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MONITORING REPORT ON INTEGRATION 2016

ALAN BARRETT, FRANCES MCGINNITY AND EMMA QUINN
(EDITORS)



AN ROINN DLÍ AGUS CIRT AGUS COMHIONANNAIS
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND EQUALITY



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Editors

Alan Barrett, Frances McGinnity, Emma Quinn

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The Authors

Alan Barrett is the Director of the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). Frances McGinnity is an Associate Research Professor at the ESRI and Adjunct Professor at Trinity College Dublin. Emma Quinn is Head of the Irish National Contact Point of the European Migration Network (EMN), within the ESRI. Philip O’Connell is Director of the UCD Geary Institute for Public Policy, University College Dublin. Emer Smyth is a Research Professor at the ESRI and an Adjunct Professor at Trinity College Dublin. Helen Russell is an Associate Research Professor at the ESRI and an Adjunct Professor at TCD. Bertrand Maître is a Senior Research Officer at the ESRI and an Adjunct Associate Professor at TCD. Merike Darmody is a Research Officer at the ESRI and an Adjunct Associate Professor at TCD. Oona Kenny is a Research Assistant at the ESRI. Samantha Arnold is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Irish National Contact Point of the European Migration Network (EMN) within the ESRI. Alan Barrett, Frances McGinnity and Emma Quinn are editors of the report. Authors responsible are indicated on each chapter.

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Foreword

Over the past two decades, Ireland has become an increasingly diverse country. A growing percentage of our population was born elsewhere and, considering that our economy is emerging from a very difficult period, significant progress has been made to integrate migrants into Irish society.

This is the fifth edition of the Integration Monitor on Ireland and is an independent report on our integration policies and actions. I wish to commend the Report's authors on a very detailed and complex body of work.

The Tánaiste and I recently launched "Migrant Integration in Ireland - A Blueprint for the Future", a strategy which builds on the foundations of what has been achieved so far and provides a framework for the Government's action on migrant integration for the period up to 2020. The strategy has been devised to respond to the new challenges that we anticipate in the years ahead.

The migrant population in Ireland is highly diverse and has diverse needs, situations and experiences. Migrant diversity has to be a feature of our planning for the future.

The first step is knowledge. We need to develop a detailed understanding of the experiences and needs of migrants living in our society. This knowledge can help us to plan our services and to support our local communities to become more fully intercultural.

The Integration Monitor provides a nuanced analysis of the situation of migrants in Ireland on key issues such as employment. It enables us to measure changes over time. It is an invaluable tool for policymaking now and into the future.

David Stanton T.D.

Minister of State at the Department of Justice and Equality with special responsibility for Equality, Immigration and Integration.

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Abbreviations

ACIT	Access to Citizenship and Its Impact on Immigrant Integration
AMIF	Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
ARP	At Risk of Poverty
CSO	Central Statistics Office
DG	Directorate general
EAL	English as an additional language
EEA	European Economic Area, which comprises the EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
EFTA	European Free Trade Association, which comprises Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland
EMN	European Migration Network
EPIC	Employment for People from Immigrant Communities
ESRI	Economic and Social Research Institute
EU	European Union
EU12	EU Member States that acceded in 2004 and 2007: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
EU15-2	‘Old’ EU15 Member States excluding Ireland and the UK: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
EU28	Ireland, UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
EUDO	EU Democracy Observatory on Citizenship
EU-SILC	EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions
FLAC	Free Legal Advice Centres
GNIB	Garda National Immigration Bureau
HRC	Habitual residence condition
HSE	Health Service Executive
ILO	International Labour Organization
INIS	Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service
MCRI	Migration and Citizenship Research Initiative

MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
NAPS	National Anti-Poverty Strategy
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Oireachtas	Parliament, which comprises the President, Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann
OPMI	Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration
ORAC	Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner
PIACC	Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD)
PPSN	Personal public service number
PRSI	Pay-related social insurance
QNHS	Quarterly National Household Survey
RTB	Residential Tenancies Board
TD	Member of parliament
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

While the inflow of immigrants to Ireland is now far behind the 2007 peak at the end of the economic boom, a significant proportion of the population now living in Ireland is of non-Irish origin. How are non-Irish nationals integrating into Irish society, in terms of finding a job, educational outcomes, income and poverty, housing and participation in political life?

This Integration Monitor considers outcomes in a wide range of life domains – employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship – and follows a series of four Monitors published between 2011 and 2014. The Monitor uses indicators proposed at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration held in Zaragoza in 2010. These indicators are comparable across European Union (EU) Member States, based on existing data and focused on outcomes.¹ This Monitor's special theme is: 'Immigrants in Ireland: Skills and Competencies', which uses data from the OECD PIACC Survey of Adult Skills. The focus is on Ireland; for selected indicators – employment, poverty, housing quality, naturalisation and immigrant skills – European comparative data are presented.

Migrants to Ireland are a diverse group in terms of their country of origin, and outcomes vary across groups. This summary focuses on overall differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals: individual chapters give more information on differences between national groups – UK, EU15-2, EU12 and non-EU nationals.² Key indicators at a glance are presented in Table A below.

INTEGRATION MONITOR: KEY FINDINGS

Ireland is emerging from a deep and prolonged recession. Chapter 2 shows that in early 2015 employment rates were slightly higher among Irish compared to non-Irish nationals, although activity rates are almost identical between Irish and non-

¹ Some differences between Irish and non-Irish may be a result of differences in age, gender, duration in Ireland, educational background and work experience. In some cases this is explicitly accounted for using statistical modelling, but for the most part descriptive indicators are presented.

² EU15-2 refers to the 'old' Member States, prior to enlargement in 2004, excluding the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland. EU12 refers to the ten 'new' Member States that joined the EU in 2004, plus Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007. Where numbers permit, non-EU nationals are further divided based on broad region of origin.

Irish nationals (around 69 per cent). Among non-Irish nationals, Africans had very low employment rates, around 40 per cent, and this pattern has persisted throughout the recession and recovery.

In 2015 the unemployment rate for non-Irish nationals, at 13 per cent, was higher than that for Irish nationals (under 10 per cent). Overall, immigrants were harder hit by the recession but the gap in unemployment between Irish and non-Irish has narrowed.

Employment rates of immigrants in Ireland are comparable with EU average employment rates of immigrants. Unemployment is higher among immigrants than among natives in Ireland as elsewhere in Europe, although the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives is less pronounced in Ireland than the European average.

Chapter 3 considers educational qualifications among adults and presents academic achievement scores for children in primary schools (see Table A). In early 2015 a higher proportion of non-Irish than Irish nationals aged 25 to 34 had third-level educational qualifications (55 per cent non-Irish versus 51 per cent Irish). A slightly lower proportion of young non-Irish adults than of young Irish adults (aged 20-24) had left school before finishing second-level education, though both proportions are low.

In English reading, immigrant students in sixth class of primary school in Ireland had lower scores than Irish peers. Students from non-English speaking backgrounds had even lower achievement scores. There was no significant difference between immigrants and Irish children in sixth class on mathematics scores. In general, differences between scores for Irish and immigrant children are somewhat greater for younger children (in second class) (see Chapter 3).

TABLE A Key Integration Indicators at a Glance

	Irish	Non-Irish
Employment (working age) 2015		
Employment rate	62.6%	60.0%
Unemployment rate	9.6%	13.1%
Activity rate	69.3%	69.0%
Education 2015		
Share of 25-34 age group with tertiary educational attainment	50.8%	55.0%
Share of early leavers from education (20-24 age group) (2014/2015 pooled)	6.4%	5.7%
Mean English reading scores at the end of primary school (2014)	265	251
Mean maths scores at the end of primary school (2014)	262	260
Social inclusion 2014		
Median annual net income (needs adjusted)	€18,496	€15,584
At risk of poverty rate	15.6%	21.1%
Consistent poverty rate	7.9%	8.8%
Share of population (aged 16+) perceiving their health as good or very good	81.7%	89.3%
Proportion of households that are property owners	76.2%	26.3%
Active citizenship end-2015		
Annual citizenship acquisition rate (non-EEA adults who acquired citizenship in 2015 as share of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' immigration permissions)		7.5%
Ratio of non-EEA adults who 'ever' acquired citizenship to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin at end-2015 (upper bound estimate)		45%
Share of non-EEA adults holding 'live' immigration permissions in 2015 who hold long-term residence		1.8%
Share of immigrants among elected national representatives		0.6%

Sources: QNHS Q1 2015 for employment and education indicators (except achievement scores, which are based on National Assessment Tests, 2014); EU-SILC 2014 for social inclusion indicators. Citizenship and long-term residence indicators: Irish Naturalisation and Citizenship Service, Eurostat. Political participation indicator: Immigrant Council of Ireland. See Appendix 2 for further details of sources.

Income, poverty, home ownership and health are used as core indicators of social inclusion in Chapter 4. After adjusting for household needs, the median income for non-Irish nationals in 2014 was lower than that of Irish nationals, and the at risk of poverty rate was higher for non-Irish nationals (see Table A). However, the consistent poverty rate, which takes into account the experience of deprivation as well as income poverty, while higher for non-Irish (at just under 9 per cent), was more similar to the rate for Irish nationals (8 per cent).³

³ The at risk of poverty rate, which refers to the percentage of a group falling below 60 per cent of median equalised income, is the official poverty threshold used by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and agreed at EU level. 'Consistent poverty' combines at risk of poverty with enforced deprivation of a range of items.

In general non-Irish nationals tend to report better health than Irish nationals, though most of the difference is due to age and education differences. Rates of home ownership are much lower among non-Irish than Irish nationals (Table A). Much of the difference in home ownership is related to length of time in Ireland, though – excluding UK nationals – differences remain even accounting for this. Chapter 4 shows how the majority of migrants in 2014 (almost 70 per cent) lived in private rented accommodation, though despite differences in housing tenure, there was no marked differences in housing quality. Migrants in Ireland appear to fare better than migrants in other EU countries in terms of overcrowding, though somewhat worse than Irish nationals.

Very significant changes have been seen in the active citizenship domain in the last decade. Three indicators were proposed at the Zaragoza conference to assess active citizenship: the share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship; the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and the share of immigrants among elected representatives (see Table A).

Around 8,600 non-EEA adults acquired Irish citizenship in 2015, which represents around 7.5 per cent of the adult non-EEA population at end-2015. Taking a longer-term perspective, between 2005 and end-2015, a total of 93,610 non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over acquired Irish citizenship. This represents 45 per cent of the estimated adult immigrant population of non-EEA origin resident in Ireland at end-2015. The estimate assumes that those naturalised in this period did not leave the State, so it is likely to be an upper bound estimate.

Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence immigration status with clear rights and entitlements attached. The share of non-EEA nationals holding long-term residence permits, under the current administrative scheme, was estimated to be just under 2 per cent at year-end 2015. The share of immigrants among elected (national) representatives was 0.6 per cent. Chapter 5 notes that the lack of political engagement among migrants may be a concern.

SPECIAL FOCUS: IMMIGRANTS IN IRELAND, SKILLS AND COMPETENCIES

Chapter 6 investigates the skills of the working-age population (16-65) in Ireland and compares the skills of immigrants with those of the native-born population using the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC). This survey, conducted in 2012 by the OECD, assesses the proficiency of adults in literacy, numeracy and problem solving in technology-rich environments. These are considered to be ‘key information-processing skills’ as they are considered necessary for full integration and participation in the labour market, education and training, as well as in social

life. Taken together, the analysis provided in this chapter shows that immigrant skill levels are, first and foremost, influenced by proficiency in English. Language proficiency overrides country of birth: those born abroad but with high levels of English language proficiency perform well across three skill areas. Foreign-born, foreign language speakers have lower skill scores on average in the areas of literacy and numeracy, despite their high levels of education.

How does Ireland compare with other countries regarding immigrant skill levels? The skills gap between the native-born and the foreign-born with a foreign language varies notably across a selection of countries, including France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. For literacy and numeracy, the relative gap is smaller in Ireland than in France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. There were no notable differences in problem solving between immigrants and the Irish-born in Ireland.

FUTURE DATA COLLECTION

The issue of monitoring the integration of immigrants has received increasing prominence at both the European Commission and the OECD. The value of such monitoring will only be as good as the data on which it is based. One issue in Ireland is how well represented non-Irish nationals are in social surveys. To be confident that the situation of non-Irish nationals is accurately measured, they need to be appropriately represented in such surveys. In the medium term, immigrant or ethnic minority boost samples would go a long way to addressing the persistent issue of small sample sizes.

The increasingly permanent nature of migration in Ireland means researchers and policymakers need to think carefully about whose outcomes they are measuring and how they do this. As noted in Chapter 7, the sizeable group of immigrants who now possess Irish citizenship means that measuring integration on the basis of nationality will miss an increasing number of naturalised citizens, and strengthens the case for including alternative measures such as ethnicity, ancestry or parents' country of birth in social surveys.

POLICY ISSUES

Migration debates in Europe have been dominated in the past few years by the refugee crisis. Yet any integration plan needs to incorporate both a response to the refugee crisis and longer-term strategy for supporting the integration of migrants.

Of particular concern is the high unemployment and low employment rate among African nationals. Chapter 2 argues that lower labour market outcomes among this group are likely to be a combination of lower educational outcomes, time spent in the asylum system and not in the labour market for those who were seeking protection, and potentially also the experience of discrimination in the Irish labour market. Further detailed research on African migrants would allow us to investigate their outcomes in more depth, and point at some potential policy responses.

The importance of language skills are highlighted in Chapter 6, which shows that immigrant skill levels are, first and foremost, influenced by proficiency in English. Given these findings and the well-established role of language in integration more generally, the ongoing lack of a clearly defined strategy for English language provision for adults is problematic. While educational achievement of non-Irish adults is similar to or even slightly better than Irish nationals, there are gaps in reading proficiency among primary school children. This suggests maintaining language support for migrant students is important, as is ensuring these supports are effective.

Political participation of migrants in Ireland is in principle favourable given generous voting rights; this contributes to a high ranking by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). However, in practice, Chapter 5 documents a serious under-representation of migrant candidates in politics and on the voting register. Continued efforts to encourage migrant voter registration and voting could potentially increase the migrant voice in Irish politics.

Publication of the government's updated integration strategy geared to current conditions presents a positive opportunity, assuming the strategy is matched with sufficient resources and effectively implemented. As migrant integration policy adopts a mainstreaming approach in Ireland, it is crucial that any integration strategy is accompanied by monitoring of migrant outcomes to ensure their needs are being served. And if policy is mainstreamed, the implementation of any integration strategy is not just the responsibility of the Department of Justice and Equality, but of all the government departments and agencies that interact with migrants.

Chapter 1

Introduction, Policy and Context

By Samantha Arnold, Emma Quinn and Frances McGinnity

Integration allows immigrants to contribute to the economic, social, cultural and political life of their host country, and is important for social cohesion. Integration is also important for encouraging acceptance of immigrants by the host country population. While facilitating migrant integration may be challenging for host countries, international evidence shows that the consequences of failed integration may become apparent in a number of ways, from early school-leaving and residential segregation to inter-ethnic violence.

The Integration Monitor 2016 follows a series of four Annual Integration Monitors published between 2011 and 2014. The Integration Monitor seeks to measure the integration of immigrants into Ireland in four key domains or policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. This report updates core indicators from the previous series and presents a special theme on ‘Immigrants in Ireland: Skills and Competencies’.

This chapter provides an introduction to and context for the indicators. Section 1.1 considers the challenges of measuring integration and monitoring outcomes, and the indicators used. Section 1.2 outlines the main trends in migration in Ireland and some recent policy developments (Box 1.1)

1.1 THE CHALLENGES OF MONITORING INTEGRATION

1.1.1 *Defining and Measuring Integration*

Defining integration is not straightforward. Integration can refer to the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration. Migrants need to ‘secure a place for themselves’ – find a home, a job, income, schools, access to healthcare – and also a place in the social and cultural sense. Penninx and Garcés-Masareñas (2016) suggest integration may be defined simply as ‘the process of becoming an accepted part of society’, both as an individual and as a group. European countries vary considerably in their understanding of integration, from assimilation to multiculturalism (Bijl and Verweij, 2012). According to the European Union’s ‘Common Basic Principles of

Integration', integration is 'a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states' (see Appendix 1). Garcés-Mascreñas and Penninx (2016) note a major shift in the policy framing of integration marked by the 2011 *European Agenda for Integration of Third-Country Nationals*, which added the country of origin as a third key actor in the process of immigrants' integration, in addition to the migrant and their host country.⁴

Integration is high on the EU policy agenda: the 2011 European agenda for the integration of non-EU migrants was followed in June 2016 with the publication of an *Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals*, which aims to support the development of Member State integration policies. The Action plan targets all third-country nationals and has regard to the specific challenges faced by refugees.⁵ It is important to note that for the EU, integration relates to third-country nationals, that is those from outside the European Union, and does not include EU nationals moving to other EU countries.

This policy focus has been accompanied by an awareness of the need to monitor integration. One of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy⁶ (see Appendix 1) is the understanding that developing clear indicators is necessary to adjust policy and evaluate progress on integration. These indicators should be based on existing and comparable data for most Member States, limited in number, simple to understand and focused on outcomes.⁷

A different, less internationally comparable but more in-depth approach is adopted by the recent review of integration in the UK, the Casey Review (Casey, 2016). This ambitious and wide-ranging report combines qualitative interviews with representative data sources to consider exclusion not only on the basis of ethnicity and immigration status, but on a range of equality grounds such as gender, religion and socio-economic status. The emphasis is on building social cohesion in communities through social interaction, and there is extensive discussion of ethnic concentration within neighbourhoods and the problems it may cause.

⁴ See: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/integration/index_en.htm.

⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/integration/index_en.htm.

⁶ Council of the EU (2004), adopted following agreement among EU Member States about the need for more dynamic policies to promote the integration of third-country nationals in Member States.

⁷ Swedish presidency conference conclusions on indicators and monitoring of the outcome of integration policies, proposed at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration, Zaragoza, Spain (April 2010). Hereafter these indicators are referred to as the Zaragoza indicators.

Collett and Petrovic (2014) also highlight the importance of monitoring in their review of mainstreaming approaches to integration policy in four European countries. Mainstreaming can be a very effective policy approach to the integration of migrants, particularly in the longer term when narrowly defined stand-alone immigrant integration policies may fall short. However these authors also stress that when a policy is mainstreamed, it is important to have specific data on immigrants to ensure that immigrants are being reached and their needs served by the policies. Without monitoring of outcomes, mainstreaming can mean that the needs of immigrants are being ignored or at least not effectively addressed (Collett and Petrovic, 2014).

Ireland pursues a policy of mainstream service provision in the area of integration, with targeted initiatives to meet specific short-term needs (Office of the Minister for Integration, 2008). A unit within the Department of Justice, the Office of the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI), has a cross-departmental mandate to lead and co-ordinate migrant integration. The delivery of integration services rests with individual government departments and agencies.⁸ In March 2014 the Cross Departmental Group on Integration was reconstituted. At that time the responsible Minister launched a consultation on a new national integration strategy,⁹ publication of which is expected in early 2017.

In addition to the policy argument for monitoring, Bijl and Verweij (2012) highlight the benefits of providing factual information about immigrants and integration in what can sometimes be politically charged debates on the topic (see also Casey, 2016). Negative attitudes to immigration have increased considerably in the UK in the last 15 years (Casey, 2016), and immigration has become a highly salient political issue. Negative attitudes to immigrants and immigration rose somewhat during the economic recession in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2013), but as Fanning (2015) argues, Ireland has not had a marked political or media backlash against immigration.

1.1.2 Integration Indicators

The main aim of this Integration Monitor is to provide a balanced and rigorous assessment of the situation of immigrants in Ireland using the most up-to-date and reliable data available. The framework for that assessment is based on the

⁸ 'About us', www.integration.ie.

⁹ This group is chaired by the Department of Justice and Equality and comprises representatives from: Department of the Taoiseach; Department of Public Expenditure and Reform; Department of Education and Skills; Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government; Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation; Department of Health and the Health Service Executive; Department of Children and Youth Affairs; Department of Social Protection; Department of Arts, Heritage and Gaeltacht Affairs; Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport; Department of Defence; CSO; An Garda Síochána; and the County and City Managers' Association (Department of Justice and Equality, 2014b).

set of integration indicators included in the Zaragoza Declaration, adopted in April 2010 by EU Ministers responsible for integration, and approved at the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 3-4 June, 2010. These are also known as the 'Zaragoza indicators'.¹⁰ A number of key principles guided the choice of these indicators. This section considers some of their strengths and limitations.

First, the indicators are focused on outcomes. For each indicator, outcomes for immigrants are compared with those for the native population, in this case the Irish population, which means that the focus is on the difference between the Irish and the immigrant populations. The two exceptions to this principle of comparing outcomes are the indicators concerning citizenship and long-term residence (see Table 1.1), which describe the context and opportunities for integration rather than measure empirical outcomes.

Second, the indicators are limited in number and largely draw on nationally representative internationally comparable data sources that already exist. This approach makes them cost-effective and, in principle, highly comparable, but it does have some disadvantages:

- (i) The existing data sources may not be designed to represent and measure outcomes for immigrants. This is discussed further in Section 1.1.3.
- (ii) The indicators principally measure the structural dimensions of integration, i.e. labour market participation and educational attainment. Cross-national data on an ongoing basis do not exist for many subjective indicators, such as sense of belonging or intentions to stay, so these are not included as core indicators.
- (iii) The focus on quantitative, nationally representative data means the Monitor lacks a sense of the lived experience of integration: this is better captured by qualitative work using interviews and case studies.¹¹ This Monitor measures integration at a national level, although it is clear that integration often takes place at a local level.

Third, the indicators are designed to be comparable over time. While the data do not allow us to follow individuals over time, we can measure changes for groups in the population. An emphasis on change is important for two reasons. Firstly, from a policy perspective, the direction of change is important: for example, are poverty rates rising or falling? From a research perspective, comparing change over time can overcome some of the limitations of the indicators. Secondly, an indicator might underestimate the proportion of an immigrant group who own

¹⁰ See http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_13055_519941744.pdf.

¹¹ Examples of such studies include Gilligan et al. (2010), MCRI (2008), UNHCR (2014).

their own homes, but if it does so consistently over time, it will still detect changes in that proportion.

Fourth, the indicators should be simple to understand and accessible. Basing indicators on familiar concepts such as unemployment and poverty means that they should have resonance for both policymakers and the general public. This transparency requirement also means they need to be defined clearly (see Appendix 2).

Table 1.1 presents the indicators used in this Integration Monitor, which draw on those proposed at Zaragoza (see also Appendix 2).

TABLE 1.1 Outline of Core Indicators, Broadly Equivalent to those Proposed at Zaragoza

1. Employment	Employment rate Unemployment rate Activity rate
2. Education	Highest educational attainment Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment Share of early leavers from education and training National Assessments of reading and mathematics in second and sixth class (primary)
3. Social inclusion	Median net income (household income and equivalised income) At risk of poverty rate Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good Share of property owners among immigrants and in the total population
4. Active citizenship	Ratio of immigrants who have acquired citizenship to non-EEA immigrant population (best estimate) Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits (best estimate) Share of immigrants among elected local representatives

Note: In some instances the indicators are slightly different because of data constraints (see Appendix 2).

As well as these core indicators, each Integration Monitor includes a different special thematic focus. This year the focus is on ‘Immigrants in Ireland: Skills and Competencies’, using data from the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC).

The focus on outcomes distinguishes this Integration Monitor from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). The MIPEX tool aims to assess, compare and improve integration policy indicators by providing ongoing assessment of policies. That said, policy forms the context for the outcomes measured here and will be discussed briefly in this report, particularly in the access information in Boxes 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2. These boxes are not intended as a statement of entitlements, and readers should refer to the relevant official bodies for further information (additional sources of information are indicated in the boxes).

1.1.3 Challenges of Monitoring Outcomes among Immigrants

Even when indicators are fixed, monitoring immigrant outcomes is challenging. This is related to how immigrants are defined, their representation in survey data and the changing composition of the group.

The general definition of immigrants in this Monitor is based on nationality, and is consistent with the previous Monitors in the series. While the EU's definition of immigrants is those coming from outside the EU, this Monitor does measure outcomes for EU immigrants. However, the nationality definition misses second-generation immigrants and naturalised citizens, who are not typically identified using general social surveys. Most immigration into Ireland is relatively recent, but given the fact that a significant proportion are now naturalised Irish citizens this has implications for how best to define the immigrant population (see Chapter 5). This is a point we return to in Chapter 7, where we also discuss the fact that ethnicity and religion are not measured in ongoing social surveys in Ireland.

A second challenge for monitoring is how effectively survey data collects information on immigrants. These large, nationally representative and excellent datasets are not designed to represent and record details of immigrants. A key concern is the tendency for certain groups to be under-represented in survey data due to, for example, poor language skills. There is also a very diverse range of nationalities among immigrants to Ireland. Small numbers in particular nationality groups often mean they need to be combined into larger nationality groups, thus losing detail about the experience of specific nationalities. Some groups, such as the homeless and those living in residential homes or direct provision centres, are excluded from household surveys by design.

EU nationals are distinguished from non-EU nationals as they have very different rights and freedom of movement in Ireland. As previous research (Barrett et al., 2006) has indicated that the experience in Ireland of people from the United Kingdom differs from other EU nationals, we have distinguished UK nationals separately, where possible. EU15-2 nationals and EU12 nationals are also distinguished separately.¹² In this Monitor, where data permit, we distinguish non-EU nationals into the following groups: 'Africa'; 'North America, Australia and Oceania'; 'Asia', which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; and 'Rest of

¹² EU15-2 comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU12 comprises the EU Member States that acceded in 2004 and 2007, i.e. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. For data reasons Croatia, which acceded to the EU in July 2013, is not included in the latter category. This also has the advantage of comparability with previous Monitors.

Europe and Rest of the World’ which comprises Central America and Caribbean, South America, Near and Middle East, and Other countries.


A third challenge with monitoring immigrant outcomes is the change in size and composition of the immigrant population over time, so that the year-on-year comparisons are potentially not of the same groups. Recent migration flows to and from Ireland illustrate how migration patterns closely reflect economic conditions: economic growth brings strong labour demand and stimulates immigration, whereas recession and falling labour demand stimulate emigration. Thus migration flows are important for understanding changes to the stock of immigrants; this is discussed in the next section.

1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TRENDS IN MIGRATION IN IRELAND

In this section we discuss the main trends in immigration in recent years with a particular focus on developments since the 2013 Monitor, which reflected data, trends and developments in law and policy up to December 2012. In 2012, Ireland had one of the highest percentages of foreign-born residents among EU Member States at 15 per cent.¹³ As noted in the 2013 Integration Monitor, the high proportion of foreign-born residents reflected large-scale immigration to Ireland.

The foreign-born resident population (as a percentage of the total population) increased by 2 percentage points between 2012 and 2014 from 15 to 17 per cent. The proportion of residents born in other EU Member States decreased by 1 percentage point (from 11 per cent to 10 per cent) and the proportion of residents from non-EU Member States increased by 3 percentage points from 2012 to 2014 (from 4 per cent to 7 per cent). Figure 1.1 shows that aside from Luxembourg (not shown) and Cyprus, Ireland has the highest proportion of residents born in other EU Member States at 10 per cent.

¹³ Source: Eurostat. Note that ‘foreign-born’ are typically first-generation immigrants, and may consist of both foreign and foreign-born who are nationals of the host country.

FIGURE 1.1 Foreign-born Residents as a Percentage of Total Population 2015

Source: Eurostat.


Notes: The following data for Luxembourg are excluded: 33 per cent born in other EU Member States, 11 per cent born in non-EU Member States.

Ireland has experienced extensive migratory change over the past two decades, linked to changing economic conditions and the expansion of the EU. Prior to the mid-1990s Ireland was a country with a long history of net emigration, but a period of economic growth from the early 1990s attracted returning Irish emigrants and other immigrants. In 2004 the enlargement of the EU led to particularly strong net inward migration. Ireland, UK and Sweden were the only three EU Member States to open their labour markets, without restrictions, to workers from new Member States. Inflows of migrants peaked during the economic boom in 2006/2007. However, due in part to a collapse in the property market, together with deteriorating international economic conditions, Ireland entered into recession in 2008. As a result, immigration declined. In 2010 Ireland re-entered a phase of significant net emigration.

Figure 1.2 demonstrates that immigration flows have risen 24 per cent from the publication of the most recent Monitor (year to April 2013) and 2015 (from around 55,900 in 2013 to 69,300 in 2015). Emigration flows have also decreased slightly by 9 per cent from 2013 to 2015 (from around 89,000 in 2013 to 80,900 in 2015), but more than twice the flow recorded in 2006 (36,000). Glynn et al. (2013) showed that Ireland has experienced significantly higher levels of emigration per capita than other Western European countries affected by the recent recession. The year to April 2015 was the sixth consecutive year of

negative net migration. The 2015 net migration figure stood at 11,600, but three times the figure recorded in 2012 (34,400), perhaps related to economic growth in Ireland.


FIGURE 1.2 Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration 1987-2015



Source: CSO 'Population and Migration Estimates',¹⁴ various releases.

Notes: Year to April of reference year.

FIGURE 1.3 Nationality of Immigration Flows, 2010-2015




Source: CSO 'Population and Migration Estimates', various releases.

Notes: Year to April of reference year.

¹⁴ The CSO creates these Population and Migration Estimates using the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) and the Census. Estimates are also compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as the number of Personal Public Service numbers allocated to non-Irish nationals, the number of work permits issued/renewed and the number of asylum applications.

Figure 1.2 shows that there has been a steady rise in immigration flows (69,200 to end April 2015) since the last Monitor (2013) (56,000), but still around 81,900 less than the 2007 peak (151,100) (McGinnity et al., 2013). Figure 1.3 shows that immigration increased for all national groups between 2013 and 2015, except Irish nationals, for whom immigration fell by an estimated 3,600 since 2013. Among non-Irish groups, the biggest change was in the non-EU group, whose immigration rate grew by an estimated 13,300 compared with 2013 (an increase of 78 per cent).

FIGURE 1.4 Nationality of Emigration Flows, 2010-2015




Source: CSO 'Population and Migration Estimates', various releases.

Notes: Year to April of reference year.

