

# MONITORING REPORT ON INTEGRATION 2018

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## Authors

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## FOREWORD

Ireland's population is growing ever more diverse. Almost 12% of people living here have a nationality other than Irish. We have seen a large increase in recent years in people choosing to become Irish citizens and in addition, the numbers of second generation migrants continue to grow.

This increasing diversity offers many benefits to our communities – from enhancing our skills base to enriching our cultural life. When we truly value diversity and take steps to demonstrate that value, we send a powerful message of inclusion and anti-discrimination into our society.

Ireland's National Strategy for Migrant Integration is underpinned by the vision that migrants are facilitated to play a full role in Irish society, that integration is a core principle of Irish life and that Irish society and institutions work together to promote integration.

Those working to realise this vision, across the public, private and voluntary sectors, need access to detailed information to inform and guide their work. It is by reference to reliable data on how migrants to Ireland are faring on key drivers of integration such as education, employment, social inclusion and active citizenship, that we can design and target effective interventions to support integration and remove barriers to it.

This is why I funded the ESRI to complete this Monitoring Report on Integration. This report brings together these data, measures changes over time, and describes policy implications. It will be a valuable resource for policymakers and practitioners alike.

The Monitoring Report provides essential evidence on outcomes for migrant groups in Ireland and shows how these compare with outcomes for the native population. This vital evidence will help to inform the design of the supports required to facilitate successful integration.

Our increased diversity brings with it both challenges and opportunities. High quality, up-to-date evidence equips us better to meet both. I welcome this report.

David Stanton, T.D.

Minister of State at the Department of Justice and Equality with special responsibility for Equality, Immigration and Integration.



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*This report has been accepted for publication by the Institute, which does not itself take institutional policy positions. All ESRI Research Series reports are peer reviewed prior to publication. The authors are solely responsible for the content and the views expressed.*



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## GLOSSARY: ABBREVIATIONS AND IRISH TERMS

CSO	Central Statistics Office
DSP/DEASP	Department of Social Protection (now Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection).
EAL	English as an additional language
EEA	European Economic Area, which comprises the EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
EPIC	Employment for People from Immigrant Communities
ESOL	English for Speakers of Other Languages
ESRI	Economic and Social Research Institute
ETB	Education and Training Board
EU	European Union
EU28	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK.
EU-East	EU-East comprises the EU Member States that acceded between 2004 and 2013, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
EU-West	‘Old’ EU15 Member States excluding Ireland and the UK: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.
EUDO	EU Democracy Observatory on Citizenship
EU-SILC	EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
FLAC	Free Legal Advice Centres
HRC	Habitual residence condition
INIS	Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
LFS	Labour Force Survey
MCRI	Migration and Citizenship Research Initiative

MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
NAPS	National Anti-Poverty Strategy
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPMI	Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD)
PRSI	Pay-related social insurance
QNHS	Quarterly National Household Survey
QQI	Quality and Qualifications Ireland
RICE	Refugee Integration, Capacity and Evaluation in Europe
SCIP	Socio-cultural Integration Processes among New Immigrants in Europe
SILC	Survey on Income and Living Conditions
Taoiseach	Prime Minister of Ireland
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### INTRODUCTION

Given that a significant proportion of the population living in Ireland is of non-Irish origin, how are non-Irish nationals integrating into Irish society? How do they compare to the Irish population in terms of employment rates, educational qualifications, income and poverty rates, health outcomes, housing and participation in Irish political life?

This Integration Monitor is the sixth of a series of reports which consider outcomes in a wide range of life domains, including employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. It is based on indicators proposed at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration held in Zaragoza in 2010. These indicators are comparable across European Union (EU) Member States, based on existing data and focused on outcomes. It should be noted that some differences between Irish and non-Irish may be a result of differences in age, gender, duration in Ireland, educational background and work experience. Accounting for these differences using statistical modelling is beyond the scope of this report, but readers are alerted to relevant differences. This Monitor's special topic is: 'Muslims in Ireland', based primarily on data from the 2016 Irish Census.

Migrants to Ireland are diverse in terms of country of origin, and outcomes vary across groups. This summary focuses on overall differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals: individual chapters give more information on differences between national groups – UK, EU-West, EU-East and non-EU nationals.<sup>1</sup> Key indicators at a glance are presented in Table A below.

### INTEGRATION MONITOR: KEY FINDINGS

The Irish labour market is showing signs of continued recovery after a deep recession. Chapter 2 shows that in early 2017 both employment and labour market activity rates were slightly higher among non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals (see Table A). The unemployment rate has continued to fall for both Irish and non-Irish nationals since 2015; and in the first quarter of 2017, at just over 7 per cent, the unemployment rate was very similar for both groups.

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<sup>1</sup> EU-West refers to the 'old' Member States, prior to enlargement in 2004, excluding the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland. EU-East refers to the 'new' Member States that joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013. Where numbers permit, non-EU nationals are further divided based on broad region of origin.

There are important differences in the labour market outcomes for different groups of non-Irish nationals. In general, non-EU nationals tend to have lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than Irish nationals. As in previous Monitors, the most disadvantaged group is African nationals, who have much lower employment and activity rates than other immigrant groups. The African employment rate is 45 per cent compared to an average of 70 per cent for non-Irish nationals. This pattern has persisted throughout the recession and recovery.

Employment rates of immigrants in Ireland are comparable to those found across the EU. In other European countries, unemployment is typically higher among immigrants than natives. In 2017, the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives is smaller in Ireland than the European average, and is not statistically significant.

Chapter 3 compares educational qualifications among Irish and non-Irish adults in 2016-2017 and presents academic achievement scores at age 15 (see Table A). A somewhat higher proportion of non-Irish than Irish nationals aged 25 to 34 had third-level educational qualifications (56 per cent non-Irish versus 51 per cent Irish). The proportion of young adults (aged 20-24) who had left school before finishing upper secondary education was similar between the two groups. At just under 5 per cent of the age cohort, the share of early leavers is very low (see Table A).

Just under 15 per cent of students taking the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test in 2015 in Ireland were from an immigrant background. As in previous Monitors, home language is salient for achievement scores. Comparing English reading, we find immigrant students from English-speaking backgrounds do not differ from their Irish peers, but immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds have lower mean scores at age 15 (see Table A). In Mathematics, differences in mean scores between the groups are smaller and not statistically significant. The same is true for Science scores (see Chapter 3).

Income, poverty, health and homeownership are used as core indicators of social inclusion in Chapter 4. After adjusting for household needs, the median annual net income for non-Irish nationals in 2016 was lower than that of Irish nationals, and the 'at risk of poverty' rate, at 21 per cent, was higher for non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals (just under 16 per cent) (see Table A). The consistent poverty rate, which takes into account the experience of deprivation as well as income poverty, was higher for non-Irish nationals (just under 13 per cent) than for Irish

nationals (8 per cent) in 2016.<sup>2</sup> The consistent poverty rate for non-EU nationals, at 29 per cent, was particularly high (see Chapter 4).

**TABLE A KEY INTEGRATION INDICATORS AT A GLANCE**

	Irish	Non-Irish
<b>Employment (working age) 2017</b>		
Employment Rate	66.4%	69.6%
Unemployment Rate	7.1%	7.5%
Activity Rate	71.5%	75.2%
<b>Education</b>		
Share of 25-34 age group with tertiary education (2016-2017 pooled)	51.0%	56.0%
Share of early leavers from education (20-24 age group) (2016-2017 pooled)	4.9%	4.8%
Mean English reading scores at age 15 (2015)	525	English Speakers: 523; non-English Speakers: 500
Mean Mathematics score at age 15 (2015)	506	English Speakers: 503; non-English Speakers: 494
<b>Social Inclusion (2016)</b>		
Median annual net income (needs adjusted)	€20,890	€17,804
At risk of poverty rate	15.7%	22.5%
Consistent poverty rate	7.9%	12.7%
Share of population (aged 16+) perceiving their health as good or very good	82.1%	88.1%
Proportion of households that are property owners	78.7%	34.2%
<b>Active Citizenship (end-2017)</b>		
Annual citizenship acquisition rate (non-EEA adults who acquired citizenship in 2017 as share of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' immigration permissions)		2.9%
Ratio of non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship since 2005 to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin at end-2017 (upper bound estimate)		45%
Share of non-EEA adults with live residence permissions holding long-term residence		1.2%
Share of immigrants among elected national representatives		0.6%

Sources: LFS Q1 2017 for employment indicators; LFS Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 for education indicators (except achievement scores, which are based on PISA 2015 data); EU-SILC 2016 for social inclusion indicators. Citizenship and long-term residence indicators: Irish Naturalisation and Citizenship Service, Eurostat. Political participation indicator: Immigrant Council of Ireland. See Appendix 2 for further details of sources.

Non-Irish nationals tend to report better health than Irish nationals, though part of this difference is linked to the lower average age of immigrants. Rates of homeownership were much lower among non-Irish than Irish nationals in 2016 (Table A). However, since 2014 there has been a large increase in homeownership across all migrant groups (except for the non-EU), which could indicate an

<sup>2</sup> The at risk of poverty rate, which refers to the percentage of a group falling below 60 per cent of the median equivalised disposable income, is the official poverty threshold used by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and agreed at EU level. 'Consistent poverty' combines at risk of poverty with enforced deprivation of two or more of a range of items.

intention to settle in Ireland for a long period of time. Chapter 4 shows how over half of non-Irish nationals in 2016 lived in private rented accommodation, compared to 7 per cent of Irish people, though there was no marked difference in housing quality between Irish and non-Irish nationals overall.

Very significant changes have been seen in the active citizenship domain in the last decade. Three indicators were proposed at the Zaragoza conference to assess active citizenship: the share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship; the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and the share of immigrants among elected representatives (see Table A).

Around 3,700 non-EEA adults acquired Irish citizenship in 2017, which represents just under 3 per cent of the adult non-EEA population at end-2017. Taking a longer-term perspective, between 2005 and end-2017, a total of 102,735 non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over acquired Irish citizenship. The number naturalised represents 45 per cent of the estimated population of non-EEA origin resident at end 2017, assuming that those naturalised in this period did not leave Ireland, so it is likely to be an upper bound estimate.

While the numbers of non-EEA nationals acquiring citizenship through naturalisation has fallen sharply since the 2012 peak, naturalisation is rising rapidly among EEA nationals. In fact in 2017, 45 per cent of naturalisations were to residents of EEA origin, and the top nationality acquiring Irish citizenship was Polish (see Chapter 5). While rising rapidly, the naturalisation rate for EEA nationals is very low.

Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence immigration status with clear rights and entitlements attached. The share of non-EEA nationals holding long-term residence permits, under the current administrative scheme, was estimated to be 1.2 per cent at year-end 2017. The share of immigrants among elected (national) representatives remained at 0.6 per cent. Chapter 5 notes that the lack of political engagement among migrants may be a concern going forward.

## **SPECIAL FOCUS: MUSLIMS IN IRELAND**

Chapter 6 presents a profile of Muslims in Ireland using 2016 Census data. The chapter presents basic figures on age and gender of the Muslim population – details of their countries of origin and how this has changed in recent years. It also documents labour market and educational outcomes, before considering other aspects of wellbeing such as family life, relationships, housing and health and how these compare to outcomes for the Irish population.

The Census data show a strong and steady growth in the Muslim population in Ireland from a low base in 2002 (around 20,000) to 2016 (over 62,000). The Muslim population is young, compared to the Irish population. By 2016, over half (55 per cent) were Irish citizens. Regarding the flow of Muslim immigrants in recent years, we observe a shift in origin, with more arriving from South Asia, and fewer from Sub-Saharan Africa. Around 40 per cent of Muslims living in Ireland define themselves as ethnically Asian.

Muslims living in Ireland are on average more highly educated than the overall population and a higher proportion of them are students (around 22 per cent). However, we also find that they have lower employment and higher unemployment rates. Employment rates are particularly low among Muslim women. Muslims in Ireland live disproportionately in urban areas, in particular in Dublin, and a sizeable majority live in private rental accommodation.

## **FUTURE DATA COLLECTION**

The value of monitoring the integration of migrants will only be as good as the data on which it is based. One issue in Ireland is how well represented non-Irish nationals are in social surveys. To be confident that the situation of non-Irish nationals is accurately measured, migrants need to be appropriately represented in such surveys. Another issue is small sample sizes. Immigrant or ethnic minority boost samples would be useful to address this problem, particularly for measuring poverty and deprivation, and would allow analysts to distinguish more policy-relevant groups. Exploiting administrative data sources in areas such as education, health and social welfare would enhance our understanding of migrant integration from survey data.

The sizeable group of immigrants who now possess Irish citizenship may be positive for their integration into Irish society but means that measuring integration on the basis of nationality may exclude an increasing number of naturalised citizens. This strengthens the case for including alternative measures such as ethnicity or parents' country of birth in social surveys, as well as a broader reflection on whose outcomes are being measured.

