least five percentage points higher and the corresponding figures for the FRG and Sweden are double those for Ireland. It is true, however, that since the industrial working class increased in Ireland from 40 per cent to 50 per cent of the total between 1973 and 1987, the overall percentage experiencing such mobility has increased.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

The picture of stability for these classes contrasts with the substantial changes in the mobility chances of those from *petit bourgeois* and farming origins. A major improvement took place in the chances of mobility to the service class for small employers and more particularly for the self-employed. The percentage succeeding in making this transition rose from 30 per cent to 36 per cent for the former group, and from 13 per cent to 36 per cent for the latter. The percentage remaining immobile in these classes dropped sharply and the flows to the non-skilled manual classes were halved; in the case of the self-employed, from one in four to one in eight. The outflow from small employers is now broadly similar to that for France in the early 1970s but with a much lower percentage reaching destinations in the industrial working class. Those from self-employed origins, on the other hand, enjoy distinctively high rates of upward mobility.

In the case of farmers, the most obvious shift is the decline in immobility where the relevant figure drops from one half to just over one-third. The percentage becoming agricultural labourers is almost halved. This change is accompanied by a significant increase in the flows to the service class but more particularly to the skilled manual group where the figure rises from 4 per cent to 14 per cent. Apart from sharing with France a relatively high level of immobility, those from farming origins also have a particularly low outflow to the non-skilled manual class.

Previous studies of social mobility in Ireland have not been in a position to distinguish between farmers by farm size. In what follows we compare the mobility chances of farmers with

(i) less than 50 acres;

(ii) 50-99 acres;

(iii) more than 100 acres;.

The first point to be made is that the percentage remaining in farming shows little variation by farm size. The outflow variations to other categories are as we might expect; almost one fifth of those from large farm origins gain access to the professional and managerial class compared with one in thirteen of those from small farm backgrounds. Correspondingly, almost four out of ten of the latter group are currently in the industrial working class compared to one in four of the former. It is noticeable that for each of the farming groups the numbers in the skilled manual and

non-skilled manual classes are very similar. This contrasts with the situation of those from non-skilled manual origins who are only half as likely to be in the skilled manual class as in the non-skilled.

With the exception of the sharp reduction in immobility among the *petit bourgeoisie* and farming classes there is relatively little evidence that changes between 1973 and 1987 involve movement towards some norm for industrial society. The Irish outflow pattern displays the distinctive, and obviously not unrelated features -

(i) opportunities for long-range mobility from the industrial working class into the service class are extremely limited;

(ii) the advantages enjoyed by property owning groups in the competition to gain access to the service class and avoid entering the non-skilled manual class are distinctively powerful.

The paper by Breen and Whelan in this volume pursues the issues of whether -

(i) such advantages should be thought of as occurring to propertied classes in general or whether particular classes such as farmers are particularly favoured;

(ii) the relative advantages enjoyed by propertied groups are related to changes in the underlying pattern of advantages between 1973 and 1987 or simply involve the exercise of constant advantages in a changing structural situation.

One important point which we wish to pursue here relates to the relative size of the *petit bourgeoisie* and farming classes. While the change in outflow rates is greatest among the *petit bourgeoisie* it is the changes in the mobility chances of those from farming origins which have the most serious implications for those from working class origins because of the size of the outflow from farming. The paper by Hannan and Commins in this volume elaborates on the manner in which, in a situation of particularly high fertility rates for the farming class and limited employment growth, the success of sons of farmers effectively led to the crowding out of these from working class origins.

CLASS MOBILITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

The foregoing analysis takes no account of unemployment and consequently, despite the scale of the class inequalities documented, it fails to bring out the full extent of the disadvantages suffered by the working class.

We have noted earlier that the impact of economic growth on occupational change operated through rather different mechanisms at each decade. By the 1980s a continuation of previous policies was no longer feasible. Negative growth rates between 1981 and 1985 were reflected, not in obvious changes in the class structure but in a seemingly inexorable climb in the unemployment rate, coupled with a process of `trading down' for middle-class school leavers (Breen, 1984).