Figure 1.4 shows the nationality breakdown of emigration flows from 2010 to 2015. Overall, emigration flows (of Irish plus non-Irish nationals) have decreased from 2013. There has been a large increase in Irish emigration flows from 2009 onwards, but it has decreased from 2013. Emigration peaked in 2013 (89,000), decreasing to an estimated 80,900 in 2015. In 2015, Irish nationals accounted for 44 per cent of the emigrant flow. The outward flow of EU15-28¹⁵ decreased from 2013 to 2015 by 39 per cent (from an estimated 14,000 to 8,500). The outward flow of EU15 (excl. Ireland and the UK) and non-EU groups increased from 2013 to 2015 by 63 and 72 per cent respectively (from around 9,900 to 15,600 and 10,300 to 17,700 respectively).

¹⁵ EU15-28 Member States that joined 2004, 2007 and 2013.

FIGURE 1.5 GNIB (Police) Residence Permissions (Non-EEA Nationals Aged 16 and Over), 2008-2015

Source: Eurostat.

Notes: Year to December of reference year. Data are not available for refugee status and subsidiary protection in 2008 and 2009. 'Other reasons' includes family members and siblings who qualify under the Irish Born Child scheme.

Figure 1.5 shows the breakdown of Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) registrations, or residence permissions, of non-EEA nationals¹⁶ aged 16 and over from 2008 to 2015. EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals aged 16 and under are not currently required to register. In 2014, the *Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014* removed the exemption for those under 16 to register with the GNIB, but this provision has not yet been operationalised.

The most recent confirmed data to year-end 2015, when there were 113,914 'live' registrations recorded, represent a decline of 27,902 (from 141,816) registrations since 2008 (a decrease of 20 per cent). The overall number of residence permits held by non-EEA adults decreased from 2012 to 2015 by 5 per cent (120,281 to 113,914). However, the overall number increased from 2014 to 2015 by over 8,000 (8 per cent). The number of 'live' residence permissions held increased in respect of each category (Figure 1.5) from 2014 to 2015. The increase in overall registrations in 2015 may be attributed to the improved economic circumstances of Ireland.

Figure 1.5 shows that the number of 'live' residence permissions issued for the purpose of work overall has decreased since 2012 by 12 per cent (2,514 from

¹⁶ The European Economic Area (EEA) comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

around 20,461 to 17,947). The share of the overall residence permissions issued decreased slightly from 17 per cent in 2012 to 16 per cent in 2015. This may reflect the increased number of naturalised citizens (see Chapter 5) and the impact of the recession. However, in 2015 the share of 'live' permissions for the purpose of work increased by 13 per cent year-on-year (from around 15,831 in 2014 to 17,947 in 2015), perhaps due in part to reforms of employment permit legislation in Ireland (see Chapter 2).

The share of residence permissions issued to family members grew from 19 per cent to 23 per cent between 2012 and 2015. Residence permission issued for family reasons is the only category which experienced an increase annually from 2008 to 2015.

The share of residence permissions issued for education reasons increased from 29 per cent in 2012 to 38 per cent in 2015, perhaps in part reflecting the renewed focus on encouraging international students to study in Ireland (see Chapter 3).

As discussed in Box 1.1 below, the total number of persons issued with residence permission on the basis of international protection (refugee status plus subsidiary protection) has increased by 35 per cent between 2013 and 2015 (from 1,059 to 1,430). The number of persons resettled increased in 2015 by 83 per cent year-on-year (from 96 in 2014 to 176 in 2015).

Box 1.1 Recent Developments in Relation to International Protection in Ireland*Reform of the International Protection System*

During 2014, the *Working Group Report to Government on Improvements to the Protection Process, including Direct Provision and Supports to Asylum Seekers* (the McMahon Report) was published. The overall finding of the Group was that no person should be in the system for five years or more. Further recommendations related to improvements to the direct provision system (state-run full board facilities for persons seeking protection). A key recommendation was to increase the weekly allowance of €19.10 per adult and €9.60 per child, which had not changed since 2000. The allowance for child residents was subsequently increased to €15.60 from January 2016.

In addition, the Group recommended allowing access to the labour market in the case of co-operating applicants who have not received their first instance refugee and subsidiary protection decisions within nine months of application. This recommendation has not been implemented.

The Group also recommended the swift enactment of the *International Protection Act 2015*. This was achieved in December 2015 and represents a significant development in the area of international protection, introducing a single application procedure for the first time. Once fully commenced, it is foreseen that the Act will mean that asylum applicants will spend less time awaiting a decision, and thus spend less time out of work in the direct provision system.

Since 2000, the year direct provision was rolled out nationally, the length of time residents have spent awaiting decisions has increased every year. As of February 2015, 41 per cent of residents were in the system for five years or more (McMahon Report). Provisional figures for end-2015 indicate that there were 4,696 residents,¹⁷ representing a 7 per cent increase from end-2013 (4,370) as reported in the 2013 Monitor.

The asylum process in Ireland is highly criticised for a number of reasons, including the effect that protracted stays in direct provision have on the integration prospects of residents (Ní Raghallaigh et al., 2016). In July 2015, a taskforce was also established to assist with transitions of persons from the direct provision system.

Ireland's Response to the Refugee Crisis

In 2015, UNHCR estimated that there were 65.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide. Some one million refugees and migrants entered Europe in 2015. Many entered the EU through Greece or Italy and transited through a number of countries en route to Western and Central Europe or the Nordic Countries (European Migration Network, 2016). In response, the EU committed to resettle over 20,000 refugees. The European Commission proposed to relocate 160,000¹⁸ people from Italy and Greece (European Commission, 2016b).

In 2015, the Irish government established the Irish Refugee Protection Programme (IRPP), and a new cross-departmental Task Force, chaired by the Department of Justice and Equality, in response to the crisis in central and southern Europe. The remit of the IRPP includes the resettlement programme, the relocation programme and the asylum procedures. The government confirmed its commitment to provide international protection for up to 4,000 persons in light of the EU Resettlement and Relocation Programmes (European Commission, 2015). Some 780 are to be resettled and 2,622 are to be relocated to Ireland between 2015 and 2017. The remaining 598 have not yet been allocated to either resettlement or relocation. Ireland receives €10,000 for each resettled person and €6,000 for each relocated person under the AMIF Programme. Resettled persons have rights similar to Irish citizens including access to the labour market and third-level education.

Ireland has a targeted approach to integration in the context of resettled refugees. Refugees avail of various supports including in respect of education and labour market access. Ní Raghallaigh et al. (2016) proposed that this approach should also be extended to beneficiaries of international protection and humanitarian leave to remain.

¹⁷ Reception and Integration Agency Monthly report for December 2015. Available at www.ria.gov.ie.

¹⁸ Resettlement is the selection and transfer of refugees from a third country. Relocation is the transfer of persons who are in need of international protection from an EU Member State.

In 2014, INIS also administered a once-off private sponsorship programme, the Syrian Humanitarian Admission Programme (SHAP). This programme provided a pathway to enter and reside in Ireland for family members of Syrian nationals living in Ireland and naturalised Irish citizens of Syrian origin. Under the scheme, 119 persons were provided permission to reside in Ireland out of applications made on behalf of 308 persons (Arnold and Quinn, 2016). Beneficiaries may access the labour market.

The increase in resettlement and the introduction of relocation initiatives will impact upon future integration strategy and policies.

Provisional data released by the Department of Justice and Equality indicate that at year-end 2015 the top five registered nationalities, accounting for over 47 per cent of all persons registered are: Brazil (16 per cent), India (11 per cent), China (9 per cent), US (7 per cent) and Pakistan (6 per cent) (Department of Justice and Equality, 2015a).

Table 1.2 shows that the largest proportion of non-Irish nationals in 2015 was recorded in the age range '25 to 44 years'. Asia recorded the highest proportion in this age range at 64.1 per cent, followed by Rest of Europe and Rest of World at 64.7 per cent. UK nationals were overrepresented in the age range '45 to 65 years' (35 per cent) compared to other nationalities. The UK also had the highest proportion of nationals in the age range '65+ years' at 17.1 per cent, followed by North America, Australia and Oceania at 8.2 per cent and EU15-2 at 5 per cent. The proportion of nationals from EU12 in the age range '0 to 14 years' was the highest at 19.6 per cent, followed by North America, Australia and Oceania at 19.9 per cent (Table A1.2).

TABLE 1.2 Profile of Migrant Stock in Ireland, 2015

	Irish %	UK %	EU15-2 %	EU12 %	Africa %	North America, Australia, Oceania %	Asia %	Rest of Europe, Rest of the World %
% Aged 25-44	26.3	32.0	57.6	61.0	57.6	47.5	64.1	64.7
% Aged 45-64	24.9	35.0	14.2	11.5	15.2	15.3	8.8	8.2
% Female	50.5	50.4	36.4	51.2	49.7	59.3	51.7	58.9
% Employed of working age	62.6	55.6	70.3	68.6	40.2	52.7	53.1	52.2
% Third-Level qualifications (working age)	35.2	47.4	67.3	34.6	38.2	70.8	66.2	55.2
% Post-Leaving Certificate qualifications (working age)	12.0	10.8	4.4	14.8	11.5	6.1	5.3	6.3

Source: Own calculations from QNHS microdata Q1 2015, weighted, all ages unless otherwise stated.

Notes: See Tables A1.2, A1.3, 2.1 and 3.1 for full tables and N of cases.

The gender of non-Irish nationals in Ireland in 2015 was largely balanced across all groups, with the exception of EU15-2 nationals, 63.6 per cent of whom were male (Table A1.3).

EU15-2 nationals had the highest employment rate at 70.3 per cent in 2015, followed by EU12 nationals at 68.6 per cent. UK nationals had a relatively low employment rate at 55.6 per cent. Nationals from North America, Australia and Oceania; Asia; and Rest of Europe and Rest of the World recorded a lower employment rate relative to EU15-2, EU12 and UK nationals (between 52 and 53 per cent). African nationals had the lowest employment rate at 40.2 per cent (Chapter 2, Table 2.1).

The proportion of nationals from North America, Australia and Oceania with third-level qualifications was the highest at 70.8 per cent, followed by EU15-2 at 67.3 per cent and Asia at 66.2 per cent. Nationals from Rest of Europe and Rest of the World had relatively high rates of third-level qualifications at 55.2 per cent. The proportion of UK nationals with third-level degrees was low compared to other non-EU groups at 47.4 per cent. The proportion of African nationals with third-level qualifications was also low at 38.2 per cent. EU12 nationals recorded the lowest levels of third-level education at 34.6 per cent (Chapter 3, Table 3.1). However EU12 nationals had the highest rates of post-Leaving Certificate qualifications at 14.8 per cent.

Non-Irish nationals also differ considerably as to how long they have been living in Ireland. Table A1.4 shows that over 60 per cent of UK nationals had been living in Ireland for more than ten years: over 20 per cent of them had been living in Ireland more than 20 years. Other migrant groups have come to Ireland relatively recently. Around 70 per cent of Africans had been in Ireland for over ten years, but among the other groups (EU, North America, Asia, Rest of the World) the proportion who had come in the past ten years is higher, in many cases over 80 per cent. Almost half of EU15-2 migrants, North Americans and 62 per cent from the Rest of the World had been living in Ireland five years or less.

Chapter 1 Appendix

TABLE A1.1 Nationality by Year, QNHS Q1 2010 - Q1 2015

	2010		2011		2012		2013		2014		2015	
	%	count	%	count	%	count	%	count	%	count	%	count
Irish	87.6	57,061	87.8	52,100	88.0	49,792	88.0	50,104	87.8	47,732	87.6	45,032
Non-Irish	12.4	6,272	12.2	5,062	12.0	5,302	12.0	4,963	12.2	4,647	12.4	4,165
Of which:												
UK	2.6	1,225	2.5	1,034	2.5	973	2.5	891	2.5	737	2.5	631
EU15-2	1.2	489	1.1	414	1.0	421	0.9	440	0.9	560	0.7	485
EU12	5.2	2,735	5.1	2,206	5.0	2,465	5.0	2,409	5.0	2,176	5.1	1,965
Africa	1.1	585	1.1	436	1.0	407	1.0	344	0.8	251	0.7	183
North America, Australia, Oceania	0.3	191	0.3	130	0.4	154	0.4	127	0.4	133	0.6	141
Asia	1.3	659	1.3	499	1.4	537	1.4	459	1.4	429	1.6	404
Rest of Europe and Rest of the World	0.7	388	0.8	343	0.8	345	0.9	293	1.1	361	1.4	356
Total	100	63,333	100	57,162	100	55,094	100	55,067	100	52,379	100	49,197

Source: Own calculations from QNHS microdata Q1 2010 - Q1 2015.

Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

TABLE A1.2 Nationality by Age, QNHS Q1 2015

	0 to 14 years	15 to 24 years	25 to 44 years	45 to 64 years	65+ years	Total %	Total Count
Irish	23.2	11.4	26.3	24.9	14.2	100	45,032
Non-Irish	14.8	9.7	55.1	15.9	4.5	100	4,165
Of which:							
UK	7.2	8.7	32.0	35.0	17.1	100	631
EU15-2	11.8	11.5	57.6	14.2	5.0	100	485
EU12	19.6	7.6	61.0	11.5	0.2	100	1,965
Africa	13.7	11.5	57.6	15.2	2.0	100	183
North America, Australia, Oceania	19.9	9.3	47.5	15.3	8.2	100	141
Asia	14.5	11.6	64.1	8.8	1.0	100	404
Rest of Europe and Rest of the World	10.4	15.6	64.7	8.2	1.1	100	356
Total	22.1	11.2	29.9	23.8	13.0	100	49,197

Source: Own calculations from QNHS microdata Q1 2015.

Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

TABLE A1.3 Nationality by Gender, QNHS 2015

	Male %	Female %	Total %	Total Count
Irish	49.5	50.5	100	45,032
Non-Irish	48.5	51.5	100	4,165
Of which:				
UK	49.6	50.4	100	631
EU15-2	63.6	36.4	100	485
EU12	48.8	51.2	100	1,965
Africa	50.3	49.7	100	183
North America, Australia, Oceania	40.7	59.3	100	141
Asia	48.3	51.7	100	404
Rest of Europe and Rest of the World	41.1	58.9	100	356
Total	49.4	50.6	100	49,197

Source: Own calculations from QNHS microdata Q1 2015.

Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

TABLE A1.4 Nationality by Duration of Residence in Ireland, QNHS Q1 2015

	Born in Ireland %	< 5 years %	5 to 10 years %	11 to 20 years %	> 21 years %	Total %	Total Count
Irish	94.3	0.2	1.0	2.2	2.3	100	45,004
Non-Irish	5.6	26.1	40.3	22.7	5.4	100	4,091
Of which:							
UK	8.2	11.1	20.5	39.4	20.8	100	623
EU15-2	4.0	47.4	23.5	19.7	5.3	100	481
EU12	5.4	15.2	61.0	18.4	0.1	100	1,919
Africa	2.4	27.2	39.1	30.8	0.6	100	180
North America, Australia, Oceania	9.9	45.6	22.5	11.8	10.2	100	140
Asia	5.8	37.1	34.7	19.9	2.5	100	399
Rest of Europe and Rest of the World	1.6	61.9	22.1	13.0	1.4	100	349
Total	83.4	3.4	5.8	4.7	2.7	100	49,095

Source: Own calculations from QNHS microdata Q1 2015.

Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. N = 102 missing cases for 'years of residence' in 2015.

Chapter 2

Employment and Integration

By Philip O’Connell and Oona Kenny

Employment is crucial to the process of economic integration and social inclusion. The OECD (2015) notes that ‘Jobs are immigrants’ chief source of income. Finding one is therefore ‘fundamental to their becoming part of the host country’s economic fabric’. Employment leads to financial independence, it allows a person to contribute to society, it confers social standing, and it avoids the risk of poverty and social exclusion in their host country. Through employment, legal residents can build networks, develop their language skills and increase participation in society. Job loss can be associated with poverty, psychological distress and more general social exclusion. The recent recession meant that labour market conditions deteriorated in many countries and in Ireland in particular. In general, immigrants are more exposed to the consequences of economic downturns, and this was clearly the experience in Ireland during the recession, as shown in previous editions of this Monitor (Barrett et al., 2014; Barrett and Kelly, 2015; Kelly et al., 2015). With a recovery in the Irish labour market since 2012, a key question for this chapter concerns the extent to which immigrants have benefited from the overall growth in employment and decline in unemployment in recent years.

This chapter presents key indicators of employment integration by nationality, including employment, unemployment, economic activity and self-employment rates. The data used in this chapter are derived from the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS), which provides labour force estimates. The QNHS is a large-scale nationally representative survey of households in Ireland, conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Unless otherwise stated, the report refers to data from QNHS Quarter 1, 2014 and Quarter 1, 2015 in order to ensure comparability with previous editions of the Monitor, which also used Q1 data. The indicators discussed in this chapter are based on special analyses of the QNHS data conducted for this Monitor and refer to the working-age population, 15-64 years.¹⁹


¹⁹ It should be noted that the differences observed between population sub-groups refer only to the Quarter 1 data, and would not necessarily represent differences in the other quarters of 2014 and 2015. However, despite variation between quarters over the year, these analyses can provide useful insights into ongoing differences by nationality.

2.1 EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES

Overall, total employment increased by just under 6 per cent between Quarter 1 2012 and Quarter 1, 2015, and the unemployment rate fell from 15 per cent to 10 per cent over the same period (CSO, 2016). This was the first sustained improvement in the labour market since the onset of the recession in 2008 and employment would continue to grow, and unemployment to fall, throughout the remainder of 2015 and the first half of 2016 (CSO, 2016).

Figure 2.1 presents the rates of employment, unemployment and activity for Irish and non-Irish nationals aged 15-64 years for the first quarters of 2014 and 2015. There is clear evidence of a gradual improvement in the labour market compared to 2012 when the employment rate was 58.2 and 58.9 for Irish and non-Irish nationals respectively (McGinnity et al., 2013). The employment rate is measured as the proportion of working adults in the working-age population (15-64 years). This increased by almost 2 percentage points for the Irish group between 2014 and 2015, but it fell by almost 1 percentage point among non-Irish nationals. In 2015 the employment rate among Irish nationals, at 62.6 per cent of 15- to 64-year-olds, was over 2½ percentage points higher than that of non-Irish nationals.

FIGURE 2.1 Key Employment Indicators for Irish and non-Irish Nationals, Q1 2014 and 2015



Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2014 and Q1 2015 (15-64 years age group).

Notes: Differences between Irish and non-Irish unemployment rates are statistically significant ($p \leq 0.05$) in both years. Differences in employment rates are statistically significant in 2015 only while differences in activity rates are significant in 2014 only.

The unemployment rate is the number unemployed expressed as a percentage of the labour force, which is the sum of the numbers employed plus unemployed. Unemployment decreased for both Irish and non-Irish nationals between 2014 and 2015; the unemployment rate of Irish nationals decreased from 11.7 per cent in 2014 to 9.6 per cent in 2015.²⁰ The unemployment rate was considerably higher among non-Irish nationals, at 15.5 per cent in 2014 but the rate decreased by almost 2½ percentage points over the year and, as a result, the gap between unemployment rates of Irish and non-Irish nationals narrowed slightly to 3½ percentage points in Q1 2015.

The labour force activity rate is calculated as the proportion of working-age adults in the population who are in the labour force, which consists of the number of people employed and unemployed. The activity rate marginally increased (by half of one percentage point) among Irish nationals between 2014 and 2015, but it fell among the non-Irish by almost 3 percentage points. This represents a reversal of a persistent pattern in which the activity rates of non-Irish nationals had exceeded those of Irish nationals.

Table 2.1 shows that there are important differences in employment and economic activity between immigrant groups. The classification of nationalities is based on the country codification in the EU Labour Force Survey from 2011 onwards. The non-EU groups are: 'Africa'; 'North America, Australia and Oceania'; 'Asia', which comprises South and South-East Asia and East Asia; and 'Rest of Europe and Rest of the World' which comprises Candidate, EFTA and Other European countries, Central America and Caribbean, South America and Near and Middle East. In this Monitor we introduce for the first time a distinction between Irish-born and foreign-born Irish nationals.²¹ Foreign-born Irish nationals are a diverse group that includes the descendants of Irish emigrants, mainly from the UK now resident in Ireland, as well as foreign-born immigrants, who acquired Irish citizenship by naturalisation. In 2015, 3.1 per cent of foreign-born Irish nationals were born in the UK but this has been decreasing slightly over the last five years (see Figure A2.1). Since 2011 there has been a marked increase in the numbers of immigrants, mainly non-EEA nationals, who acquired Irish citizenship (see Figure A2.1). This is due both to an increase in applications and the introduction of administrative reforms to reduce a pent-up backlog of applications. As a result the number of persons acquiring Irish citizenship increased from 6,300 in 2010 to over 25,000 in 2012 (Eurostat, 2016).²² Foreign-born Irish citizens accounted for over 6 per cent of the population aged over 15

²⁰ The QNHS classifies as unemployed persons who, in the week before the survey, were without work and available for work within the next two weeks, and had taken specific steps, in the preceding four weeks, to find work.

²¹ Note that this distinction was not made in the analysis in Figure 2.1 above in which both foreign-born and Irish-born Irish nationals were grouped together.

²² See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of trends in naturalisation.

years of age in 2015. The labour market experiences of naturalised citizens can be expected to differ from both those of Irish-born citizens as well as from non-naturalised immigrants. We might expect that naturalised citizens, with a greater stake in the host society, and a larger bundle of rights, may tend to fare better in the labour market than non-naturalised immigrants. However, a paper by Kelly et al. Haugh (2015) shows that naturalised immigrants from certain regions, particularly in Africa, had exceptionally unfavourable employment and unemployment outcomes in Ireland in 2012 and 2014. Table 2.1 shows that foreign-born Irish tended to have similar employment rates compared to Irish-born in both years, although these are not significantly different. Foreign-born Irish exhibit slightly higher unemployment rates than Irish-born Irish, although this difference is only significant in 2014. Employment and unemployment rates of foreign-born Irish are somewhat more favourable than those for non-Irish nationals.

TABLE 2.1 Key Employment Indicators by National Group Q1 2014 and 2015

Nationality	Employment rate (%)		Unemployment rate (%)		Activity rate (%)		Total Population (000's)	
	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015
Irish	60.8	62.6	11.7	9.6	68.8	69.3	2,558.0	2,539.9
Irish-born	60.8	62.7	11.6	9.5	68.7	69.3	2,367.5	2,345.1
Foreign-born	61.0	62.1	13.3 Δ	11.0	70.4	69.8	190.4	194.8
Non-Irish	60.7	60.0*	15.5*	13.1*	71.9*	69.0	455.8	464.7
<i>Of which:</i>								
UK	57.3	55.6*	18.3*	16.4*	70.1	66.4	84.5	85.9
EU15-2	70.2*	70.3	8.9	7.9	77.0*	76.4	35.5	25.7
EU12	68.5*	68.6*	15.7*	11.5*	81.2*	77.5*	187.6	189.7
Africa	37.4*	40.2*	30.6*	19.1	54.0*	49.7*	32.8	28.0
North America, Australia, Oceania	63.1	52.7	9.5	5.1*	69.7	55.6*	15.1	18.7
Asia	58.7	53.1*	15.0*	15.0	63.8	62.5*	52.0	60.7
Rest of Europe and Rest of the World	46.7*	52.2*	17.2	15.5	56.4*	61.8*	48.3	55.9
Total	60.8	62.2	12.3	10.2	69.3	69.2	3,013.8	3,004.6

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2014 and 2015 (15-64 years age group).

Notes: * denotes that the estimates for this group are statistically significantly different from Irish nationals at $p \leq 0.05$. Δ Denotes that the estimates for this group are statistically significantly different from Irish-born Irish nationals at $p \leq 0.05$.

In Q1 2015, nationals of the pre-enlargement 'old' EU Member States (EU15-2) had the highest employment rate at 70.3 per cent. Nationals of the 'new' EU12 Member States also reported a high employment rate (68.6 per cent), and the highest activity rate (77.5 per cent), so there are less economically inactive people in this group, but also a high unemployment rate. While the unemployment rate fell among the EU12 group from 15.7 per cent in 2014 to

11.5 per cent in 2015, this latter rate was still well above the average in 2015. UK nationals also had a high unemployment rate (16.4 per cent in 2015) and also a relatively low employment rate (55.6 per cent in 2015). African nationals reported the highest unemployment rate (30.6 per cent in 2014), and the lowest employment (37.4 per cent) and activity rates (54 per cent). Previous research on immigrants in the Irish labour market suggests that the main concentration of labour market disadvantage occurs among the Black African national-ethnic group and this group was also much more likely than either Irish natives or other immigrant groups to have experienced discrimination while looking for work (Kingston et al., 2013).

Discrimination may provide part of the explanation for the high unemployment rates among Africans participating in the labour force. However, it is also necessary to consider the low labour force participation rates among Africans. Further analysis of the QNHS data underpinning Table 2.1 above shows that in 2015 the employment rate among African females was just 31 per cent, compared to 50 per cent among males, a particularly large gender gap. The QNHS data also show that African families tend to have more children: 20 per cent of African families had four or more children, double the rate among Irish-national families. The 2013 Integration Monitor included a special focus on the children of immigrants, based on data from the *Growing up in Ireland* survey, and that analysis showed that African mothers had very low rates of employment and very high rates of engagement in home duties. African mothers also had less favourable educational qualifications, with higher proportions having lower secondary education, and smaller proportions with third-level qualifications, than other groups, including both natives and immigrants (McGinnity et al., 2013). Thus, the low employment rates among Africans may be partly due to the high costs of childcare in Ireland, which may be unaffordable for African mothers with large numbers of children, relatively low earning potential, and, because of their immigrant status, less recourse to relatives to provide childcare. In addition to these compositional factors, Kingston et al. (2013) also suggested that the severe disadvantages suffered by Black African individuals may be due in part to the fact that many Black Africans in Ireland are refugees and would have spent an extended period of time excluded from the labour market, and from participation in Irish society, as asylum seekers in the direct provision system, leading to a negative effect on their future employment prospects.

Nationals of Asia, North America, Australia and Oceania, and the Rest of Europe and the Rest of the World all share the characteristic of low employment rates (all below 55 per cent of the population) and those from Asia, North America, Australia and Oceania, and the Rest of Europe and the Rest of the World also showed high levels of unemployment (in excess of 15 per cent in 2015).

An additional striking pattern in Table 2.1 is the decline in activity rates for most nationality groups. Activity rates among Irish-born Irish increased marginally from 68.7 per cent of the population in 2014 to 69.3 per cent in 2015, and those from the Rest of (non-EU) Europe and the Rest of the World increased from 56.1 per cent to 61.8 per cent. However, activity rates for all other groups declined. The sharpest falls in activity rates occurred in respect of nationals of North America, Australia and Oceania, which fell from 69.7 per cent in 2014 to 55.6 per cent in 2015, and nationals of the 'new' EU12 states, which fell from 81.2 per cent to 77.5 per cent. Activity rates of Africans, already at a low rate of 54 per cent in 2014, fell to 49.7 per cent in 2015.

Table 2.2 shows the main employment indicators by age group. Employment and activity rates among young people are substantially lower than among older age groups, irrespective of nationality. Low activity rates among younger Irish nationals reflect the fact that many are still in the educational system and are therefore neither working nor looking for a job (so they are not part of the labour force).

Many young non-Irish nationals are also engaged in education, but a significant proportion come to Ireland to work. Lower activity rates in the older cohort (aged 45-64) may be explained by retired people, or people engaged with home duties, who are not part of the labour force. The decline in activity rates among non-Irish nationals between 2014 and 2015 can be seen in each age group, but they are particularly marked among those non-Irish nationals aged 15-24 years; from 38 per cent of the population age group in 2014 to 31.2 per cent in 2015. The decline in activity rates among the older age groups is less severe, and among Irish nationals a small decline in the activity rate is confined to the 15-24 year age group. There is no evidence to suggest that this decline in activity rates is due to greater participation in education. An analysis of the data shows that while there was a slight increase in the proportion of 15-24 year old Irish nationals currently in education – from 67.9 per cent in 2014 to 68.5 per cent in 2015 – there was a 1½ percentage point decline in the proportion of non-Irish nationals of the same age currently in education. This fell from 66 per cent in 2014 to 64.5 per cent in 2015, although it had risen from 61 per cent of non-Irish 15- to 24-year-olds in 2013.

TABLE 2.2 Key Employment Indicators by Age Group Q1 2014 and Q1 2015

Age band	Nationality	Employment rate (%)		Unemployment rate (%)		Activity rate (%)		Total	
		2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015
15-24 years	Irish	26.3	27.3	25.1	21.8	35.1	34.9	465.4	464.2
	Non-Irish	28.0	25.3	26.3	19.1	38.0	31.2	64.1	55.9
25-44 years	Irish	73.6	76.0	11.3	9.0	82.9	83.5	1,099.3	1,066.8
	Non-Irish	69.3*	68.0*	13.0	11.0	79.6*	76.4*	302.2	317.1
45-64 years	Irish	62.8	64.7	9.1	7.7	69.1	70.1	993.3	1,008.8
	Non-Irish	55.2*	53.3*	21.0*	19.7*	69.9	66.4*	89.5	91.8

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2014 and Q1 2015 (15-64 years age group).

Note: * denotes that the indicator for the group is statistically significantly different from Irish nationals at $p \leq 0.05$.

Unemployment rates among young people, aged 15-24, are extremely high among both Irish (21.8 per cent in 2015) and non-Irish nationals (19.1 per cent), although unemployment rates among young people have been falling since 2012 (CSO, 2016). High youth unemployment rates reflect the difficulties faced by young people in finding jobs after leaving full-time education. In most OECD countries unemployment among immigrant youth is higher than among native youth (OECD, 2012). In Ireland we observe a higher employment rate among young non-Irish nationals relative to Irish youth in 2014, and a lower unemployment rate in 2015, although these differences are not significantly different. While these differences are small, the pattern may be due to selective migration strategies. Young non-Irish people enter the Irish labour market if they have skills associated with good employment prospects, and consequently achieve comparable labour market outcomes with young Irish nationals. In turn, young Irish nationals may be more likely to emigrate if they have skills that are marketable abroad and as such are not as valued in the Irish labour force.

In the older age groups, the patterns are more conventional, with Irish nationals showing higher levels of employment and lower levels of unemployment. The contrast among those aged 45-64 years is stark: almost 20 per cent of non-nationals in this age group were unemployed in 2015, compared to less than 8 per cent of Irish nationals.