## **POLICY ISSUES**

A number of policy issues emerged from this Monitor. While the unemployment gap between Irish and non-Irish nationals has narrowed, the persisting high unemployment and low employment rate among African nationals is of concern. Chapter 2 argues that poorer labour market outcomes among this group are likely to be a combination of somewhat lower educational outcomes, time spent in the asylum system and not in the labour market for those who were seeking

protection, and potentially also the experience of racism and discrimination in the Irish labour market. Investigating the outcomes of African migrants in more depth might allow us to point at some potential policy responses. Forthcoming work by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection will also be helpful in this regard.

Chapter 3 notes that a gap remains in English reading outcomes between Irish 15-year-olds and those from a non-English speaking migrant background. This underlines the importance of monitoring needs, spending and effectiveness of English language tuition in Irish schools.

Chapter 4 finds high rates of consistent poverty among the non-EU population in Ireland in 2016. 29 per cent of the non-EU population count as both at risk of poverty and deprived on two or more items, compared to 8 per cent of the Irish population. More detailed analysis could investigate the link between non-employment and poverty and which national groups are most at risk, to supplement ongoing work on the Jobseeker's Longitudinal Dataset.

Political participation of migrants in Ireland is in principle favourable given generous voting rights. In practice, however, Chapter 5 documents a serious under-representation of migrant candidates in politics and on the voting register. Continued efforts to encourage migrant voter registration and voting would potentially increase migrant participation in Irish politics.

The Migrant Integration Strategy, published in early 2017, is ambitious in scope, covers a range of policy areas and represents a significant statement of policy intent. Whether those policy goals are achieved depends on how effectively the strategy is implemented. As integration policy is mainstreamed in Ireland, the implementation of this strategy is the responsibility of all government departments and agencies that interact with migrants, not just the Department of Justice and Equality. Projects funded by government but delivered by NGOs are also an important component of the strategy. It is important that any integration strategy is accompanied by evaluation of measures and monitoring of migrant outcomes, to ensure policies are effectively meeting the needs of the migrant population.

## CHAPTER 1

---

### Introduction, Policy and Context

By Samantha Arnold and Frances McGinnity

Integration allows immigrants to contribute to the economic, social, cultural and political life of their host country, and is important for social cohesion. Integration is also important for encouraging acceptance of immigrants by the host country population. While facilitating migrant integration may be challenging for host countries, international evidence shows that the consequences of failed integration may become apparent in a number of ways, from early school-leaving and residential segregation to inter-ethnic violence.

The 2018 Integration Monitor follows a series of five Annual Integration Monitors published between 2011 and 2017. The Integration Monitor seeks to measure the integration of immigrants into Irish society in four key domains or policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. This report also presents a special theme on ‘Muslims in Ireland’.

This chapter provides an introduction to and context for the indicators. Section 1.1 considers the challenges of measuring integration and monitoring outcomes, and the indicators used. Section 1.2 outlines the main trends in migration in Ireland and presents selected results from Census 2016 (Box 1.2).

#### 1.1 THE CHALLENGES OF MONITORING INTEGRATION

##### *1.1.1 Defining and measuring integration*

Defining integration is not straightforward. Integration can refer to the process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration. Migrants need to ‘secure a place for themselves’ – find a home, a job, income, schools, access to healthcare – and also a place in the social and cultural sense. Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas (2016, p. 14) suggest integration may be defined simply as ‘the process of becoming an accepted part of society’, both as an individual and as a group.

For the EU, integration relates to third-country nationals (those from outside the European Union), and does not include EU nationals moving to other EU countries. However, this Integration Monitor measures outcomes for non-EU and

EU immigrants. According to the European Union's 2004 *Common Basic Principles of Integration*, integration is 'a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States' (see Appendix 1).

In Ireland, integration is defined as the 'ability to participate to the extent that a person needs and wishes in all major components of society without having to relinquish his or her own cultural identity' (Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 1999 in Department of Justice and Equality, 2017).

Integration is high on the EU policy agenda: the 2011 *European Agenda for Integration of Third-Country Nationals* was followed in June 2016 with the publication of an *Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals*, which aims to support the development of Member State integration policies. The Action plan targets all third-country nationals and has regard to the specific challenges faced by refugees.<sup>3</sup>

This policy focus has been accompanied by an awareness of the need to monitor integration. One of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy<sup>4</sup> (see Appendix 1) is the understanding that developing clear indicators is necessary to adjust policy and evaluate progress on integration. These indicators should be based on existing and comparable data for most Member States, limited in number, simple to understand and focused on outcomes. This is the approach adopted in 2010 by EU Ministers in the Zaragoza Declaration (see Section 1.1.2).<sup>5</sup>

Collett and Petrovic (2014) also highlight the importance of monitoring in their review of mainstreaming approaches to integration policy in four European countries. Mainstreaming can be a very effective policy approach to the integration of migrants, particularly in the longer term when narrowly defined stand-alone immigrant integration policies may fall short. However these authors also stress that when a policy is mainstreamed, it is important to have specific data on immigrants to ensure that they are being reached and their needs are being served by the policies. Without monitoring of outcomes, mainstreaming can mean that the needs of immigrants are being ignored or at least not effectively addressed (Collett and Petrovic, 2014).

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<sup>3</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/integration/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/integration/index_en.htm).

<sup>4</sup> Council of the EU (2004), adopted following agreement among EU Member States about the need for more dynamic policies to promote the integration of third-country nationals in Member States.

<sup>5</sup> Swedish presidency conference conclusions on indicators and monitoring of the outcome of integration policies, proposed at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration, Zaragoza, Spain (April 2010). Hereafter these indicators are referred to as the Zaragoza indicators.



Ireland pursues a policy of mainstream service provision in the area of integration, with targeted initiatives to meet specific short-term needs (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). A unit within the Department of Justice and Equality, the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration, has a cross-departmental mandate to lead and co-ordinate migrant integration. The delivery of integration services rests with individual government departments and agencies. While government departments and agencies are crucial to service delivery, a key method of delivering on the objectives of the Migrant Integration Strategy (see below) is also working with non-governmental delivery partners.<sup>6</sup>

In February 2017 the Government published *The Migrant Integration Strategy – A Blueprint for the Future*.<sup>7</sup> The Strategy is monitored by the Migrant Integration Strategy Monitoring and Co-ordination Committee operating under the auspices of the Department of Justice and Equality. This Committee is responsible for agreeing indicators for measuring progress. A number of government agencies are individually responsible for monitoring progress in their departments as well (see Section 1.1.2). Progress on the implementation of the actions set out in the Strategy is to be reviewed at the end of 2018, following which a report will be prepared for Government (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017).

In addition to the policy argument for monitoring, Bijl and Verweij (2012) highlight the benefits of providing factual information about immigrants and integration in what can sometimes be politically charged debates on the topic (see also Casey, 2016). Negative attitudes to immigration have increased considerably in the UK in the last 15 years (Casey, 2016), and immigration has become a highly salient political issue. Negative attitudes to immigrants and immigration rose somewhat during the economic recession in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2018), but as Fanning (2018) argues, Ireland has not had a marked political or media backlash against immigration.

### **1.1.2 Integration indicators**

The main aim of this Integration Monitor is to provide a balanced and rigorous assessment of the situation of immigrants in Ireland using the most up-to-date and reliable data available. The framework for that assessment is based on the set of integration indicators included in the Zaragoza Declaration, adopted in April

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<sup>6</sup> Where possible, references to measures and projects run by NGOs in this Monitor will indicate whether they are government funded.

<sup>7</sup> Specifically, the report was published by a group chaired by the Department of Justice and Equality and comprising representatives from: Department of the Taoiseach; Department of Public Expenditure and Reform; Department of Education and Skills; Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government; Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation; Department of Health and the Health Service Executive; Department of Children and Youth Affairs; Department of Social Protection; Department of Arts, Heritage and Gaeltacht Affairs; Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport; Department of Defence; CSO; An Garda Síochána; and the County and City Managers' Association (Department of Justice and Equality, 2014).

2010 by EU Ministers responsible for integration, and approved at the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 3-4 June, 2010. These are also known as the 'Zaragoza indicators'.<sup>8</sup> A number of key principles guided the choice of these indicators. This section considers some of their strengths and limitations.

First, the indicators are focused on outcomes. For each indicator, outcomes for immigrants are compared with those for the native population, in this case the Irish population, which means that the focus is on the difference between the Irish and the immigrant populations. The two exceptions to this principle of comparing outcomes are the indicators concerning citizenship and long-term residence (see Table 1.1), which describe the context and opportunities for integration rather than measure empirical outcomes.

Second, the indicators are limited in number and largely draw on nationally representative and internationally comparable data sources that already exist. This approach makes them cost-effective and, in principle, highly comparable, but it does have some disadvantages:

- (i) The existing data sources may not be designed to represent and measure outcomes for immigrants. This is discussed further in Section 1.1.3.
- (ii) The indicators principally measure the structural dimensions of integration. These dimensions are objective, and include the likes of labour market participation and educational attainment. Cross-national data on an ongoing basis do not exist for many subjective indicators, such as sense of belonging or the experience of racism and discrimination, so these are not included as core indicators.
- (iii) All of the indicators study integration at the individual level, neglecting factors that are pertinent to the integration of communities. In general, this is not a major drawback, because poorly integrated communities tend to be comprised of poorly integrated individual migrants. However, there are some exceptions. In particular, migrant communities can be spatially segregated in or concentrated in disadvantaged areas. These issues will not show up in the Zaragoza indicators, but research is underway to investigate them in Ireland.
- (iv) The focus on quantitative, nationally representative data means the Integration Monitor lacks a sense of the lived experience of integration: this is better captured by qualitative work using interviews and case studies.<sup>9</sup> This report measures integration at a national level, although it is clear that integration often takes place at a local level. Gilmartin and Dagg (2018)

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<sup>8</sup> See <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/declaration-of-the-european-ministerial-conference-on-integration-zaragoza-15-16-april-2010>.

<sup>9</sup> Examples of such studies include Gilligan et al. (2010); MCRI (2008); UNHCR (2014).

compare integration outcomes between non-Irish nationals that have settled in Dublin and those residing in the Border region. They show that relative to the native population in each area, non-Irish residents in the Border region exhibit poorer integration outcomes than their counterparts in Dublin.

Third, the indicators are designed to be comparable over time. While the data do not allow us to follow individuals over time, we can measure changes for groups in the population. An emphasis on change is important for two reasons. Firstly, from a policy perspective, the direction of change is important: for example, are poverty rates rising or falling? From a research perspective, comparing change over time can overcome some of the limitations of the indicators. Secondly, an indicator might underestimate the proportion of an immigrant group who own their own homes, but if it does so consistently over time, it will still detect changes in that proportion.

Fourth, the indicators should be simple to understand and accessible. Basing indicators on familiar concepts such as unemployment and poverty means that they should have resonance for both policymakers and the general public. This transparency requirement also means they need to be defined clearly (see Appendix 2). Opting for simple, accessible ‘headline’ figures means there is no statistical modelling in this Integration Monitor. This means that some of the differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals may be because of, for example, education or age differences. This is noted in the text where particularly relevant.

Table 1.1 presents the indicators used in this Integration Monitor, which draw on those proposed at Zaragoza (see also Appendix 2).

**TABLE 1.1      OUTLINE OF CORE INDICATORS, BROADLY EQUIVALENT TO THOSE PROPOSED AT ZARAGOZA**

<b>1. Employment</b>	Employment rate Unemployment rate Activity rate
<b>2. Education</b>	Highest educational attainment Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment Share of early leavers from education and training Mean English reading and Mathematics scores for 15-year-olds (PISA)
<b>3. Social inclusion</b>	Median net income (household income and equivalised income) At risk of poverty rate Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good Share of property owners among immigrants and in the total population
<b>4. Active citizenship</b>	Ratio of immigrants who have acquired citizenship to non-EEA immigrant population (best estimate) Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits (best estimate) Share of immigrants among elected local representatives

*Note:* In some instances the indicators are slightly different because of data constraints (see Appendix 2).

In addition, the indicators arose from the EU's Common Basic Principles and are consistent with them (i.e. Principles 3, 5, 6 and 9 respectively. See Appendix 1). Current Irish integration policy (the Migrant Integration Strategy) has regard to the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration.

The Migrant Integration Strategy's focus is on ensuring the equitable provision of public services within a mainstreamed system. Additional key strategic themes include: promoting interculturalism; embedding integration within social inclusion activities such as sports clubs, unions, the media; effective and equitable provision of services through the private sector; encouraging local level integration measures; building capacity, encouraging self-determination and political participation among migrants themselves. Table 1.2 lists key actions in the Strategy, which are most directly relevant to the Zaragoza indicators set out in Table 1.1.