Despite the creation of many thousands of jobs since 1958, unemployment levels in Ireland remain high by

international standards. Unemployment in Ireland has been characterised by a high overall rate and a high level of long-term unemployment. As economic conditions have worsened and the debt crisis has effectively precluded the public sector from its previous role as the major source of job creation, not only has the Irish unemployment rate worsened but so has the proportion of long-term unemployed. Currently, over one in six workers is unemployed and nearly half of all registered unemployed males have been out of work for a year or more.

The degree to which unemployment has been concentrated in the working classes is striking. Unemployment among non-agricultural unskilled workers has hardly fallen below 30 per cent since 1961, while that for the upper middle class has only once exceeded three per cent. The persistence of high levels of unemployment within the former category points to the absence not only of social but also of geographical mobility. Such people could neither advance in the occupational structure nor, apparently, could they migrate in search of greater opportunities. The position of the unskilled group was exacerbated by the logic of Irish industrial development policy through imbalances or disjunctures between the forms of employment created and the kinds of jobs which have been lost. In broad terms, the jobs which have been lost have been in traditional, indigenous industries, which failed to survive once protectionism was dismantled, and have been of relatively low skill levels,

predominantly located in urban areas, notably Dublin. The jobs which have been created have often required greater levels of skills and have been more widely dispersed throughout the country (Breen, *et al.*, 1990: 143-147).

In Table 5 we introduce unemployment as a destination. The three class schema employed includes all clerical workers and the technicians' group in the Intermediate Category. Not surprisingly, the probability of unemployment varies by class origin for both countries but there is a particularly high probability of one in four for those of manual origins in Ireland. Commenting on the English data, Goldthorpe and Payne (1986a: 17-18) conclude that mobility chances for manual workers have polarised between 1972 and 1983 with more experiencing upward mobility, but more too being downwardly mobile into unemployment. The return of mass unemployment "has had the general effect of `raising the stakes'". In Ireland no such improvement in the prospects of upward mobility has occurred for those from manual backgrounds but undoubtedly their risk of unemployment has grown rapidly with one in four being located in this category. In England, men from manual origins are twice as likely to appear in the service class as to be unemployed but in Ireland this probability is reversed. It is for the intermediate class that such a polarisation has occurred, while at the top there has been relatively little change.

[Insert Table 5 About Here]

Our expectation would be that the effect of class

origins on risk of unemployment would operate throughout its impact on current class position.

In order to pursue this issue further, in Figure 1 we look at the relationship between labour force status and class making use of the eleven-class schema for non-farming classes. The indicator of labour force status taken on this occasion is the percentage unemployed or permanently unable to work because of illness or disability. In opting for this measure we are taking into account the fact that the extent to which an illness will cause a person to be "unemployable" will vary under different labour market conditions, and the burden of increased risks are borne disproportionately by vulnerable groups (Bartley, 1987: 97). Less than three per cent in the higher professional and managerial group are "out of work" compared to close to six out of ten of the unskilled manual group. The lowest risk among the working class is one in four, with the exception of the technicians' group where it falls to one in seven. The highest risk in the intermediate group is one in eleven. Within the working class it is notable that skilled manual workers actually have a somewhat higher risk than semi-skilled workers. This is likely to be due to the difference in their sectoral distribution.

[Figure 1 About Here]

It is, of course, perfectly possible that any relationship which exists between the risk of being out of work and class origin can be accounted for entirely by the

association between class of origin and present class and between the latter and labour force status, leaving no independent or `carry-over´ effect for class origins. In this situation a log-linear model which embodies the hypothesis that the odds of a man being out of work rather than in employment or retired are dependent upon his current class position but not on his class of origin (though allowing for the association between origin and destination) should provide an adequate fit. In log-linear terms, this model is

$$\log F_{ijk} = (US) + (FS)$$

where F_{ijk} is the expected value in cell ijk of a three-way table of class of origin (F) with I categories, class of destination (S) with J categories and employment (U) with K categories. Such a model does indeed provide an adequate fit to the 1983 English data analysed by Goldthorpe and Payne (1983). However, from Table 6 it is clear that such a model does not come close to fitting the Irish data. Adding the association between class origin and employment status, reduce the x^2LR value by 40.9 for a loss of two degrees of freedom. Thus the final model is

$$\log F_{ijk} = (US) + (UF) + (FS)$$

[Table 6 About Here]