TABLE 2.3 Key Employment Indicators by Gender Q1 2014 and 2015

Gender	Nationality	Employment rate (%)		Unemployment rate (%)		Activity rate (%)		Total	
		2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015
Male	Irish	65.2	67.5	13.8	11.6	75.7	76.3	1,270.6	1,261.7
	Non-Irish	68.3*	68.5	16.4*	13.4*	81.7*	79.1*	225.5	225.0
Female	Irish	56.4	57.8	9.2	7.3	62.1	62.4	1,287.4	1,278.2
	Non-Irish	53.3*	52.0*	14.4*	12.7*	62.3	59.5*	230.3	239.7

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2014 and 2015 (15-64 years age group).

Note: * denotes that the indicator for the group is statistically significantly different from Irish nationals at $p \leq 0.05$.

Table 2.3 presents the key employment indicators by gender and nationality. The employment rate was higher among non-Irish males than among Irish males in both years, but with an increase in the Irish employment rate, and virtually none in the non-Irish, the employment gap between the two groups narrowed. However, the highest unemployment rate occurred among non-Irish males; 16.4 per cent in 2014, falling to 13.4 per cent in 2015; this compares to 11.6 per cent among Irish men in 2015. The activity rate was also higher among non-Irish males, although this fell between 2014 and 2015.

Non-Irish females had a marginally higher activity rate (62.3 per cent) than Irish females (62.1 per cent) in 2014. However, the decline in activity rates meant that activity rates of non-Irish women fell below that of Irish nationals in 2015. Employment rates of non-Irish females were lower than those of Irish females, markedly so in 2015 (52 per cent versus 57.8 per cent). Unemployment rates were substantially higher among non-Irish than Irish women (12.7 per cent versus 7.3 per cent in 2015). The relatively low unemployment rate among Irish women may reflect their concentration in relatively sheltered areas of employment, including the public sector, although it must also be viewed in the light of their relatively low activity rates.

2.2 SELF-EMPLOYMENT

In some countries, self-employment represents an important source of employment for immigrants, partly perhaps because it affords access to employment in a manner less susceptible to discrimination and other barriers than might the case in dependent forms of employment. However, this does not appear to be the case in Ireland. In general, the level of self-employment is lower among foreign nationals in Ireland than among comparable groups in other OECD countries. This may be due to the stringent immigration requirements faced by migrant entrepreneurs wishing to move to Ireland or to barriers to migrant self-employment such as language barriers, access to local business networks, and difficulties in accessing finance and lack of previous financial history in the

country. All of these may be related to the relatively recent nature of Irish migration, and lack of established ethnic networks. In an effort to stimulate investment and self-employment among immigrants to Ireland, the Immigrant Investor Programme was established by the Irish Government in 2012. This Programme provides a mechanism by which non-EEA nationals and their families who commit to an approved investment in Ireland, may acquire residency status in Ireland.

TABLE 2.4 Self-employment Rates by National Group Q1 2014 and 2015

Nationality	Self-employment Rate Overall (%)		Self-employment Rate Excluding Agriculture (%)	
	2014	2015	2014	2015
Irish	16.5	16.0	13.4	13.0
Irish-born Irish	16.6	16.1	13.3	12.9
Foreign-born Irish	15.9	15.1	15.0	14.7
Non-Irish	9.5*	9.9*	9.4*	9.8*
UK	18.6	17.9	17.8	17.9*
EU15-2	12.3	9.0*	11.3	8.6
EU12	5.7*	6.6*	5.9*	6.7*
Non-EU	9.3*	10.6*	9.2*	10.2
All	15.5	15.1	12.8	12.5

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2014 and 2015 (15-64 years age group).

Note: * denotes that the indicator for the group is statistically significantly different from Irish nationals at $p \leq 0.05$.

The self-employment rate of Irish nationals (16 per cent) was substantially higher in 2015 than that of non-Irish nationals (9.9 per cent) in general. However between 2014 and 2015 the self-employment rate decreased slightly among Irish nationals (-0.5 per cent) while it increased for non-Irish nationals (+0.4 per cent), thus narrowing this gap. The gap, although still significantly different, is smaller in the non-agricultural sector which may be a reflection of the inheritance tradition in Irish farm self-employment. The self-employment rate among foreign-born Irish at 15.1 per cent in 2015 was almost as high as that among Irish-born Irish (16.1 per cent), and well ahead of the non-Irish rate (9.9 per cent).

Notwithstanding the overall difference between Irish and non-Irish nationals, UK nationals showed the highest rate of self-employment; 17.9 per cent overall in 2015, somewhat higher than the native Irish rates of self-employment. Nationals of the 'pre-EU-enlargement' (EU15-2) states also show relatively high rates of self-employment, although the rate declined from 12.3 per cent in 2014 to 9 per cent in 2015. This may reflect a pattern in which longer-established immigrants have gradually overcome barriers to entrepreneurial activity in Ireland, although this is clearly an issue that merits further research. Nationals of the post-enlargement EU12 states, as well as those from outside the EU, show much lower

rates of self-employment, although the non-EU rate increased between 2014 and 2015.

For the purpose of comparison, Table 2.5 shows employment, unemployment and activity rates for Ireland, the UK, where labour market conditions are similar to Ireland, and average rates for the EU28 countries in 2015. These are broken down by country of birth so that rates are shown for those born outside the EU, outside the reporting country and natives of the reporting country. The employment rate in Ireland is lower than the European average, reflecting the lingering effects of the economic crisis here. In this context, it is not surprising that the employment rate among Irish nationals resident in Ireland (63 per cent in 2015) is lower than the average corresponding rates for nationals of the EU countries (66 per cent). The Irish national employment rate is substantially lower than the rate of 73 per cent in respect of UK nationals resident in the UK. However, the employment rate of all foreign-born residents in Ireland, at just less than 63 per cent, is equal to the average rates of foreign-born residents elsewhere in the EU. These average employment rates fall well below the employment rate of over 70 per cent among foreign-born residents in the UK. Employment rates of residents from non-EU countries of birth are lower than the average for all foreign-born residents throughout Europe, including Ireland, where the employment rate is comparable to the European average.

TABLE 2.5 Comparative Employment, Unemployment and Activity Rates for Ireland, UK and EU 2015

Country of birth	Reporting country	Employment rate %	Unemployment rate %	Activity rate %
Reporting country	Ireland	63.4	9.1	69.8
	United Kingdom	73.2	5.2	77.3
	EU28 average	66.0	8.9	72.5
Foreign born country of birth	Ireland	62.6	11.4	70.7
	United Kingdom	70.5	6.4	75.4
	EU28 average	62.7	13.9	72.9
Non-EU country of birth	Ireland	56.4	12.2	64.2
	United Kingdom	65.5	7.6	70.9
	EU28 average	57.6	18.0	70.3

Source: Eurostat. Last updated on 08.09.16; Employment, unemployment and activity rates by sex, age and country of birth (%) [lfsa_ergacob], [lfsa_urgacob], [lfsa_argacob].

Note: 'Reporting country' refers to the country or countries for which figures are shown; this has been broken down by 'Country of birth' which refers to the country in which residents of the reporting country were born (for example whether they were born in the reporting country or foreign-born and if foreign-born whether their country of birth was outside the EU).

In general, unemployment rates are higher among non-nationals than natives. Ireland follows this pattern: the average unemployment rate among all foreign-born residents in Ireland in 2015 is 11 per cent, compared to 9 per cent among natives. However, the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives is

lower in Ireland and the UK than is found, on average, in the EU. The unemployment rate among non-EU immigrants is higher than the average for all foreign born, and among this group the unemployment rate in Ireland, at 12 per cent in 2015, is substantially lower than the EU average of 18 per cent, although substantially higher than the rate in the UK.

The activity rate reflects patterns of both employment and unemployment. The activity rate of Irish natives, at 70 per cent, is almost 3 percentage points lower than the corresponding EU average and 7 percentage points lower than that for natives in the UK. However, overall activity rates of immigrants in Ireland (71 per cent) are somewhat higher than among Irish natives, while activity rates among immigrants are comparable with natives, on average, across the EU, and lower than natives in the UK. The lowest activity rates are to be found among immigrants from non-EU countries: just 64 per cent in Ireland, compared to over 70 per cent on average in the EU and in the UK.

2.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Ireland is emerging from a deep and prolonged recession, which entailed a sharp contraction in employment and a dramatic rise in unemployment. Previous monitors showed that non-Irish nationals were hit harder by the recession than Irish nationals. The contraction in employment was much greater among non-Irish nationals, while the growth in unemployment was substantially greater.

In assessing the extent to which emigrants have shared in that recovery, it is instructive to compare the recent trends discussed above with those reported by McGinnity et al. (2013) in respect of 2012, during the depths of the recession. The evidence is mixed. Most of the gains in the employment rate have accrued to Irish nationals; for this group the employment rate increased from 58.2 per cent of the population in 2012 to 62.6 per cent in 2015, a gain of 3.6 percentage points. Among non-Irish nationals, the employment rate increased from 58.9 per cent in 2012 to 60 per cent in 2015, a gain of just over 1 percentage point. Africans have very low employment rates, around 40 per cent, and this pattern has persisted throughout the recession and the recovery. Part of this may be due to discrimination.²³ Part may also be due to compositional effects; African women have particularly low employment rates and combine relatively large numbers of children with low average levels of educational attainment, with the result that many may be unable to earn enough to meet high childcare costs. However, it

²³ McGinnity et al. (2009) tested discrimination in recruitment against different national groups using a field experiment. They found that African, Asian and European (German) applicants needed to apply for twice as many jobs as Irish applicants to get called to interview.

should also be recognised that many Africans have historically spent extended periods excluded from the labour market as asylum seekers in the direct provision system, with potential negative long-term impacts on their employment prospects.

Unemployment decreased for both Irish and non-Irish nationals between 2012 and 2015: the unemployment rate of Irish nationals decreased from 14.7 per cent in 2012 to 9.6 per cent in 2015. Over the same period, the unemployment rate among non-Irish nationals fell from 18.5 per cent in 2012 to 13.1 per cent in 2015, and as a result, the gap between the unemployment rates of Irish and non-Irish nationals has narrowed marginally, standing at 3½ percentage points in 2015. African nationals reported the highest unemployment rate (over 30 per cent in 2014), and other groups with elevated unemployment rates – in excess of 15 per cent in 2015 – include nationals of the UK, Asia, and the Rest of Europe and the Rest of the World.

This Monitor introduces a distinction between Irish-born and foreign-born Irish for the first time in order to take account of the growing number of people who have acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation in recent years, although this group also includes the foreign-born children of Irish emigrants currently resident in Ireland, so it is a very diverse group. In 2015 foreign-born Irish nationals had lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than Irish-born Irish nationals, but higher employment and lower unemployment rates than non-Irish nationals.

Employment rates of immigrants in Ireland are comparable with EU average rates, although they fall well below employment rates of immigrants in the UK, which reflects the higher overall employment rate in the UK. Unemployment is higher among immigrants than among natives in Ireland as elsewhere in Europe, although the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives is less pronounced in Ireland than the European average.

Box 2.1 Access to Employment

All nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) may migrate to Ireland to take up employment without restriction. McGinnity et al., 2014 outline the different means of access to employment applicable to non-EEA nationals. Labour migration policy is developed and administered by the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation in co-operation with the Department of Justice and Equality. Most newly arrived non-EEA workers hold a Stamp 1 registration certificate and an employment permit. Changes to the employment permit system were introduced in October 2014 by the *Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014*. It established nine different types of employment permit and changed the criteria for issuing those permits. This may account for the 42 per cent increase in work permits issued to non-EEA nationals from 2013 to 2015 (5,495 to 3,863). The nine main types of employment permit are: critical skills employment permit holders; general employment permit holders; dependant/partner/spousal employment permit holders; intra-company transferees; contract for services employment permit holders; reactivation employment permit holders; internship employment

permit holders; sport and cultural employment permit holders; and exchange agreement employment permit holders.

The Critical Skills Employment Permit replaces the previous Green Card Permit and is designed to attract highly skilled persons to the Irish labour market for occupations deemed critically important to the Irish economy or which are experiencing skills shortages, including ICT professionals, professional engineers and technologists. Critical Skills permits are issued to non-EEA workers earning a minimum of €60,000 per year. Additionally, a restricted number of permits to workers earning a minimum of €30,000 per year will be issued.

General Employment Permits are available for occupations with an annual salary of €30,000 or more and for a restricted number of occupations with salaries below €27,000. The permit is granted for two years initially, and then for a further three years. A labour market needs test is required with all work permit applications. Holders of work permits must have been in employment for at least 12 months before applying for family reunification and must satisfy certain income conditions.

Dependant/Partner/Spousal Employment Permits are issued to the spouses/partners/dependants of holders of critical skills and general work permits and Researchers.²⁴

In general, holders of employment permits may only change employers after 12 months and must apply for a new permit to do so.

Intra-Company Transfer Employment Permits facilitate the transfer of senior management, key personnel (with an annual salary of €40,000 per year) or trainees (with an annual salary of €30,000) who are non-EEA nationals from an overseas branch of a multinational corporation to its Irish branch.

Contract for Services Employment Permits facilitate the transfer of non-EEA employees to work on a contract to provide services to an Irish entity on a contract for service basis.

Reactivation Employment Permits apply to non-EEA nationals who entered the State on a valid employment permit but who fell out of the system through no fault of their own and/or who has been badly treated or exploited in the work place, to work legally again.

Internship Employment Permits facilitates the employment of non-EEA nationals in the State who are full-time students enrolled in third-level institutions outside the State, for the purpose of gaining work experience.

Sport and Cultural Employment Permits facilitate the employment of non-EEA nationals with the relevant skills, experience or knowledge for the development, operation and capacity of sporting and cultural activities.

Exchange Agreements Employment Permits facilitate the employment of non-EEA nationals under international reciprocal agreements, such as the Fulbright Programme for Researchers and Academics.

In response to recent economic growth, more labour shortages were identified in 2014 compared to recent years. Reforms were brought in by the *Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014* in part to address these shortages. As a result, 7,253 work permits were issued, an increase of 88 per cent compared to 2013. Holders of employment permits still account for a very small proportion of migrant workers in Ireland. This figure represented just 2.4 per cent of total employment of non-Irish nationals (an increase from 1.4 per cent in 2013) and 0.4 per cent of total employment in Q4 2015 (an increase from 0.2 per cent in 2013) (CSO, QNHS 2015). In December 2015 there were 17,947 'live' residence permissions held for work-related reasons by non-EEA nationals²⁵ aged 16 and over (Eurostat). This represented 16 per cent of 'live' immigration permissions held by non-EEA nationals at that time.

Self-employment

Prior to March 2016, non-EEA nationals who wished to be self-employed in Ireland could apply for a Business Permission. This has been suspended pending review.²⁶ An Immigrant Investor Programme was introduced in 2012 and facilitates non-EEA nationals and their families who commit to an approved investment in Ireland.²⁷ Also in 2012, the Start-Up Entrepreneur Programme was introduced for 'high-potential start-ups'. The capital

²⁴ Under the 'Scheme for admission of third-country researchers to Ireland'. See www.djei.ie.

²⁵ It is not possible to estimate the size of these groups for EEA nationals.

²⁶ www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/WP09000013.

²⁷ Investment terms range from a minimum investment of €450,000 to €2 million, See: www.inis.gov.ie/en/inis/pages/new%20programmes%20for%20investors%20and%20entrepreneurs.

requirement is €50,000 and has no initial job creation targets.

Student Probationary Extension (SPE)

In 2011, the Student Probationary Extension (SPE) allowed students who had been continuously residing in Ireland since 2004 transition to the new immigration regime (see previous Monitors for more detailed information). They were permitted to register for a two-year probationary period at the end of which they were eligible to apply for Stamp 4 permission to reside in the State, which enabled them to access the labour market. Applications for Stamp 4 permission on the basis of the SPE were processed during 2014 and 2015 (Sheridan and Whelan, 2016).²⁸


Support with accessing employment

Several support organisations may be accessed by migrants in Ireland, including Intreo a service of the DSP, which provides employment and income supports (formerly FÁS); the Local Employment Service; and the EPIC programme in Business in the Community Ireland. Each may be accessed by EU citizens and non-EEA citizens with Stamp 4 residence permission.

Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) has a range of responsibilities, including facilitating the recognition of qualifications gained outside the State. An online international qualifications database is maintained, which lists certain foreign qualifications and provides advice regarding the comparability of a qualification to one gained in Ireland. Individuals whose qualifications are not listed in the database may apply to the qualifications recognition service, part of Quality and Qualifications Ireland, to have their qualification recognised.²⁹

Chapter 2 Appendix

FIGURE A2.1 Proportion of Irish Nationals by their Country of Birth, Q1 2010 - Q1 2015



Source: Own calculations from QNHS microdata Q1 2010-Q1 2015.

²⁸ Immigration Act 2004 (Student Probationary Extension) (Giving of Permission) (Fee) Regulations 2015 (S.I. No. 133 of 2015).

²⁹ www.qqi.ie.

Chapter 3

Education and Integration

By Oona Kenny, Merike Darmody and Emer Smyth

Education is a key factor in the integration process for immigrant adults and children as it can play a significant role in improving economic and social outcomes. Higher levels of education are related to higher employment rates and labour market earnings. For example, in Ireland 81 per cent of 25-64 year old adults with a bachelor's degree are employed compared to 55 per cent of those with upper secondary education only. In addition, those educated to degree level earn more than twice the income of those with upper secondary education (OECD, 2015a). In general across OECD countries, higher educational attainment is also found to be linked to better physical health, improved socio-emotional wellbeing and higher levels of active citizenship (OECD, 2015a; OECD 2015b).

A recent OECD report highlights the importance of the education system in fostering the effective integration of immigrants as follows;

The way in which education systems respond to migration has an enormous impact both on whether or not immigrants are successfully integrated into their host communities and on the economic and social wellbeing of all members of the communities they serve, whether they have an immigrant background or not (OECD, 2015c).

Ireland differs somewhat from other European countries as the number of second generation immigrants, that is, the children of immigrants born in Ireland, is significantly lower. The relatively recent nature of migration into Ireland means that most non-Irish nationals are first generation immigrants having arrived here as adults. This has important consequences for any assessment of educational outcomes as it implies that the majority of migrants will have completed their education in their country of origin. Section 3.1 of this chapter focuses on the educational outcomes of adults comparing these for both the Irish and non-Irish population. The outcomes for immigrant children who have received (at least some of) their education through the Irish educational system are examined in Section 3.2. Details of policy, and in particular changes in policy since the previous Integration Monitor regarding access and supports to education for migrant adults and children, are discussed in Box 3.1 which concludes this chapter.

3.1 EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR ADULTS IN IRELAND

3.1.1 *Highest Educational Attainment*

Table 3.1 presents the highest educational attainment by nationality for the working population (those aged 15-64 years) using data from QNHS, Q1 2014 and Q1 2015. Comparison is based on groups of Irish and non-Irish respondents and where numbers allow, the non-EU group is broken into smaller national groups as in Chapter 2. Educational attainment is shown across four levels: no formal to lower secondary (Junior Certificate), upper secondary (Leaving Certificate), post-Leaving Certificate and third level. There are two considerations to bear in mind when comparing third-level attainment between groups of Irish and non-Irish nationals. Firstly, as discussed in earlier chapters, immigrants in Ireland have a younger age profile. Secondly, there is an age gradient in educational attainment in Ireland which favours younger cohorts while older Irish people generally have lower levels of education.

Table 3.1 shows that non-Irish nationals are significantly more likely to have higher levels of education compared to Irish nationals; the extent to which this reflects the younger age profile of migrants is analysed in Figure 3.1. For example, a significantly larger proportion of non-Irish nationals have third-level qualifications (47.5 per cent in 2015) compared to Irish nationals (35.2 per cent in 2015) and in both years more non-Irish nationals were educated to upper secondary level. The trend reverses when low educational attainment is considered; here, more than twice the proportion of Irish nationals have no formal to lower secondary education (27.8 per cent) when compared to non-Irish nationals (13.4 per cent).

There is more complexity when national group differences are explored. EU12 nationals have lower levels of third-level education compared to Irish nationals and other groups, but have the highest rates of post-Leaving Certificate qualifications. As noted in previous years, this is likely to be related to a greater emphasis on vocational qualifications within the educational system in some EU12 countries. The proportion of African nationals with third-level education is also low relative to other non-Irish immigrants.

EU15-2 nationals on the other hand, along with non-EU nationals, are the most highly educated. For example, in both years more than two-thirds of immigrants from EU15-2, North America, Australia and Oceania hold third-level qualifications, as do more than half of those from Asia and the Rest of the World. These findings may be the result of a strong proactive link between Irish economic migration policies and measures that address labour market shortages; for example, Gusciute et al. (2015) found significant improvements in the linking

of Ireland's employment permit system to information on labour shortages and surpluses. These measures mean that many non-EU immigrants working in Ireland are highly qualified; indeed Behan et al. (2015) report that 69 per cent of the total new employment permits issued in 2014 were to professionals.

TABLE 3.1 Highest Education Attainment by Nationality Q1 2014 and Q1 2015

	No formal to lower secondary (%)		Upper secondary (%)		Post-leaving certificate (%)		Third Level (%)		Total population (000s)	
	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015	2014	2015
Irish	27.8	27.4	26.2	25.4	12.5	12.0	33.4	35.2	2,507.3	2,498.5
Non-Irish	13.4*	12.7*	30.5*	29.2*	12.5	10.5*	43.6*	47.5*	405.4	415.4
<i>Of which:</i>										
UK	19.3*	20.3*	22.9	21.6	12.9	10.8	44.8*	47.4*	77.9	81.5
EU15-2	5.9*	6.1*	18.3*	22.2	6.5*	4.4*	69.3*	67.3*	31.7	23.0
EU12	13.0*	12.9*	37.6*	37.7*	17.4*	14.8*	32.0	34.6	160.4	160.4
Africa	20.7*	16.6*	33.6	33.7	15.1	11.5	30.6	38.2	29.8	25.8
North America, Australia, Oceania	~	8.3*	~	14.8*	~	6.1*	69.3*	70.8*	14.0	18.3
Asia	12.4*	9.4*	23.9	19.2*	5.6*	5.3*	58.2*	66.2*	47.9	55.5
Rest of Europe and Rest of the World	8.9*	6.6*	33.5*	31.9*	7.3*	6.3*	50.3*	55.2*	43.7	50.9
All	25.8	25.3	26.8	25.9	12.5	11.8	34.9	36.9	2,912.8	2,913.9

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2014 and Q1 2015 (15-64 year age group).


Notes: Proportions exclude 'other/not stated' which is negligible for the Irish nationals but higher for non-Irish Nationals. 'Third level' includes non-honours degrees and honours degrees or above; *denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different from Irish nationals at $p \leq 0.05$. ~Denotes that estimates are deemed too small for publication due to reliability concerns.

In Figure 3.1 the focus is narrowed to the proportion of 25- to 34-year-olds who report having third-level education. This eliminates some of the problems caused by comparing a relatively young immigrant population with the older Irish working-age population. The non-EU categories have been combined here due to small numbers within groups.

Overall in 2014, almost the same proportion of Irish nationals (49.8 per cent) and non-Irish nationals (48.3 per cent) aged 25 to 34 years had completed tertiary education. While this is the first year that the proportion of Irish nationals with third-level education was higher than that for non-Irish nationals, the difference is not statistically significant. In 2015, a slightly lower proportion of 25 to 34 year old Irish nationals (50.8 per cent) completed tertiary education compared with non-Irish immigrants of the same age (55.0 per cent). This is more consistent with findings from previous Integration Monitors and represents a statistically significant difference.

Again there is considerable variation between groups within the non-Irish category. Following a pattern similar to that found in previous years, young EU15-2 nationals report the highest level of tertiary education (71.8 per cent in 2015) while young EU12 nationals have the lowest proportion of third-level education (40.3 per cent in 2015).

FIGURE 3.1 Share of 25-34 Year Age Group with Tertiary Education, Q1 2014 and Q1 2015



Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2014 and Q1 2015 (25-34 year age group).

Notes: Proportions exclude 'other/not stated' which is negligible for the Irish nationals but higher for non-Irish Nationals. Data are not shown for the UK group in 2014 due to small unweighted cell sizes. The Irish nationals group is significantly different ($p \leq 0.05$) from the non-Irish national group in 2015 but not 2014. Differences are significant ($p \leq 0.05$) between Irish nationals and all sub-categories of the non-Irish groups except for the UK in both years.

3.1.2 Early School Leavers among Adult Immigrants

Rates of early school leaving in Ireland have been declining since the early 2000s. The latest data show that 89.4 per cent of 20- to 24-year-olds are currently educated to Leaving Certificate or equivalent level compared with 82.6 per cent in 2000 (DES, 2015). Irish rates of early school leaving are now lower than the EU27 average (DES, 2015). However, the disparity in unemployment risk between early school leavers and those with higher educational attainment is greater in Ireland compared to many other OECD countries (OECD, 2015a). Alongside the disadvantages early school leavers face in the labour market such as unemployment and lower job quality and pay levels (Smyth and McCoy, 2009), they are more likely to experience poorer social outcomes including lone parenthood, imprisonment (Smyth and McCoy, 2009) and poorer health (Layte et al., 2007).

Increasing levels of educational attainment and falling numbers of early school leavers, as described above, have resulted in substantially reduced numbers of both Irish and non-Irish nationals within this group. In order to carry out an analysis of Irish and non-Irish early school leavers aged 20-24 years,³⁰ the data for Q1 2014 and Q1 2015 have been pooled (see Table 3.2). There is a very small but statistically insignificant difference between the proportion of Irish and non-Irish nationals who are early school leavers. There is a large difference between the EU12 and non-EU groups; however, some of this may be due to the way in which vocational courses are classified.³¹

TABLE 3.2 Share of Early School Leavers by Nationality Q1 2014 and Q1 2015 (pooled)

Nationality	Share of Early School Leaver at Lower Secondary Level %	Total Population (000s)
Irish	6.4	408.7
Non-Irish	5.7	64.9
Of which:		
UK	~	~
EU15-2	~	~
EU12	10.6	17.5
Non-EU	2.9*	33.8
Total	6.3	473.6

Source: Special analysis of the QNHS microdata for Q1 2014 and Q1 2015 Pooled (20-24 age group).

Notes: ~ Denotes that estimates are deemed too small for publication due to reliability concerns. * Denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different from Irish nationals at $p \leq 0.05$. These estimates are not directly comparable to those published in McGinnity et al., 2014 due to the pooling of data and the use of a different coding system.

A slight drop in the proportion of non-Irish early school leavers from 6.4 per cent to 5.1 per cent between the years 2014 and 2015³² could indicate that it is the less educated young migrants who are leaving Ireland following the economic recession while those with more qualifications have stayed or continue to immigrate. A lower proportion of early school leavers in the non-EU national group may be due to government policies aimed at addressing skills shortages in

³⁰ Although the recommended Zaragoza indicator is 18 to 24 years, previous Integration Monitors limited the analysis to the 20 to 24 year age group.

³¹ The Eurostat definition of early school leavers includes those aged 18-24 years recorded in the Labour Force Survey, whose highest level of education or training is 'lower secondary' based on ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) 2011 Levels 0-2. Prior to 2014 this classification was based on ISCED 1997 Level 0-3C short. Both the ISCED 2011 and ISCED 1997 include vocational courses which can be completed in not more than two years. This definition can lead to problems in the correct measurement of educational attainment as it is difficult to distinguish short and long vocational courses. The impact of this may be greater in some EU12 countries where vocational qualifications play a more significant role in the education system. In the previous Monitor (see McGinnity et al., 2013) an indicator of early school leavers was calculated which excluded those with short (less than two years) vocational courses which led to a substantial reduction in the gap between EU12 immigrants and others. This was not possible in this Monitor as short vocational courses are included in the Level 2 code under ISCED 2011, unlike ISCED 1997 where they were coded separately and therefore possible to exclude.

³² From QNHS data with periods Q1 2014 and Q1 2015 analysed separately (not shown).

particular labour market sectors. For example, the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation introduced a policy in April 2013 which sought to increase the number of employment permits in the ICT sector by 50 per cent and reduce their processing time. The efficiency of this policy is evidenced by Quinn and Guscuite's (2013) finding that almost half of employed non-EU nationals are working in high-skilled occupations.

As pointed out earlier, Ireland has a high proportion of first generation immigrants which means that while some will have attended secondary school in Ireland, most non-Irish nationals will have been educated or left school early in their country of origin.

3.2 IMMIGRANT CHILDREN IN IRISH SCHOOLS

The previous sections of the chapter have outlined differences in the educational qualifications of immigrant and Irish adults. In Ireland, even at the same qualification level, the grades received have a significant influence on life chances, determining access to higher education and to higher quality employment (Smyth and McCoy, 2009). However, information is not routinely collected on potential differences in exam performance between immigrant and Irish young people, though *Growing Up in Ireland* survey data gathered this year will provide the first systematic information on variation in Junior Certificate exam performance. In the absence of information on performance in State examinations (Junior and Leaving Certificate), data from cross-national and national standardised tests provide useful insights into the cognitive development of immigrant and Irish children (see, for example, McGinnity et al., 2014, which analyses performance in PISA tests). This section draws on National Assessment tests conducted with primary school children in 2014 to examine differences in reading and mathematics performance between immigrant and Irish children.³³ The recent publication of PISA 2015 results will facilitate further comparable analyses for those in second-level education.

National assessments of reading and mathematics have been conducted periodically in Irish primary schools since 1972. The most recent of these tests was carried out in May 2014 and involved 8,840 students in second and sixth class in 150 sampled primary schools. The tests were administered by class teachers under the supervision of inspectors from the Department of Education and Skills. In addition to the tests, sampled students and their parents completed

³³ The authors are very grateful to Gerry Shiel and Peter Archer of the Educational Research Centre for access to the report (Kavanagh et al., 2016) in advance of publication.

a questionnaire which captured their characteristics and experiences of learning within and outside school. The survey collected information on the place of birth of the student and the language(s) spoken at home. Children born outside Ireland made up 9.7 per cent of those in second class and 11.7 per cent of those in sixth class. Furthermore, a language other than English/Irish was the main language spoken at home in 9 per cent of the families of those in second class and 7 per cent of the families of those in sixth class.

Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show mean (average) reading scores by place of birth and main language spoken at home respectively. Reading scores are found to be significantly lower among children born outside Ireland than among those born in Ireland at both second and sixth class levels. The gap in performance is slightly lower among sixth class students (14 points compared with 19.3 for second class students) (Table 3.3). Children whose families mainly speak a language other than English/ Irish have significantly lower reading scores than those who speak mainly English, with a performance gap of 26-27 points at both second and sixth class levels (Table 3.4).