**TABLE 1.2 OUTLINE OF ACTIONS IN THE MIGRANT INTEGRATION STRATEGY RELEVANT TO THE CORE INDICATORS**

<b>1. Employment</b>	Continued publication of disaggregated data on unemployment (Action 38). Education and training appropriate to the needs of migrants including unemployed migrants (Actions 39 and 40) and engagement with migrants who are registered jobseekers (Action 41).
<b>2. Education</b>	Improved provision of ESOL classes and annual monitoring of the numbers of non-English speaking migrant children in schools (Actions 29, 32, 33, 35, 37). Training of teachers and attracting migrants into the teaching profession (Actions 27 and 31).
<b>3. Social inclusion</b>	Monitoring progress on reducing poverty and social exclusion among migrants (Action 20). Improved access to services through training and by ensuring language-appropriate information and interpreting services (Actions 15, 16, 18 and 19).
<b>4. Active citizenship</b>	Encouraging migrants to participate in local and national politics (Action 58) and register to vote (Action 59) including by providing multi-lingual information on how to register and on elections (Action 60).

Source: Migrant Integration Strategy.

As well as the core indicators, each Integration Monitor includes a different special thematic focus. This year the focus is on ‘Muslims in Ireland’, using 2016 Census data. It is important to indicate that not all Muslims captured in the Census are immigrants.

The focus on outcomes distinguishes this Integration Monitor from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). The MIPEX tool aims to assess, compare and improve integration policy indicators by providing ongoing assessment of policies. That said, policy forms the context for the outcomes measured here and will be discussed briefly in this report, particularly in the access information in Boxes 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2.<sup>10</sup>

### **1.1.3 Challenges of monitoring outcomes among immigrants**

Even when indicators are fixed, monitoring immigrant outcomes is challenging. This is related to how immigrants are defined, their representation in survey data and the changing composition of the group.

The general definition of immigrants in this Integration Monitor is based on nationality and is consistent with the previous publications in the series. While the EU’s definition of immigrants is those coming from outside the EU, this Integration Monitor does measure outcomes for EU immigrants. However, the nationality definition misses second-generation immigrants and naturalised citizens, who are not typically identified using general social surveys. Most immigration into Ireland is relatively recent, but because a significant proportion of immigrants are now

<sup>10</sup> These boxes are not intended as a statement of entitlements, and readers should refer to the relevant official bodies for further information (additional sources of information are indicated in the boxes).

naturalised Irish citizens this has implications for how best to define the immigrant population (see Chapter 5). This is a point we return to in Chapter 7, where we also discuss the fact that ethnicity and religion are not measured in most ongoing social surveys in Ireland.

A second challenge for monitoring is how effectively survey data collect information on immigrants. These large, nationally representative datasets are not designed to represent and record details of immigrants. A key concern is the tendency for certain groups to be under-represented in survey data due to, for example, poor language skills. There is also a very diverse range of nationalities among immigrants to Ireland. Small numbers in particular nationality groups often mean they need to be combined into larger nationality groups, thus losing detail about the experience of specific nationalities. Some groups, such as the homeless and those living in residential homes or direct provision centres, are excluded from household surveys by design.

EU nationals are distinguished from non-EU nationals as they have very different rights and freedom of movement in Ireland. As previous research (Barrett et al., 2006) has indicated that the experience in Ireland of people from the United Kingdom differs from other EU nationals, we have distinguished UK nationals separately, where possible. EU-West nationals and EU-East nationals are also distinguished separately.<sup>11</sup> In this Integration Monitor, where data permit, we distinguish non-EU nationals into the following groups: 'Africa'; 'North America, Australia and Oceania'; 'Asia', which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; and 'Rest of Europe and Rest of the World' which comprises Central America and Caribbean, South America, Near and Middle East, and other countries. However, where data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions are used (Chapter 4), these latter groups are aggregated into a 'non-EU' category.

A third challenge with monitoring immigrant outcomes is the change in size and composition of the immigrant population over time, so that the year-on-year comparisons are potentially not of the same groups. Recent migration flows to and from Ireland illustrate how migration patterns closely reflect economic conditions: economic growth brings strong labour demand and stimulates immigration, whereas recession and falling labour demand stimulate emigration. Thus migration flows are important for understanding changes to the stock of immigrants; this is discussed in the next section.

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
<sup>11</sup> EU-West comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East comprises the EU Member States that acceded between 2004 and 2013, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

## 1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TRENDS IN MIGRATION IN IRELAND

In this section we discuss the main trends in immigration in recent years with a particular focus on developments since the 2016 Integration Monitor, which reflect trends and developments in law and policy up to December 2015.

In 2017, Ireland had one of the highest percentages of foreign-born residents among EU Member States at 17 per cent.<sup>12</sup> The proportion of residents born in other EU Member States increased by 3 percentage points from 2015 to 2017 (from 10 per cent to 13 per cent).<sup>13</sup> The proportion of residents from non-EU Member States decreased by 3 percentage points from 2015 to 2017 (from 7 per cent to 4 per cent). Figure 1.1 shows that aside from Luxembourg (not shown), Cyprus and Ireland have the highest proportion of residents born in other EU Member States at 13 per cent.

**FIGURE 1.1 FOREIGN-BORN RESIDENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION 2017**



Source: Eurostat (at 1 January 2017).


Notes: The following data for Luxembourg are excluded: 40 per cent born in other EU Member States, 7 per cent born in non-EU Member States. Stateless residents not included.

<sup>12</sup> Source: Eurostat. Note that 'foreign-born' are typically first-generation immigrants, and may consist of both foreign nationals and foreign-born nationals of the host country.

<sup>13</sup> Foreign-born also includes those born in Northern Ireland. These are counted among those born in other EU Member States.

Ireland has experienced extensive migratory change over the past two decades, linked to changing economic conditions and the expansion of the EU. Prior to the mid-1990s Ireland was a country with a long history of net emigration, but a period of economic growth from the early 1990s attracted returning Irish emigrants and other immigrants. In 2004 the enlargement of the EU led to particularly high net inward migration. Ireland, the UK and Sweden were the only three EU Member States to open their labour markets, without restrictions, to workers from new Member States. Inflows of migrants peaked during the economic boom in 2006/2007. However, due in part to a collapse in the property market, together with deteriorating international economic conditions, Ireland entered into recession in 2008. As a result, immigration plummeted. In 2010 Ireland re-entered a phase of significant net emigration, across all groups.<sup>14</sup> Revised estimates provided by the CSO presented in Figure 1.2 show that the year to April 2017 was the fifth consecutive year of decreased emigration. The 2017 net migration figure stood at an estimated 19,800.<sup>15</sup>

**FIGURE 1.2 IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION AND NET MIGRATION, 1987-2017**



Source: CSO 'Population and Migration Estimates',<sup>16</sup> various releases.

Notes: Year to April of reference year.

<sup>14</sup> All groups (Irish, UK, EU-West, EU-East and Rest of the World) saw an increase in emigration between 2010 and 2011 (Irish, UK, EU-West/East) and/or between 2011 and 2012 (Irish, EU-West/East and Rest of the World).

<sup>15</sup> The Population and Migration Estimates have been revised following the 2016 Census, and are not directly comparable to those shown in the last Integration Monitor (Barrett et al., 2017).


<sup>16</sup> The CSO creates these Population and Migration Estimates using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Census, when available. Estimates are also compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as the number of Personal Public Service numbers allocated to non-Irish nationals, the number of work permits issued/renewed and the number of asylum applications.



Using revised estimates from the CSO Population and Migration Estimates, Figure 1.2 demonstrates that immigration inflows have risen 11 per cent from 2015 to 2017 (from around 75,900 to 84,600). Emigration flows have also decreased by 7 per cent from 2015 to 2017 (from around 70,000 to 64,800), but are 80 per cent higher than the flow recorded in 2006 (36,000).


Figure 1.3 shows that immigration increased for all national groups from 2015 to 2017, except EU-East, for whom immigration fell by an estimated 1,300 since 2015. Immigration by (returning) Irish nationals increased by 3 per cent from 2015 (26,600) to 2017 (27,400). Among non-Irish groups, the biggest change was in the non-EU group, whose immigration rate grew by an estimated 7,500 compared with 2015 (an increase of 34 per cent).

**FIGURE 1.3 NATIONALITY OF IMMIGRATION FLOWS, 2010-2017**



Source: CSO 'Population and Migration Estimates', various releases.  
 Notes: Year to April of reference year.

Figure 1.4 shows the nationality breakdown of emigration flows from 2010 to 2017. Overall, emigration flows (of Irish plus non-Irish nationals) have decreased since 2015 (from an estimated 70,000 to 64,800). There has been a large increase in Irish emigration flows from 2009 onwards, but it has decreased from its peak of 89,000 in 2013. Emigration peaked in 2013 (89,000), decreasing to an estimated 64,800 in 2017. In 2017, Irish nationals accounted for 48 per cent (30,800) of the emigrant flow compared with 61 per cent in 2015 (42,500). From 2015 to 2017, the outward flow of the non-EU groups increased by 56 per cent (from an estimated 8,800 to 13,700); EU-East increased by 35 per cent (from 7,100 to 9,600); and EU-West increased by 12 per cent (6,000 to 6,700). The outward flow of UK nationals decreased from 2015 to 2017 by 29 per cent (from around 5,600 to 4,000).

**FIGURE 1.4 NATIONALITY OF EMIGRATION FLOWS, 2010-2017**


Source: CSO 'Population and Migration Estimates', various releases.

Notes: Year to April of reference year.

Figure 1.5 shows the breakdown of all registrations, or residence permissions, of non-EEA nationals<sup>17</sup> aged 16 and over from 2008 to 2017. EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals aged under 16 were not required to register. In 2014, the *Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014* removed the exemption for those under 16 to register, but this provision has not yet been operationalised, meaning that we still have no reliable data on this group.

The most recent confirmed data to year-end 2017, when there were 128,066 registrations recorded, represent a decline of 13,750 (from 141,816) registrations since 2008 (a decrease of 10 per cent). The overall number of residence permits held by non-EEA adults increased from 2016 to 2017 by over 17,000 (15 per cent from 110,927).

<sup>17</sup> The European Economic Area (EEA) comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

**FIGURE 1.5 RESIDENCE PERMISSIONS (NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER), 2008-2017**

Source: Eurostat (table: migr\_resvalid).

Notes: All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year. Data are not available for protection reasons (refugee and subsidiary protection) in 2008 and 2009.

Figure 1.5 shows that the number of residence permissions issued for the purpose of work overall has increased since 2016 by 25 per cent (from around 20,973 to 26,133). The share of the overall residence permissions issued increased slightly from 19 per cent in 2016 to 20 per cent in 2017, perhaps due in part to reforms of employment permit legislation in Ireland (see Barrett et al., 2017).

The number of residence permissions issued for family reasons has increased since 2016 by 11 per cent (from around 27,243 to 30,184). The share of residence permissions issued to family members decreased slightly from 25 per cent to 24 per cent between 2016 and 2017.

The number of residence permissions issued for education reasons has increased since 2016 by 13 per cent (from around 35,323 to 39,779). The share of residence permissions issued for education reasons also decreased from 32 per cent in 2016 to 31 per cent in 2017.

The number of residence permissions issued for protection reasons has increased since 2016 by 20 per cent (from around 1,659 to 1,983), in part reflecting Ireland's participation in EU relocation and resettlement schemes (Barrett et al., 2017;

Arnold et al., 2018). The share of residence permissions issued for protection reasons remained constant at 1.5 per cent in 2016 and 2017.

Provisional data released by the Department of Justice and Equality indicate that at year-end 2017 the top ten registered nationalities, accounting for over 50 per cent of all persons registered were: Brazil (15 per cent), India (14 per cent), China (9 per cent), US (7 per cent), Pakistan (6 per cent), Nigeria (4 per cent), Philippines (4 per cent), Malaysia (3 per cent), Canada (3 per cent) and South Africa (3 per cent) (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018a).

### BOX 1.1 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN IRELAND

Since the publication of the last Monitor in 2017, efforts have been made to implement the recommendations arising from the 2014 *Working Group Report to Government on Improvements to the Protection Process, including Direct Provision*<sup>18</sup> and *Supports to Asylum Seekers* (McMahon Report).

The International Protection Act 2015 commenced in December 2016. The Act introduced a single application procedure for the first time. It was foreseen that asylum applicants would spend less time awaiting a decision, and thus spend less time out of work in the direct provision system. However, due to a backlog of cases and the process of transitioning to the new asylum system, interview waiting times have actually increased from 13 weeks at the end of 2015<sup>19</sup> to 18-20 months in 2017 (Arnold, et al., 2018).