The strength of the independent or carry-over effects of class origin is illustrated in Figure 2. The three class schema utilised here, unlike the previous one, allocates the industrial working class, agricultural workers and lower grade clerical workers to the `working class´, and the higher

grade clerical together with the farming and *petit bourgeoisie* groups to the intermediate class. At each level of current class position , class origin has a substantial

[Figure 2 About Here]

impact. Thus for those in the service class the percentage of work varies from 0.3 per cent to 5.8 per cent depending on class background. For the intermediate class the range of variation is from 3.2 per cent to 10.4 per cent; the corresponding figures for the working class other than the skilled manual are 11.2 per cent and 32.9 per cent; finally, while none of the members of the unskilled working class come from professional and managerial backgrounds, the probability of being out of work rises from one-third for those from intermediate class backgrounds to two-thirds for those from working class origins. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the processes through which class origin has such an impact. The most plausible interpretation is that in a country where a situation of a long-term excess of labour supply exists, class origin may serve not only as a good predictor of current class position but may also distinguish within classes between those with stable and unstable work histories.

THE NATURE OF THE UNSKILLED MANUAL CLASS

The results reported in Figure 2 direct our attention to the distinctive nature of the unskilled manual class which forms ten per cent of the destination class distribution. In the first place, while close to one in four of the

semi-skilled manual group is intragenerationally mobile out of the working class, this is true of only one in seven of the unskilled manual group. An inflow perspective, perhaps, brings out the distinctive nature of the class more clearly. While just over 85 per cent of the members of the semi-skilled manual group are drawn from working class or small farm origins, this holds true for 94 per cent of the unskilled manual group.

Contrary to conventional expectations, the unskilled manual group are not concentrated in urban areas as we can see from Figure 3. In fact, because of the concentration of professional, administrative and managerial respondents in Dublin, the unskilled manual class are underrepresented in Dublin. On the other hand, they are overrepresented outside the main urban areas. Over half are located in open country or towns less than 3,000 and more than three-quarters are located outside the major urban areas. This finding is confirmed by analysis of the small area data from the 1986 Census which shows that employing the Census definition of unskilled, 67 per cent are found outside the major urban areas. The corresponding figure from our data set is 73 per cent. One difference that does arise, though, is that while one-third of unskilled manual workers in rural areas are aged over fifty, this is true of only one-sixth of those in the major urban areas.[3]

[Figure 3 About Here]

MARGINALISATION AND POVERTY

In this final section we provide evidence for the consequences of marginalisation. The indicator of poverty we employ combines information on income and life-style and is derived from a conceptual framework in which poverty is understood as *exclusion* arising from lack of resources (Callan, *et al.*, 1991). In Table 7 we set out a list of deprivation items. We have defined as poor those residing in households who suffer an *enforced* lack of any one of these items and whose incomes, adjusted for household composition, fall below 70 per cent of average household income. In Figure 4 we break down poverty by class. With the exception of farmers, the risk of residing in a household which is in poverty for men between 20-64 remains rather low outside the working class. The risk reaches just over one in six for the semi-skilled manual and then rises to one in five for the skilled manual class; this finding is consistent with our earlier results relating to the distribution of unemployment. For farmers with less than 50 acres and agricultural workers, the figure rises to almost one in three. Finally, for the unskilled manual class the risk of poverty is just over four out of ten.

[Figure 4 About Here]

Not surprisingly, in view of the evidence we have presented in relation to the risk of being out of work, class origin has a significant independent impact on poverty. Employing the same three-class classification that was

employed in that analysis, we find that close to one out of two unskilled manual workers with working class origins are living in households which fall below the poverty line; for no other group does the figure rise above one in four.