TABLE 3.3 Mean Reading Scores in Second and Sixth Class by Place of Birth, 2014 National Assessments

	Born in Ireland	Born elsewhere
Second class	266.2	246.9*
Sixth class	265.2	251.2*

Source: Kavanagh, Shiel, Gilleece, Kiniry (2016).

Note: * difference is significant at the $p < .05$ level.

TABLE 3.4 Mean Reading Scores in Second and Sixth Class by Language Spoken Most Frequently at Home, 2014 National Assessments

	English	Language other than English/ Irish
Second class	266.3	239.3*
Sixth class	265.2	239.7*

Source: Kavanagh, Shiel, Gilleece, Kiniry (2016).

Note: * difference is significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Turning to mathematics test scores, second class students born outside Ireland have significantly lower test scores than their Irish-born peers, with a gap of 13.8 points in performance. Sixth class students born outside Ireland have slightly lower maths scores than their peers but the gap is much smaller (2.1 points) and is no longer statistically significant (Table 3.5). Students who speak another language other than English/Irish at home are found to have lower scores in mathematics in both class groups but this difference is statistically significant only for second class students (Table 3.6). Without longitudinal data it is unclear whether this is due to immigrant students 'catching up', at least in mathematics,

or to compositional differences between immigrant groups. Previous monitors (see McGinnity et al., 2013) have reported evidence to suggest that non-English speaking immigrants in Ireland may benefit from spending more time in the educational system. This is based on data from OECD (2010) which show no significant differences in the reading scores between immigrant students who arrive in Ireland at age five or under, compared those who arrived between 6-12 years of age; however, the reading scores for those who arrived at age 12 or over were significantly lower.

TABLE 3.5 Mean Mathematics Scores in Second and Sixth Class by Place of Birth, 2014 National Assessments

	Born in Ireland	Born elsewhere
Second class	265.7	251.9*
Sixth class	262.3	260.2

Source: Kavanagh, Shiel, Gilleece, Kiniry (2016).

Note: * difference is significant at the $p < .05$ level.

TABLE 3.6 Mean Mathematics Scores in Second and Sixth Class by Language Spoken Most Frequently at Home, 2014 National Assessments

	English	Language other than English/ Irish
Second class	265.3	248.7*
Sixth class	265.2	239.7

Source: Kavanagh, Shiel, Gilleece, Kiniry (2016).

Note: * difference is significant at the $p < .05$ level.

In summary, the data indicate that immigrant children (defined in terms of place of birth and language spoken at home) have lower national assessment test results in the core skills of reading and mathematics at primary level. Differences are statistically significant for both reading and mathematics among second class students but are only significant for reading for sixth class students. Not surprisingly, the performance gap is greater in terms of language than place of birth, indicating the importance of language competency in shaping educational outcomes.

3.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Among the adult population, a higher proportion of non-Irish nationals have third-level qualifications compared to Irish nationals who are more likely to have no formal to lower secondary education. Within the non-Irish group there is much variation: as in previous monitors, immigrants from EU12 countries and Africa are among those with the lowest proportion of third-level qualifications while a high proportion of EU15-2 nationals and immigrants from North America,

Australia and Oceania, and Asia have tertiary education. However, as noted, a strong educational age gradient in Ireland means that older Irish nationals are in general less well qualified compared to their younger counterparts. In addition, non-Irish immigrants tend to be clustered within the younger age groups.

When the age range is restricted to 25- to 34-year-olds, we see these differences in educational attainment become less marked, so that in 2015 almost 51 per cent of Irish nationals in this age cohort hold third-level qualifications compared to 55 per cent of non-Irish nationals. This gap is steady over time, as indicated by previous monitors which show that the share of 25-34 year old non-Irish immigrants are consistently between 2 to 5 percentage points more likely to have tertiary education.

There is very little difference in the proportion of early school leavers among both Irish and non-Irish national groups. However, at least some of the relatively low proportion of non-Irish early school leavers may be attributed to differential migration patterns by educational level. While EU12 nationals appear to be the most disadvantaged educationally, care needs to be taken here as small numbers meant it was not possible to carry out a full analysis of early school leavers within the non-Irish group. Similarly, where the proportion of early school leavers is lowest among non-EU immigrants compared to others, there is a large mix of nationalities in this group, and much heterogeneity of educational level as seen in Table 3.1 for example.

It must be remembered that the majority of non-Irish nationals are first generation immigrants and will have completed their education outside Ireland; however, there is an increasing population of non-Irish immigrant children now in Irish schools. Results from the 2014 National Assessment tests show that mean reading scores are significantly lower among primary school children in second and sixth class who are born outside Ireland and, in particular, among those who speak a language other than English/Irish at home. The same pattern is found for mean mathematics scores although the gap between Irish and non-Irish nationals is slightly lower and only significant for children in sixth class. These findings do suggest monitoring of both spending on English language provision (see Box 3.1) and the effectiveness of such provision as one important element to facilitate the integration of migrant children in Irish schools.

Box 3.1 Access To Education*Access to Education*

The Irish education system is made up of primary, second-level, further and third-level education. State-funded education is available to Irish citizens at all levels and to non-Irish citizens at primary and secondary levels, or until aged 18. The situation of access to third-level education is different. Most undergraduate students attending publicly funded third-level courses do not have to pay tuition fees (but do pay registration fees). Since September 2014, an Irish, EU, EEA or Swiss student who has spent at least five years in primary school or second-level school in Ireland can avail of EU fee rates. To qualify for 'free fees', a student must have been living in an EEA³⁴ Member State or Switzerland for at least three of the five years before starting the course. The student must also fulfil one of the following six criteria as regards nationality and immigration status in Ireland: be a citizen of EEA Member State or Switzerland; or have an official refugee status; or be a family member of a refugee and have been granted permission to live in Ireland; or be a family member of an EU national with permission to stay in the state with residence Stamp 4EUFAM; or have been granted humanitarian leave to stay in the country; or been granted permission to remain in the State by the Minister for Justice and Equality, following a determination by the Minister not to make a deportation order under Section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999. Non-EU fees vary between colleges. As English is the language of instruction in Irish higher education institutions,³⁵ many look for an English language proficiency test (TOEFL or equivalent). In 2015 a Pilot Scheme was introduced to enable school-leavers who have been in the protection system for more than five years and meet special criteria to apply for student supports. In June 2016 Minister Bruton announced the continuation of the Scheme.³⁶

Previous monitors have summarised the situation regarding ownership, patronage and funding of Irish primary and post-primary schools (see McGinnity et al., 2014; 2013; 2012). School patronage is relevant to migrant students, many of whom are not from a Catholic background, given the dominance of the Catholic Church in school patronage in Ireland. In 2011 a Forum was set up to explore issues regarding school patronage. The report that followed (see Coolahan et al., 2012) initiated a consultation process on support for religious and cultural diversity in primary schools. The report also pointed to the potential for the divestment of Catholic schools to other patron bodies in areas with several Catholic schools; progress to date has been slow with only two schools divested.³⁷ Previous studies have highlighted difficulties in gaining access to schools for some migrant families because of the use of waiting lists and policies favouring children within older siblings in the school (see Smyth et al., 2009). In July 2016 Minister Bruton introduced the Education (Admission to Schools) Bill to the Oireachtas following approval by Government. The Programme for Government targets enactment of this legislation before September 2017. This legislation aims at ensuring that the enrolment process in all primary and post-primary schools is inclusive, transparent and fair.

Supports for Immigrants in Schools

In order to support immigrant children in Irish schools in September 2010 the *Intercultural Education Strategy 2010-2015 (IES)* was launched, addressing all levels of education (Department of Education and Skills, 2010). However, there has been a lack of systematic information on the implementation of this Strategy. In Intercultural Education Strategy 2010-2015 explicit reference is made for the need to promote and evaluate data gathering and monitoring 'so that policy and decision making is evidence based' (Department of Education and Skills, 2010). The monitoring of the implementation of the IES was impacted by the austerity measures due to the economic downturn. The Integration Unit within the DES was disbanded and staff re-

³⁴ The members of the EEA (the European Economic Area) are the Member States of the EU, along with Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.

³⁵ Some courses operate through the medium of Irish: BA in Business and Gaeilge or a BA in Journalism and Gaeilge with FIONTAR DCU. FIONTAR operates completely through Irish.

³⁶ See: www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2016-Press-Releases/PR2016-03-05.html.

³⁷ In answer to Parliamentary Questions on 14 July 2015 the then Minister for Education and Skills, Deputy Jan O'Sullivan stated that there were two cases of actual changes of patronage for existing schools (both from the Church of Ireland) one of which was divested to Educate Together (the second passed from the Earl of Dunraven, following his death to Countess of Dunraven and Mount Earl, Geraldine Dunraven). A further four schools commenced under the patronage of Educate Together up to that time with four more due to begin operating in the September; three under Educate Together patronage and one as a Gaelscoil operating under the patronage of An Foras Patrúnachta (PQ [29153/15] and [29154/15]).

assigned. A key support for migrant children in Irish schools is the provision of English language tuition delivered mainly through specialised 'English as an Additional Language' (EAL) teachers. Since the academic year 2012/13, assignment of teachers for special needs education and language support has been combined through the General Allocation Model (GAM) and is based on the total number of students in the school. Thus, it is no longer possible to monitor spending on English language tuition in schools. It is also a problem for monitoring the Intercultural Education Strategy, given that spending on EAL is a large part of the financial resources devoted to that strategy.

Additional language support hours have been provided in schools with a high concentration of students requiring English language support and this alleviation measure is continuing for the school year 2016/17. A survey of primary schools conducted for the National Assessment 2014 (Kavanagh et al., 2016) indicates that primary schools have an average of 2.4 officially sanctioned GAM/EAL posts with an average of 0.4 additional, officially sanctioned language support posts. Among the surveyed schools, 2.3 per cent of second class students and 2 per cent of sixth class students were in receipt of language support for English. The proportion in receipt of language support for English was higher in DEIS Urban Band 1 schools (5.3 per cent for second class and 6.5 per cent for sixth class). Other language supports include the distribution of language assessment kits to primary and post-primary schools, in-service provision for language support teachers, guidelines on EAL for all teachers, and a booklet on intercultural education in both primary and post-primary schools.

International Students

A number of initiatives were introduced targeting international students, with the aim of bringing them to Ireland. The share of residence permissions issued for education reasons increased from 29 per cent in 2012 (35,028) to 38 per cent in 2015 (43,540), perhaps in part reflecting the renewed focus on encouraging international students to study in Ireland.

In January 2015, the work concession for non-EEA students changed. Prior to 2015, students had been eligible to work 20 hours per week during term and 40 hours per week during holidays. However, due to variability of terms between colleges, the holiday periods were standardised to May, June, July and August and 15 December to 15 January.

In May 2015, the Interim List of Eligible Programmes (ILEP) was introduced to replace the former Internationalisation Register. The ILEP was introduced to tackle immigration abuses and to protect international students in light of the closure of a number of language schools, leaving students out-of-pocket and without the institutional affiliation required as per the terms of their residence permission.

English Language Provision for Adults

McGinnity et al., (2013) outline the several initiatives set up to provide English language support for adults including English Language Programmes for migrant workers, the unemployed and asylum seekers provided by the 16 Education and Training Boards (ETBs). Accreditation at NFQ Levels 4 and 5 and/or IELTS preparation may be offered in some ETB centres for a fee. The courses are funded by the Department of Education and Skills, although exact spending figures are not available. ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) classes are provided by ETBs nationally to meet the needs of learners who may be highly educated with professional and skilled backgrounds who are attending classes to learn English or improve their English. Solas' Further Education and Training Strategy 2014-2019³⁸ calls for the provision of clear policy for ESOL provision with priority to low-skilled and unemployed migrants. It also recommends assessing language competency level on entry of ESOL learners to ETB provision. ETBs also provide English language tuition under the Back to Education Initiative (BTEI). Other groups that provide educational supports for immigrant adults include the Fáilte Isteach project, SPIRASI³⁹ and Doras Luimní.⁴⁰

³⁸ See www.education.ie/en/Publications/Policy-Reports/Further-Education-and-Training-Strategy-2014-2019.pdf.

³⁹ See: <http://spirasi.ie/education>.

⁴⁰ See: <http://dorasluimni.org>.

Chapter 4

Social Inclusion and Integration

By Bertrand Maître and Helen Russell

This chapter examines social inclusion among the migrant population, using the Zaragoza indicators of income, poverty, material deprivation and home ownership (the Zaragoza indicators are described in Chapter 1 and Appendix 2). Social inclusion is broadly conceived as the ability of an individual to participate fully in society. Income and material resources are central to facilitating social inclusion, and below a certain level the lack of such resources will prevent participation in the normal way of life in society. The level at which such exclusion occurs has been the subject of much research and has been measured in a variety of ways. Here we adopt the measures of poverty and social exclusion developed as part of the Irish National Anti-Poverty Strategy⁴¹ and those used in EU poverty monitoring. Poverty risks are ameliorated by the market, the welfare state and the family. Migrants' access to market income through employment has been described in Chapter 2. The conditions surrounding access to income support, housing supports and healthcare through the welfare state are outlined in Box 4.1. Support from co-resident family members and regular inter-household support is captured in the income measures used here.⁴²

Health and housing are also fundamental to an individual's quality of life. Poor health influences the resources an individual needs to participate in the society, and can have a significant negative impact on labour market, educational and other outcomes. The housing measure in the Zaragoza indicators is home ownership. For migrants, home ownership is sometimes seen as a measure of investment in the receiving country, a longer term indicator of integration, as well as of economic capacity (Alba and Logan, 1992). However, home ownership is likely to be a better measure of social inclusion in countries with long-standing migrant populations than in Ireland where immigration has been relatively recent. Therefore in addition to housing tenure, the chapter examines indicators of housing quality and overcrowding.

⁴¹ See www.socialinclusion.ie/poverty.html.

⁴² Household income includes inter-household transfers received but transfers to other households e.g. remittances sent abroad, are not included.

There have been significant improvements in the economy and in the labour market since the publication of the last Integration Monitor, and as well as mapping the situation in 2014 (the latest period for which social inclusion data are available) this chapter considers whether there has been any change in circumstances of migrants between 2011 and 2014.

The results in this chapter are based on analysis of the 2014 Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).⁴³ The EU-SILC is the survey used to provide annual estimates of household income and poverty in Ireland by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). It is the only ongoing, nationally representative survey dataset that can be used to accurately estimate income, poverty and deprivation in Ireland. It is also harmonised across Europe, and is the main source of comparative data on these indicators in the EU. A disadvantage for analysing migrants' income and poverty is that, while very well designed to measure income and living conditions, the EU-SILC was not specifically designed to survey non-Irish nationals. The sample size of the migrant sample is 1,274 in 2014, but gets smaller when we disaggregate groups. The number of African and Asian migrants in the EU-SILC sample declined compared to 2011 and the sample numbers do not support further descriptive analysis of these groups, therefore these are grouped together with other non-EU nationals. For all the indicators we run statistical tests to be sure that the differences observed in the sample reflect differences in the population. The number of cases within groups is also indicated in each table. The distribution of migrants across nationality groups differs slightly from the QNHS sample used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the main difference is that EU-SILC has a lower proportion of non-EU nationals than the QNHS (see Table A4.1).

As in the previous chapters, nationality is used to identify migrants.⁴⁴ This means that those who were born outside Ireland but naturalised as Irish citizens are included in the Irish group. A high number of naturalisations have occurred since 2011, when the social inclusion of migrants was last measured in the Integration Monitor 2013: 94,811 in the period 2011 to 2015 (see Chapter 5 below). If those who were naturalised differ from those who were not then this may contribute to differences in social inclusion indicators overtime; this is known in research terms as a 'selection effect'. Previous research in Europe has shown that language proficiency, longer length of residency, marriage, employment, and higher socio-economic status all increase the probability of becoming naturalised (Vink et al., 2013). Features of the sending country and the institutions in the host country are also influential (*ibid.*, see also Chapter 5 this volume). In Ireland the fees for

⁴³ For a detailed description of the EU-SILC survey see CSO (2015). The 2015 wave microdata is due for release in late 2016.

⁴⁴ We use this definition to maintain consistency across chapters and comparability with early years of the Monitor.

naturalisation are also likely to be a disincentive for migrants with low incomes.⁴⁵ These findings suggest that more advantaged migrants will have been naturalised.

Section 4.1 describes in more detail how income, poverty and deprivation are measured and compares these indicators across nationality groups. Section 4.2 considers self-reported health, and Section 4.3 home ownership. The conclusion summarises and reflects on data needs in the area. Box 4.1 describes access to social services in Ireland, with a focus on whether provision differs for migrants.

4.1 INCOME AND POVERTY

4.1.1 Household Income

This chapter uses the same method as the CSO to measure income. The calculations are based on information on income recorded for each of the 12 months prior to the interview. This monthly information is combined to produce an annual income figure. The latest available EU-SILC data are from 2014 and the income figures refer to varying 12-month periods between 2013 and 2014, depending on the date of the interview. Firstly, all income received by each member of the household in the preceding 12 months is pooled. This includes income from all sources including employment, social transfers, and interest on savings. Tax and social insurance contributions are also summed to household level and subtracted from the gross household income to calculate the total disposable household income. This aggregated disposable household income is then assigned to each individual. Thus all members of the same household are treated as having the same standard of living.

All individuals in the household, including children and those over 65, are incorporated into the analysis. The median disposable income is then estimated, which is the midpoint of all the income observations in the sample, so that half of individuals or households have incomes below this level and half above.⁴⁶ Here we calculate the median income for Irish nationals, non-Irish nationals and then

⁴⁵ All applicants pay an initial €175 application fee, a further €950 naturalisation fee is payable by successful adult applicants and €200 in the case of children and widows/widowers of Irish citizens. Refugees are exempt from the payment of the naturalisation fee but there is no possibility to have the fee waived on the grounds of economic hardship (Becker and Cosgrave, 2014).

⁴⁶ The median income is not as sensitive to outliers (very high and very low incomes), which is why it is presented instead of the mean income.

by national group, according to the nationality reported by the individual.⁴⁷ All estimates are weighted to be representative of the population. The estimates for median disposable household income by nationality group, the first 'Zaragoza Indicator' in this Chapter, are presented in Table 4.1.

The median disposable household income does not take account of any variation in household needs. Households are composed of different numbers of adults and children that are dependent on the household income, so income is typically adjusted to account for this variation. This adjustment is called an equivalence scale. In this analysis the national equivalence scale used by the Central Statistics Office is adopted, which assigns a value of 1 for the first adult, 0.66 for any additional household members aged 14 and over and 0.33 for any children under 14.⁴⁸ The disposable household income is divided by the equivalence scale value to calculate the equivalised income for each individual. This is the standard CSO adjustment for measuring poverty in Ireland and has been adopted in the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) poverty measure.⁴⁹ Estimates of the median equivalised income for different national groups are presented alongside median disposable income in Table 4.1.

The median disposable household income in 2014 was €40,974 (Table 4.1). The median is considerably higher for Irish nationals €42,000 compared to non-Irish nationals at €35,700. In relative terms, the median income of non-Irish nationals was 85 per cent that of Irish Nationals, compared to 87 per cent in 2011 and 89 per cent in 2010 (Integration Monitor, 2013).⁵⁰ Between 2011 and 2014 the median disposable income increased marginally for Irish nationals (up from €41,696), while it decreased for non-Irish nationals (down from €36,437) (see Table A4.2). However, statistical tests show that the change over time is insignificant for both groups. These trend figures do not take into account changes in the composition of the two groups over time, such as an increase in the proportion of non-EU nationals who are students.

There is substantial variation in disposable median income within the non-Irish national group.⁵¹ The income of those from the EU15-2 countries does not differ

⁴⁷ Note that individuals in multinational houses will have the same income but be assigned a different national group in the table. An alternative would be to assign all individuals the nationality of the household head, but this would under-represent some nationalities in mixed nationality households.

⁴⁸ This is based on assumptions about economies of scale in larger households. Different equivalence scales have different assumptions about household needs.

⁴⁹ See www.socialinclusion.ie/poverty.html for further details.

⁵⁰ A t-test shows that the widening gap in median income between nationals and migrants over the period 2011 and 2014 is statistically significant.

⁵¹ EU15-2 refers to nationals of States that were members of the EU prior to 2004 (excluding Ireland and UK) and EU12 refers to nationals of States that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 (see Abbreviations for more details).

significantly from the Irish-national group. UK migrants have the lowest median income (€31,000) followed by the non-EU group (€34,000) and those from the EU12 (€37,000). The biggest deterioration in income since 2011 has occurred for the non-EU group: in 2011 the median income for this group was €47,000 and did not differ significantly from the income of the Irish population (see Table A4.2). Further analysis (not shown) found that the drop in median income was apparent in all nationality subgroups in the non-EU category (Asian, African and Rest of the World) and may be caused by differences in the composition over time (e.g. age, educational profile) or by a worsening of circumstances for non-EU migrants.

Note there are many reasons why the incomes of migrant households may differ from those of households headed by an Irish national. A key issue in terms of household income is how many adults in the household are working, but also, for those adults working, the quality of their jobs and the wages they earn. Previous research in Ireland has found lower wages among non-Irish nationals, even after controlling for characteristics like work experience and tenure (Barrett et al., 2016). Non-Irish nationals are also more likely to be found in low-paid sectors and occupations (Barrett and Duffy, 2008; Kingston et al., 2013).

TABLE 4.1 Yearly Household Income and Household Equivalised Income, 2014

	Disposable Household Income (Median) €		Equivalised (Needs Adjusted) Income (Median) €		No of Individuals in Each Group (Unweighted)
Irish	42,029		18,496		12,803
Non-Irish	35,679	*	15,584	*	1,274
Of which:					
UK	30,951	*	14,720	*	229
EU15-2	42,439	n.s	20,119	n.s	137
EU12	36,764	*	16,002	*	653
Non-EU	34,251	*	11,638	*	255
All	40,974		18,203		14,077

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2014, weighted.

Note: Equivalised income is income adjusted for the size and composition of the household, see text for further details. * is to signal that the group median is significantly different from the Irish median at $p \leq 0.05$; N.S. indicates that the difference is not statistically significant in this sample (using the non-parametric median test).

After adjusting for household size and composition, the median equivalised annual income is still significantly lower for non-Irish nationals (€15,600) than Irish nationals (€18,500). This represents a gap of 15.7 per cent, which is considerably wider than the gap of 6.6 per cent recorded for 2011 (McGinnity et al., 2013). This change over time is statistically significant and means that when households of a similar size and composition are compared, the non-Irish households have fallen further behind Irish households over the period.

The relative positioning of most of the nationality groups in income remains unchanged in 2014 compared to 2011 when household size and composition have been taken into account, with the exception of non-EU migrants, who replace UK nationals as the group with the lowest income. The result suggests that the non-EU groups have greater income needs due to larger household size or other household composition features.

4.1.2 Poverty Rates

Policies to monitor and reduce poverty in Ireland have adopted a number of different poverty indicators. The first is an income-based measure, which identifies those that fall below a certain income threshold. The threshold is established relative to the median income of households in society in order to capture the sense that the household falls significantly below what is the societal norm. The threshold used by the Irish government, and in EU poverty monitoring, is 60 per cent of median income: households below this poverty line are defined as being at risk of poverty.

In 2014, 16 per cent of Irish nationals were in households at risk of poverty but the figure rises to 21 per cent among non-Irish nationals. There is considerable variation among different nationality groups. Those from the EU12 actually have lower at risk of poverty rates than Irish nationals, while the EU15-2 group do not significantly differ from the Irish majority. In contrast, the percentage at risk of poverty among UK nationals is 23 per cent and the rate for non-EU nationals is 46 per cent, almost three times the rate of Irish nationals.

The at risk of poverty (ARP) rate for Irish nationals remained stable at 16 per cent between 2011 and 2014 (Integration Monitor, 2013 for 2011 poverty rate; for 2014 poverty rate see Table 4.2). In contrast, the rate for non-Irish nationals increased, from 15.5 per cent in 2011 to 21.1 per cent in 2014. The increase in the rate was particularly sharp for non-EU nationals, which rose from 18 per cent in 2011 to 46 per cent in 2014. The strong increase in the at risk of poverty (ARP) rate for the non-EU group is due, in part, to the increasing proportion of students in this group, as well as to an increased risk of poverty for those who were at work. First, while in 2011 and 2014 the percentage of non-EU nationals at work was quite similar (40 per cent and 37 per cent respectively), there was a large increase in the percentage of students, from 9 per cent to 23 per cent (this is also reflected in the large increase in residence permissions issued for education reasons, see Box 3.1). Overall in Ireland, students have lower levels of income than the general population and therefore have a greater at risk of poverty rate (CSO, 2015). The incidence of at risk of poverty figures among the non-EU

nationals shows that in 2011, students accounted for 14 per cent of the poor compared to 38 per cent in 2014.⁵² Over the same period there was an increase in the rate of in-work poverty for the non-EU nationals, which increased from 7 per cent in 2011 to 29 per cent in 2014 (compared to 6 per cent in 2014 for the Irish nationals).⁵³ Identifying the reasons behind the increase in in-work poverty is not possible given the small sample size.

Income levels alone, even when equivalised, do not fully capture the differences in needs between households that result in different standards of living (Whelan et al., 2003). Moreover, relative income poverty measures do not work well in periods of rapid economic change such as that experienced in Ireland over the last decade, due to fluctuations in the threshold (see Watson and Maître, 2012). Therefore, a non-income based measure of poverty was developed for the National Anti-Poverty Strategy. The 'deprivation index' consists of 11 basic items that are established as being part of the 'normal way of life of society'. The 11 items include adequate heating, clothing and food, as well as participation in family and social life. Households that experience an enforced absence of two or more of these items are considered to be deprived. Enforced absence exists only if the household lacks the item because they cannot afford it, not, for example, because they prefer not to have it. The deprivation and the at risk of poverty measure are combined to form the indicator of 'consistent poverty' which includes those who are both deprived and below the 60 per cent median income threshold.

Overall, 29 per cent of individuals were in households lacking at least two of the basic deprivation items in 2014, and there was no difference in this proportion among Irish and non-Irish nationals. However among deprived individuals the level of deprivation was significantly greater for non-Irish nationals, who lacked 4.3 items on average, compared to 3.9 items for Irish nationals. There was no significant difference in the rate of consistent poverty between Irish and non-Irish nationals, with 7.9 and 8.8 per cent defined as consistently poor respectively. Some differences do emerge when more detailed nationality categories are examined. UK nationals are found to have a higher level of deprivation (38 per cent) and a higher consistent poverty rate (16 per cent) compared to Irish nationals. UK nationals have lower employment rates than Irish nationals which may account for some of the higher poverty rate, in particular a high proportion of the sample is retired (24 per cent of adult UK nationals compared to 13 per cent of Irish nationals). Non-EU nationals also had a higher consistent poverty

⁵² Excluding students from the Non-EU nationals group reduces the at risk of poverty rate from 46 per cent to 37 per cent in 2014, which is still significantly higher than the rate for Irish nationals.

⁵³ In 2014, 24 per cent of Non-EU nationals at risk of poverty were at work, while it was 16 per cent in 2011.

rate (12 per cent) than Irish nationals, which was driven by their higher rates of income poverty.

Those from the EU15-2 had a lower level of deprivation than the native Irish group, but did not differ on the consistent poverty measure. The EU12 group had the same level of deprivation as Irish nationals, but when combined with their low level of income poverty, this resulted in a significantly *lower* consistent poverty rate (5.5 per cent).

TABLE 4.2 At Risk of Poverty, Deprivation and Consistent Poverty Rates, 2014

	At Risk of Poverty (under the 60 median poverty line) (%)		Deprivation (enforced lack of 2 or more items) (%)		Consistent Poverty (At Risk + Deprived) (%)		No of individuals (unweighted)
Irish	15.6		29.1		7.9		12,803
Non-Irish	21.1	*	28.5	n.s.	8.8	n.s.	1,274
Of which:							
UK	23.0	*	37.6	*	15.7	*	229
EU15-2	19.1	n.s.	20.9	*	7.5	n.s.	137
EU12	11.0	*	27.3	n.s.	5.5	*	653
Non-EU	45.8	*	27.8	n.s.	11.8	*	255
All	16.2		29.0		8.0		14,077

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2014, weighted.

Note: * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p \leq 0.05$. N.S. indicates that the difference is not statistically significant in this sample. See text for further details.


Comparing the poverty and deprivation rates to those in 2011 and applying statistical tests, we found that deprivation and consistent poverty increased significantly for Irish nationals, while the ARP was unchanged. For the non-Irish group as a whole, the ARP increased between 2011 and 2014 (15.5 per cent to 21.1 per cent) but deprivation and consistent poverty were stable. Among the national sub-groups we found:

- There was no change for UK nationals;
- For EU15-2 migrants there was a significant increase in the ARP (from 6 per cent to 19 per cent);
- Among EU12 migrants the deprivation rate declined significantly (from 34 per cent to 27 per cent);
- Among non-EU migrants ARP and consistent poverty increased significantly, but the change in deprivation was not significant.

These comparisons do not control for any changes in the composition of the migrant groups over time.

Finally, we situate the Irish findings of poverty and deprivation in a broader European context.⁵⁴ While the ARP rate for national citizens in Ireland (14.5 per cent) is just below the European average (15.4 per cent) the situation for non-Irish groups are quite different to the European norm. In Ireland the rate of income poverty for EU nationals (14.6 per cent) is the same as that for natives and is well below the EU average for EU nationals (24.3 per cent). In contrast, non-EU nationals in Ireland fare somewhat worse than across Europe on average (with an ARP rate of 39.8 per cent compared to an EU average of 37.8 per cent).

FIGURE 4.1 At Risk of Poverty Rates by Citizenship Group across the EU, 2014



Source: Eurostat database ilc_li31, based on EU-SILC. Adult population (18+) only. Citizenship is defined by nationality rather than place of birth.

Note: ARP means that household income is less than 60 per cent of median income within the country. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Turkey, Romania and Croatia are excluded due to lack of data.

4.2 HEALTH STATUS

In this section we compare the health status of Irish and non-Irish nationals, as this is an important element of quality of life (Watson et al., 2016). The analysis is based on a self-assessed measure of health status: 'How good is your health in general?' Five response categories are allowed ranging from very good to poor. This item corresponds to the Zaragoza indicator, which is the proportion of the population who perceive their health status as 'good' or 'very good'.