By contrast, the proportion of residents living in direct provision for more than five years recently began to decrease. In 2014, around 38 per cent of residents were in the system for five years or more,<sup>20</sup> decreasing to around 24 per cent in 2015,<sup>21</sup> and around 13 per cent in 2016.<sup>22</sup> Provisional figures for end-2017 indicate that there were 4,678 residents, around 8 per cent of whom were living in direct provision for more than five years.<sup>23</sup> In 2015 there were an estimated 7,937 people in the protection system; 4,330 (or 55 per cent) of whom resided outside direct provision or had left the State (McMahon Report, 2015). It was reported in 2018 that a higher than normal proportion of applicants taking up the offer of direct provision accommodation has impacted upon bed capacity (Arnold et al., 2018). From August 2017, the weekly allowance paid to residents increased from €19.10 per adult and €15.60 per child to €21.60 per resident.

In June 2018, the *European Communities (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2018*, which transposed the *EU (recast) Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU)*, came into effect. Under

<sup>18</sup> Direct provision accommodation centres are state-run full board facilities for persons seeking protection.

<sup>19</sup> Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, *Annual Report 2015*. Available at [www.orac.ie](http://www.orac.ie).

<sup>20</sup> Reception and Integration Agency *Annual Report 2014*. Available at [www.ria.gov.ie](http://www.ria.gov.ie).

<sup>21</sup> Reception and Integration Agency *Annual Report 2015*. Available at [www.ria.gov.ie](http://www.ria.gov.ie).

<sup>22</sup> Reception and Integration Agency *Annual Report 2016*. Available at [www.ria.gov.ie](http://www.ria.gov.ie).

<sup>23</sup> Reception and Integration Agency Monthly report for December 2017. Available at [www.ria.gov.ie](http://www.ria.gov.ie).

the Regulations, co-operating asylum applicants who have not received a first instance decision within nine months may apply for permission to access the labour market. A person who holds permission to work is also entitled to avail of vocational training under the Regulations. In August 2018 the government launched a consultation process on draft National Standards for accommodation offered to people in the protection process. (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018.)

#### *Ireland's Response to the Refugee Crisis*

In 2015, the Irish Government established the Irish Refugee Protection Programme (IRPP), and a cross-departmental Task Force, chaired by the Department of Justice and Equality. The Government confirmed its commitment to provide international protection for up to 4,000 persons in light of the EU Resettlement and Relocation Programmes (European Commission, 2015). As of the end of March 2018, 1,022 asylum seekers were relocated from other European countries and as of the end of June 2018 (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018b), 820 programme refugees were resettled from UNHCR camps in non-EU countries under these programmes<sup>[1]</sup> (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018b). The Irish Government has made further pledges for programme refugees (945 persons) and established a new Humanitarian Admission Programme (530 persons) to fulfil the initial commitment to provide protection to 4,000 refugees and asylum seekers. The Humanitarian Admission Programme will provide a pathway to enter and reside in Ireland for up to 530 family members of citizens, beneficiaries of international protection and programme refugees originating from: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea and Burundi.

Programme refugees have rights similar to Irish citizens including access to the labour market and third-level education. Relocated asylum seekers enjoy an accelerated asylum procedure. Beneficiaries of international protection avail of various supports including in respect of social protection, housing, education and labour market access.

While the numbers of beneficiaries of international protection, programme refugees and asylum seekers have been increasing in recent years, information on their integration outcomes cannot be extracted from existing survey data sources and are thus not reported in this Integration Monitor.

### **BOX 1.2      SELECTED RESULTS FROM CENSUS 2016**

#### *Nationality*

In April 2016 there were 535,475 non-Irish nationals living in Ireland (down from 544,357 in April 2011) from over 200 different nations. The proportion of the total population who were non-Irish nationals fell from 12.2 per cent in 2011 to 11.6 per cent in 2016. The fall in 2016 can be explained in

<sup>[1]</sup> IRPP Statistics 26 February 2018. Available at [www.integration.ie](http://www.integration.ie).

part by the rise in the number of those with dual Irish nationality. The number of persons with dual Irish nationality increased by 87 per cent since April 2011 (from 55,905 to 104,784). EU nationals accounted for 9 per cent (408,918 persons) resident in Ireland in 2016 compared to non-EU nationals who represented 3 per cent (126,557 persons) of the total population living in Ireland in 2016.

Polish nationals were the largest non-Irish nationality grouping recorded in 2016, representing 23 per cent of the non-Irish population. UK nationals were the second largest group with 103,113 living in Ireland in 2016 (19 per cent of the non-Irish population).

### *Ethnicity*

The Census shows that 185,683 people reported an ethnicity other than 'White Irish'. The majority (94 per cent) of people who indicated they were 'White Irish' were born in Ireland. Of the 6 per cent (226,078) born elsewhere, 121,174 were born in England and Wales (121,174) and Northern Ireland (53,915). Some 20,301 were born in the Americas, 17,017 of whom were born in the US. One in three of those with 'Black or Black Irish – African' ethnicity (39 per cent) were born in Ireland (22,331 persons), as were 31 per cent (2,126) of those with other Black backgrounds. The remainder of this group were born primarily in Nigeria which accounted for 27 per cent.

### *Language*

Some 368,107 non-Irish nationals speak a language other than Irish or English at home. French, Polish, German and Spanish were the most common languages spoken at home. Of the non-Irish nationals who arrived in 1996 or before who speak a language other than Irish or English at home, 80 per cent indicated that they spoke English very well in April 2016. For those who arrived in 2015, only 44 per cent indicated that they spoke English very well. The Census 2016 illustrates how ability improves with length of time living in Ireland.

### *Spatial distribution of non-Irish nationals*

Dublin City (91,876 persons), Fingal (46,909) and Cork County (42,002) had the highest numbers of non-Irish nationals in 2016. Leitrim (3,526) and Sligo (5,892) had the lowest numbers. The highest proportion of non-Irish nationals was in Galway City (19 per cent or 91,876 persons) and the smallest was in Donegal (7.3 per cent or 2,505 persons). Non-Irish nationals were more likely to live in urban areas. Ballyhaunis in Co. Mayo was the town with the highest proportion of non-Irish nationals (40 per cent or 941 persons), followed by Edgeworthstown in Co. Longford (32 per cent or 667 persons).

### *Households headed by non-Irish nationals*

Around 204,000 households were headed by a non-Irish nationals (12 per cent of all households), around 49,000 of which were headed by a UK national and 45,000 of which were headed by a Polish national.

## CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX

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The largest proportion of non-Irish nationals in 2017 was recorded in the age range '25 to 44 years' (see Table A1.2). Migrants from Rest of Europe and Rest of the World recorded the highest proportion in this age range at 72 per cent, followed by Asia at 63 per cent. UK nationals were over-represented in the age range '45 to 65 years' (39 per cent) compared to other nationalities. The UK also had the highest proportion of nationals in the age range '65+ years' at 21 per cent, followed by North America, Australia and Oceania at 5 per cent and EU-West at 3 per cent. The proportion of nationals from North America, Australia and Oceania in the age range '0 to 14 years' was the highest at 19 per cent, followed by EU12 at 16 per cent (Table A1.2). The gender of non-Irish nationals in Ireland in 2016 was largely balanced across all groups (Table A1.3).

Non-Irish nationals also differ considerably as to how long they have been living in Ireland. Table A1.4 shows that over 60 per cent of UK nationals had been living in Ireland for more than ten years: nearly 30 per cent of them had been living in Ireland more than 20 years. Other migrant groups have come to Ireland relatively recently. Around 40 per cent of people from EU-East had been living in Ireland for over ten years. Around 25 to 30 per cent of people from Asia, Africa, EU-West, and North America, Australia and Oceania had been in Ireland for over ten years. The proportion of Rest of Europe and Rest of the World who had come in the past ten years was lower at 18 per cent. Almost half of North America, Australia and Oceania, EU-West and Asia migrants and almost 60 per cent from the Rest of the World had been living in Ireland five years or less.

**TABLE A1.1 NATIONALITY BY YEAR, LFS Q1 2013 – Q1 2017**

	2013		2014		2015		2016		2017	
	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count
<b>Irish</b>	88.4	50,104	88.6	47,732	88.6	45,032	88.5	37,632	88.2	40,053
<b>Non-Irish</b>	11.7	4,963	11.4	4,648	11.4	4,165	11.6	3,653	11.8	3,973
<b>UK</b>	2.4	891	2.3	737	2.3	631	2.2	647	2.2	743
<b>EU-West</b>	1.1	440	1.2	560	1.3	485	1.4	528	1.4	505
<b>EU-East</b>	5.1	2,409	5.2	2,178	5.3	1,981	5.3	1,649	5.2	1,755
<b>Africa</b>	0.8	344	0.6	251	0.5	183	0.5	145	0.4	139
<b>North America, Australia, Oceania</b>	0.3	127	0.3	133	0.3	141	0.3	102	0.4	141
<b>Asia</b>	1.2	459	1.0	429	1.0	404	0.9	278	1.1	360
<b>Rest of Europe and Rest of the World</b>	0.7	293	0.8	360	0.8	340	1.0	304	1.0	330
<b>Total</b>	100	55,067	100	52,380	100	49,197	100	41,285	100	44,026

Source: Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2010-Q1 2017.

Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

**TABLE A1.2 NATIONALITY BY AGE, LFS Q1 2017**

	0 to 14 years	15 to 24 years	25 to 44 years	45 to 64 years	65+ years	Total %	Total Count
<b>Irish</b>	22.3	12.4	25.99	24.69	14.63	100	37,632
<b>Non-Irish</b>	12.0	10.7	53.8	18.3	5.2	100	3,653
<b>Of which:</b>							
<b>UK</b>	5.6	8.1	25.5	39.4	21.5	100	647
<b>EU-West</b>	7.6	14.7	60.3	14.0	3.5	100	528
<b>EU-East</b>	15.9	10.4	59.8	13.6	0.4	100	1,649
<b>Africa</b>	11.7	16.2	55.8	13.1	3.2	100	145
<b>North America, Australia, Oceania</b>	19.2	8.9	42.2	24.5	5.4	100	102
<b>Asia</b>	11.3	13.6	62.7	11.4	1.1	100	278
<b>Rest of Europe and Rest of the World</b>	9.8	7.8	71.6	9.5	1.3	100	304
<b>Total</b>	21.1	12.2	29.3	23.9	13.5	100	41,285

Source: Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2017.

Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.



**TABLE A1.3 NATIONALITY BY GENDER, LFS Q1 2017**

	Male %	Female %	Total %	Total Count
<b>Irish</b>	49.5	50.6	100	37,632
<b>Non-Irish</b>	49.8	50.2	100	3,653
<b>Of which:</b>				
UK	51.3	48.7	100	647
EU-West	47.9	52.1	100	528
EU-East	49.5	50.5	100	1,649
Africa	56.7	43.3	100	145
North America, Australia, Oceania	42.4	57.6	100	102
Asia	54.8	45.2	100	278
Rest of Europe and Rest of the World	45.7	54.3	100	304
<b>Total</b>	49.5	50.5	100	41,285

Source: Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2017.

Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted.

**TABLE A1.4 NATIONALITY BY DURATION OF RESIDENCE IN IRELAND, LFS Q1 2017**

	Born in Ireland %	< 5 years %	5 to 10 years %	11 to 20 years %	> 21 years %	Total %	Total Count
<b>Irish</b>	94.2	0.3	0.8	2.4	2.3	100	37,610
<b>Non-Irish</b>	5.0	29.7	26.3	31.8	7.2	100	3,589
<b>Of which:</b>							
UK	6.2	13.6	15.9	36.7	27.6	100	636
EU-West	4.3	46.1	20.9	19.2	9.5	100	518
EU-East	5.2	21.8	33.4	39.5	0.1	100	1,625
Africa	5.9	27.0	40.8	24.2	2.2	100	141
North America, Australia, Oceania	3.0	51.8	16.8	15.8	12.5	100	101
Asia	4.9	46.2	24.3	24.0	0.5	100	272
Rest of Europe and Rest of the World	3.4	59.0	20.1	15.4	2.3	100	296
<b>Total</b>	83.8	3.7	3.8	5.8	2.3	100	41,199

Source: Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2017.

Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. N = 86 missing cases for 'years of residence' in 2017.



## CHAPTER 2

### Employment and Integration

By Philip O’Connell and Éamonn Fahey

Employment is central to the process of economic integration and social inclusion for all members of a society. The OECD (2015) notes that:

*Jobs are immigrants’ chief source of income. Finding one is therefore fundamental to their becoming part of the host country’s economic fabric. It also helps them – though there is no guarantee – to take their place in society as a whole by, for example, clearing the way into decent accommodation and the host country’s health system. Work also confers social standing in the eyes of the immigrant’s family, particularly children, and with respect to the host-country population. (p. 79).*

Employment leads to financial independence and reduces the risk of poverty and social exclusion; it allows an immigrant to contribute to the economy, and it confirms social standing in the host society. Recent years have seen a substantial recovery in the Irish labour market, following the very serious decline in labour market conditions during the 2008-2012 recession. With a recovery in the Irish labour market since 2012, a key question for this chapter concerns the extent to which immigrants have benefited from the overall growth in employment and decline in unemployment in recent years.