CONCLUSIONS

Politicians in Ireland shared with many social scientists a sanguine view of the relationship between economic growth and industrialisation. In fact, the kind of changes in occupational structure which are associated with social mobility can vary enormously at comparable levels of economic development. The speed, rhythm and phasing of structural change is crucial. In Ireland, late and rapid industrialisation meant that the decline in opportunities for agricultural employment could not be compensated for by alternative opportunities in Ireland. Emigration filled the gap.

The nature of the shift and composition effects taking place in Ireland between 1973 and 1987 were such as to produce a convergence in the marginal distribution of the Irish class structure towards a pattern not untypical of modern industrial societies. By 1987 the overall level of mobility in Ireland came close to the norm for Western European societies.

In terms of class composition, the Irish service class had, in common with those in other countries, inflows from a heterogeneous set of sources but was notable for the relatively high inflow from farming. The small employer and

self-employed group in Ireland became a great deal more heterogeneous between 1973 and 1987, with a significant decline in self-recruitment and a substantially increased inflow from the industrial working class. In the industrial working class, however, despite a significant inflow from the agricultural classes, two-thirds of its occupants had been intergenerationally immobile.

With regard to mobility chances, we observed a remarkable stability in class mobility chances at the extremes of the Irish class hierarchy. In contrast, a major improvement took place in the upward mobility prospects of the *petit bourgeois* and farming groups. The upwards flow from the self-employed is distinctively high when placed in a comparative context. The most striking finding, however, is the extent of the barriers to upward mobility into the service class from the industrial working class. These barriers are of a scale sufficient to mark out Ireland as an exceptional case.

The degree of disadvantage suffered by the working class is even greater than would be suggested by conventional mobility analysis because it conceals the dramatic increase in risks of unemployment for this group. In England in 1983 those from manual backgrounds were only half as likely to be unemployed as to be upwardly mobile into the service class. In Ireland in 1987 men from manual backgrounds were over twice as likely to be unemployed as to be mobile into the service class.

A more detailed breakdown showed that the risk of being "out of work" was particularly high among the unskilled group of whom more than 60 per cent fell into this category. Indeed, over 40 per cent of fathers in this class fell into this category. Furthermore, in Ireland, unlike England, class origin has a substantial independent or carry-over effect on employment status with two-thirds of those from working class backgrounds who are currently in the unskilled manual group being out of work. The unskilled manual group is one which experiences particularly severe obstacles to upward mobility and, in turn, is an extremely homogenous group, with well over 90 per cent of its members being drawn from the working class or small farm backgrounds.

The changes in the class composition of the Irish work-force emerged from industrial development that was more rapid, occurred later and was more State-inspired than in most Western societies. So intense were the changes that it is easy to overlook their incompleteness. A substantial share of the work-force was in residual classes stranded in the course of industrial development, especially farmers on marginal holdings and labourers without skills. Their position was exacerbated by the logic of Irish industrial development.

The dispersal of industrial location to rural areas in the 1960s and 1970s had long roots in Fianna Fail policy and more generally in the ideology of rural fundamentalism. However, during the recent past, its purpose has been not

simply to provide an alternative to agricultural employment for those who could no longer acquire it but also to yield a second occupation for those farmers whose acreage is too small to ensure their viability.[2] It has been argued that the costs of the policy of locating industry in 'new' areas was carried by the urban working class - particularly the lower working class - whose jobs in indigenous firms were fast disappearing. As Hannan and Commins point out elsewhere in this volume, the latter difficulties did not become obvious to politicians or those affected by them until the 1970s while the marginalisation of small farmers was apparent by the mid-1960s.