Self-assessments of health and illness status are widely used in health research and are found to be a good predictor of future mortality (Idler and Benyamini,

⁵⁴ Note that the Eurostat figures for Ireland are not identical to those we have calculated due to differences in measurement. For example, the Eurostat figures are for adults only.

1997) and healthcare usage (Burstrom and Fredlund, 2001). There may, however, be differences in how people of different nationalities assess their health due to cultural differences in response style, as is found in cross-national research (Zimmer at al., 2000; Jürges, 2007). The strength of such cultural differences may vary depending on how long migrants have lived in the host country.

TABLE 4.3 Self-Assessed Health Status by Nationality, 2014

	Very Good or Good health (%)		Mean Age (rounded)	No of individuals (16 and over)
Irish	81.7		46	9,533
Non-Irish	89.3	*	37	1,088
Of which:				
UK	81.0	n.s	49	225
EU15-2	98.4	*	40	115
EU12	90.1	*	34	544
Non-EU	90.9	*	33	204
All	82.6		45	10,621

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2014, percentages weighted; N unweighted.

Notes: * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p \leq 0.05$. # is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at $p \leq 0.1$. N.S. indicates that the difference is not statistically significant in this sample. See text for further details.

Self-reported health is found to be significantly higher among non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals: 89 per cent of non-Irish national report that their health is good or very good compared to 82 per cent of Irish nationals (see Table 4.3). Again there is much variation within the non-national group. UK nationals are distinctive in that their self-assessed health is the same as that of Irish nationals. Those in the EU15-2 group have exceptionally high self-assessed health: almost all of the group (98 per cent) report their health to be good or very good. These figures do not take into account important differences in the characteristics of immigrants compared to the native population which affect health status. The results in the previous chapter (Table 3.1) showed that a much higher proportion of non-Irish nationals were educated to degree level and that educational attainment was particularly high amongst EU15-2 nationals, and a number of non-EU groups (Asian, North America, Australia/Oceania). Health is also strongly related to age and non-Irish nationals are significantly younger on average than the native Irish population (37 years versus 46 years). When we hold relevant characteristics constant such as age, education, income level and gender, we find that only EU15-2 Nationals have significantly higher self-reported health than Irish Nationals (see Table A4.3).

Previous studies have found a 'healthy immigrant effect', whereby the health status of immigrants is better than comparable native-born individuals (Domnich et al., 2012; Nolan, 2012). However, it is unclear why this effect is only observed

here for the EU15-2. Explanations for the healthy immigrant effect include processes of self-selection, under-reporting of health problems, and 'cultural buffering' due to healthier lifestyles in the country of origin.

4.3 HOUSING TENURE AND CONDITIONS

The share of migrants owning their own home is another Zaragoza indicator of migrant integration. In the years of the economic boom and property bubble, house prices in Ireland rose rapidly and mortgage borrowing grew to unprecedented levels. In 2008, the domestic property market collapsed resulting in substantial falls in house prices, the highest level of mortgage arrears across Europe (Maître et al., 2014) and high levels of negative equity (Duffy and O'Hanlon, 2014). There was a peak to trough decline in house prices nationally of over 50 per cent, with prices in Dublin falling by over 57 per cent (Duffy, 2015). Stricter controls on mortgage lending alongside falling income and high levels of unemployment meant new mortgages remained low despite the large reduction in prices (Duffy and O'Hanlon, 2014). House prices nationally have been increasing since early 2013, with the largest rises occurring in the cities and commuter counties (Morgenroth, 2016). At the same time, rental prices in Dublin have been rising since 2011, with particularly sharp increases recorded in 2014 and 2015 (RTB/ESRI, 2016). Outside Dublin, rental prices began to rise in 2014 and accelerated in 2015. Given the concentration of migrants in the private rented sector, these rental increases are likely to have an impact on standard of living.

Due to the boom and bust context, levels of home ownership are therefore likely to diverge for different cohorts. This cohort effect operates alongside life-cycle effects, whereby home ownership is higher among older age groups and those who have formed families.

In the analysis of home ownership the nationality of the household reference person is used for the whole household. The figures in Table 4.4 show that 77 per cent of Irish nationals are home owners compared to only 25 per cent of non-Irish nationals. These proportions are very similar to those in 2011 reported in the previous Integration Monitor. The home ownership patterns of UK nationals are closer to those of Irish nationals, in that 66 per cent of the group own their home. Nevertheless the gap in ownership between UK and Irish nationals is statistically significant. Ownership rates are particularly low among the EU12 group (7 per cent) and the non-EU group (18 per cent). Over a third of EU15-2 nationals own their own home.

TABLE 4.4 Housing Tenure by Nationality,[‡] 2014

Nationality	Home Owners (%)	Private rented	LA Rented	No of households (unweighted)	Sig. (chi Sq)
Irish	77.0	11.8	11.2	4,847	
Non-Irish	24.8	69.8	5.4	509	*
Of which:					
UK	65.6	25.5	8.9	122	*
EU15-2	36.8	60.1	3.1	67	*
EU12	7.3	89.0	3.7	250	*
Non-EU	18.0	73.2	8.8	70	*
All	71.5	18.0	10.6	5,356	

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2014, percentages weighted; N unweighted. A small number of households living rent-free have been excluded from the analysis.

Note: [‡] The questions on home ownership were answered by the person who answered the household questionnaire, and their nationality is used.

Migrants are also less likely than Irish nationals to have access to local authority (LA) provided housing: 11 per cent of Irish households are LA tenants compared to 5 per cent of non-Irish households. Local authority housing rates are somewhat higher among UK nationals and non-EU nationals. Consequently, non-Irish nationals are highly concentrated in the private rented housing sector, with 70 per cent of migrant households located in this sector. The proportion ranges from 26 per cent among UK nationals to 89 per cent of EU12 nationals, with 73 per cent of non-EU nationals living in the private rented sector (Table 4.4).⁵⁵ The rules governing eligibility for housing supports for migrants is outlined in Box 4.1. These patterns of housing tenure mean that migrants are likely to be particularly exposed to the current pressures in the housing rental market.

It is likely that these patterns are influenced by the age, life-cycle stage, and length of residence as well as factors such as low income and financial exclusion (i.e. less access to mortgage credit). The OECD (2012) notes that the large difference in tenure status between immigrant and native-born populations may reflect the fact that many immigrants in Ireland are relatively recent arrivals. Social norms around home ownership differ across societies and ownership rates may also reflect such preferences. Intentions to stay in Ireland for shorter or longer periods will also influence housing tenure preferences. Non-EU nationals may face particular constraints in accessing credit if they only have temporary residence permission.

⁵⁵ The private rented group will also include some households living in social housing provided by Housing Associations.

As discussed in Chapter 1, migrant groups in Ireland vary according to how long they have lived here (see Table A1.4). UK migrants have the longest period of residence: 60 per cent have lived in Ireland for ten or more years. A much smaller percentage of EU12 and non-EU nationals have lived in Ireland a long period (see Table A1.4). Many non-EU immigrants arrived in Ireland in the five years preceding the survey.

Home ownership patterns among non-Irish nationals are linked to length of residence (Table 4.5). Home ownership among non-Irish nationals who have lived in Ireland for 15 years (76 per cent) is much closer to the figure for Irish nationals (77 per cent). When we exclude the UK from the non-national group the home ownership figure among long-term residents falls to 70 per cent. Finally, we run a statistical model which compares home ownership across nationalities holding age, education level, and gender and income level constant.⁵⁶ The model shows that non-Irish Nationals are significantly less likely to own a home compared to Irish nationals with similar characteristics, and that the chances of home ownership are particularly low among EU12 and non-EU nationals.

TABLE 4.5 Home Ownership (%) by Nationality by Length of Residency, 2014

	Length of Time in Ireland			
	<5 years	5 to <10yrs	10 to <15yrs	15yrs or more
Non-Irish	8.3	20.2	47.2	75.7
Non-Irish (excluding UK)	6.5	11.1	35.9	69.5

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2014. Further breakdowns cannot be shown due to small sample sizes.

Housing tenure provides relatively little insight into housing conditions, therefore we use additional information from the EU-SILC to compare the quality of housing occupied by Irish nationals and non-Irish nationals (Table 4.6). The quality of housing may be particularly variable in the private rented sector, therefore we also look at this sector separately. Conditions are compared along two dimensions. First, housing deprivation, which is a four-item scale measuring access to basic housing amenities including hot water, a bath or a shower, toilet facilities and central heating. A household is deprived on this dimension if they do not have at least one of these items. The second dimension is the neighbourhood environment. This consists of a five-item scale relating to the area where the household is located including noise, pollution, crime and also housing deterioration. A household is deprived on this dimension if they experience at least one of these issues. We find that there is no difference in housing conditions between Irish and non-Irish nationals on these two measures. This is also the case

⁵⁶ Length of residency is not controlled as this is only available for the migrant population.

when we restrict the comparison to households within the rental sector. There are some differences within the migrant group, i.e. UK nationals and non-EU nationals record higher level of deprivation on both measures however these cannot be presented due to small numbers.


TABLE 4.6 Housing Conditions

	All Households		Private Rented	
	% deprived on housing	% deprived on environment	% deprived on housing	% deprived on environment
Irish	9.6	30.8	13.8	36.7
Non-Irish	9.8	32.9	11.1	35.5

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2014, weighted percentages.

A final measure of housing quality is overcrowding. This is measured across Europe by Eurostat.⁵⁷ The situation for national citizens and non-nationals across countries in 2014 is shown in Figure 4.2. The level of overcrowding in Ireland is low for migrants and non-migrants alike, though the rate is higher for non-Irish nationals (8.4 per cent) than Irish nationals (3.9 per cent). Higher overcrowding rates among those who are not citizens of the reporting country are observed in almost all of the countries observed. Differences between the two groups are particularly wide in Greece, Italy, Austria and Portugal.

FIGURE 4.2 Overcrowding Rates across the EU by Citizenship



Source: Eurostat database based on EU-SILC ilc_lvho15, extracted 12/12/2016.

⁵⁷ For the definition see <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tessi171>.

Rising levels of homelessness have also been recorded with the number of homeless children being a particular cause of public and policy concern. Therefore further research is needed on how housing cost burden and homelessness affect migrants to Ireland and whether the quality of housing differs across nationality groups.

4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter finds that in 2014, non-Irish nationals had a lower median disposable household income and a lower equivalised (needs-adjusted) household income compared to Irish nationals. Non-Irish nationals were also significantly more likely to reside in households living below the income poverty line drawn at 60 per cent of median household income. However, levels of material deprivation and consistent poverty did not differ between Irish and non-Irish nationals. Previous research has shown that income measures can fluctuate and may not adequately reflect standards of living, therefore combining such measures with indicators of material deprivation are seen as producing more robust measures of poverty. The discrepancy between current income and long-term resources can be particularly acute for groups such as students, the retired and the self-employed.

These overall figures for the non-Irish conceal some important differences between nationality groups. Migrants from the UK are particularly disadvantaged on both the income and the deprivation measures: part of this is accounted for by the low employment rate of this group, including the higher proportion of pensioners. The higher levels of poverty among UK nationals was also found in previous Monitors (McGinnity et al., 2011; 2012; and 2013) and is connected with the higher rate of unemployment and inactivity amongst this group and their poorer educational profile compared to EU15-2 and non-EU nationals. The non-EU group were also disadvantaged in terms of income levels (disposable and equivalised) and income poverty but not on the material deprivation. The relatively small sample size for some subgroups of non-EU nationals in the EU-SILC survey did not allow for further disaggregation (such as Asian, African and Rest of the World immigrants).

Comparing income and poverty rates to those in 2011 we found that the gap between the equivalised income of non-Irish and Irish nationals widened over the period. This may be due to changes in the composition of the non-Irish group and to the increase in the number of naturalisation between the two EU-SILC surveys. The breakdown by nationalities suggests that the deterioration in income over time was most noticeable for the EU15-2 and non-EU nationals. The rise in income poverty among the non-EU citizens was in part linked to the increasing

proportion of students in this group but also to a rise in in-work poverty. The income situation of UK nationals remained unchanged. Deprivation was stable over time for all the non-national groups but increased significantly for Irish nationals. Some changes among non-nationals may not be detected because of the small numbers for analysis.

Taken as a whole there appear to have been both losses and gains in terms of the integration of migrant groups. Income and deprivation gaps persist, especially for UK nationals and non-EU nationals, and the situation of the latter group has deteriorated somewhat. In contrast, the situation improved for those from the newer EU Member States (EU12) as there was a significant decline in deprivation levels.

In (self-defined) health terms, the migrant group fare at least as well as Irish nationals, and those from EU15-2 countries have significantly better health than Irish nationals when other relevant characteristics are controlled. In contrast, there are sharp differences in housing tenure by nationality status even when comparing those of similar age, gender and education level. The pattern of home ownership is partly driven by the length of time non-nationals have spent living in Ireland and migrants in Ireland for more than 15 years have the same home ownership rate as Irish nationals. However, when the UK group is excluded, a difference in home ownership remains even among long-term residents, which suggests that lack of access to resources and different intentions to remain in Ireland may also play a role. The two measures of housing quality examined suggest that despite the differences in housing tenure, migrants do not, on average, live in worse quality housing than Irish nationals. This overall result may disguise differences between migrant groups and there is some evidence of lower quality housing among the UK and non-EU groups but the numbers are too small to be conclusive.

The diversity of experience across groups and domains is also reflected in the international comparisons. Migrants in Ireland appear to fare better than those in other EU countries in terms of overcrowding, though this single measure is unlikely to adequately capture cross-national variation in housing quality. For income poverty, however, there is a divergent experience for those from inside and outside the EU. EU nationals living in Ireland do considerably better in terms of avoiding income poverty compared to the average across the EU28. In contrast, non-EU nationals in Ireland have levels of income poverty higher than the EU28 average. This variation in experience for different migrant groups suggests the need for further research into factors underlying this poverty rate, in order to consider whether greater targeting of supports and interventions is needed, and what form these could take.

Box 4.1 Access to Social Services*Social Welfare*

The social welfare system is administered by the Department of Social Protection. It is divided into the following main types of payments:

- Social insurance payments;
- Social assistance or means tested payments;
- Universal payments.

To qualify for social insurance payments an individual must have made the necessary number of social insurance (PRSI) payments for the scheme in question and satisfy a certain conditions. Social assistance payments are made to those who do not have enough PRSI contributions to qualify for the equivalent social insurance-based payments.

EU law requires that EU nationals are treated equally to Member State nationals in regard to accessing social welfare. In practice, national administrative rules lead to differing levels of access. This is evidenced in Ireland by the application of a Habitual Residency Condition (HRC) to social assistance payments and to child benefit, which means that applicants must show they are both resident in, and have a proven close link to Ireland.

Currently the Department of Social Protection assesses the following:

- Length and continuity of residence in Ireland;
- Length and purpose of any absence from Ireland;
- Nature and pattern of employment;
- Applicant's main centre of interest;
- Applicant's intentions to live in Ireland as it appears from the evidence.

(Department of Social Protection, 2013)

The evidence used for each factor depends on the facts of the individual case and the final decision reached is to some extent subjective. There have been some criticisms of the subjectivity of the decision making process (FLAC, 2012).

Health Services

In Ireland there is universal access to public healthcare, though costs may apply, for example for GP services. Medical Card holders may access certain public health services free of charge in Ireland. Entitlement to Medical Cards is means tested regardless of nationality. Asylum applicants living in direct provision are entitled to a Medical Card: refugees and those with leave to remain are also entitled to a Medical Card.

Housing Services

Local authorities in Ireland are the main provider of social housing for people who need housing and cannot afford to buy their own homes. Local authority housing is allocated according to housing need, and rents are based on ability to pay. Rent supplement is available for those in private rented accommodation who cannot afford to meet their housing costs.

The Department of Environment, Community and Local Government has reviewed access to social housing for immigrants, and in 2012 issued revised guidelines in access to social housing supports for non-Irish nationals.⁵⁸ Generally speaking, all EEA nationals may be considered for assessment for social housing support from housing authorities if;

- 1) they are in employment/self-employed in the State; or
- 2) where they are not currently working/employed it is because: they are temporarily unable to work because of illness/accident; they are recorded as involuntarily unemployed after having been employed for longer than a year; and they are registered as a job-seeker with Department of Social Protection and FÁS.

⁵⁸ Circular Housing 47/2012 'Access to social housing supports for non-Irish nationals – including clarification re Stamp 4 holders'.

A non-EEA national with at least five years reckonable residence and a valid current Stamp, or with any length of reckonable residence and a current valid Stamp extending to potentially permit five years' residence, is eligible on residence grounds to be considered for social housing support.

New asylum applicants are housed within the direct provision where they receive food, accommodation and a payment of €19.10 per week. The allowance for child residents was increased to €15.60 from January 2016. Asylum applicants may not receive rent supplement. For further details see Box 1.1.

Chapter 4 Appendix

TABLE A4.1 Composition of Sample by Nationality, EU-SILC and QNHS

	Q1 QNHS 2014 %	EU-SILC 2014 %
Irish	87.8	90.0
Non-Irish	12.2	10.0
Of which:		
UK	2.5	1.7
EU15-2	0.9	1.0
EU12	5.0	5.2
Non-EU	3.8	2.0
All	100	100
Unweighted N	52,379	14,077

Source: EU-SILC 2014 and QNHS 2014.

TABLE A4.2 Yearly Household Income and Household Equivalised Income, 2011

	Disposable Household Income (Median) €		Equivalised (needs adjusted) Income (Median) €		No of individuals in each group (unweighted)
Irish	41,696		18,318		9,916
Non-Irish	36,437	*	17,105	*	1,089
Of which:					
UK	32,447	*	15,375	*	193
EU15-2	53,002	n.s	23,895	n.s	82
EU12	34,637	*	15,891	*	487
Non-EU	47,237	*	18,792	*	327
All	40,997		18,148		11,005

Source: Taken from McGinnity et al., 2013, based on EU-SILC 2011.

TABLE A4.3 Logistic Regression Models of Home Ownership and Subjective Health, 2014

	Health			Home Ownership		
	B	Odds Ratio	Sig.	B	Odds Ratio	Sig.
Nationality (ref: Irish)						
UK	-.018	.982	.923	-.851	.427	.000
EU15-2	2.083	8.031	.006	-1.799	.166	.000
EU12	.010	1.010	.948	-3.147	.043	.000
Non-EU	.055	1.057	.824	-2.630	.072	.000
Gender (ref: female)						
Male	.138	1.148	.014	.185	1.203	.016
Age (ref: over 60)						
Age 18-29 yrs	1.563	4.772	.000	-4.135	.016	.000
Age 30-39 yrs	.987	2.684	.000	-2.314	.099	.000
Age 40-49 yrs	.659	1.933	.000	-1.335	.263	.000
Age 50-59 yrs	.401	1.494	.000	-.720	.487	.000
Education (ref: third level)						
Lower Secondary	-1.203	.300	.000	-1.118	.327	.000
Upper Secondary	-.335	.715	.000	-.254	.775	.013
Log equivalised Income	.362	1.436	.000	.712	2.038	.000
Constant	-2.062	.127	.000	-4.157	.016	.000
N		10,004			4,141	

Source: EU-SILC 2014.

Chapter 5

Active Citizenship⁵⁹

By Emma Quinn

Three indicators designed to measure integration in the active citizenship domain were among those included in the Zaragoza Declaration, adopted in April 2010 by EU Ministers responsible for integration, and approved at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in June 2010. Firstly, the naturalisation rate, measured as the ratio of resident immigrants to those who acquired citizenship; secondly the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and thirdly the share of immigrants among elected representatives. This chapter presents the calculation of these indicators based on the best available national data, together with available supplementary information and data. Active citizenship indicators differ from the other indicators presented within the Integration Monitor because they describe the context and the opportunities for integration, rather than presenting direct comparisons of outcomes between Irish and non-Irish nationals. The focus of this chapter is on naturalisation and political participation and does not include broader active citizenship indicators on, for example, volunteering and trade union membership.⁶⁰

Citizenship, acquired by birth or through naturalisation, describes a particular legal bond between an individual and his or her State. The law in relation to citizenship acquisition is set out in Box 5.1. More than 121,100 non-Irish nationals acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation between 2005 and 2015.⁶¹ This means that a large group of naturalised non-EU migrants have enhanced opportunities for integration in Ireland, in terms of access to institutions, goods and services. Naturalised migrants may also participate fully in the democratic process. This represents important progress.

⁵⁹ The term 'active citizenship' is used here as a broad concept embracing formal and non-formal, political, cultural, inter-personal and caring activities (Taskforce on Active Citizenship, 2007) and as such is not limited to the activities of Irish citizens.

⁶⁰ Indicators on a broader range of forms of civic participation of migrants are recommended in the evaluation report on the Zaragoza indicators, including on: participation in voluntary organisations; membership in trade unions; membership in political parties; political activity (The European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013).

⁶¹ Exact figure 121,123 includes an estimation of 20,000 certificates issued between 2005 and 2009 plus precise annual figures between 2010 and 2015. Source: Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service.

The naturalisation rate measures on an ad hoc basis how many immigrants become citizens over time. This indicator tells about the extent to which the integration of migrants is facilitated by access to full citizenship rights. Data show that Ireland has entered a new phase in relation to the naturalisation of resident non-Irish nationals since publication of the Annual Integration Monitor 2013. The naturalisation rate for non-EEA adults peaked at 16.4 per cent in 2012 before falling steadily to reach 7.5 per cent in 2015. The total number of naturalisation certificates issued in 2012 was just over 25,100, declining by 46 per cent to around 13,500 in 2015. In 2014 Eurostat data indicate that Ireland's naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals was the highest in the EEA. It now appears that the double effect, seen in the last Integration Monitor (2013), of a large cohort of immigrants becoming eligible to apply for naturalisation and the resolution of a sizeable processing backlog, has become much less pronounced.

The two groups of naturalised EEA and non-EEA citizens now show very different trends. While the number of certificates issued to non-EEA nationals more than halved, falling from almost 23,700 in 2012 to just over 10,400 in 2015, the number issued to EEA nationals more than doubled, from approximately 1,450 in 2012 to 3,150 in 2015. Accordingly, the proportion of EEA nationals among total recipients has grown significantly, from 6 per cent in 2012 to 23 per cent in 2015. Despite this upward trend the share of the overall resident EEA population that chooses to naturalise annually remains very small, at less than one per cent in 2014.

The long-term residence indicator shows the proportion of the migrant population with a secure residence status and, by extension, socio-economic rights and responsibilities more similar to those of citizens than migrants with more temporary status. In 2012, 4.8 per cent of migrants holding live immigration permissions were long-term residents while in 2016 the figure stood at 1.8 per cent. This fall may be associated with the large volume of naturalisation applications granted since 2010. However the continued lack of a widely available long-term residence status could be impacting negatively on the integration of migrants who cannot, or do not wish to naturalise. The final indicator proposed at Zaragoza was the share of immigrants among elected representatives. This indicator allows us to capture some basic information on the level of participation of immigrants in politics. Migrants are very under-represented among politicians in Ireland: 0.21 per cent of City and County Councillors elected in the 2014 Local Elections were non-Irish nationals, while in the 2016 general election out of 158 members of the Dáil just one member is a naturalised Irish national, giving an indicator of 0.6 per cent.

5.1 NATURALISATION

5.1.1 *Processing of Naturalisation Certificates*

Approximately 22,000 applications were awaiting decision in March 2011 and this number had fallen to approximately 8,500 applications pending decision in December 2013.⁶² In April 2016 the Minister for Justice commented that the processing of a backlog of cases on hand in 2011 explained the significant increase in persons naturalised during the period 2012 to 2014 inclusive.⁶³ Continuing a trend noted in previous Integration Monitors, processing times for naturalisation applications have improved, falling from an average of seven months in 2013 to three months in 2014 and 2015.⁶⁴ The number of valid naturalisation applications received by the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service fell by 36 per cent from a peak of 19,900 applications in 2012 to 12,651 in 2015. By March 2016 approximately 90,000 non-Irish citizens had received naturalisation certificates at citizenship ceremonies since their introduction in June 2011.⁶⁵ Figure 5.1 illustrates the fact that the ratio of applications rejected to certificates issued decreased in the period from 20 per cent in 2010 to 4 per cent in 2015. INIS noted that there has been a large drop in errors within applications, attributed in part to the Irish Citizenship Application Support Service, discussed in Section 5.1.4.⁶⁶

5.1.2 *Trends in Naturalisation Certificates Issued and Applications Rejected*

Figure 5.1 shows that the number of naturalisation certificates issued to EEA and non-EEA nationals increased very significantly between 2010 and 2012. In addition to the processing improvements discussed above, the increase may be partly explained by the relatively recent nature of sustained immigration flows to Ireland. Table 5.1 shows that 6 per cent of the usually resident population was non-Irish in 2002. This figure increased to 10 per cent in 2006, and again to 12 per cent in 2011. The stock of usually resident non-Irish nationals increased by 30 per cent between 2006 and 2011.

⁶² Minister for Justice and Equality, parliamentary question, 11 December 2013.

⁶³ Minister for Justice and Equality, parliamentary question, 14 April 2016.

⁶⁴ Average time taken to process all applications processed to a decision during the reference year. Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2016.

⁶⁵ 'Celebrating our history and our shared future', accessed at www.inis.gov.ie/, August 2016.

⁶⁶ Comments received from INIS and OPMI, January 2017.


TABLE 5.1 Census Data on Resident Population by Nationality, 2002-2011

	Irish nationals	EU nationals*	Non-EU nationals	Total Non-Irish	Total population
2002	3,584,975	133,436	90,825	224,261	3,858,495
2006	3,706,683	275,775	143,958	419,733	4,172,013
2011	3,927,143	386,764	157,593	544,357	4,525,281

Source: CSO Census 2002; 2006; 2011.

Note: *2006 data include ten EU Member States; 2006 data include 25 EU Member States; 2011 include 27 EU Member States. Responses 'No nationality' and 'Not stated' are excluded in all columns other than 'Total population'.

The huge rate of annual increase between 2010 and 2012 in non-EEA nationals acquiring Irish citizenship through naturalisation has been replaced with a downward trend since 2013. A large decrease can be seen in the number of naturalisation certificates issued between 2012 to 2015: 25,109 certificates were issued to non-Irish nationals in 2012 falling by 46 per cent to 13,565 in 2015. See Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2.

FIGURE 5.1 Naturalisation Certificates Issued to EEA and Non-EEA Nationals and Total Applications Rejected, 2010-2015

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2016.

Notes: Non-EEA data on certificates issued include persons recorded as 'as Stateless, Unknown or Recognised non-citizen': 3 (2011), 6 (2012), 1 (2013), 2 (2014), 6 (2015). Certificates were also issued to persons whose nationality was not readily available and these are included in the non-EEA data: 78 (2011), 1 (2013), 15 (2014), 22 (2015). Figure contains updates to previously published 2010-2012 data. Data contained in Tables 5.2 and A5.1.

A significant proportion of naturalisation certificates issued each year are to the spouses of Irish nationals. In 2015 some 19.5 per cent of certificates issued were

on the basis of marriage to an Irish national. In 2014 the equivalent proportion was 15 per cent.⁶⁷

As in previous Integration Monitors, the large majority of naturalisation certificates issued in 2015 were to non-EEA nationals. This is unsurprising for a range of reasons, discussed in more detail in Section 5.1.3. However the proportion of EEA nationals among the total number issued with certificates has grown significantly, from 6 per cent in 2012 to 23 per cent in 2015. The overall number of naturalisation certificates issued to EEA nationals has also more than doubled in the period, from 1,450 in 2012 to 3,144 in 2015. In contrast the number of certificates issued to non-EEA nationals has more than halved, falling from 23,659 in 2012 to 10,421 in 2015.

In 2012 some 23,659 non-EEA nationals naturalised as Irish citizens. By 2013 the number had fallen by 5 per cent to 22,456, and fell again more steeply by 19 per cent to 18,155 in 2014. The figure of 10,421 non-EEA nationals receiving naturalisation certificates in 2015 is close to the equivalent figure in 2011. The proportion of non-EEA nationals among the total number of recipients has fallen from 94 per cent in 2012 to 77 per cent in 2015.

The data in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 indicate clearly that Ireland has entered a new phase regarding the naturalisation of non-EEA nationals.

TABLE 5.2 Naturalisation Certificates Issued to EEA and Non-EEA Nationals by Age Group, 2010-2015

Nationality	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
EEA	477	453	1,450	1,788	2,949	3,144
Non-EEA	5,835	10,336	23,659	22,456	18,155	10,421
Aged <16	1,053	630	3,952	5,099	4,694	1,824
Aged 16+	4,782	9,706	19,707	17,357	13,461	8,597
Grand total	6,312	10,789	25,109	24,244	21,104	13,565

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2016.

Notes: Non-EEA data include persons recorded as 'as Stateless, Unknown or Recognised non-citizen': 3 (2011), 6 (2012), 1 (2013), 2 (2014), 6 (2015). Certificates were also issued to persons whose nationality was not readily available and these are included in the non-EEA data: 78 (2011), 1 (2013), 15 (2014), 22 (2015). Table contains updates to previously published 2010-2012 data.

⁶⁷ Data on the numbers of persons who naturalised on the grounds of marriage to Irish national: 2,642 (2015); 3,157 (2014); 3,060 (2013); 1,679 (2012); 1,659 (2011); 422 (2010). Data received from Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, September 2016.

Nationality of Non-Irish Nationals who Acquired Citizenship through Naturalisation

Census data indicate that the Nigerian population increased by 82 per cent between 2002 and 2006 and by a more modest 8 per cent in 2011, to reach 17,642 (CSO, 2012). This trend is reflected in the high representation of Nigerian nationals among those who naturalised in recent years, which peaked in 2012 and fell off more recently. The recent decrease in naturalisation certificates issued to non-EEA nationals overall is partly driven by a 76 per cent drop in Nigerian nationals acquiring citizenship by naturalisation between 2013 and 2015: 5,783 Nigerian nationals acquired citizenship in 2013 compared to 1,360 in 2015.

The Indian population doubled between Census 2006 and 2011 to reach 16,986, again reflected in high representation of Indian nationals among those who naturalised in recent years. The number of certificates issued to nationals of India also declined in the period since the 2013 Integration Monitor (-46 per cent). A similar trend was seen in applications from nationals of the Philippines (-53 per cent), Pakistan (-59 per cent) and China (-28 per cent). See Table 5.3 for further detail on the nationality breakdown of non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship by naturalisation between 2013 and 2015.