This chapter presents key indicators of employment integration by nationality, including employment, unemployment, economic activity and self-employment rates. The data used in this chapter are derived from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a large-scale nationally representative survey of households in Ireland, conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The LFS replaced the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) from Quarter 3, 2017 and its publication also incorporates revised population estimates arising from the 2016 Census. The impact of these changes for the current and previous Monitors is outlined in the Appendix to Chapter 2. In general, the revised LFS data show higher employment and activity rates than the QNHS for both Irish and non-Irish nationals. The 2016 Integration Monitor indicated that employment rates of Irish and non-Irish nationals were about equal at just 60 per cent of the population aged 15-64 years of age: the revised estimates from the LFS would suggest that the non-Irish employment rate (63.4 per cent) was 1.6 percentage points higher than the Irish rate (61.8 per cent). The LFS data also show higher unemployment rates than the QNHS data, particularly among Irish nationals. As a result, the

revised data indicate a smaller unemployment gap between Irish and non-Irish, suggesting that the impact of the recession on unemployment among immigrants may not have been quite as severe as the QNHS data had led us to believe.

Unless otherwise stated, the report refers to data from LFS Quarter 1, 2016 and 2017 to remain consistent with previous editions of the Integration Monitor, which also used Quarter 1 data. The indicators discussed in this chapter are based on special analyses of the LFS data conducted for this report and refer to the working-age population, 15-64 years.<sup>24</sup>


## 2.1 EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES

Overall, total employment increased by just under 16 per cent between Quarter 1 2012 and 2017, and the unemployment rate fell from 15.8 per cent to just over 7 per cent over the same period (CSO, 2018). This reflects a sustained improvement in the labour market since the recession which began in 2008, and employment would continue to grow, and unemployment to fall, throughout the remainder of 2017 and early 2018 (CSO, 2018).

Figure 2.1 presents the rates of employment, unemployment and activity for Irish and non-Irish nationals aged 15-64 years for the first quarters of 2016 and 2017. There is clear evidence of a gradual improvement in the labour market compared to 2012 when the employment rate was 58.2 and 58.9 for Irish and non-Irish nationals respectively (McGinnity et al., 2014). The employment rate is measured as the proportion of working adults in the working age population (15-64 years). This increased by less than 2 percentage points for the Irish group between 2016 and 2017, and by more than 2 points among non-Irish nationals. In 2017 the employment rate among non-Irish nationals, at 69.6 per cent of 15-64-year-olds, was 3 percentage points higher than that of Irish nationals.

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<sup>24</sup> It should be noted that the differences observed between population sub-groups refer only to the Quarter 1 data, and would not necessarily represent differences in the other quarters of 2016 and 2017. However, despite variation between quarters over the year, these analyses can provide useful insights into ongoing differences by nationality.

**FIGURE 2.1 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS FOR IRISH AND NON-IRISH NATIONALS, Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017**

*Source:* Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 year age group).

*Note:* Differences between Irish and non-Irish employment and activity rates are statistically significant ( $p \leq .05$ ) in both years; differences in unemployment are not significant in either year.

The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed expressed as a percentage of the labour force, which is the sum of the numbers employed plus unemployed.<sup>25</sup> Unemployment decreased for both Irish and non-Irish nationals between 2016 and 2017: the unemployment rate of Irish nationals decreased from 8.8 per cent in 2016 to 7.1 per cent in 2017. The unemployment rate was about one percentage point higher among non-Irish nationals, at 9.8 per cent in 2016 and the rate decreased by almost two and a half percentage points over the year and, as a result, the gap between unemployment rates of Irish and non-Irish nationals narrowed to less than half of a percentage point in the first quarter of 2017. The gap is not significant in either year, representing a substantial narrowing of the disparity in unemployment between Irish and non-Irish nationals observed in previous monitors, which has been between three and five percentage points.

The labour force activity rate is calculated as the proportion of working age adults in the population who are in the labour force, which consists of the number of people employed and unemployed. The activity rate followed the trend in employment, albeit more sluggishly: it increased marginally (by half a percentage point) among Irish nationals between 2016 and 2017, and by even less than that among the non-Irish. In 2017 the activity rate was almost four percentage points higher for non-Irish nationals than for Irish nationals.

<sup>25</sup> The QNHS classifies as unemployed persons who, in the week before the survey, were without work and were available for work within the next two weeks, and had taken specific steps, in the preceding four weeks, to find work.

Table 2.1 shows that there are important differences in employment and economic activity between immigrant groups. The classification of nationalities is based on the country codification in the EU Labour Force Survey from 2011 onwards.<sup>26</sup> In the 2016 Integration Monitor we introduced a distinction between Irish-born and foreign-born Irish nationals. In 2017 there were almost 212,000 foreign-born Irish nationals resident in Ireland. They accounted for about 8 per cent of all Irish nationals and 6.8 per cent of the total population aged 15-64 years. Foreign-born Irish nationals are a diverse group that includes the descendants of Irish emigrants, mainly from the UK now resident in Ireland, as well as foreign-born immigrants, who acquired Irish citizenship by naturalisation.

The distinction between Irish-born and foreign-born Irish nationals was included the previous Monitor because we hypothesised that the labour market experiences of naturalised citizens would be different both to those of Irish-born citizens and to non-naturalised immigrants. We might expect that naturalised citizens, with a greater stake in the host society, and a larger bundle of rights, might expect to fare better in the labour market than non-naturalised immigrants, although perhaps not as well as Irish-born natives. However, a paper by Kelly et al. (2015) shows that naturalised immigrants from certain regions, particularly Africa, had exceptionally unfavourable employment and unemployment outcomes in Ireland in 2012 and 2014.

Table 2.1 shows that foreign-born Irish tended to have slightly lower employment rates in both 2016 and 2017 though these are not significantly different. Their employment rates were also lower than the average non-Irish employment rates in both years. They also had higher unemployment rates than the native-born Irish, and these were statistically significant. In 2017 the foreign-born Irish unemployment rate, at just over 10 per cent, was significantly higher than the native-born Irish rate of 7 per cent, and also higher than the average unemployment rate among non-Irish nationals.

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<sup>26</sup> The 'EU-West' category comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East comprises the EU Member States that acceded between 2004 and 2013, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 'North America and Oceania' includes the Canada, United States of America, Australia and New Zealand. 'Asia' comprises South and South-East Asia and East Asia. 'Rest of Europe and World' includes comprises Candidate, European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and other European countries, Central America and Caribbean, South America and Near and Middle East.

**TABLE 2.1 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY NATIONAL GROUP Q1 2016 AND 2017**

	Employment rate (%)		Unemployment rate (%)		Activity rate (%)		Total Population ('000)	
	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017
<b>Irish</b>	64.7	66.4	8.8	7.1	71.0	71.5	2,643.5	2,661.3
<b>Irish-born</b>	64.8	66.6	8.6	6.9	70.9	71.5	2,439.7	2,449.4
<b>Foreign-born</b>	64.2	64.8	<b>11.1</b>	<b>10.1</b>	72.1	72.1	203.8	212.0
<i>Of which:</i>								
<b>Non-Irish</b>	67.5	69.6	9.8	7.5	74.9*	75.2*	453.6	467.9
<b>UK</b>	62.7	66.4	10.8	7.2	70.4	71.6	78.7	78.3
<b>EU-West</b>	75.4*	76.0*	4.5*	3.9*	78.9*	79.1*	56.8	60.8
<b>EU-East</b>	72.1*	74.2*	11.0*	8.0	81.0*	80.6*	208.8	210.0
<b>Africa</b>	52.1*	44.7*	14.2	16.2*	60.7*	53.3*	18.9	16.5
<b>North America, Oceania</b>	61.7	63.6	3.5	8.6	63.9	69.5	11.8	14.7
<b>Asia</b>	67.3	63.5	5.9	8.7	71.5	69.5	37.2	45.5
<b>Rest of the World</b>	52.0	61.6	12.6	7.0	59.5*	66.3*	41.4	42.2
<b>Total</b>	65.1	66.9	8.9	7.2	71.5	72.1	3,097.1	3,129.3

Source: Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 years age group).

Note: Bold denotes statistically significant differences from Irish-born at  $P \leq .05$ . \* denotes statistical significance from Irish nationals at  $P \leq .05$ .

In general, nationals of other EU Member States have higher employment rates than Irish nationals and those from outside the EU: nationals of the pre-enlargement 'old' EU Member States (EU-West) had the highest employment rate at 76 per cent. Nationals of the 'new' EU15-28 Member States (EU-East) also reported a high employment rate (74 per cent), and the highest activity rate (81 per cent), so there are less economically inactive people in this group. These were significantly higher than the rates for Irish nationals. However, the unemployment rate among EU-East nationals is high compared to other Europeans, and is not significantly different to the unemployment rate among Irish nationals.

African nationals reported the highest unemployment rate (14 per cent) of any group in 2016, and the lowest employment (52 per cent) and activity rates (61 per cent). These rates actually declined between 2016 and 2017, when most labour market outcomes for nearly every other nationality group improved. In 2017 less than 45 per cent of Africans in the 15-64 year age group were employed only 53 per cent of them were economically active. Unemployment among Africans increased from about 14 per cent in 2016 to 16 per cent in 2017, a worrying departure from the general trend towards declining unemployment.

Previous research on immigrants in the Irish labour market suggests that the main concentration of labour market disadvantage occurs among the Black African

ethnic group and this group was also much more likely than either Irish natives or other immigrant groups to have experienced discrimination while looking for work (Kingston et al., 2013; McGinnity et al., 2017).<sup>27</sup>

Racism and discrimination may be major causes of African labour market disadvantage in Ireland. Michael (2016) details instances of workplace racism against Africans reported to ENAR Ireland's iReport online reporting system.<sup>28</sup> These racist incidents are perpetrated by both customers and colleagues, and are identified by the victims as significant barriers to employment and career progression (Michael, 2016). This analysis of Afrophobia points to broader problems of hostility and antipathy directed specifically at people who belong to the African diaspora in Ireland.

However, it is also necessary to consider the low labour force participation rates among Africans. Additional analysis of the 2016 and 2017 LFS (not shown) finds that the gender divide in activity rates for African nationals is particularly stark, and is even greater than the difference found among all immigrant groups combined, which is shown in Table 2.3. Analysis for the 2016 Integration Monitor showed that African families tend to have more children. Data from the *Growing Up in Ireland* survey showed that African mothers have low rates of employment and less favourable educational qualifications (McGinnity et al., 2014). Thus, it was suggested that the low employment rates among African women may be partly due to the high costs of childcare in Ireland, which may be unaffordable for African mothers with relatively large families, relatively low earning potential, and, because of their immigrant status, less recourse to relatives to provide childcare (O'Connell and Kenny, 2017). In addition to these compositional factors, Kingston et al. (2013) also suggested that the severe disadvantages suffered by Black African individuals may be due in part to the fact that many Black Africans in Ireland are refugees. This means they would have spent an extended period of time excluded from the labour market, and from participation in Irish society, as asylum seekers in the direct provision system, leading to a scarring effect on their future employment prospects. International research has shown the damaging effect of unemployment periods on subsequent labour market outcomes (Gangl, 2006). Analysis of data from the 2011 Census (O'Connell, forthcoming), which indicates that immigrants from countries with relatively large numbers of asylum seekers in Ireland tend to have lower employment rates, and higher unemployment rates, lends support to the contention that the exclusion of asylum seekers from the Irish labour market had lasting negative effects on the

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<sup>27</sup> The CSO gathers information on Africans in two ways. In the Census, there is a question on ethnic and cultural background. One of the options the respondent can tick in response to this question is 'Black or Black Irish – African'. Alternatively, African nationality can be captured in both the Census and the Labour Force Survey by aggregating the write-in responses to the question 'What is your nationality?' We count nationals of all countries on the continent of Africa, including countries in North Africa, as African.

<sup>28</sup> ENAR Ireland is the European Network Against Racism, Ireland.



employment prospects of asylum seekers. However, that analysis also concludes that the African disadvantage is likely due to the combination of restrictive policies regarding the right to work on the part of the State, as well as discriminatory practices on the part of employers, based on statistical models that take account of both educational attainment and language ability (O'Connell, forthcoming).

Non-EU nationals in general show lower employment and activity levels: just over 63 per cent of those from North America and Asia were employed in 2017, as were about 62 per cent of those from the Rest of the World. This may reflect the fact that non-EU nationals require employment permits in order to participate in the Irish labour market. However, further analysis of the LFS microdata indicates that a greater proportion of non-EU nationals in Ireland are students than is the case for the EU groups. Nevertheless, it should be noted that employment rates of non-EU nationals have increased in recent years, suggesting that these also have participated in the more general improvement in the labour market. This is not however, the case among the Asian group, which saw a decline in employment and an increase in unemployment between 2016 and 2017, though these changes are not statistically significant.