While the urban working class clearly did suffer from this policy, our analysis shows that the non-skilled manual class are not wholly concentrated in urban areas but are, in fact, widely geographically dispersed. While industrial policy may have favoured those outside the urban areas, it appears that those from unskilled manual backgrounds lost out in the competition for the new rural positions to the *petit bourgeoisie* and farmers. Of particular importance here because of their high reproduction rates was the strong outflow from farming backgrounds to the skilled manual class. One feature which distinguishes the urban and rural unskilled manual groups is their age profile. Because much new industry requires a more skilled work-force, younger rather than older workers are favoured because of their higher educational levels. A 1979 IDA survey showed that 55 per cent of jobs

created in new grant-aided industries were held by people less than 25 years of age (OECD, 1984: 26). The influence of this is reflected in the fact, while in the major urban areas one-sixth of the unskilled manual class are over 50 this rose one in three for those outside such areas. Thus, an explanation of the relationship between industrial development and the poor position of the unskilled working class must deal, not only with the geographical disjuncture between areas where jobs were being lost and those where jobs were being created, but also with differences between the old jobs and the new. In other words, the disjuncture between the age and skills profile of those whose jobs in indigenous industries were disappearing and the skill requirement of the new industries.

Although opportunities in unskilled or nearly skilled work are continually diminishing, there is at the same time little provision for either intra- or inter-generational mobility out of the marginalised working class. The absence of large scale adult training and re-training means that unskilled adults cannot acquire skills, while the Irish educational system does not serve as a vehicle by which children of lower working class families acquire qualifications and skills. There remains a large proportion of each cohort of school leavers - about 12 per cent - who come into the labour market each year wholly lacking in formal qualifications. The available evidence on the composition of emigrants suggests that unlike the 1950s few

opportunities exist for those without skills and qualifications to work outside Ireland. So emigration reflects an extension of mobility differentials: those with educational qualifications but unable to find work in Ireland can search elsewhere. Those without such qualifications and who cannot find work remain unemployed in Ireland (NESC, 1991). So a marginalised class is being reproduced through the educational and training systems while being sustained by social welfare provisions. The creation of employment for members of this class was an option which was never seriously implemented. The consequences of this failure are shown in the fact that, using a combined measure of income and life-style deprivation, we find that 40 per cent of the members of this class are living in households which are experiencing poverty.

NOTES

1. All figures other than for Ireland 1987 are taken from Goldthorpe (1987) with the exception of those relating to Ireland in 1973, which are derived from the CASMIN data.

2. See Hannan and Commins in this volume for a more detailed discussion of these issues.

3. For an earlier discussion of the implications for the Irish mobility regime of the existence of a rural proletariat see Arikson and Goldthorpe (1987b:155).

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Table 1: *The Class Schema*

Full version		Seven-class	
I	Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials; managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors	I+II	Service class; professionals, administrators and managers; higher-grade technicians; supervisors of non-manual workers
II	Lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials; higher-grade technicians; managers in small industrial establishments; supervisors of non-manual employees		
IIIa	Routine non-manual employees, higher grade (administration and commerce)	III	Routine non-manual workers; routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce; sales personnel; other rank-and-file service workers
IIIb	Routine non-manual employees, lower grade (sales and services)		
IVa	Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with employees	IV a+b	*Petit bourgeoisie*: small proprietors and artisans, etc., with and without employees
IVb	Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees		
IVc	Farmers and smallholders; other self-employed workers in primary production (i) owning 100 acres or more (ii) owning 50-99 acres (iii) owning 30-49 acres	IVc	Farmers: farmers and small-holders and other self-employed workers in in primary production
V	Lower-grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers	V+ VI	Skilled workers: lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers; skilled manual workers
VI	Skilled manual workers		
VIIa	Semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture, etc.)	VIIa	Non-skilled workers: semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture, etc.)
VIIb	Agricultural and other workers in primary production	VIIb	Agricultural labourers: agricultural and other workers in primary production

Table 2: *A Comparison of the Distribution of Class Origins and Destinations for 1973 and 1987*

	Origins		*Destinations*	
	1973	*1987*	*1973*	*1987*
Professional and Managerial	6	8	14	17
Routine Non-Manual	5	7	9	10
Small Employers and Self-Employed	10	6	8	7
Farmers	39	27	22	10
Lower Technical, Manual Supervisory and Skilled Manual	14	20	20	28
Non-skilled Manual	20	27	21	24
Agricultural Workers	7	5	7	3