TABLE 5.3 Non-EEA Nationals who Acquired Citizenship by Naturalisation 2013-2015, by Nationality (Top 10)

Acquired Citizenship in 2013			Acquired Citizenship in 2014			Acquired Citizenship in 2015		
Nationality	Number	%	Nationality	Number	%	Nationality	Number	%
Nigeria	5,783	26	Nigeria	3,286	18	India	1,611	15
India	3,011	13	India	2,939	16	Nigeria	1,360	13
Philippines	2,485	11	Philippines	2,184	12	Philippines	1,167	11
Pakistan	1,805	8	Pakistan	1,244	7	Pakistan	733	7
Ukraine	694	3	China	576	3	China	473	5
China	656	3	South Africa	563	3	Brazil	393	4
Moldova	552	2	Ukraine	536	3	South Africa	369	4
South Africa	488	2	Brazil	459	3	Ukraine	323	3
Iraq	417	2	DR Congo	421	2	US	246	2
Bangladesh	403	2	Moldova	356	2	DR Congo	245	2
Other	6,162	27	Other	5,591	31	Other	3,501	34
Total	22,456	100	Total	18,155	100	Total	10,421	100

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2016.

Notes: Other includes: persons recorded as 'as Stateless, Unknown or Recognised non-citizen': 1 (2013), 2 (2014), 6 (2015) and Certificate issued to persons whose nationality was not readily available 1 (2013), 15 (2014), 22 (2015). Figure contains updates to previously published 2010-2012 data.

Vink et al. (2013) also showed that the level of development⁶⁸ of migrants' country of origin is important in understanding propensity to naturalise, with immigrants from highly developed countries much less likely to make this choice. Bauböck et al. (2013) show that migrants from low-or medium-developed countries have a greater motivation and incentive to naturalise, while the OECD (2011) indicates that highly educated migrants from low income countries are more likely to do so than less educated migrants from low income countries.⁶⁹

Table 5.4 shows the nationality of EEA nationals who naturalised in the period 2013-2015. The number of Polish nationals who naturalised more than doubled from the very low base of 507 in 2013 to 1,116 in 2015. Census data show that the Polish population in Ireland has grown particularly rapidly in recent years, from just over 2,000 in 2002, to 63,276 in 2006 and to 122,585 in 2011 (CSO, 2012).

The number of Romanian nationals who took Irish citizenship in 2015 (901) was 60 per cent higher than in 2013 (564). Latvian and Hungarian nationals also showed increasing representation among newly naturalised citizens. All these nationality groups showed very significant increases between Census 2002, 2006 and 2011 (CSO, 2012).

TABLE 5.4 EEA Nationals who Acquired Citizenship by Naturalisation, 2013-2015, by Nationality

Acquired Citizenship in 2013			Acquired Citizenship in 2014			Acquired Citizenship in 2015		
Nationality	Number	%	Nationality	Number	%	Nationality	Number	%
Romania	564	32	Romania	1,029	35	Poland	1,161	37
Poland	507	28	Poland	939	32	Romania	901	29
Latvia	150	8	Latvia	225	8	Latvia	327	10
Bulgaria	83	5	Hungary	137	5	Hungary	172	5
Lithuania	80	4	Lithuania	103	3	Lithuania	126	4
Other	404	23	Other	516	17	Other	458	15
Total	1,788	100	Total	2,949	100	Total	3,145	100

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2016.

Despite the upward trend of EEA nationals naturalising, the proportion of the resident EEA population choosing to naturalise annually remains extremely low. See Section 5.1.3.

⁶⁸ Using data from the Human Development Index, a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and standard of living.

⁶⁹ The possibility for a migrant to hold dual nationality will also have an impact. China for example does not allow dual citizenship, while India allows dual citizenship under certain circumstances.

5.1.3 Citizenship Indicators

Access to the host country nationality is an important part of integration policy, providing immigrants with legal entitlement to full participation and membership in the host country society. Immigrants who choose to naturalise have been shown to have better socio-economic outcomes than immigrants who do not take on the host country citizenship (Liebig and Von Haaren, 2011). The naturalisation rate, measured as the ratio of resident immigrants to those who acquired citizenship, captures information on the opportunities to naturalise (policies) as well as on a range of other contextual factors such as such as immigrants' motivation to naturalise, duration of residence, and settlement in the country (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013).

This section presents an annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals, which is derived using administrative data (residence permits) in order to produce the most up to date and precise indicator possible. A similar rate is provided for EU nationals, and because administrative data are not available for this group we report an indicator compiled by Eurostat. Eurostat data are then also used to place Ireland's citizenship indicators in an EU context.

Citizenship Indicator for non-EEA Nationals

Table 5.5 shows the annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals i.e. the ratio of the number of non-EEA population holding 'live' immigration permissions, to the number who acquired citizenship through naturalisation in the reference year. The similar indicator produced by Eurostat⁷⁰ draws on survey-based estimates of the non-citizen resident population. Here we use administrative data obtained directly from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service. A drawback is that only non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over are required to register with the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service/Garda National Immigration Bureau, therefore the indicator in Table 5.5 refers to the age group 16 and over. The annual citizenship acquisition rate for non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over remained stable in 2012-2013 at around 16 per cent, before falling to 12.8 per cent in 2014 and again to 7.5 per cent in 2015.

⁷⁰ See table migr_acqs at <http://ec.europa.eu>.

TABLE 5.5 Citizenship Indicator Non-EEA Nationals Aged 16 and Over

	Annual Naturalisation Rate						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over acquired citizenship in reference year	NA	4,782	9,706	19,707	17,357	13,461	8,597
Number of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over holding 'live' immigration permissions	134,549	133,232	128,104	120,281	107,435	105,569	113,914
Share of total number of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' permissions in ref. year (aged 16 and over) who acquired citizenship in ref. year (%)	NA	3.6	7.6	16.4	16.2	12.8	7.5

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2016. Eurostat (migr_resvalid), extracted August 2016: all valid residence permits on 31 December on reference year.

Note: Non-EEA data include persons recorded as 'as Stateless, Unknown or Recognised non-citizen': 3 (2011), 6 (2012), 1 (2013), 2 (2014), 6 (2015). Certificates were also issued to persons whose nationality was not readily available and these are included in the non-EEA data: 78 (2011), 1 (2013), 15 (2014), 22 (2015). Table contains updates to previously published 2010-2012 data.

It is difficult to establish the cumulative proportion of the non-EEA migrant population that has naturalised: we do not know how many people naturalised prior to 2005 as reliable records do not exist. We also do not know how many people who naturalised subsequently left the State or died.

A total of 93,610 non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over naturalised between 2005 and 2015 (see McGinnity et al., 2014, and Table 5.5). If we assume no outflows/deaths among those naturalised it is possible to estimate that approximately 45 per cent of the population aged 16 and over of migrant origin (defined as the currently registered non-EEA population aged 16 and over, plus those 'ever' naturalised) have acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation since 2005.⁷¹ Given the fact that some non-EEA citizens who naturalised are likely to have left the State, or possibly died in this ten-year period, this is likely to be an upper bound estimate. It does indicate that a substantial proportion of non-EEA migrants have acquired Irish citizenship.

Citizenship Indicator for EU Nationals

In Table 5.6 we report the Eurostat estimates of the percentage of EU nationals who acquired citizenship in the reference year. It is estimated that less than one per cent of the resident EU population in Ireland acquired citizenship each year

⁷¹ Using this method of calculation the estimated population of migrant origin in 2015 is 207,524. Note that given our assumptions this figure will always increase. The stock figure used includes certain groups of non-EEA nationals, such as students, Intra-Company Transferees and trainees, whose residence in Ireland does not count as 'reckonable residence' when applying for naturalisation. Such groups are included in the estimate because it is a matter of national policy whether or not their residence counts towards eligibility for naturalisation. To exclude them would conflate the 'policy outcome' with 'policy output' within the indicator.

between 2009 and 2014, although the rate has increased significantly in the period from 0.06 per cent to 0.78 per cent.

TABLE 5.6 Citizenship Indicator for EU Nationals in Ireland

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
EU residents who acquired citizenship as a share of EU residents	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.33	0.45	0.78

Source: EUROSTAT (migr_acqs), extracted August 2016. 2013 data are provisional.

It is unsurprising for a range of reasons that EU migrants in Ireland show lower naturalisation rates than non-EU migrants. Non-EEA nationals have much greater incentives to naturalise: they often lack security of residence and are more constrained in terms of movements in and out of the State when compared to EEA migrants. Rights and entitlements held by resident EU nationals are very similar to those held by Irish citizens, with participation in General Elections representing the main exception.


Bauböck et al. (2013) argue that even where immigrants enjoy secure residence and similar social rights to national citizens, as with EU citizens residing in other Member States, it is only when they become full citizens that political parties and representative institutions take into account their interests and opinions. In this context the very low naturalisation rate for EEA nationals could be viewed as concern, if their migration is permanent.

Citizenship Indicator in an EU Context

Figure 5.2 locates Ireland in an EU context using Eurostat indicators on the share of EU citizens and non-EU citizens who acquired citizenship in different countries in 2014. The rate of naturalisation of EU citizens is calculated by Eurostat as the total number of persons of EU origin granted citizenship through naturalisation in the reference year, divided by the total estimated resident population of EU nationals. The process is repeated for non-EU nationals.

The rate of naturalisation of non-EU nationals seen in Ireland in 2014 was clearly unusual. Due in part to efforts to reduce the processing backlog, Ireland recorded the highest rate, followed by the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. As regards naturalisation of EU nationals, Ireland's 2014 rate of (0.78 per cent) was lower than that seen in some Member States, for example Hungary (8.30 per cent) and Sweden (3.73 per cent). However most Member States show rates lower than Ireland's. As discussed above, incentives to naturalise may be low for EU migrants living in other European countries.

FIGURE 5.2 Residents Who Acquired Citizenship as a Share of Resident Non-Citizens by Former Citizenship (%), 2014



Source: EUROSTAT (migr_acqs), extracted August 2016.

5.1.4 Issues Regarding Naturalisation in Ireland

A range of improvements has been made to the naturalisation application procedure in Ireland since 2011, which have been documented in previous Integration Monitors. Developments include staff training,⁷² a revised application form, clearer requirements (for example regarding ‘good character’ and legal residence) and the availability of an online reckonable residency calculator. OPMI continues to fund the New Communities Partnership’s Citizenship Application Support Service (CASS), which since 2011 has assisted migrants to fill in

⁷² Comments received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, November 2016.

applications for citizenship.⁷³ INIS has observed that the much improved ratio of applications rejected to certificates issued shown in Figure 5.1 demonstrates the success of this approach.⁷⁴ The requirement to be self-sufficient is now attached less importance in assessment. This may also have contributed to the decline in the number of rejected applications.⁷⁵

The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is an independent multi-country index of 167 indicators, which aims to measure policies that are considered by the authors to be critical to migrants' opportunities to integrate. The MIPEX 2015 project is led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), and the Migration Policy Group. Data are sourced from the responses of national researchers. In Ireland these are drawn from the HSE, the Immigrant Council of Ireland (NGO) and an independent researcher.⁷⁶ While such indices have the advantage of allowing complex and evolving policy to be compared internationally in a concise manner, the method is not without limitations, among them the fact that important detail and context relating to policy differences can be lost (Goodman, 2015).

The MIPEX 2015 indicator on access to nationality comprises the dimensions of: eligibility, conditions, security of status and dual nationality. The eligibility conditions for naturalisation in Ireland are broadly deemed to be favourable. MIPEX also noted with approval the fact that Ireland does not impose a language or citizenship test and allows dual citizenship. Liebig and Von Haaren (2011) point out the positive impact dual citizenship has on immigrants' propensity to naturalise in OECD countries.

The continued lack of an appeal procedure in Ireland for rejected applicants for naturalisation was highlighted in MIPEX 2015 as uncommon in an international context. Insecurity of status among applicants is also highlighted as a consequence of the Minister for Justice and Equality's 'absolute' discretion to interpret naturalisation eligibility requirements (Huddleston et al., 2015). The ACIT (Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration) study⁷⁷ investigated citizenship law and policy in all EEA countries plus EU accession

⁷³ www.integration.ie.

⁷⁴ Comments received from INIS and OPMI, January 2017.

⁷⁵ Comments received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, November 2016.

⁷⁶ For more information see www.mipex.eu.

⁷⁷ The ACIT research project compared how European states regulate the acquisition of citizenship and the impact of citizenship on the socio-economic and political participation of immigrants. ACIT developed four sets of citizenship indicators on citizenship laws (CITLAW), their implementation (CITIMP), and their impact on acquisition rates (CITACQ) and integration policies (CITINT). The project was financially supported by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, administered by DG Home Affairs and carried out by: the European University Institute, the Migration Policy Group (Brussels), University College Dublin, University of Edinburgh and Maastricht University.

states, and found that most countries have a right to appeal built into the naturalisation procedure, including judicial review processes. The authors found that appeal decisions can cover substantive aspects as well as procedural aspects in nearly all countries that offer a right to appeal (Bauböck et al., 2013). In Ireland applicants have a right of access to the High Court by way of application for judicial review, but this does not reconsider the merits of an application (Becker and Cosgrave, 2013a).

Becker and Cosgrave (2013b) suggest that the State could do more to encourage eligible persons to apply for naturalisation, for example by providing more information on the benefits of Irish citizenship. The authors acknowledge the promotional effect of citizenship ceremonies introduced in 2011 but argue that application fees and the fee payable on approval are too high and could act as deterrents to potential applicants.⁷⁸ International research on the administrative fees for ordinary naturalisation by Goodman (2010) indicates that fees in Ireland are among the highest in the EU. However the data are not indexed, for example to national labour or other costs.⁷⁹ The Minister for Justice has commented that the fees are appropriate given the effort and cost involved in processing applications for a certificate of naturalisation, also noting that following the grant of citizenship non-EEA nationals no longer have to register their presence in the State with the Garda National Immigration Bureau, which requires the payment of a fee of €300 per registration.⁸⁰

The fact that resident migrants aged under 16 are not required to register with the Garda National Immigration Bureau (GNIB) means that non-EEA children have faced problems proving sufficient reckonable residence for the purpose of making a naturalisation application. This issue has been highlighted in each previous Integration Monitor. Provision for the registration of under 16s has been made in the *Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014*, but the section cannot be put into operation as the facilities to implement it are not yet in place.⁸¹ Progress, in the form of new policies which allow the children of migrants to count their parents' residence in their own naturalisation application, was noted in the Annual Integration Monitor 2013.⁸² The Immigrant Council of Ireland has drawn attention recently to the position of migrant children in care, including

⁷⁸ The standard application fee is €175 and a further €950 is payable by successful adult applicants. See Box 5.1 for more detail.

⁷⁹ Some EU Member States have higher fees, for example the current fee for naturalisation in the UK is £1,236.

⁸⁰ Minister for Justice and Equality, parliamentary question, 3 December 2015.

⁸¹ Comments received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, November 2016.

⁸² MRCI (2013) indicate that since 2012 young adults between the ages of 18 and 23 who entered the State as minor dependants of their parents can apply for naturalisation using the residency stamps of their parents as proof of residency prior to the age of 16. In addition, the children of at least one naturalised Irish citizen parent, who have been legally resident in the State for three years, may now apply to naturalise on that basis (reported in McGinnity et al., 2014).

separated children, who continue to rely on their parent having been lawfully resident in Ireland and having successfully applied for naturalisation themselves in order to make an application. Clear legislative guidelines are called for on access to naturalisation for children, including children in the care of the State, in order that legal certainty is provided (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2016).

5.2 LONG-TERM RESIDENCE

Long-term residence is a secure residence status offered to migrants who have legally and continuously resided in the host country for a requisite period of time, often five years. Typically the status offers migrants treatment more equal to citizens of the host country, without requiring them to adopt the nationality of the country. EU Directive 2003/109/EC, concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, states that the integration of ‘third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the Member States is a key element in promoting economic and social cohesion’. Ireland has not opted in to Directive 2003/109/EC.⁸³ In Ireland no statutory scheme exists. An administrative long-term residence is open to employment permit holders (and their dependent spouses) and scientific researchers only. See Box 5.2 for a description of access to long-term residence in Ireland.

5.2.1 Long-term Residence Indicator

The share of non-EU immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence was agreed by the EU Member States as a core indicator of integration outcomes. Eurostat produces such an indicator⁸⁴ which, as was discussed above, draws on survey-based estimates of the non-citizen population. In Table 5.7 we again use administrative data obtained from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service in order to increase the accuracy of the non-EEA population figure and to produce a more up to date indicator. The Eurostat data are used in Section 5.2.2 to place Ireland in an EU context.

Table 5.6 reports the share of non-EEA nationals holding long-term residence among all live residence permissions, in the period 2010 to 2015.

⁸³ Under the terms of the protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Ireland does not take part in the adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title IV of the EC Treaty unless Ireland opts in to the measure. Ireland has given an undertaking to opt in to measures that do not compromise the Common Travel Area with the UK.

⁸⁴ Data available in Eurostat Table migr_acqs.

TABLE 5.7 Long-term Residence Indicator


	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Persons holding long-term residence	8,367	7,721	5,771	3,392	2,309	2,019
Number of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over holding 'live' immigration permissions	133,232	128,104	120,281	107,435	105,569	113,914
Share of the total number of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' permissions in reference year (aged 16 and over) who held long-term residence in reference year (%)	6.3	6.0	4.8	3.2	2.2	1.8

Source: Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, Eurostat (migr_resvalid), extracted August 2016: all valid residence permits on 31 December on reference year.

The share of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' immigration permissions who hold long-term residence in the same years has fallen significantly in the period, from 4.8 per cent in 2012 to 1.8 per cent in 2015. (This calculation excludes persons granted 'permission to remain without condition as to time', see Box 5.2).

5.2.2 Ireland's Long-term Residence Indicator in an EU Context

Figure 5.3 illustrates the Eurostat indicator on the share of non-EU citizens who held long-term residence in 2014. The Member States with the highest rates of long-term residence permissions issued were Latvia (mainly under national legislation) and Estonia (mainly under Directive 2003/109/EC). Ireland had a low rate of non-EU citizens holding long-term residence in an EU context.


FIGURE 5.3 Share of Long-term Residents Among All Non-EU Citizens Holding Residence Permits by Citizenship on 31 December 2014 (%)

Source: Eurostat (migr_resshare), extracted August 2016. Data are unavailable for: Denmark, Greece, Croatia, Netherlands. UK and Norway are marked NA in data table.

5.2.3 Issues Regarding Long-term Residence in Ireland

The number of non-EEA nationals who applied for and were granted long-term residence in Ireland declined significantly between 2012 and 2015: applications fell by 90 per cent while the number of new long-term residence permits granted fell by 65 per cent. See Figure 5.4 and Table A5.3.

FIGURE 5.4 Long-term Residence Permits Held and New Permits Applied For by Non-EEA Nationals (Aged 16 and Over), 2010-2015



Source: Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service. See Table A5.3 for detailed data tables.

As noted in the previous Integration Monitor, the fall in long-term residence permits issued may be associated with improved processing of naturalisation applications and the large volume of naturalisation applications granted since 2010.

At time of writing the previous Annual Integration Monitor the publication of an *Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill* which could include a statutory long-term residence scheme was expected. However protracted delays in agreeing the details of this wide-ranging legislation and urgency arising from the findings of the Working Group on the Protection Process (See Box 1.1) contributed to a decision to extract and fast track the protection elements of the Bill, now enacted as the *International Protection Act, 2015*. The 2016 Programme for Government undertakes to introduce a comprehensive Immigration and Residency Reform Bill, aimed at modernising Ireland's visa and residency systems (Department of Taoiseach, 2016). It is possible that long-term residence will fall under the scope of this planned legislation.

5.3 CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

As noted in previous Integration Monitors Ireland's political system offers more opportunities for migrant integration than most EU countries. Irish or UK citizenship is required in order to stand or vote in general elections, but all

residents in Ireland, regardless of nationality, may stand and vote in local elections. The UNHCR RICE report notes that Ireland is unusual in having easy access to politicians, representatives and institutions in general (UNHCR, 2014).

MIPEX 2015 ranks Ireland highly in terms of the political participation of migrants. The dimensions of the political participation indicator are as follows; electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and implementation policies.⁸⁵ While the authors deem voting rights to be inclusive and note state support for immigrant-led organisations such as AKiDWA and the New Communities Partnership (NCP), it is stated that consultation with new communities is somewhat weak,⁸⁶ similar to many new immigration countries (Huddleston et al., 2015). The UNHCR (2014) highlighted the importance of volunteering to refugees, as a platform for creating and sustaining social and ethnic-community bridges, as a tool to improve English language skills and as a space for skills learning, skills which could then be transferable to other spheres of life.

5.3.1 Political Participation Indicator

Local and European elections took place in Ireland on 23 May 2014 and an Irish general election took place on 26 February 2016. The recommended indicator of integration in this domain is the share of immigrants among elected representatives. In order to give a more complete picture available, data are used below to construct indicators on migrant candidates, migrant elected representatives and migrant voter participation.

Non-Irish Candidates

The previous Integration Monitor reported that 37 migrant candidates stood in the 2009 local elections, of which 14 originally came from Nigeria and eight from Poland (McGinnity et al., 2014).⁸⁷ A total of 31 New Irish/Non-Irish/UK nationals contested the 2014 local elections (Kavanagh, 2014).⁸⁸ Polish and Nigerian were the most common nationalities among candidates.⁸⁹ Kavanagh (2014) notes that if the proportion of non-Irish/UK national candidates contesting the election

⁸⁵ See www.mipex.eu/political-participation, accessed August 2016.

⁸⁶ This indicator is based on answers from national researchers to the question: 'Are there strong and independent bodies composed of migrant representatives bodies or associations?' National researchers are asked to rate the strength of national, regional, capital and local organisations in terms of regular consultation; consultation composition; consultation leadership; consultation powers; consultation representativeness.

⁸⁷ A total of 1,823 candidates stood for election (McGing and Kavanagh, 2010).

⁸⁸ Provisional data contained in the article were confirmed by the author in November 2016.

⁸⁹ This group included eight female and 23 male candidates. As in 2009, most of the candidates ran as independent candidates (21), with two candidates running for Fine Gael, two candidates running for Labour, one candidate running for Sinn Féin, three candidates running for the Green Party and two candidates running for the People Before Profit Alliance.

reflected the resident population as recorded in Census 2011, there would have been 218 selected or declared, rather than 31.⁹⁰

Non-Irish Elected Representatives

The recommended indicator of integration in this domain is the share of immigrants among elected representatives. The 2014 Local Elections resulted in the election of 949 City and County Councillors. Out of this number just two non-Irish nationals were elected giving an indicator of 0.21 per cent (McGinnity et al., 2014).

The 2016 general election, in which only Irish and UK citizens had a vote, took place in February 2016. Out of 158 members of the Dáil⁹¹ just one member is a naturalised Irish national⁹² giving an indicator of 0.6 per cent.

Non-Irish Voter Participation

Table 5.8 shows the percentage of non-Irish nationals who are listed on the electoral register (2016/2017). Naturalised Irish nationals are included within the category of Irish nationals and cannot be separately identified. The percentage of non-Irish nationals who were resident in local authorities at the time of Census 2011 is also provided and the local authorities are sorted by the difference in percentage points.

This exercise suggests that Dublin City, Fingal and Galway County may face particular challenges regarding the mobilisation of migrant voters. There is a 15 point difference between the percentage of non-Irish adults resident in Dublin City and the percentage of non-Irish on the Register of Electors in Dublin City. In Fingal and Galway City the difference is 13 points.

The publication of Census 2016 population by local authority area will allow this analysis to be performed more accurately in the near future. The number of Irish, EU and non-EU nationals registered on the electoral register is supplied in Table A5.4.

⁹⁰ Based on the overall candidate number of 2,036 as of 8 May (Kavanagh, 2014).

⁹¹ www.oireachtas.ie.

⁹² Comments received from Immigrant Council of Ireland, September 2016.

TABLE 5.8 Percentage of Non-Irish Registered to Vote, 2016/2017, Compared to Percentage of Non-Irish in Usually Resident Population Aged 18 Years and Over in Local Authorities

Local Authority	% Non-Irish on Register of Electors 2016/2017 (A) %	% Non-Irish resident population aged 18 + based on Census 2011 (B) %	Difference (A - B) Percentage Points
Dublin City	5.7	21.1	- 15.4
Fingal	8.7	21.8	- 13.1
Galway City	9.0	21.6	- 12.6
Kildare	3.3	14.1	- 10.8
South Dublin	5.4	15.7	- 10.4
Cork City	4.8	14.8	- 10.0
Cavan	4.1	13.7	- 9.6
Meath	4.1	13.1	- 9.0
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown	4.4	13.4	- 8.9
Carlow	3.9	12.8	- 8.9
Westmeath	4.9	13.6	- 8.7
Waterford City and County	4.0	12.1	- 8.0
Longford	8.0	15.9	- 7.9
Limerick City and County	4.0	11.6	- 7.6
Wicklow	4.3	11.9	- 7.6
Galway County	2.9	10.5	- 7.6
Clare	5.3	12.6	- 7.3
Mayo	5.1	12.3	- 7.2
Kilkenny	3.4	10.6	- 7.1
Wexford	4.0	11.1	- 7.1
Cork County	5.8	12.9	- 7.1
Sligo	4.5	11.5	- 7.1
Kerry	6.2	13.2	- 7.1
Donegal	3.0	9.6	- 6.6
Laois	5.5	12.1	- 6.6
Roscommon	5.8	12.4	- 6.6
Louth	5.5	12.1	- 6.6
Leitrim	7.3	13.8	- 6.5
North and South Tipperary	5.0	11.3	- 6.3
Monaghan	6.3	12.6	- 6.2
Offaly	4.4	10.6	- 6.2
State	5.1	14.3	- 9.3

Sources: Electoral register data from Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government. Population data: CSO, Special tabulation, Census 2011.

Issues Related to Political Participation

International research indicates that ethnic minorities are less likely to register to vote than the majority population (Heath et al., 2013). Increasing the proportion of non-Irish nationals registered to vote in Ireland has continued to be a priority among NGOs, civil society organisations and local authorities since publication of the last Integration Monitor (2013).

Voting mobilisation efforts among migrants were undertaken ahead of the local and European elections in May 2014. For example in Forum Polonia ran a campaign entitled 'Vote! You are at home'.⁹³ The campaign sought to encourage Polish citizens to vote and aimed to strengthen and develop a network of contacts between the Polish community in Ireland, local leaders and volunteers, Irish partners and other minorities (O'Boyle et al., 2016). Dublin City Council was among local authorities that ran voter registration campaigns (Dublin City Council, 2016).

As discussed above we do not know what proportion of the migrant population has naturalised and therefore may vote as Irish citizens. The participation of naturalised Irish citizens was a priority for some NGOs in the period. For example Nasc hosted 'Your Ireland, Your Vote' open day events aimed at encouraging new Irish citizens to vote in the General election.⁹⁴ In addition the Minister reported the inclusion of a leaflet in the information packs issued to all candidates at citizenship ceremonies, which provides information on voting rights and how to register.⁹⁵

The establishment of an Electoral Commission forms part of the Programme for Government and if realised could enhance migrant voter participation and improve the quality of available data from the register.⁹⁶ There has been some progress in this regard with the publication of the Report of the Joint Committee on the Consultation on the Proposed Electoral Commission in January 2016 (Houses of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Environment, Culture and the Gaeltacht, 2016). The Immigrant Council of Ireland notes that official information on voting rights available from the responsible Department,⁹⁷ although translated into multiple languages, is long and difficult to extract key information from.⁹⁸

O'Boyle et al. (2016) observe that immigrants in Ireland have faced little anti-immigrant populist politics, relative to immigrants in the UK for example, but that migrants remain 'chronically unrepresented' within the Irish political system.

⁹³ This campaign was based on the project 'Your vote Your choice', which aimed at promoting civic participation in Poland and encouraging Polish migrants living in eight Member States of the European Union (Italy, Spain, France, the Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Belgium and Hungary) to vote in the European Parliament elections of May 2014, and in local government elections in the UK and Ireland held at the same time (O'Boyle et al., 2016).

⁹⁴ See www.nascireland.org/latest-news/nasc-to-host-your-ireland-your-vote-voter-registration-open-day.

⁹⁵ Minister for Justice and Equality, parliamentary question, 16 December 2015.

⁹⁶ Duplicate/multiple entries, deceased/emigrated voters appearing on the register, large groups of people not registered to vote and the mistaken removal of valid voters were all highlighted as problems in the Report of the Joint Committee on the Consultation on the Proposed Electoral Commission (Houses of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Environment, Culture and the Gaeltacht, 2016).

⁹⁷ Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government.

⁹⁸ Comments received from Immigrant Council of Ireland, September 2016.

Looking in particular at Polish migrants standing for and voting in the 2014 local election in Ireland, O’Boyle et al. report a disappointing level of engagement in 2014 compared to 2009. Drawing on survey research on the policies and practices of political parties regarding immigrant communities and ethnic-minority groups (Fanning et al., 2007) and on immigrant candidates (Fanning and O’Boyle, 2010) the authors comment that political parties do not actively seek to include, nor exclude, immigrants. It is proposed that there was a sense of disillusionment amongst Irish political parties, arising from low levels of immigrant voter turnout during the 2009 local government elections, and perceptions that immigrant candidates performed poorly in the 2009 elections (O’Boyle et al., 2016).

Migrants may engage politically without registering to vote. Sanders et al. (2014) looked at the democratic engagement of ethnic minorities in the UK and found that ethnic minority citizens were in general as democratically engaged as members of the white majority group. Democratic engagement is broadly defined and includes elements ranging from voting and membership of a political party to non-electoral engagement for example by signing petitions, taking part in peaceful demonstrations, interest in/knowledge of politics and institutional confidence. No similar analysis has yet been undertaken in Ireland.

The Immigrant Council of Ireland and Nasc are currently running a series of ‘One-Stop-Shops’ on civic and political participation of migrants in various locations. The Immigrant Council of Ireland and Forum Polonia are also working on a pilot internship scheme which allows Polish nationals to undertake internships with Dublin City Councillors.⁹⁹

5.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP

This chapter investigates the three ‘Zaragoza’ indicators designed to measure integration in the active citizenship domain and provides supplementary data and information on the themes of naturalisation, long-term residence and political participation. As such the chapter does not include broader active citizenship indicators on, for example, volunteering and trade union membership.