**TABLE 2.2 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY AGE GROUP Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017**

Age band	Nationality	Employment rate (%)		Unemployment rate (%)		Activity rate (%)		Total Population ('000)	
		2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017
15-24	Irish	36.5	39.1	16.6	13.2	43.7	45.1	507.9	523.0
	Non-Irish	43.7*	43.3	16.3	11.8	52.1*	49.0	66.1	60.4
25-44	Irish	76.4	78.8	8.7	6.7	83.6	84.5	1,107.4	1,096.5
	Non-Irish	73.5*	75.7*	8.4	6.4	80.3*	80.8*	293.9	304.0
45-64	Irish	66.2	67.1	6.5	5.7	70.8	71.1	1,028.1	1,041.8
	Non-Irish	65.6	67.0	11.2*	9.4*	73.9	74.0	93.6	103.5

Source: Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 years age group).

Note: \* denotes statistical significance from Irish nationals at  $P \leq .05$ .

Table 2.2 shows the main employment indicators by age group. Employment and activity rates among young people are substantially lower than among older age groups, irrespective of nationality. Low activity rates among younger Irish nationals reflect the fact that many are still in the educational system and are therefore neither working nor looking for a job (so they are not part of the labour force). The employment and activity rates among non-Irish nationals were higher than among natives in 2016; but not significantly so in 2017 as the Irish rates increased, perhaps due to a general improvement in the labour market for young people.

Many young non-Irish nationals are also engaged in education, but a significant proportion come to Ireland to work. Between 2016 and 2017, employment and activity rates increased for both Irish and non-Irish nationals aged between 25 and 44, who might be considered the prime working age group. However the non-Irish rates were significantly lower than the corresponding rates of the Irish in both years. Lower activity rates in the older cohort (aged 45-64) may be explained by people who took early retirement, or people engaged with home duties, who are not part of the labour force; and there are no significant differences between Irish and non-Irish with respect to either their employment or activity rates. However, unemployment rates are substantially and significantly higher among the non-Irish than the Irish in the older age group: over 9 per cent of non-Irish in the older age group were unemployed in 2017, compared to less than 6 per cent of Irish.

**TABLE 2.3 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY GENDER Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017**

		Employment rate (%)		Unemployment rate (%)		Activity rate (%)		Total ('000)	
		2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017
<b>Male</b>	Irish	69.2	71.1	10.2	7.7	77.0	77.0	1,309.8	1,316.8
	Non-Irish	76.3*	78.8*	9.6	6.6	84.4*	84.3*	225.5	233.6
<b>Female</b>	Irish	60.4	61.8	7.2	6.5	65.0	66.1	1,333.7	1,344.6
	Non-Irish	58.9	60.4	10.0*	8.7*	65.5	66.2	228.1	234.3

Source: Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 years age group).

Note: \* denotes statistical significance from Irish nationals at  $P \leq .05$ .

Table 2.3 presents the key employment indicators by gender and nationality. The employment rate was higher among non-Irish males than among Irish males in both years, and employment rates increased for both groups between 2016 and 2017. There was no difference in employment rates of Irish versus non-Irish women, but the latter showed significantly higher unemployment rates: almost 9 per cent of non-Irish women were unemployed in 2017, compared to 6.5 per cent of Irish women.

## 2.2 SELF-EMPLOYMENT

In some countries, self-employment represents an important source of employment for immigrants, partly because it may afford access to employment in a manner less susceptible to discrimination and other barriers than might be the case in dependent forms of employment. However, this does not appear to be the case in Ireland. In general, the level of self-employment is lower among foreign nationals in Ireland than among comparable groups in other OECD countries. This may be due to the stringent immigration requirements faced by migrant entrepreneurs wishing to move to Ireland, or to barriers to migrant self-employment such as language barriers, access to local business networks, and difficulties in accessing finance and lack of previous financial history in the

country. All of these may be related to the relatively recent nature of Irish migration, and lack of established ethnic networks. In an effort to stimulate investment and self-employment among immigrants to Ireland, the Immigrant Investor Programme was established by the Irish Government in 2012. This programme provides a mechanism by which non-EEA nationals and their families who commit to an approved investment in Ireland, may acquire residency status in Ireland.

The self-employment rate of Irish nationals was 15 per cent in 2016, substantially higher than that of non-Irish nationals (10 per cent) in general. However, between 2016 and 2017 the self-employment rate decreased slightly among both groups. The gap in self-employment rates, although still significantly different, is smaller in the non-agricultural sector which may be a reflection of the inheritance tradition in Irish farm self-employment. The self-employment rate among foreign-born Irish at 14 per cent in 2016 was almost as high as that among Irish-born Irish (15 per cent), and well ahead of the non-Irish rate (10 per cent).

**TABLE 2.4 SELF-EMPLOYMENT RATES BY NATIONAL GROUP Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017**

	Self-employment Rate Overall (%)		Self-employment Rate Excluding Agriculture (%)	
	2016	2017	2016	2017
<b>Irish</b>	15.0	14.2	12.3	11.6
<b>Irish-born</b>	15.1	14.3	12.2	11.5
<b>Foreign-born</b>	14.0	13.3	13.7	12.8
<b>Non-Irish</b>	10.1*	8.1*	10.1*	8.1*
<b>UK</b>	21.7*	19.0*	21.3*	18.1*
<b>EU-West</b>	11.0	6.6	10.9	6.7
<b>EU-East</b>	6.5*	5.9*	6.7*	6.0*
<b>Non-EU</b>	8.8*	5.9*	8.6*	6.0*
<b>All</b>	14.3	13.2	12.0	11.0

Source: Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 years age group).

Note: \* denotes statistical significance from Irish nationals at  $P \leq .05$ .

Notwithstanding the overall difference between Irish and non-Irish nationals, UK nationals showed the highest rate of self-employment – almost 22 per cent overall in 2016, substantially higher than the native Irish rates of self-employment. Nationals of the post-enlargement EU-East states, as well as those from outside the EU, show much lower rates of self-employment, and both rates declined between 2016 and 2017.

## 2.3 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

To place the Irish indicators in comparative perspective, Table 2.5 shows employment, unemployment and activity rates for Ireland, the UK (where labour market conditions and institutions are similar to Ireland), and average rates for the EU28 countries in 2017. These are presented separately by nationality so that rates are shown for natives, for foreign nationals and for non-EU nationals. Note that the figures for Ireland presented here are slightly different to those shown in Table 2.1 because they relate to the entire year, rather than just the first quarter of 2017.

The employment rate among natives in Ireland (67 per cent in 2017) was just below the EU average, and both were substantially lower than the equivalent rate in the UK, which has achieved higher overall employment rates in recent years. The employment rate of all foreign residents in Ireland, at 70.4 per cent, was higher than the average rates of foreign residents elsewhere in the EU. However, these Irish and EU rates fell below the employment rate of 72.5 per cent among foreign residents in the UK. In general, the employment rates of those from non-EU countries were lower than the average for all foreign residents throughout Europe, including both Ireland and the UK. The employment rate among non-EU nationals in Ireland and the UK are similar (61 per cent) and both are a good deal higher than the EU average (54.6 per cent).

**TABLE 2.5 COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES FOR IRELAND, UK AND EU, 2017**

Reporting country	Nationality	Employment Rate	Unemployment Rate	Activity Rate
Ireland	Native	67.1		72
	Foreign national	70.4	7.6	76.2
	Non-EU national	61.0	8.9	66.9
UK	Native	74.4	4.3	77.7
	Foreign national	72.5	5.3	76.5
	Non-EU national	61.1	7.7	66.3
EU28	Native	68.1	7.3	73.5
	Foreign national	62.5	12.5	71.4
	Non-EU national	54.6	16.6	65.5

*Source:* Eurostat, Employment, unemployment and activity rates by sex, age and country of birth (per cent). Tables Ifsa\_ergan, Ifsa\_urgan and Ifsa\_argan.

*Notes:* Analysis is restricted to the working age population (15-64) in all cases. 'Reporting country' refers to the country or countries for which figures are shown; this has been broken down by 'citizenship' which refers the respondent's relationship to the reporting country. The data in Table 2.5 refer to annual averages for 2017, which may lead to discrepancies between these data and indicators reported in Table 2.1, which refer to Quarter1.

In general, unemployment rates are higher among non-nationals than natives. Ireland follows this pattern, though the gap is small and is likely not statistically

significant: the average unemployment rate among all non-nationals in Ireland in 2016 was 7.6 per cent, compared to 6.8 per cent among natives. However, the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives was lower in Ireland and the UK than is found, on average, in the EU. The unemployment rate among non-EU nationals was higher than the average for all non-Irish nationals, and among this group the unemployment rate in Ireland, at just under 9 per cent in 2017, was substantially lower than the EU average of 16.6 per cent, though substantially higher than the rate in the UK.

The activity rate reflects patterns of both employment and unemployment. The activity rate of Irish natives, 72 per cent, was similar to the corresponding EU average and nearly six percentage points lower than that for natives in the UK. However, overall activity rates of immigrants in Ireland (76 per cent) were somewhat higher than among Irish natives, while activity rates among immigrants were comparable with natives, on average, in the UK and on average across the EU. The lowest activity rates were to be found among immigrants from non-EU countries – 67 per cent in Ireland, and marginally lower than that, on average, in the EU and the UK.

## 2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Ireland has emerged from a deep and prolonged recession, which entailed a sharp contraction in employment and a dramatic rise in unemployment. Previous Integration Monitors showed that non-Irish nationals were hit harder by the recession than Irish nationals, in terms of both employment and unemployment rates. In general, the current report presents a rather more optimistic picture. In the context of improving labour market conditions, the gaps between Irish and non-Irish residents have receded to the point where they are no longer statistically significant. Indeed, the average employment rate among non-Irish nationals was just under 70 per cent in 2017, compared to less than 66 per cent among Irish, and the unemployment rates among both groups were similar, at just over 7 per cent.

Notwithstanding these general trends, there are important differences in the labour market outcomes for different groups of non-Irish nationals. In general, non-EU nationals tend to have lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than Irish nationals. As in previous Integration Monitors, the most disadvantaged group is African nationals, who have much lower employment and activity rates, and higher unemployment, than any other group of immigrants. In a worrying trend, their labour market situation deteriorated between 2016 and 2017.

Employment rates of immigrants in Ireland are somewhat higher than the EU average rates, though they fall well below employment rates of immigrants in the UK, which reflects the higher overall employment rate in the UK. Unemployment is higher among immigrants than among natives in Ireland compared to elsewhere in Europe, although the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives is substantially less pronounced in Ireland than the European average.

## BOX 2.1 ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT

All nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) may migrate to Ireland to take up employment without restriction. Barrett et al., 2017 outline the different means of access to employment applicable to non-EEA nationals.<sup>29</sup> Labour migration policy is developed and administered by the Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation in co-operation with the Department of Justice and Equality.

Most newly arrived non-EEA workers hold a Stamp 1 registration certificate and an employment permit. The nine main types of employment permit are: critical skills employment permit holders; general employment permit holders; dependant/partner/spousal employment permit holders; intra-company transfers; contract for services employment permit holders; reactivation employment permit holders; internship employment permit holders; sport and cultural employment permit holders; and exchange agreement employment permit holders.<sup>30</sup>

The Critical Skills Employment Permit is designed to attract highly skilled non-EEA persons to the Irish labour market for occupations deemed critically important to the Irish economy or which are experiencing skills shortages. Critical Skills permits are issued to non-EEA workers earning a minimum of €60,000 per year. Additionally, a restricted number of permits to workers earning a minimum of €30,000 per year will be issued. General Employment Permits are available for occupations with an annual salary of €30,000 or more and for a restricted number of occupations with salaries below €27,000. The various permit types are discussed in detail in Barrett et al., 2017.

In general, holders of employment permits may only change employers after 12 months and must apply for a new permit to do so. The Atypical Working Scheme administered by the Department of Justice and Equality provides for short-term employment contracts in the State, which are not facilitated by the employment permit system. A total of 2,781 applications were approved under this scheme in 2017.

In May 2018 the Minister of Business, Enterprise and Innovation announced the introduction of a new pilot scheme for low skilled workers from outside the EEA. The scheme is limited in numbers, is conditional on a salary of at least €22,000 per year, and is restricted to certain industries experiencing labour market shortages. The scheme was extended in August 2018.

<sup>29</sup> See Box 1.1 for changes regarding access to the labour market for asylum applicants introduced in 2018.

<sup>30</sup> See <https://dbei.gov.ie/en>.

In 2017, 11,361 employment permits were issued, an increase of 57 per cent compared to 2015. Despite a significant increase in the numbers issued in recent years, holders of employment permits still account for a very small proportion of migrant workers in Ireland. This figure represented just 3.4 per cent of total employment of non-Irish nationals and 0.5 per cent of total employment in Q2 2017 (CSO QNHS, 2017). In December 2016 there were 20,973 'live' residence permissions held for work-related reasons by non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over (Eurostat). This represented 19 per cent of 'live' immigration permissions held by non-EEA nationals at that time.