Table 3: *COMPARATIVE INFLOW RATES BY NATION: Percentage in Selected Classes from Different Class Origins*

Percentage in Professional Administration and Managerial Class Originating in				*Industrial Working Class Percentage Originating in .....*			
Industrial Working Class		*Agricultural Classes*		*Industrial Working Class*		*Agricultural Classes*	
England	45	Poland	34	England	74	Hungary	46
FRG	41	Hungary	25	FRG	65	Poland	46
Sweden	40	Ireland 1973	23	Ireland 1987	63	Sweden	32
Poland	35	Ireland 1987	18	Ireland 1973	57	France	29
Hungary	32	Sweden	17	Sweden	51	Ireland 1973	27
Ireland 1987	32	France	10	France	47	Ireland 1987	24
Ireland 1973	28	FRG	8	Poland	42	FRG	16
France	28	England	4	Hungary	39	England	7

Table 4: *COMPARATIVE OUTFLOW RATES BY NATION*
Percentage of those of Selected Class Origins found in Different Classes

Percentage of those of Professional, Administrative and Managerial origins found in				*Percentage of those of Working Class origins found in .....*			
Professional and Managerial Class		*Industrial Working Class*		*Professional and Managerial Class*		*Industrial Working Class*	
Poland	67	Hungary	34	FRG	22	Hungary	73
FRG	61	FRG	26	Sweden	22	Poland	71
France	60	Poland	25	Poland	21	FRG	69
England	59	Sweden	25	England	18	Ireland 1987	69
Sweden	56	England	22	France	17	Ireland 1973	68
Ireland 1987	56	Ireland 1987	22	Hungary	16	England	66
Ireland 1973	55	Ireland 1973	21	Ireland 1987	11	France	63
Hungary	52	France	21	Ireland 1973	11	Sweden	61

Table 5: *Class Distribution of Respondents by Class of Father*

Father's Class		*Professional and Managerial*	*Other Non-Manual and Farmers*	*Respondents Class Manual and Agricultural Workers*	*Unemployed*
Professional and Managerial	Ireland 1987	56.3	28.5	11.8	3.4
	England 1983	63.1	23.2	9.3	4.4
Other Non-Manual and Farmers	Ireland 1987	16.5	44.2	27.8	11.4
	England 1983	32.7	36.2	22.8	8.2
Manual	Ireland 1987	10.3	23.1	41.4	25.1
	England 1983	20.5	29.5	39.5	10.5

Source for English figures Goldthorpe and Payne (1986a).

Table 6: *Log Linear Models of the Association Between Employment Status, Class and Class Origins*

Model			X^2_{LR}	D.F.
FS	US		49.8	8
FS	US	UF	8.9	6

PRIMARY LIFE-STYLE DEPRIVATION ITEMS

1. Household manager has had to go without heating during the last year through lack of money, i.e. has had to go without a fire on a cold day, or go to bed early to keep warm or light a fire late because of lack of gas/fuel.

2. Household manager has had a day in the last two weeks when she/he did not have a substantial meal at all - from getting up to going to bed.

3. Household is:-
   (i) Currently in arrears on rent, mortgage, ESB or gas

   or (ii) Has had to go into debt within the past 12 months to meet ordinary living expenses such as rent, food, Christmas or back to school expenses.

   or
   (iii) Had to sell or pawn anything worth £50 or more to meet ordinary living expenses

   or (iv) Receive assistance from a private charity - such as SVP - in the last year

4. Lacking new, not secondhand, clothes

5. Lacking a meal with meat, chicken or fish every second day.

6. Lacking two pairs of strong shoes

7. Lacking a warm waterproof overcoat

8. Lacking a roast meat joint or its equivalent once a week

Figure 1

Labour Force Status by Class

Percentage Unemployed or Permanently unable to work through illness or disability(Men 20-64)



Figure 2

Percentage Out of Work by Class Origins Controlling for Current Class

(Excluding Those Currently in Farming)



Figure 3

Location of the Unskilled Manual Class



Figure 4

Poverty by Class

The risk of being in a household which is in poverty