Naturalisation

The chapter has shown that a large group of naturalised migrants now have enhanced opportunities for integration in Ireland, in terms of access to institutions, goods and services and the potential for full participation in the

⁹⁹ Comments received from Immigrant Council of Ireland, September 2016.

democratic process. The annual increase in the naturalisation rate that was so prominent in previous Integration Monitors is not seen in this Monitor. The rate for non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over remained stable in 2012-2013 at around 16 per cent, before falling to 12.8 per cent in 2014 and again to 7.5 per cent in 2015. The number of naturalisation certificates issued has fallen by 46 per cent since 2012 to around 13,500 in 2015. It now appears therefore that the double effect, seen in the last Integration Monitor (2013), of a large cohort of immigrants becoming eligible to apply for naturalisation and the resolution of a sizeable processing backlog, has become much less pronounced.

While the number of certificates issued to non-EEA nationals more than halved, the number issued to EEA nationals annually more than doubled, but from a very low base. The low naturalisation rate for EEA nationals (0.78 per cent overall in 2014 according to Eurostat data) is unsurprising for a range of reasons discussed above. However the fact that a large group of residents in Ireland may not participate fully in the political system may represent a concern.

A range of improvements have been made to the naturalisation application procedure in Ireland since 2011, which has clearly had a very positive effect. However the continued lack of appeal for rejected applicants, the discretion which the Minister has in granting or refusing an application and high fees continue to be contentious issues. As noted in previous Monitors, the fact that resident non-EEA nationals aged under 16 are not required to register with the GNIB means that such children can face problems proving sufficient reckonable residence for the purpose of making a naturalisation application. The problem is particularly acute for children in care or otherwise separated from their family.

Long-term residence

The rate of non-EEA nationals acquiring long-term residence status has fallen significantly from 4.8 per cent in 2012 to 1.8 per cent in 2015. The fall in long-term residence permits issued may be associated with improved processing of naturalisation applications and the large volume of naturalisation applications granted since 2010. Progress has not yet been made on supporting the integration of migrants who cannot or do not wish to naturalise, through provision of a more secure immigration status.

Political Participation

MIPEX 2015 ranks Ireland highly in political participation, largely due to favourable voting rights. Our analysis shows that migrants remain very under-represented among political representatives; of 949 City and County Councillors elected in the 2014 Local Elections just two were non-Irish nationals giving an

indicator of 0.21 per cent. In the 2016 general election, in which only Irish and UK citizens had a vote, out of 158 members of the Dáil just one member is a naturalised Irish national giving an indicator of 0.6 per cent. The lack of political engagement among the migrant population, in particular the large resident EEA population, may be a concern. Bauböck et al. (2013) argue that the naturalisation of immigrants not only secures equal rights for the individual concerned, but when citizens of immigrant origin can exercise equal power in elections and politics at national level where the rights of foreigners are regulated, this benefits the wider migrant group. While NGOs have been active in trying to increase participation, research indicates that political parties need to redouble their efforts.

Box 5.1 Access to Citizenship¹⁰⁰

Defining Nationality and Citizenship

Citizenship describes the particular legal bond between an individual and his or her State, acquired by birth or naturalisation, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means according to national legislation (European Migration Network, 2014). In the Irish Constitution, the individual member of the State is referred to as a 'citizen' but the status is referred to as 'nationality and citizenship'. The EUDO CITIZENSHIP Observatory notes that the two terms describe different elements of the relationship between the individual and the Irish State. Nationality relates to the external (international) dimension, whereas citizenship relates to the internal (domestic) dimension.¹⁰¹

Citizenship Through Naturalisation

An application for a certificate of naturalisation is considered under the *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956, as amended*. Foreign nationals living in Ireland may apply to the Minister for Justice and Equality to become an Irish citizen by naturalisation if they are over 18 years, or a minor who was born in the State after 1 January 2005. The applicant must 'be of good character' and have had a period of one year continuous reckonable residence in the State immediately before the date of application and, during the previous eight years, have had a total reckonable residence in the State amounting to four years. The applicant must intend in good faith to continue to reside in the State after naturalisation and make a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State. In previous years applicants had been required to have been 'self-supporting' i.e. not dependent on social welfare for the three years prior to application. More recently this requirement has not featured strongly in decision making. A more pragmatic approach has been taken and social welfare checks are only carried out in cases where specific queries may arise.¹⁰² Periods spent in Ireland, for example, as an asylum applicant or as a student are not considered when calculating reckonable residence.

There is now an obligation on the State¹⁰³ to provide reasons for a refusal of an application for naturalisation (although this issue continues to be a source of some debate as discussed in Section 5.1.3). Aside from judicial review of proceedings there is no mechanism for challenging the refusal of an application. Currently Irish citizenship may be withdrawn, following a procedure set out in the *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956 as amended*, no matter how long a person has been an Irish citizen (though not if it would make them stateless).

¹⁰⁰ See www.inis.gov.ie/ and www.citizensinformation.ie/en/ for more general information.

¹⁰¹ EUDO CITIZENSHIP Observatory, 'Translations and a brief discussion of the use of the terms 'citizenship' and 'nationality in legal documents and political debates'. Available at: <http://eudo-citizenship.eu>.

¹⁰² Comments received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, November 2016.

¹⁰³ Following the judgment in the case of *Mallak [2012] IESC 59*.

Citizenship Through Birth or Descent

The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 provides that only children born to Irish citizen parent(s) automatically become Irish citizens. A child born on the island of Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 is entitled to Irish citizenship if they have a British parent, or a parent who is entitled to live in Northern Ireland or the Irish State without restriction on their residency. Other foreign national parents of children born in the island of Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 must prove that they have a genuine link to Ireland (evidenced by being resident legally for at least three out of the previous four years) in order for their child to claim Irish citizenship.¹⁰⁴ Irish citizens may hold the citizenship of another country without giving up their Irish citizenship.

Application Fees

The standard application fee payable by all applicants is €175. A further €950 is payable by successful adult applicants for naturalisation. The naturalisation fee is €200 in the case of minors and widows or widowers of Irish citizens. Persons granted refugee status and those recognised as stateless persons are exempt from payment of the naturalisation fee.¹⁰⁵ There is no possibility to have the naturalisation fee waived on economic or hardship grounds (Becker and Cosgrave, 2013b).

Box 5.2 Access to Long-Term Residence¹⁰⁶

Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence status. The current administrative scheme allows persons who have been legally resident in the State for a continuous period of five years or more on the basis of an employment permit (and their dependent spouses)¹⁰⁷ or scientific researchers, to apply for a five-year residency extension. They may also then apply to work without the need to hold an employment permit. A €500 fee for processing applications under this scheme was introduced in 2009. This long-term residency scheme is available to those who are still in employment and to those with an employment permit who, having completed five years' work, have been made redundant.

Non-EEA nationals who have lived in Ireland for at least eight years and who are of 'good character' may be permitted to remain in Ireland 'without condition as to time'. They receive a Stamp 5 registration on their passport and can work without an employment permit (Becker, 2010).

¹⁰⁴ If children are born outside Ireland their parent or grandparent must have been born in Ireland for them to qualify automatically for citizenship. See www.inis.gov.ie for further information.

¹⁰⁵ Minister for Justice and Equality, parliamentary question, 3 December 2015.

¹⁰⁶ See www.inis.gov.ie/ and www.citizensinformation.ie/en/ for more general information.

¹⁰⁷ In order to apply for long-term residency as a spouse/dependant, the applicant must be legally resident in the State as a spouse/dependant for the required five years. Long-term permission does not exempt the spouse/dependant(s) from employment permit requirements.

Chapter 5 Appendix

TABLE A5.1 Valid Applications for Naturalisation 2010-2015 and Number of Rejected Applications

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Valid applications received*	9,000	18,300	19,900	18,976	15,415	12,651
Number of rejected applications for naturalisation	1,239	618	407	720	638	492

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2016.

Note: *Valid applications' refers to those applications accepted for processing, i.e. they were correctly completed and included the required supporting documentation

TABLE A5.2 Non-EEA Nationals who Acquired Citizenship, by Sex, 2013-2015¹⁰⁸

	Number who Acquired Citizenship	Percentage of Total
2015		
Male	5,376	51.6
Female	5,042	48.4
Total	10,421	100.0
2014		
Male	8,845	48.7
Female	9,307	51.3
Total	18,155	100.0
2013		
Male	10,219	45.5
Female	12,207	54.4
Total	22,456	100.0

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2016.

Notes: Total includes persons for whom gender is unspecified: 3 in 2015, 3 in 2014 and 30 in 2013. Non-EEA data include persons recorded as 'as Stateless, Unknown or Recognised non-citizen': 3 (2011), 6 (2012), 1 (2013), 2 (2014), 6 (2015). Certificates were also issued to persons whose nationality was not readily available and these are included in the non-EEA data: 78 (2011), 1 (2013), 15 (2014), 22 (2015)

TABLE A5.3 Non-EEA Nationals Holding Long-Term Residence and Number of New Long-Term Residence Permits Applied For During 2010-2015

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Persons holding long-term residence	8,367	7,721	5,771	3,392	2,309	2,019
New applications for long-term residence	2,415	1,812	705	288	164	69

Source: Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, data received August 2016.

¹⁰⁸ Note that these tables include data on non-EEA nationals aged under 16 years, which were unavailable in previous Annual Monitoring Reports on Integration.

TABLE A5.4 Register of Electors 2016/2017 by Local Authority and Voter Nationality*

	Total Registered	Irish citizens %	British citizens %	Other EU %	Non-EU citizens %
Dublin City	338,999	94.3	1.6	0.3	3.8
Cork	308,483	94.2	2.0	0.6	3.2
South Dublin	190,168	94.6	0.8	0.2	4.4
Fingal	183,819	91.3	1.5	0.8	6.4
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown	156,639	95.6	1.8	0.7	2.0
Kildare	143,591	96.7	1.2	0.4	1.7
Limerick City and County	141,753	96.0	0.9	0.2	2.8
Meath	140,515	95.9	1.1	1.4	1.6
Galway	135,859	97.1	1.3	0.7	1.0
Donegal	125,674	97.0	1.3	0.2	1.5
Tipperary	124,010	95.0	1.9	0.7	2.4
Kerry	116,276	93.8	2.5	2.4	1.4
Wexford	111,643	96.0	1.5	1.7	0.8
Mayo	102,448	94.9	2.6	0.4	2.1
Wicklow	96,063	95.7	2.1	0.4	1.8
Louth	94,780	94.5	0.9	0.9	3.7
Clare	90,361	94.7	2.1	1.1	2.2
Cork City	83,414	95.2	1.0	0.6	3.2
Waterford City and County	83,068	96.0	2.0	0.5	1.5
Kilkenny	71,093	96.6	1.3	0.3	1.8
Westmeath	68,448	95.1	0.9	0.6	3.3
Laois	60,393	94.5	1.3	1.2	3.0
Offaly	57,654	95.6	1.3	0.3	2.8
Cavan	55,734	95.9	1.1	0.3	2.8
Sligo	53,110	95.5	1.9	0.4	2.2
Roscommon	48,831	94.2	3.5	0.2	2.0
Monaghan	48,791	93.7	0.5	0.2	5.6
Galway City	45,731	91.0	1.3	7.3	0.4
Carlow	40,958	96.1	1.1	1.7	1.1
Longford	30,762	92.0	2.2	1.3	4.4
Leitrim	26,989	92.7	3.9	0.8	2.6
Total	3,376,057	94.9	1.6	0.8	2.7

Source: Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government.

Note: *Nationality inferred from voter's eligibility to vote in elections as follows: Irish citizens may vote at every election and referendum; British citizens may vote at Dáil, European and local elections; Other EU citizens may vote at European and local elections; Non-EU citizens may vote at local elections only.

Chapter 6

Special Topic – Immigrants in Ireland: Skills and Competencies

By Merike Darmody and Emer Smyth

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In most developed countries the employment rates of immigrants fall short of those of natives (OECD, 2008). However, the situation varies notably between jurisdictions. This occurs because of differences in the profile of immigrant groups, including their skill levels and language proficiency, or because labour markets and institutions across jurisdictions differ in their approach to immigration and immigrant employment (Bratsberg et al., 2013). The share of skill-based admissions varies considerably across host countries (Levels et al., 2014). In recent years, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have admitted most immigrants based on the country's skill requirements. Labour market prospects are generally better for high-skilled immigrants than for other immigrants (Aydemir, 2014). Successful integration into the labour market of the receiving country is seen to benefit immigrants as well as local economies.

Immigrants' skills are related to a number of factors including: age, ethnicity, time of arrival, educational attainment and language proficiency, among others (Batalova and Fix, 2015). Proficiency in the language of the host country is often seen as the most important condition for labour market integration. The foreign-born who lack host-country language proficiency can become a group with cumulative disadvantages as language skills not only determine their position on the labour market but also the level of their social integration. Individuals not proficient in the majority language face a 14 percentage-point lower employment rate than other immigrants and an over-qualification rate that is on average 17 percentage points higher across OECD countries (Thoreau, 2014).

Previous Integration Monitor reports have included a special theme, providing an in-depth examination of an area relevant to one of the many aspects of integration. In this report the special theme is the skills and competencies of immigrants in Ireland. Immigrants in Ireland have high levels of educational attainment relative to other countries (CSO, 2012), and Chapter 3 has shown that many immigrant groups have higher educational qualifications than the Irish

population. However, even at the same educational level, immigrants may differ notably in their English language proficiency.

While previous research has highlighted differences in the literacy and numeracy skills of 15-year-old Irish and immigrant youth (McGinnity et al., 2014), less is known about the skills and competencies of the immigrant adult population in Ireland, a gap that can be addressed using the OECD PIAAC Survey of Adult Skills.

This chapter investigates the skills of the working-age population (16-65) in Ireland and compares the skills of immigrants with those of the native-born population using PIAAC data. The Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), conducted in 2012 by the OECD, assesses the proficiency of adults in literacy, numeracy and problem solving in technology-rich environments. These are considered to be 'key information-processing skills' as they are considered necessary for full integration and participation in the labour market, education and training, as well as in social life. The weighted response rate in Ireland was 72 per cent, with almost 6,000 adults (5,983) between the ages of 16 and 65 (CSO, 2013) participating in the study. The survey was administered between August 2011 and March 2012 by the Central Statistics Office on behalf of the Department of Education and Skills. The survey was based on a three-stage unequal probability sample, with areas, households and adults selected at random within each county (CSO, 2013). Further variation in the weights was added through non-response and calibration adjustments.¹⁰⁹ Data were collected face-to-face by CSO interviewers in the homes of respondents using a mix of laptop computers and paper test booklets.

The analysis provided in this chapter has been carried out using the IEA IDB Analyse; statistical software developed by the International Association for the Evaluation of Education Achievement Data Process and Research Centre (IEA-DPC) for analysing large-scale international assessment data. It takes account of the complex sampling design in computing sampling variance and of the series of test scores (plausible values) assigned to each respondent. The chapter considers differences in skill levels according to language of origin and country of birth as well as level of educational attainment, age, and gender. The chapter also explores how Ireland compares with selected case study countries regarding the native-immigrant skills gap. These countries were selected on the basis of the unique snapshot of the characteristics of immigrants provided in OECD (2008).

¹⁰⁹ For more information, see:
www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/surveysandmethodologies/surveys/education/piaac/documents/AdjudicationIreland.pdf.

6.2 IMMIGRANT SKILLS

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report, many individuals of immigrant origin in Ireland tend to be young and overqualified for their jobs. This is not surprising considering that a high proportion of immigrants in Ireland are highly educated (Darmody et al., 2016). On the basis of their higher levels of education and younger age, immigrants would be expected to possess higher skills. However, it is possible that low levels of English language proficiency may impact on access to skilled jobs. Exploring the skill levels of non-Irish nationals sheds further light on the interplay between education, skills and proficiency in English.

The descriptive analysis of PIAAC data shows that 18 per cent of the adult respondents to the PIAAC survey were of immigrant backgrounds (either first or second generation).¹¹⁰ Because of the small number of cases in some groups, country of birth was grouped in the Irish PIAAC data; the largest group (11 per cent of the total sample) were born in North America and Western Europe; the rest coming from Central and Eastern Europe (6 per cent), Asia (2 per cent) and Africa (1 per cent).¹¹¹ Over half of the new arrivals were younger than 44 years of age and had arrived to Ireland after 1991.

As with the national population (see Chapter 3), there were significant differences ($p < .005$) between the levels of educational attainment of immigrants and Irish-born adults in the PIAAC sample; while the proportion of people with tertiary education was 43 per cent among the immigrant group, the corresponding figure among Irish adults was 29 per cent. Similar differences were found in terms of the educational attainment of respondents' parents; a higher proportion of immigrants had at least one parent with tertiary education, compared to the Irish-born (39 per cent vs. 18 per cent). There were also significant differences ($p < .005$)¹¹² in levels of educational attainment between country groups, with the highest proportion of those with tertiary education among respondents of Asian origin (73 per cent), followed by those from North America and Western Europe (40 per cent). There are also significant differences ($p < .005$) between immigrants and the Irish-born in their age profile. The proportion of young people (24 and less) in the PIAAC dataset is equal for immigrants and Irish-born individuals (18 per cent). However, there are more immigrants than Irish-born individuals in the age group 25-34 (37 per cent vs. 22

¹¹⁰ According to Eurostat (2015), foreign nationals make up 11.8 per cent of the Irish population. See: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7113991/3-18122015-BP-EN.pdf/d682df12-8a77-46a5-aaa9-58a00a8ee73e>.

¹¹¹ Some cases were too small to be allocated separate categories and are grouped as 'other' (0.7 per cent; $n=39$).

¹¹² In the Data Analyser, standard errors are used to determine whether there are 'statistically significant' differences between estimates. The significance used in PIAAC is at the 5 per cent level (CSO, 2013).

per cent) and 35-44 (26 per cent vs. 23 per cent); the Irish-born outnumber immigrants in the older age categories.

The remainder of the chapter focuses on the literacy, numeracy and problem solving skills of immigrant and Irish adults aged 16 to 65. The main classification in this report is based on a combination of place of birth and native language, distinguishing between three groups:

- Irish-born and native English speaker (80 per cent);
- Foreign-born and native English speaker (12 per cent);
- Foreign-born and foreign language speaker (8 per cent).¹¹³

In addition, patterns are analysed across a range of other criteria, including country of origin, level of education, gender and age. The analyses focus on comparing mean (average) test scores but also look at the distribution across skills levels to assess whether (certain groups of) immigrants are likely to have very low literacy, numeracy and problem solving skills.

6.2.1 Literacy

In order to assess participants' literacy levels, they were asked to read through texts of varying complexity to find specific pieces of information. The texts included newspaper articles, websites and posters. The results from the assessment are reported on a 500-point scale, with a higher score indicating greater proficiency. Literacy mean scores are found to differ by the country of birth and language spoken, reflecting fluency in English. The analysis shows that in Ireland Irish-born English speakers have an average score of 267 compared with 274 for foreign-born English language speakers; the extent to which this reflects the higher educational profile of this group is analysed below. Immigrants whose first language is not English achieve notably lower scores, at 249 points.

Comparison of literacy scores by country of birth reveals that those born in North America or Western Europe have the highest scores (283), followed by Asians (256), those from Central and Eastern Europe (247) and Africa (243).

Adults with higher levels of education tend to achieve higher literacy scores (CSO, 2013). Therefore, the higher educational profile of immigrants may partially mask their skill differences from those of Irish adults. For both Irish and immigrant

¹¹³ PIAAC findings across OECD countries also routinely report findings for the 'native-born and foreign language' group. However, this group is too small in the Irish sample to permit separate analyses.


adults, average literacy scores are highest for those with tertiary education (Table 6.1). Within educational groups, foreign-born, foreign language speakers have the lowest average scores; there is little evidence that the skills gap differs across educational levels. The pattern is different for foreign-born English language speakers who have higher scores than their Irish counterparts among those with secondary education but lower scores for post-secondary and tertiary groups.

TABLE 6.1 Mean Literacy Score by Educational Attainment and Immigrant Status

Level of education	Irish-born, English language speaker	Foreign-born, English language speaker	Foreign-born, foreign language speaker
Secondary or lower	252	262	231
Post-secondary	269	264	238
Tertiary	295	291	271

Source: PIAAC microdata.

FIGURE 6.1 Level of Performance in Literacy Tests by Immigrant and Irish-born Status



Source: PIAAC microdata.

To help interpret the scores, the scale can be divided into proficiency levels. There are six levels for literacy; from below Level 1 (the lowest) to Level 5 (the highest).¹¹⁴ Across participating countries, 16.7 per cent of participants performed at or below Level 1, which is seen as a low level of skills. As shown in Figure 6.1, comparison of percentages at each skill level of immigrants and the Irish-born¹¹⁵ in Ireland reveals that there were somewhat more immigrants below Level 1 (7 per cent versus 4 per cent). There were no notable differences in literacy scores for higher categories.

¹¹⁴ Below Level 1 (0-175); Level 1 (176-225); Level 2 (226-275); Level 3 (276-325); Level 4 (326-375); Level 5 (376-500)

¹¹⁵ Due to small numbers, 'Level 4 and Level 5' were combined.

Table 6.2 shows that 28 per cent of immigrants who were brought up speaking a different language performed at or 'below Level 1' compared to 17 per cent of Irish-born, English language users. Foreign-born, English language speakers were less likely to fall into the low skill group and more likely to fall into the highest skill group (Level 3 and above).

TABLE 6.2 Percentages of Adults at Levels of Literacy Proficiency by Language and Place of Birth

Level of education	Irish-born, English language speaker	Foreign-born English language speaker	Foreign-born, foreign language speaker
Level 1 and below	17	12	28
Level 2	38	37	39
Level 3	37	40	28
Level 4, 5	8.3	10.6	5.3

Source: PIAAC microdata.

There were no notable gender differences in the literacy score between male and female Irish-born respondents (269 and 266 respectively). For immigrant respondents, the gender differences in literacy scores were not statistically significant, although females achieved somewhat higher scores (261 for males and 265 for females). There were also somewhat more immigrant females than males with tertiary education in the sample (47 per cent vs. 39 per cent).

Table 6.3 presents the comparison of literacy levels by immigrant status and age. Across all age groups, except those over 55 years of age, immigrant adults are more likely to fall into the low skill group (Level 1 or below) compared with Irish-born adults. The difference is least pronounced for those aged 35-44 where an equal proportion of Irish and immigrant adults have high literacy proficiency (Level 4 or above).


TABLE 6.3 Percentages of Adults at Levels of Literacy Proficiency by Age Group and Immigrant Status

Level of education	24 years or less		25-34 years		35-44 years		45-54 years		55+ years	
	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born
Level 1 or below	17	12	19	10	18	16	27	20	23	28
Level 2	37	41	40	34	33	33	37	42	35	41
Level 3	40	39	34	42	38	40	28	31	36	28
Level 4 and higher	5	9	7	14	11	11	9	6	6	3

Source: PIAAC microdata.

The descriptive analysis indicates that the immigrant-native literacy gap varies by education, age and language. As a next step, multivariate analysis (linear regression) was carried out using IDB Analyser, to determine whether immigrant-native differences in literacy proficiency disappear when controlling for these and other variables. Model 1 (see Figure 6.2) presents analysis based on place of birth and language with literacy test scores (plausible) values as a dependent or outcome variable.¹¹⁶

FIGURE 6.2 Literacy Test Scores by Place of Birth and Language Showing (A) Raw Differences from the Irish-born and (B) Differences Adjusted for Gender, Age and Educational Level (Linear Regression)



Source: PIAAC microdata.

As shown in the descriptive analysis above, foreign-born, foreign language speakers have significantly lower average literacy scores than Irish-born adults, while foreign-born, English language speakers have slightly (but significantly) higher scores than Irish adults.¹¹⁷ Controlling for levels of education, age and gender (Model 2), the difference between foreign-born English language speakers and their Irish counterparts becomes non-significant; thus, the higher raw scores of this group were due to their higher levels of education and younger profile. Comparing like with like, the literacy skills gap between foreign-born, foreign language speakers and Irish adults becomes larger (from 9 to 14.5 points).


Analysis of country of birth (Asia, Africa, North America and Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe) shows that immigrants from Africa and Central/

¹¹⁶ Instead of one proficiency score, PIAAC survey has ten plausible values (PVs) that are combined in a certain way to come up with correct estimates and standard errors. The OECD has created software tool to use these plausible values in analysis taking into account the complex sampling and assessment design of PIAAC.

¹¹⁷ See Appendix A6.1 for full linear regression table.

Eastern Europe have significantly lower literacy scores than those born in Ireland (see Figure 6.3). Scores among those of Asian origin are also lower but do not differ significantly from the Irish-born group. In contrast, those from North America and Western Europe have significantly higher literacy scores than the Irish-born. Controlling for education, age, and gender, the literacy skills gap between the Irish-born and those from Africa, Central/Eastern Europe and Asia becomes larger while the advantage for those from North America and Western Europe reduces in size to become non-significant. Thus, the profile of immigrant groups in terms of higher educational levels and a younger profile serves to partially conceal the literacy skills gap in relation to Irish-born adults.

FIGURE 6.3 Literacy Test Scores by Country of Birth and Literacy Test Scores (Plausible Values) Showing (A) Raw Differences from the Irish-born and (B) Differences Adjusted for Gender, Age and Educational Level (Linear Regression)



Source: PIAAC microdata.

6.2.2 Numeracy

PIAAC numeracy test included real-world problems and ranged from simple sums to the calculation of averages, percentages and the estimation of quantities. The format of the tasks included supermarket price tags, food labels, graphs and tables containing numbers.

There is no notable difference between the average numeracy proficiency of immigrant (257) and Irish-born (255) adults. However, the average mean scores in numeracy vary by respondents' language background and place of birth: foreign-born individuals with a language other than English score significantly ($p < .005$) lower (246) than Irish-born English speakers (255). However, foreign-born English language speakers have the highest numeracy scores (265). In terms of country of birth, respondents born in North America and Western Europe have

an average numeracy score of 270; while those of African origin have the lowest average score at 235.


As with literacy tests, both immigrant and Irish-born participants with tertiary degrees attained higher numeracy scores compared to those with lower levels of education. The pattern of numeracy scores reflected that of literacy scores: foreign-born, non-English speakers had the lowest scores within each level of education. Foreign-born English speakers with at least secondary education achieved higher average scores than their Irish-born counterparts but there was a skills advantage for the Irish-born with post-secondary and tertiary education (Table 6.4).

TABLE 6.4 Mean Numeracy Score by Educational Attainment and Immigrant Status

Level of education	Irish-born, English language speaker	Foreign-born English language speaker	Foreign-born, foreign language speaker
Secondary or lower	238	251	226
Post-secondary	256	252	228
Tertiary	287	284	273

Source: PIAAC microdata.

FIGURE 6.4 Levels of Performance in Numeracy Tests by Immigrant Status (Percentages)



Source: PIAAC microdata.

Figure 6.4 shows differences between immigrant and Irish-born groups in their numeracy levels: there were somewhat more immigrant respondents with very low skill levels (below Level 1) compared to the Irish-born (9 per cent vs. 7 per cent), but the Irish-born are more likely to be in the Level 1 and 2 categories. The

immigrants were more likely to fall into the highest skill groups (Level 3 and above). As shown in Table 6.5, 30 per cent of individuals born outside Ireland and not native English speakers scored at Level 1 or below in numeracy. Foreign-born English language speakers were more likely to perform at a higher level than the Irish and immigrants with a different mother tongue.

TABLE 6.5 Percentages of Adults at Levels of Numeracy Proficiency by Language and Place of Birth

Level of education	Irish-born, English language speaker	Foreign-born English language speaker	Foreign-born, foreign language speaker
Level 1 and below	26	19	30
Level 2	38	38	37
Level 3	29	34	27
Level 4 and higher	8	10	6

Source: PIAAC microdata.

TABLE 6.6 Percentages of Adults at Levels of Numeracy Proficiency by Gender and Immigrant Status

Level of education	Male		Female	
	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born
Level 1 and below	24	21	24	30
Level 2	35	36	39	40
Level 3	32	31	31	26
Level 4 and higher	10	11	7	4

Source: PIAAC microdata.


There were significant gender differences in numeracy test scores. Irish-born men scored significantly ($p < .005$) higher than Irish-born females in the numeracy test (262 and 249 respectively). Among immigrant respondents, there was also a gender gap, but a much smaller one than among the Irish-born group (259 for males and 255 for females). As shown in Table 6.6, there were no notable differences between immigrant males and females in the proportion with very low scores, in contrast to the over-representation of adult Irish-born women in the lowest skill group. However, there were more immigrant males than immigrant females who performed at Level 4 or higher. There were few differences within age groups in the proportion with low numeracy skill levels; the exception was the oldest age group (55+) where the Irish-born had much lower skill levels than their immigrant counterparts (see Table 6.7).

TABLE 6.7 Percentages of Adults at Levels of Numeracy Proficiency by Age and Immigrant Status

Level of education	24 or less		25-34		35-44		45-54		55+	
	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born
Level 1 or below	22	23	22	18	21	23	31	29	23	38
Level 2	42	40	39	37	34	41	33	40	35	40
Level 3	30	30	31	35	34	36	26	25	35	20
Level 4 and higher	6	6	8	11	12	11	10	6	6	4

Source: PIAAC microdata.

Multivariate analyses were also carried out for numeracy skills with numeracy plausible values as a dependent variable. As with literacy skills, foreign-born/foreign language speakers achieve significantly lower scores compared to the Irish-born while foreign-born/English speakers achieve significantly higher scores (see the first set of columns in Figure 6.5). Taking account of level of education (the second set of columns), age and gender, the differences between the Irish-born and non-English speakers remain significant and, in fact, become larger, indicating the importance of English language proficiency. The initial numeracy test score advantage for foreign-born English speakers becomes non-significant when the higher educated and younger profile of this group is taken into account.


FIGURE 6.5 Raw and Adjusted Differences in Numeracy Test Scores by Place of Birth and Language Interaction (Linear Regression)

Source: PIAAC microdata.

Turning to country of birth, immigrants from Africa and Central/Eastern Europe have significantly lower numeracy test scores than those born in Ireland. Those from North America and Western Europe achieve significantly higher numeracy scores while the difference between the Irish-born and those from Asia is not significant (see first set of columns, Figure 6.6). Taking account of level of

education, age, and gender (Model 2), the differences between the Irish and those from Africa or Central/Eastern Europe become more pronounced while the gap for those from Asia becomes larger and significant. The test score advantage for those from Western Europe and North America becomes smaller but remains statistically significant.