Other recent developments in this area include the transposition of the European Union Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU) (see Box 1.1 for details).

### *Self-employment*

An Immigrant Investor Programme was introduced in 2012 and facilitates non-EEA nationals and their families who commit to an approved investment in Ireland.<sup>31</sup> A total of 334 applications were received under the Immigrant Investor Programme (IIP) in 2017. By the end of 2017, applications for investments to the value of €570.7 million had been processed through the IIP. Also in 2012, the Start-Up Entrepreneur Programme was introduced for 'high-potential start-ups'. The capital requirement is €50,000 and has no initial job creation targets. During 2017, 143 applications were received under the Start-Up Entrepreneur Scheme (STEP) (Sheridan, forthcoming).

### *Support with accessing employment*

Several support organisations may be accessed by migrants in Ireland, including Intreo, a service of the DEASP, which was formed through the merger of social welfare offices, FÁS and community welfare officers. The EPIC programme in Business in the Community Ireland is one of several migrant employability programmes funded by the Department of Justice and Equality.<sup>32</sup> Migrants who are in receipt of Jobseeker's payments may also be referred to JobPath, a job-seeking support service provided by private companies on contract from DEASP. These services may be accessed by EU citizens and non-EEA citizens with Stamp 4 residence permission.

Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) has a range of responsibilities, including facilitating the recognition of qualifications gained outside the State. An online international qualifications database is maintained, which lists certain foreign qualifications and provides advice regarding the comparability of a qualification to one gained in Ireland. Individuals whose qualifications are not listed in the database may apply to the qualifications recognition service, part of Quality and Qualifications Ireland, to have their qualification recognised.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Investment terms range from a minimum investment of €450,000 to €2 million, See: [www.inis.gov.ie/en](http://www.inis.gov.ie/en).

<sup>32</sup> RISE, the Refugee Interactive Skills for Employment project, <https://rise-project.eu> and the Immigrant Integration Initiative, run by NASC, are two others.

<sup>33</sup> [www.qqi.ie](http://www.qqi.ie).

## CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX

### The new Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the old Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS)

The Labour Force Survey (LFS) replaced the Quarterly National Household (QNHS) from Quarter 3, 2017. Similar to the QNHS, the LFS is a large-scale, nationwide survey of households in Ireland. It is designed to produce quarterly labour force estimates that include the official measure of employment and unemployment in the State in accordance with the International Labour Organisation classification. The survey collects information from 27,000 households every quarter.

The release of the first LFS in Q3 2017 also incorporated adjustments to the historic QNHS data series to take account of revisions to population estimates arising from the 2016 Census of Population, as well as to ensure comparability of the older QNHS series with the new LFS headline indicators. The Census count of resident population in April 2016 indicated a total of 4,739,597 persons, just over 65,900 or 1.4 per cent greater than the previous estimate.

The revised population estimates varied by population sub-group. Table A2.1 compares the data published in the QNHS release for Q2, 2016 with the revised data for the LFS for the same quarter, which coincides in time with the 2016 Census.

**TABLE A2.1 ESTIMATES OF TOTAL POPULATION AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER FROM QNHS AND LFS BY NATIONALITY**

	QNHS Q2 2016 (‘000)	LFS Q2 2016 (‘000)	Difference (‘000)
<b>Irish</b>	3,132.3	3250.8	118.5
<b>Non-Irish</b>	505.4	483.4	-22.0
<b>UK</b>	108.9	99.2	-9.7
<b>EU-West</b>	27.5	59.4	31.9
<b>EU-East</b>	196.3	211.0	14.7
<b>Other</b>	172.7	113.8	-58.9
<b>Total</b>	3,637.7	3734.2	96.5

Sources: QNHS: CSO statistical release, 22 September 2017, Quarterly National Household Survey Quarter 2 2017. LFS: [www.cso.ie/en/statistics/labourmarket/labourforcesurveytimeseries](http://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/labourmarket/labourforcesurveytimeseries).

The revised population total from the LFS, 3,734,200 persons, is 96,500 greater than the QNHS estimate. The revisions result in an increase in Irish nationals



(+118,500) but a decrease in the estimated number of non-Irish nationals. The revised estimates suggest that there were almost 60,000 persons from the older EU Member States, over twice the previous estimate, and almost 69,000 fewer persons from outside the EU, an overestimate of about 65 per cent.

These revised estimates on the LFS have implications for labour market outcomes estimated in previous versions of the Integration Monitor. Table A2.2 shows the effects of the revisions for labour market outcomes in 2014 and 2015 (published in the 2016 Integration Monitor, see Barrett et al., 2017) relating to the headline comparison between employment, unemployment and activity rates for Irish and non-Irish nationals.

**TABLE A2.2 ESTIMATES OF EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES, AND TOTAL POPULATION AGED 15-64 YEARS, IRISH AND NON-IRISH NATIONALS**

	Irish		Non-Irish		All	
	QNHS	LFS	QNHS	LFS	QNHS	LFS
<b>Employment</b>						
2014	60.8%	61.8%	60.7%	63.4%	60.8%	62.0%
2015	62.6%	63.7%	60.0%	63.3%	62.2%	63.6%
<b>Unemployment</b>						
2014	11.7%	12.4%	15.5%	15.8%	12.3%	12.9%
2015	9.6%	10.3%	13.1%	13.0%	10.2%	10.7%
<b>Activity</b>						
2014	68.8%	70.5%	71.9%	75.3%	69.3%	71.2%
2015	69.3%	71.0%	69.0%	72.7%	69.2%	71.3%
<b>Population</b>						
2014	2,558,000	2,620,025	455,800	436,468	3,013,800	3,056,493
2015	2,539,900	2,630,397	464,700	440,960	3,004,600	3,071,357
<b>Difference</b>						
<b>Employment</b>						
2014		1.0%		2.7%		1.2%
2015		1.1%		3.3%		1.4%
<b>Unemployment</b>						
2014		0.7%		0.3%		0.6%
2015		0.7%		-0.1%		0.5%
<b>Activity</b>						
2014		1.7%		3.4%		1.9%
2015		1.7%		3.7%		2.1%
<b>Population</b>						
2014		62,025		-19,332		42,693
2015		90,497		-23,740		66,757

Sources: QNHS: Barrett et al. (2017). LFS: Authors' analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2014 and 2015 (15-64 years age group).

In general, the revised LFS data show higher employment and activity rates than the QNHS for both Irish and non-Irish nationals. The greatest discrepancies occur in respect of activity rates among non-Irish nationals: the revised estimates for 2015 are 3.7 percentage points higher.

Another effect of the revisions is to alter aspects of the comparison between Irish and non-Irish labour market outcomes. The 2016 Integration Monitor indicated that employment rates of Irish and non-Irish nationals were about equal at just over 60 per cent of the population aged 15-64 years of age: the revised estimates from the LFS would suggest that the non-Irish employment rate (63.4 per cent) was 1.6 percentage points higher than the Irish rate (61.8 per cent).

The LFS data indicate higher unemployment rates than the QNHS data, particularly among Irish nationals. As a result, the revised data indicate a smaller unemployment gap between Irish and non-Irish, suggesting that the impact of the recession on unemployment among immigrants may not have been quite as severe as the QNHS data had led us to believe.

## CHAPTER 3

### Education and Integration

By Éamonn Fahey and Frances McGinnity

Education is a key factor in the integration process for immigrant adults and children as it can play a crucial role in improving economic and social outcomes (OECD, 2017). Higher levels of education are related to improved labour market outcomes, including higher earnings and employment rates. For example, in Ireland in 2016 among Irish and non-Irish 25-34-year-olds, the unemployment rate was 27 per cent for those with lower secondary qualifications, compared to 6 per cent of those with a third-level degree. Among those in employment, those educated to degree level earn more than twice the income of those with upper secondary education in Ireland (OECD, 2017). Across OECD countries, those with higher educational attainment have better physical health, improved socio-emotional wellbeing and participate more actively in their societies (OECD, 2017).

Because inward migration is a relatively new phenomenon in Ireland, many non-Irish nationals are first generation immigrants that arrived in adulthood. Unlike in most other European countries the number of second generation immigrants, that is, the children of immigrants born in Ireland, is significantly lower. This has important consequences for any assessment of educational outcomes as it implies that the majority of migrants will have completed their education in their country of origin, though this is changing.

Section 3.1 of this chapter compares the educational outcomes of Irish and non-Irish adults. The outcomes for immigrant children who have received (at least some of) their education through the Irish educational system are examined in Section 3.2. Box 3.1 outlines details of policy, and in particular changes in policy, since the previous Integration Monitor regarding access and supports to education for migrant adults and children.

#### 3.1 EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR ADULTS IN IRELAND

##### 3.1.1 *Highest educational attainment*

Table 3.1 uses Labour Force Survey (LFS) data to present a comparison of educational attainment between working age Irish and non-Irish nationals. In line with previous issues of the Integration Monitor, the data pertain to the first quarter of the last two years for which data are available at the time of writing;

2016 and 2017. However, unlike in previous editions, here we have pooled the two years together, to boost sample size and allow for more reliable analysis of small migrant groups. The measure of educational attainment used here is a recoded version of the standard ISCED variable. There are four categories available: a group with no education beyond lower-secondary level (including people with no formal education); respondents with upper secondary (Leaving Certificate or equivalent) only; people with Post-Leaving Cert qualifications,<sup>34</sup> and people with third-level qualifications. Note that the 'Post-Leaving Certificate' group is relatively small, making up only 12 per cent of the population, meaning that estimates are unreliable for some groups. The analysis is restricted to the working-age population, between the ages of 15 and 64. Note there have been some minor changes to the data source since the 2016 Integration Monitor (see Chapter 2 Appendix).

**TABLE 3.1 HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY NATIONALITY, Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017 (POOLED), FOR THOSE AGED 15-64**

	No formal to lower secondary (%)	Upper secondary (%)	Post-Leaving Certificate (%)	Third level (%)	Total ('000)
<b>Irish</b>	25.5	26.0	11.9	36.6	5,209.8
<b>Non-Irish</b>	11.1*	28.4*	10.7*	49.7*	822.1
<i>Of which</i>					
<b>UK</b>	18.8*	20.0*	10.2	51.0*	147.6
<b>EU-West</b>	3.9*	17.2*	5.1*	73.7*	106.9
<b>EU-East</b>	12.1*	37.3*	15.6*	34.9	362.5
<b>Africa</b>	13.3*	27.7	10.3	48.7*	32.1
<b>North America, Australia and Oceania</b>	4.1*	16.6*	5.1*	74.1*	24.2
<b>Asia</b>	7.3*	20.0*	4.3*	68.4*	74.0
<b>Rest of the World</b>	6.9*	30.0 *	4.3*	58.8*	74.8
<b>All</b>	23.6	26.4	11.7	38.4	6,031.9

Source: Labour Force Survey Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (pooled). Working age respondents (15-64).

Notes: Proportions exclude 'other/not stated' which is negligible for Irish nationals but higher for non-Irish nationals. 'Third level' includes non-honours degrees and honours degrees or above; \*denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different from Irish nationals at  $p \leq 0.05$ .

As in the previous Integration Monitor, we see that the non-Irish population enjoys a large and statistically significant advantage in educational attainment over the Irish population of working age. The chance of being in the lowest attainment category is over twice as high for the Irish as for the non-Irish population. Just under half of the non-Irish population has a third-level qualification, compared to 36.6 per cent of Irish people.

<sup>34</sup> A Post-Leaving Certificate course is taken after a student has passed their Leaving Certificate, and is generally a one- or two-year course. PLC courses are aimed primarily at students who would like to develop vocational or technological skills in order to enter an occupation, or go on to higher education.

However, this comparison masks considerable variation within the non-Irish population. The most advantaged immigrants are those from the industrialised economies of Western Europe, North America and Australia/Oceania. Almost three-quarters of respondents from these countries have tertiary education, and fewer than one-in-twenty were in the lowest category. As in previous years, Eastern European immigrants, who constitute the largest immigrant group, are disproportionately concentrated in the middle two categories. Post-Leaving Certificate qualifications were held by 15.6 per cent, and 37.3 per cent had full secondary education as their highest attainment. The high rate of Post-Leaving Certificates in this group may reflect the vocational nature of the education systems in East European countries like Poland (Baranowska, 2011). In most categories, UK nationals are slightly more advantaged than the Irish population, with 51 per cent holding a third-level qualification and only 18.8 per cent with the equivalent of a Junior Certificate or less. However, the differences in their values for technical/vocational qualifications to the corresponding Irish values are statistically indistinguishable from zero.