FIGURE 6.6 Country of Birth and Numeracy Plausible Values (Linear Regression)




Source: PIAAC microdata.

6.2.3 Problem Solving

The problem solving in technology-rich environments test involved the use of various computer applications including email, spreadsheets, word processing etc. The design of the survey allowed for participants to take the test on paper. Seventeen per cent of the Irish sample opted for this option compared with 9 per cent in other countries (CSO, 2013). Consequently there are no problem solving data for this group and the responses are affected by this as the mean scores are not representative of the full population.¹¹⁸ For this reason, this section presents only percentages of adults by levels of problem solving proficiency. Figure 6.7 shows significant ($p < .005$) differences in levels of problem solving by immigrant status. While there were more Irish-born adults performing below Level 1 (19 per cent vs. 17 per cent), the proportion of those performing at Level 2 and above was higher among immigrants (40 per cent vs. 37 per cent).

¹¹⁸ In order to give more robust comparison across countries, the OECD uses the percentage of adults within each level of problem solving scale.

FIGURE 6.7 Problem Solving by Immigrant Background

Source: PIAAC microdata.

Table 6.8 shows that a similar proportion of Irish-born English language speakers and foreign-born foreign language speakers (19 per cent) performed below Level 1. Foreign-born English language speakers were more likely to achieve higher problem solving scores compared to the other two groups: natives and those born abroad and having a different mother tongue to English (42 per cent at Level 2 and higher compared with 37 per cent and 34 per cent respectively).

TABLE 6.8 Percentages of Adults at Levels of Problem Solving by Language and Place of Birth

Level of education	Irish-born, English language speaker	Foreign-born English language speaker	Foreign-born, foreign language speaker
Below Level 1	19	16	19
Level 1	44	42	46
Level 2 and higher	37	42	34

Source: PIAAC microdata.

There were significant gender differences ($p < .005$) in problem solving test scores among the Irish born group with no marked gender variation among the immigrant population. There were few differences between immigrant and Irish males but appreciably higher skill levels among immigrant women compared to their Irish-born counterparts (see Table 6.9). Significant differences ($p < .005$) could also be observed in participants' performance by age group (see Table 6.10). Younger immigrants and Irish-born adults were more likely to have higher problem solving scores than their older counterparts. While Irish-born adults under age 34 were more likely to perform at Level 2 or higher compared to their immigrant counterparts, immigrants in the older age categories outperformed their Irish counterparts at higher levels of problem solving.

TABLE 6.9 Percentages of Adults at Levels of Problem Solving Proficiency by Gender and Immigrant Status

Level of education	Male		Female	
	immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born
Below Level 1	17	18	17	20
Level 1	44	41	43	47
Level 2 and higher	40	41	40	33

Source: PIAAC microdata.

TABLE 6.10 Percentages of Adults at Levels of Problem Solving Proficiency by Age and Immigrant Status

Level of education	24 or less		25-34		35-44		45-54		55+	
	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born	Immigrant	Irish-born
Below Level 1	13	11	16	12	18	22	16	27	29	40
Level 1	47	42	40	42	41	43	48	49	47	47
Level 2 and higher	40	46	44	46	41	35	36	24	24	12

Source: PIAAC microdata.

6.3 IRELAND IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS

This section presents comparative analyses of literacy, numeracy and problem solving skills across a range of European countries. In particular, the analysis focuses on how Ireland compares to the selected countries in terms of the immigrant and native skills gap. Spain was chosen as, like Ireland, it has faced large-scale immigration in recent decades while being essentially a country of emigration in the past. Over-qualification is an issue for immigrants in many South European and some North European countries. For example, in Spain and Sweden the share of immigrants holding jobs for which they are overqualified is twice as high as for those born in the country. Points-based immigration is used to regulate immigration from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) in the United Kingdom. Whether this has resulted in higher skills among immigrants will be explored in this section. Germany and France have been selected because of the long tradition of recruiting foreign workers but concerns persist over the integration of the new arrivals into the labour force. This has partially been explained by lower levels of formal education among immigrants (Speckesser, 2013). While comparing the information across countries a single definition for immigrants is being used, which is 'foreign-born' due to data limitations and to avoid too small numbers in some categories.

The proportion of immigrants varies across the selected case study countries. The highest proportion is in Germany and Sweden (20 per cent), followed by Ireland and the UK (18 per cent), France (17 per cent) and Spain (12 per cent). Immigrants also vary by their native language; across the case study countries,

the proportion of foreign-born, foreign language speakers was the highest in Sweden (15 per cent) and Germany (11 per cent).

TABLE 6.11 Educational Attainment (Immigrants and Native-born, %)

	Secondary or lower		Post-secondary		Tertiary	
	Immigrant	Native-born	Immigrant	Native-born	Immigrant	Native-born
Ireland	39	53	18	17	43	29
France	76	73	N/A	N/A	24	27
Germany	70	63	4	6	26	31
Spain	77	68	3	2	21	21
Sweden	65	64	6	9	29	28
United Kingdom	51	67	0.3	0.2	48	33

Source: PIAAC microdata.

Note: Information on post-secondary education was not available for France. N/A denotes not applicable.

There is a notable gap in educational attainment between immigrants and native-born adults in the case study countries. In Ireland and the UK a greater proportion of immigrants have tertiary education compared to the native-born population (see Table 6.11). In Spain, France and Germany immigrants with secondary education or lower outnumber the native-born population. Sweden appears distinctive in having a similar educational profile among the native and immigrant populations.¹¹⁹

6.3.1 The Native-Immigrant Gap in Literacy, Numeracy and Problem Solving Skills


Average test scores vary notably across countries so this section focuses on relative rather than absolute differences in skills between immigrant and native adults.

Figure 6.8 shows the immigrant-native skills gap in literacy across the case study countries based on country of birth and language. It shows the difference in average test score between the native-born native language speakers and the three immigrant groups. A native advantage (higher scores) can be observed across all the case study countries compared to immigrants brought up to speak a different language to that of the host country. The largest gap between native-born, native language speakers and immigrants with a foreign language is evident in Sweden and France. The smallest gap is found in Ireland and the UK, most

¹¹⁹ Over the years Sweden has accepted many refugees and asylum seekers who arrived with relatively low levels of education and transferrable skills. In recent years the education level of immigrants overall to Sweden has increased. Forty-four per cent of immigrants who arrived after 2002 had some form of higher education, compared to 31 per cent of those who arrived before 1991 (Fredlund-Blomst (2013)).

likely reflecting the higher educational profile of immigrant groups in these countries (see above). Foreign-born, native speakers have lower scores than the native-born in all countries, except Ireland, but the skills gap is much smaller for those groups than those with another mother tongue.


FIGURE 6.8 The Immigrant-Native Skills Gap in Literacy across the Selected Countries



Source: PIAAC microdata.

Note: The 'native-born, foreign language' category was omitted for Ireland because of small numbers.


As with literacy, a larger native-immigrant gap in numeracy skills could be observed between the native-born native language speakers and foreign-born foreign language speakers, particularly in Sweden and France. The numeracy gap for this group is much smaller in Ireland compared to the other case study countries (Figure 6.9). Foreign-born native speakers have lower numeracy scores in all countries except Ireland, with the largest gap found in France.

FIGURE 6.9 The Immigrant-Native Skills Gap in Numeracy across the Selected Countries

Source: PIAAC microdata.

Note: The 'native-born, foreign language' category was omitted for Ireland because of small numbers.

It should be borne in mind that a small proportion (9 per cent internationally) of adults with some technology skills could opt to take the assessment on paper rather than on computer. This means that no problem solving data exist for this group. The OECD have cautioned that problem solving mean scores are not representative of the full population of computer-users across countries, and are thus not suitable for international comparison (CSO, 2013). In addition, the problem solving test was not carried out in Spain. The analysis provided here is based on the percentage of adult immigrants within each level of the problem solving scale as a more robust measure of proficiency for comparison purposes.

FIGURE 6.10 Levels of Problem Solving Scale by Immigrant and Native Status

Source: PIAAC microdata.

Note: France did not participate in the problem solving assessment.

Figure 6.10 shows that more immigrants in Ireland scored at Level 2 or above compared to the Irish-born (40 per cent vs. 37 per cent). The pattern differed for Sweden where there were notably more immigrants who performed below Level 1 (32 per cent vs. 12 per cent). A similar pattern could be observed for Germany (30 per cent vs. 15 per cent) and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom (23 per cent vs. 17 per cent).¹²⁰

6.4 SUMMARY

It is likely that labour migration in Ireland will persist at a relatively high level in the coming decades. Skills disparities between migrants and natives are consistently observed among school-going children in various countries and are evident at all stages of the educational career (Heath et al., 2008). Although the achievement gap¹²¹ between immigrants and non-migrants is also observed for adults (Kahn, 2004), migration-related skills disparities between adults are rarely studied. This chapter has explored the size of the immigrant-native skills gap in Ireland, but also cross-nationally, focussing on PIAAC data on literacy, numeracy and problem solving.

¹²⁰ The comparison of levels by country of birth and language are not provided here because of very small numbers across some categories.

¹²¹ The achievement gap refers to the observed, persistent disparity of educational measures between the performance of groups of students, especially groups defined by socio-economic status (SES), race/ethnicity and gender.

According to the analysis presented here, the immigrant-native skills gap is mainly driven by English language proficiency. This is in line with previous studies which show that language proficiency is an important determinant of immigrant productivity (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2002). According to OECD calculations, immigrants who report language difficulties have over-qualification rates that are 25 percentage points higher than similar immigrants with stronger language skills (OECD, 2014).

Irish immigration policy is likely to have had an impact on the characteristics of migrants, especially of recent arrivals. Today's migration flows in Ireland are characterised by higher levels of education. Despite this, due to limited English language proficiency among some immigrants, Irish-born adults are found to have higher average literacy and numeracy scores than immigrant adults. As expected, immigrants and Irish-born individuals with tertiary education perform better across all three tests: literacy, numeracy and problem solving. Among immigrant respondents, females had higher literacy scores while in numeracy males outperformed females. Analysis by age group showed that immigrants outperformed Irish-born respondents among the older age categories. Multivariate analysis indicates that even when controlling for levels of education, age and gender, foreign-born, foreign language speakers achieve lower literacy scores. Those coming from North America and Western Europe tend to perform better in literacy and numeracy tests compared to other immigrant groups, even when controlling for education, age and gender. Compared to literacy and numeracy data, less information was available in the PIAAC data for problem solving in technology-rich environments (with mean scores not representative of population). Analysis of levels of proficiency revealed that the proportion of those performing at Level 2 and above was higher among immigrants. As before, language proficiency is important: foreign-born English language speakers were more likely to achieve higher scores compared to the other two groups: natives and those born abroad and having a different mother tongue to English.

Taken together, the analysis provided in this chapter shows that immigrant skill levels are, first and foremost, influenced by proficiency in English. Language proficiency overrides country of birth: those born abroad but with high levels of English language proficiency perform well across three skill areas. Foreign-born, foreign language speakers tend to have lower skill scores, despite their high levels of education.

How does Ireland compare with other countries regarding immigrant skill levels? The skills gap between the native-born and the foreign-born with a foreign language varies notably across a selection of countries, including France,

Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. For literacy and numeracy, the relative gap is smaller in Ireland than in the other countries with the largest skills gap found in Sweden. There were no notable differences in problem solving between immigrants and the Irish-born in Ireland; the pattern differed for Sweden where there were significantly ($p < .005$) more immigrants than Swedish-born adults who performed below Level 1.

It can be argued that immigrants who arrive at a young age will develop strong host country language skills as adults and are thus more likely to integrate well into the labour markets of the receiving country than those who are older and have poor language skills. Poor language skills may restrict the new arrivals to occupations where language skills are less important or require relatively little communication. This may result in some immigrants working in areas below their qualification level (see Chapter 2). While labour market integration may be relatively unproblematic for immigrants from Western European countries, many of whom have good language skills, the situation is different for other groups – Eastern Europeans, Asians, Africans and other groups who may face considerable obstacles in entering the labour market. In their discussion of societal developments in the context of labour market integration, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) have argued that: ‘What counts is increasingly what individuals can do, and not who they are.’

Chapter 6 Appendix

TABLE A6.1 Full Linear Regression Table for Literacy

Literacy / Language	Model 1	Model 2	Literacy/nationality	Model 1	Model 2
	Regression coefficient			Regression coefficient	
Native-born, foreign language	2.54	4.98	Africa	(-12.33)**	(-15.62)**
Foreign-born, English language	3.20**	-0.37	Asia	(-4.82)	(-15.24)**
Foreign-born, foreign language	(-9.17)**	(-14.54)**	N America W Europe	5.35**	2.15
(Ref: native-born, native language)			C and E Europe	(-10.15)**	(-15.29)**
			(Ref: Ireland)		
Age 25-34		(-2.61)**	Age 25-34		(-1.74)
Age 35-44		(-3.54)**	Age 35-44		(-3.17)**
Age 45-54		(-6.91)**	Age 45-54		(-6.75)**
Age 55+		(-8.50)**	Age 55+		(-8.43)**
(Ref: age less than 24)			(Ref: age less than 24)		
Upper secondary		15.55**	Upper secondary		15.53**
Post-secondary		14.40**	Post-secondary		14.42**
Tertiary		27.71**	Tertiary		27.53**
(Ref: lower secondary)			(Ref: lower secondary)		
Male		3.02**	Male		3.09**
(Ref: Female)			(Ref: Female)		
Constant	264.04**	274.24**	Constant	245.33**	240.76**

Source: PIAAC microdata.

TABLE A6.2 Full Linear Regression Table for Numeracy

Numeracy/language	Model 1	Model 2		Numeracy/nationality	Model 1	Model 2
	Regression coefficient				Regression coefficient	
Native-born, foreign language	1.62	3.65		Africa	(-10.14)**	(-13.00)**
Foreign-born, English language	4.77**	0.08		Asia	1.24	(-10.78)**
Foreign-born, foreign language	(-4.82)**	(-10.52)**		N America W Europe	7.25**	3.65**
(Ref: native-born, native language)				C and E Europe	(-7.03)**	(-12.35)**
				(Ref: Ireland)		
Age 25-34		(-2.51)**		Age 25-34		(-1.66)
Age 35-44		(-3.18)**		Age 35-44		(-2.86)**
Age 45-54		(-5.46)**		Age 45-54		(-5.40)**
Age 55+		(-8.01)**		Age 55+		(-8.01)**
(Ref: age less than 24)				(Ref: age less than 24)		
Upper secondary		16.53**		Upper secondary		16.52**
Post-secondary		14.84**		Post-secondary		14.88**
Tertiary		31.35**		Tertiary		31.15**
(Ref: lower secondary)				(Ref: lower secondary)		
Male		8.06**		Male		8.11**
(Ref: Female)				(Ref: Female)		
Constant	256.92	269.91**		Constant	246.55**	244.01**

Source: PIAAC microdata.

Chapter 7

Issues for Policy and Data Collection

By Frances McGinnity

The main task of this Integration Monitor is to report on integration outcomes. This chapter briefly highlights some policy issues to emerge from this report, and reflects on some implications for future data needs.

Migration debates in Europe have been dominated in the past few years by the refugee crisis. Some one million refugees entered Europe in 2015. Ireland has voluntarily committed to resettle and relocate refugees as part of the European effort (see Box 1.1). This is an important and resource-intensive action, although as a group, resettled and Convention refugees comprise a small proportion of overall migrants in Ireland and this is true of most EU Member States.

While the inflow of immigrants is clearly far behind the 2007 peak, a significant proportion of the population now living in Ireland is of non-Irish origin (12 per cent non-Irish in the 2010-2015 period, Table A1.1). And indeed as Chapter 5 has demonstrated, there is now a significant minority of migrants of non-EEA origin who are Irish citizens. This raises questions about how to identify migrants, and measure their outcomes, if a significant minority are now Irish citizens. It also underlines the need for a long-term proactive approach to policy on integration, and for integration monitoring. If migrant integration policies are mainstreamed into government departments, outcomes need to be monitored to assess their effectiveness (Collett and Petrovic, 2014). The challenge is to strengthen both integration policies and monitoring to get the most of integration, for Ireland's economy, its society and immigrants themselves.

7.1 ISSUES FOR FUTURE DATA COLLECTION

The issue of monitoring the integration of immigrants has received increasing attention from both the EU and OECD (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013; OECD 2015, 2016). The value of such monitoring will only be as good as the evidence and data on which it is based.

One important issue is how well non-Irish nationals are represented in social surveys. To be confident that we are representing the situation of non-Irish nationals accurately and monitoring change over time, we also need to be sure that they are appropriately represented in the surveys we are using, however challenging this may be. Some groups, both Irish and non-Irish nationals, are excluded from survey data, such as those institutions, communal accommodation, direct provision centres and the homeless, a group who may be particularly disadvantaged. Other groups while captured in the data may be under-represented.

In the short term, it is important that efforts be continued to encourage the participation of non-Irish nationals in the EU-SILC and the QNHS, the major sources of information on income, poverty and the labour market in Ireland. Pooling waves of these data may be one way of overcoming the small number of cases in certain migrant groups, though monitoring change over time can then become more difficult.

In the medium term, immigrant or ethnic minority boost samples, like in many other European countries, would go a long way to addressing the problem of small sample sizes. These could be in ongoing large-scale surveys like the QNHS or the EU-SILC, or in surveys like the European Social Survey. This would be of considerable benefit to the monitoring of integration in Ireland.

In terms of recording immigrants in official statistics, significant improvements have been made in the accuracy and availability of administrative statistics on immigration in recent years. However, the fact that non-EEA nationals aged 16 and under are not required to register with INIS/GNIB is an ongoing problem. Registration of under 16s is necessary to allow the residence of such children to be officially documented; to facilitate access to naturalisation and potentially to long-term residence in the future. Some progress has been made: provision for the registration of under 16s has been made in the *Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014*¹²² but the section cannot be put into operation yet as the facilities to underpin it are not yet in place.¹²³

Refugees are not identified as refugees on national survey or administrative data. Aside from ad hoc studies, such as the RICE report (UNHCR, 2014), there is currently no way of tracking how well refugees are integrating into Irish society, in terms of employment, social inclusion, political participation, socio-cultural

¹²² www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2014/act/26/section/35/enacted/en/html#sec35.

¹²³ Comments received from OPMI, November 2016.

integration, whether they have come here as part of a programme, or as asylum seekers later determined to be Geneva Convention refugees.

A crucial issue for measuring integration in Ireland is that a significant group of immigrants now have Irish citizenship. This means that measuring integration on the basis of nationality, as this Monitor does to be consistent with previous Monitors, will miss an increasing number of naturalised citizens, particularly migrants of non-EEA origin. In fact any statistics on the basis of nationality will miss an important proportion of the population it is designed to measure, and those remaining in the non-Irish group may differ from those who have naturalised. Chapter 2 examines outcomes of foreign-born Irish nationals, in an attempt to address this issue. This is very useful, yet many of these were born in the UK (see Figure A2.1) and came to Ireland many years ago, and are rather different in profile to recent migrants who naturalised in the past five years.

What are the alternatives? One possibility is to use a more durable measure like ethnicity or ancestry (as in the US or Australia) to measure integration, to include both naturalised citizens and second-generation immigrants (Waters, 2014). Another, currently under discussion at European level, is to include a question on standard social surveys (QNHS, EU-SILC) about parent's country of birth. In both cases these would need to be measured in ongoing surveys in Ireland like the QNHS and EU-SILC. The increasingly permanent nature of migration in Ireland means researchers and policymakers working on integration need to think carefully about whose outcomes they are measuring and how they do this; and those collecting data, such as the Central Statistics Office, need to continue to develop measures to respond to the changing migrant population in Ireland.

European research has increasingly started to explore trends in religious beliefs, practices, and identities, and their consequences for migrant integration trajectories (Warner, 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). This emerging interest in religion is, of course, largely driven by societal debates over immigrants from Islamic countries, concerns about socio-economic exclusion, and their increasing public visibility in Western Europe. Debates on Islam and Muslim migrants have been less prominent in Ireland, perhaps partly due to the fact that they do not constitute a large proportion of the migrant population (see Appendix 3). Their outcomes are not measured in this Monitor as religion is not typically identified in social surveys in Ireland, aside from the Census. The Equality modules of the QNHS (2004, 2010, 2014) are important exceptions to this: they have a large sample and also include questions on the experience of discrimination on the basis of religion. This may be an avenue for future research to supplement qualitative research in the area (Carr, 2016). The imminent publication of the Census 2016 will also be important to assess trends in the size of religious minorities.

An important recent study of integration in the UK (Casey, 2016), highlights the role of localities and neighbourhoods, and ethnic concentration within neighbourhoods. This is a major topic of international research (Charles, 2003; Bolt et al., 2010), but has received less attention in Ireland. An investigation of how national/ethnic groups are distributed across localities in Ireland (for example electoral wards) using Census data, and whether this has any consequences for outcomes, could yield very useful insights into migrant integration in Ireland.

7.2 POLICY ISSUES

In terms of employment, Chapter 2 assesses the extent to which migrants have shared in the recovery. The evidence is mixed. The overall gap in unemployment rates between Irish and non-Irish had narrowed slightly by 2015, but most of the gains in the employment rate accrued to Irish nationals. Targeted labour market and education programmes that focus on providing equal employment opportunities, and offer retraining, education, and language and cultural supports, are important for ensuring that immigrants have an equal chance to participate in the labour market.

Of particular concern is the high unemployment and low employment rate among African nationals highlighted in Chapter 2. The previous Integration Monitor also found evidence of high material deprivation among this group, and high financial strain and low incomes among families with young children (McGinnity et al., 2013). While investigating the factors underlying this disadvantage are beyond the scope of this report, Chapter 2 argues that poorer labour market outcomes among this group are likely to be a combination of lower educational outcomes, time spent in the asylum system and not in the labour market for those who were seeking protection, and potentially also the experience of discrimination in the Irish labour market (see Kingston et al., 2015). Previous research in Ireland has shown clearly the link between low employment rates and income poverty and deprivation for working-age adults and children (Watson et al., 2012). Further detailed research on African migrants would allow us to investigate their outcomes in more depth, and point at some potential policy responses.

The importance of language skills is highlighted by Chapter 6, which showed that immigrant skill scores are, first and foremost, influenced by proficiency in English. Those born abroad but with high levels of English language proficiency perform well across three skill areas (numeracy, literacy and problem solving). Foreign-born, foreign language speakers tend to have lower skill scores, despite their high levels of education. Given these findings and the well-established role of

language in integration more generally (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006), the ongoing lack of clearly defined strategy for English language provision for adults is problematic. As noted in Box 3.1, spending figures on existing English-language training are not available.

The key message from Chapter 3 is that while educational achievement of non-Irish adults is similar to or even slightly better than Irish nationals, there are gaps in reading proficiency among primary school children. This is salient as most non-Irish adults in Ireland received their education abroad, thus the performance of children in the education system is a better indicator of how well the education system is integrating migrants. It suggests maintaining language support for migrant students is very important. In order to plan effectively policymakers need to know what proportion of students at primary and second level require English language tuition, what the budget requirement is and how effective English language tuition is. In this regard, the fact that the budget allocation for English language tuition in schools has now been merged with the budget for special needs education and can no longer be monitored is problematic. It means that the budget allocation for a key strand of the Intercultural Education Strategy can no longer be measured either (see Box 3.1).

To supplement the national assessments and PISA data more differentiation of education statistics would be very useful. What proportion of students from a migrant background exit the Irish education system with lower secondary qualifications or less? Are there differences in achievement between Irish students and those from a migrant background in State exams?

Chapter 5 shows that although the annual naturalisation rate has now declined from the 2012 peak, there has been a rapid rise in the size of the naturalised population in the last few years. This is due to increased applications as well as improvements in the processing of applications. Over the last decade more than 121,100 migrants acquired Irish citizenship, and therefore greater opportunities for integration. This represents important progress. Yet Ireland remains without a statutory Long-Term Residence permission. The problems regarding limited access to the current administrative scheme persist, as do uncertainties about the exact nature of conditions attached to the status. As noted in Chapter 5, the protection elements of the *Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, 2010* were fast-tracked, and enacted in December 2015. It is not clear whether long-term residence will fall under promised new legislation to modernize Ireland's visa and residency system.

Political participation of migrants in Ireland is in principle favourable given generous voting rights, which contributes to a high ranking by MIPEX. However in

practice Chapter 5 documents a serious under-representation of migrant candidates in politics, and on the voting register. NGOs have been active in trying to increase participation, but some commentators argue that political parties have tended to give insufficient attention to potential migrant candidates and the migrant electorate (O'Boyle et al., 2016). Continued efforts to encourage migrant voter registration and voting could potentially increase the proportion of migrants registered to vote and the migrant voice in Irish politics.

Immigration may have fallen, but there are no indications that the proportion of migrants living in Ireland has fallen. If anything, the indications are that many are here to stay. In this context, the publication of the government's updated integration strategy presents a positive opportunity, assuming the strategy is matched with sufficient resources and is effectively implemented. As stressed in Chapter 1 of course, if migrant integration policy adopts a mainstreaming approach, as it does in Ireland, it is crucial that any integration strategy is accompanied by monitoring of migrant outcomes to ensure their needs are being served. In addition, if policy is mainstreamed, implementation of any integration strategy is not just seen as the responsibility of the Department of Justice and Equality, but of all the government departments and agencies that interact with migrants.

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Appendix 1 Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union

- 1 Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
- 2 Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.
- 3 Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.
- 4 Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.
- 5 Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.
- 6 Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration.
- 7 Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.
- 8 The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.
- 9 The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.
- 10 Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation.
- 11 Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.

Appendix 2 Definition of Indicators, Based on Those Agreed at Zaragoza

Indicator	Definition	Data Source
1. Employment		
Employment rate	Proportion of population of working age (15-64) who are employed.	Labour Force Survey (QNHS)
Unemployment rate	Proportion of labour force (employed plus unemployed) of working age (15-64) who are unemployed.	Labour Force Survey (QNHS)
Activity rate	Proportion of adults of working age (15-64) who are in the labour force (employed and unemployed).	Labour Force Survey (QNHS)
Self-employment rate	Proportion of employed population who are self-employed (that is working in his or her own business, professional practice or farm for the purpose of making a profit).	Labour Force Survey (QNHS)
2. Education		
Highest educational attainment	Share of population aged 15 to 64 with third-level, post-leaving certificate, upper secondary and no formal/lower secondary education.	Labour Force Survey (QNHS)
Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment*	Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary (third-level) education.	Labour Force Survey (QNHS)
Share of early leavers from education and training*	Share of population aged 20 to 24 with no more than lower secondary education and not currently in education.	Labour Force Survey (QNHS)
Mean achievement scores at primary level in reading and mathematics*	Mean achievement scores in reading and mathematics at primary level	National Assessments 2014
3. Social inclusion		
Median net income	Median net income – median net (household and equivalised) income of the immigrant population and the Irish population.	EU-SILC
At risk of poverty rate	At risk of poverty rate – share of population with net disposable income of less than 60 per cent of national median.	EU-SILC
Consistent poverty rates	Proportion of population both (1) at risk of poverty and (2) living in households that lack two or more basic items such as food, clothing or heat.	EU-SILC
Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good	Share of population aged 16+ perceiving their health status as good or very good.	EU-SILC
Ratio of property owners to non-property owners among immigrants and the total population	Percentage of property owners among immigrant and Irish household respondents.	EU-SILC
		<i>Contd.</i>

CONTD.

4. Active citizenship

Share of immigrants that have acquired citizenship (best estimate)	Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population who have acquired citizenship (best estimate).	Department of Justice and Equality
Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits	Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population granted long-term residence (best estimate).	Department of Justice and Equality
Share of immigrants among elected representatives	Share of immigrants among elected national representatives.	Immigrant Council of Ireland

Notes: Employment and unemployment are defined in this table and elsewhere in this report using the standard International Labour Organisation's (ILO) definitions. People are defined as employed if they have worked for pay in the week preceding the survey interview for one hour or more, or who were not at work due to temporary absence (i.e. sickness or training). Unemployed persons are those who did not work in the week preceding the interview, but were available to start work in the next two weeks and had actively sought work in the previous four weeks. ILO unemployment estimates differ from both the live register of unemployment and from the individual's own self-assignment of his or her principal economic status. * indicates where definitions of the indicators differ slightly from those proposed at Zaragoza, based on data constraints. Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment instead of the share of 30- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational achievement; share of early leavers from education and training aged 20 to 24 instead of 18 to 24; mean achievement scores for second and sixth class of primary school in reading and mathematics instead of the proportion of 15-year-olds achieving Level 1 or under in the PISA assessment tests.

Appendix 3 Religion by Nationality

Population Usually Resident and Present in the State by Nationality and Religion										
	All Irish	Non-Irish	EU27 exc. Irish	Other Europe	African	Asian	US	Other, not stated and none	All	All
Roman Catholic	89.8	52.0	60.5	13.6	23.5	29.6	55.1	42.4	84.7	3,831,187
Church of Ireland, England, Anglican, Episcopalian	2.4	5.6	6.6	1.1	6.2	1.2	2.5	2.4	2.7	124,445
Muslim (Islamic)	0.5	5.4	0.6	12.6	21.1	23.4	0.7	2.0	1.1	48,130
Orthodox (Greek, Coptic, Russian)	0.2	6.4	5.8	54.6	2.0	3.5	0.6	1.6	1.0	44,003
Other Christian religion, n.e.s.	0.6	2.8	1.4	1.8	13.2	3.9	5.3	1.1	0.9	39,652
Presbyterian	0.4	1.5	1.3	0.4	4.2	0.5	3.0	0.7	0.5	22,835
Apostolic or Pentecostal	0.1	1.5	0.6	0.2	12.0	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.3	13,876
Other stated religions	0.9	7.4	4.8	3.8	11.9	19.2	11.6	2.0	1.7	75,655
No religion/ not stated	5.2	17.5	18.4	11.9	5.9	18.0	20.5	47.4	7.2	325,498
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Total (000s)	3,927,143	544,357	386,764	16,307	41,642	65,579	24,884	62,962	4,525,281	4,525,281

Source: CSO Census 2011 Profile 7 Religion, Ethnicity and Irish Travellers – Ethnic and cultural background in Ireland, Interactive table CD702.

Whitaker Square,
Sir John Rogerson's Quay,
Dublin 2
Telephone **+353 1 863 2000**
Email **admin@esri.ie**
Web **www.esri.ie**
Twitter **@ESRIDublin**
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