In general, African immigrants can be said to be doing well relative to the Irish, but not so well relative to other immigrant groups. This is true both for the lowest and highest categories of educational attainment. Third-level qualifications are held by 48.7 per cent of Africans; significantly higher than the Irish population, but well below the overall non-EU average of 62.5 per cent. African nationals are also unusual in the extent to which they exhibit change over time. Additional analysis (not shown) finds that the percentage of African migrants with third-level education is up over 14 percentage points from the previous period (2014-2015).<sup>35</sup> This increase is statistically significant, though the magnitude of the change may be a result of the relatively small numbers surveyed.

Compared to the total non-EU population, Asian nationals have higher attainment, and nationals of the 'Rest of the World' have slightly lower attainment. This is particularly the case in tertiary education, where the average for non-EU nationals (62.5 per cent), bisects the figures for Asians (68.4 per cent) and nationals of Rest of the World (58.8 per cent).

Part of the educational advantage enjoyed by immigrant groups can be explained by the age profile of each group. In both the Irish and non-Irish adult population, younger people are more likely to have third-level education. With the exception of the UK, all immigrant groups are younger than the Irish population. This is particularly true of the Eastern European and non-EU population which have median age of 32 and 31 respectively, compared to 37 for Irish nationals.


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<sup>35</sup> Results are available from the authors on request.

Therefore, it is likely that some of the relationship between nationality and educational attainment is due to the age of the immigrant groups. To investigate this, we compare educational qualifications restricting the analysis to people aged 25-34 (see Figure 3.1).

As expected, the share of the Irish population with tertiary education rises substantially, to 51 per cent, when the analysis is restricted to young adults. The non-Irish population also shows an increase in qualification levels, but the increase is smaller, meaning that the groups converge. However, the difference of five percentage points remains statistically significant.

**FIGURE 3.1 SHARE OF 25-34 YEAR AGE GROUP WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION, Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017 (POOLED)**



Source: Labour Force Survey Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (pooled). Age 25-34 years.

The UK nationals are an interesting group, because they stand out against the pattern of all of the other immigrant groups in two ways. First, their median age in the years 2016 and 2017, at 48, was eleven years older than the Irish population (and 18 years older than Eastern European immigrants). Second, the age gradient on educational attainment is much less steep than for both Irish nationals and other immigrant groups. For instance, attainment of tertiary education among UK nationals aged 45-54 is 57.3 per cent – five and a half percentage points higher than UK nationals aged 25-34. By contrast, Irish and non-EU nationals aged 45-54 are much less likely to have third-level qualifications than their younger counterparts, by approximately 11-13 percentage points. Because many UK nationals are older and well-educated, their rate of tertiary education remains virtually unchanged and becomes statistically indistinguishable from the Irish rate when the sample is restricted to people aged 25-34.

As expected, we find that the advantage in tertiary attainment between Western Europeans (81 per cent) and non-Europeans (73 per cent) on one hand, and Irish nationals on the other, is reduced when we consider young adults only. But even among 25-34-year-olds, with 81 per cent of young West Europeans and 73 per cent of non-EU nationals having third-level qualifications compared to 51 per cent of Irish, these differences remain statistically significant. The level of qualifications among non-EU nationals is partly a result of recent immigration policy in Ireland, which has largely restricted non-EU immigration to highly skilled occupations (see Box 2.1). When looking at the entire working age population (aged 15-64, see Table 3.1) we find Eastern Europeans to be at a disadvantage relative to Irish nationals, but this difference is not statistically significant. However, in Figure 3.1 this gap increases substantially, and becomes significant at the 0.1 per cent level.

### **3.1.2 Early school leaving among young adult immigrants**

In Table 3.2, we turn our attention to the other end of the educational attainment spectrum by analysing rates of early school leaving among 20-24-year-olds by nationality. Early school leaving in Ireland is associated not only with poorer labour market outcomes such as unemployment, lower job quality and lower pay levels, but also poorer social outcomes such as lone parenthood and imprisonment (Smyth and McCoy, 2009).

Early school leaving is defined as the proportion of young adults with lower secondary education or less who are not currently in the education system.<sup>36</sup> As in the previous Integration Monitor, there is no statistically significant difference between the Irish and non-Irish population in the proportion of early school leavers. Note the rate of dropout among young adults in Ireland is very low – less than 5 per cent for both Irish and non-Irish – partly as a result of sustained policy effort in combating educational disadvantage in Ireland (Smyth et al., 2015). Looking in greater detail at the non-Irish population, we see that young East Europeans have substantially higher rates of dropout than Irish nationals, and this difference is statistically significant. However, at 8.8 per cent, this is still relatively low in a cross-national perspective. In 2017, 10.6 per cent of 18-24 year olds in the EU were defined as early school leavers.<sup>37</sup> The non-EU population aged 20-24 has substantially lower rates of early school leaving.

<sup>36</sup> The Eurostat definition specifies an age range of 18-24, here we are constrained by the LFS to use the age range 20-24.

<sup>37</sup> See [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Early\\_leavers\\_from\\_education\\_and\\_training](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Early_leavers_from_education_and_training). Note that the European definition is the same but the age range is slightly different.

**TABLE 3.2 SHARE OF NATIONALITY GROUPS DEFINED AS EARLY SCHOOL LEAVERS, Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017 (POOLED)**

	Share of early school leavers	N. Early Leavers (weighted)
<b>Irish</b>	4.9	22,735
<b>Non-Irish</b>	4.8	3,446
<b>UK</b>	5.2	478
<b>EU-West</b>	2.1	277
<b>EU-East</b>	8.8*	2,508
<b>Non-EU</b>	0.9*	183
<b>Total</b>	4.9	26,182

Source: Labour Force Survey Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (pooled). Eurostat indicator of early school leaving.

Note: \* significantly different from Irish nationals at the  $p < .05$  level.

### 3.2 IMMIGRANT CHILDREN IN IRISH SCHOOLS

Section 3.1 presented differences in the educational qualifications of Irish and non-Irish adults. This section focuses on differences in achievement for those still in the education system. The education of the children of immigrants, raised and educated in the host country, is considered a benchmark for integration (OECD, 2015). Students who succeed in school are more likely to improve their skills and access better jobs: schools are also arenas for social integration, given that children and young people spend much of their time in school (McGinnity and Darmody, forthcoming).

A body of international research has investigated the educational outcomes of immigrant students, typically finding some educational disadvantage for immigrant students compared to native peers, though this varies across immigrant groups and across countries (Heath et al., 2008; Volante et al., 2018). This section draws on published data from the OECD's PISA study, an international survey of 15-year-olds that takes place every three years. It is the recommended data source for assessing student achievement because of its international comparability (see Appendix 2).

PISA assesses students' literacy in reading, Mathematics and Science at age 15. 'Literacy' is used to stress the ability to apply knowledge, rather than reproduce facts from the school curriculum.<sup>38</sup> Fifteen is the target age because this represents the end of compulsory schooling in many countries. Science was the main focus of the 2015 assessment, though the discussion here focuses on results for English reading and Mathematics, as well as Science, for consistency with previous Integration Monitors and as these are core skills.

<sup>38</sup> For examples of questions, see Shiel et al., 2016, Appendix B.



In Ireland 167 secondary schools took part in PISA 2015, with 5,741 students completing the assessment. PISA categorises a student as having an ‘immigrant’ background if the student was born in the test country and both parents were born elsewhere, or if the student and parents were born outside the test country (OECD, 2016). Students are considered ‘native’ if they, and at least one parent, were born in the test country. Using this classification, 14.4 per cent of students have an immigrant background, a slightly higher proportion than the average across OECD countries (12.5 per cent) (Shiel et al., 2016). The proportion with an immigrant background in the PISA study in Ireland has also risen significantly since 2003 (3.4 per cent), and even since 2012 (9.6 per cent), the last PISA survey. Previous studies have highlighted how important language spoken in the home is for academic achievement (Barrett et al., 2017; Darmody and Smyth, 2018), so these tables also distinguish immigrant students by language background. Doing so, 85.6 per cent of students are classified as native Irish; 7.3 per cent immigrant with English or Irish spoken at home and 7.1 per cent as immigrant with another language spoken at home. Table 3.3 presents mean achievement scores in English reading, Mathematics and Science for these groups.

Mean English reading scores do not differ between Irish 15-year-olds (525) and immigrant students from an English speaking background (523), but immigrants from a non-English speaking background have significantly lower scores on English reading (500) (Table 3.3). For Mathematics, immigrants from a non-English speaking background also have lower scores (494) than Irish students (506) but the gap is smaller than for English reading and not statistically significant (see Table 3.3). For Science scores, immigrants from English speaking backgrounds actually have higher mean scores than Irish students, though the difference is not significant. Immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds have lower mean scores in Science than their Irish counterparts but the difference is not significant, as with Mathematics (see Table 3.3).

**TABLE 3.3 MEAN SCORES IN ENGLISH READING, MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE BY STUDENTS’ IMMIGRANT AND LANGUAGE BACKGROUND IN IRELAND, PISA 2015**

	Reading score	Mathematics score	Science score	% of students
<b>Irish</b>	524.7	506.2	505.1	85.6
<b>Immigrant, English speaking background</b>	522.8	503.4	507.9	7.3
<b>Immigrant, other language background</b>	499.7*	493.6	492.9	7.1

Source: Shiel et al. (2016). See Appendix Table A6.6.

Note: \* significantly different from Irish nationals at the  $p < .05$  level.

These findings replicate a pattern found in earlier PISA studies for English and Mathematics (McGinnity et al., 2014). It is also consistent with comparisons of verbal and numerical ability from the *Growing Up in Ireland* study at age 13 (Darmody and Smyth, 2018). Here the authors found significant differences between immigrant origin students and Irish students in English reading but not in Mathematics. Distinguishing by linguistic background, Darmody and Smyth found that students from a non-English speaking background had significantly lower scores than students from an English speaking background, but for Mathematics the pattern is reversed, with slightly but significantly higher scores among non-English speakers (ibid).

Analysing national assessments at primary level, Kavanagh et al. (2016) find mean English reading scores significantly lower for children born outside Ireland, and particularly for those who spoke a language other than English at home. The same is true for Mathematics, though the gap in scores is smaller than for English reading and not statistically significant in sixth class (Kavanagh et al., 2016).

In summary, these data indicate that immigrant students from non-English language backgrounds have lower PISA scores in the core skill of reading at age 15 than their Irish counterparts, and this difference is statistically significant. No significant differences between immigrant and Irish students were found for Mathematics or for Science. It is worth noting that the gap between immigrants with different levels of language is greater than the immigrant/non-immigrant gap. This indicates the importance of language competency in shaping educational outcomes. Given the importance of English language fluency for a range of secondary school subjects in Ireland, poor proficiency in English may weaken performance in other subjects too. And as Darmody et al. (2011) point out, overall differences may lead to cumulative disadvantage as students move through the education system.

While achievement scores in standardised tests such as PISA are useful broad indicators, they provide limited information. Performance by students in state examinations is very important given the role of Leaving Certificate exam grades in securing access to higher education and good quality employment. There is currently no information on State examination grades for Irish and immigrant students. Another significant information gap is on the post-school transitions of Irish and immigrant students (Darmody and Smyth, 2018).

### 3.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

This chapter compared the educational attainment of Irish and non-Irish adults, as well as achievement indicators at age 15. Among the working age population, a higher proportion of non-Irish adults have third-level education (almost half of

them) compared to 37 per cent of Irish adults. Part of this is due to the fact that non-Irish nationals are younger, on average, than Irish nationals. Comparing younger adults (aged 25-34), we find non-Irish nationals are still more likely to have third-level qualifications (56 per cent of them) compared to 51 per cent of Irish nationals, though the gap is much smaller. There is no difference overall in rates of early school leaving between Irish and non-Irish nationals; the rate for both groups (around 5 per cent of 20-24-year-olds) is low.

There is considerable variation between different national groups in terms of educational attainment. West Europeans, North Americans and Asians are the most highly educated, with around 70 per cent of working age adults with third-level education. Around half of working age Africans have third-level education, but only one-third of East Europeans (see Table 3.1). East Europeans also have higher levels of early school leaving than Irish young people, or other migrant groups (see Table 3.2).

While the majority of non-Irish nationals received their education outside Ireland, there is an increasing population of non-Irish students passing through the Irish school system. Among 15-year-olds the salient difference for achievement is language spoken at home. Evidence from the PISA 2015 test indicates that mean scores for English reading do not differ between Irish students and migrants from an English-speaking background. Reading scores are significantly lower for migrants from a non-English-speaking background (see Table 3.3). Mathematics and Science scores are somewhat lower for students from a non-English-speaking background, but the difference is not statistically significant. These findings echo those of previous Integration Monitors, and the findings for English reading suggest that monitoring the spending on English language tuition (see Box 3.1) and its effectiveness is one important element in facilitating the integration of migrant children into Irish schools.

**BOX 3.1 ACCESS TO EDUCATION***Access to Education*

The Irish education system is made up of primary, second-level, further and third-level education. State-funded education is available to Irish citizens at all levels and to non-Irish citizens at primary and secondary levels, or until aged 18. The situation of access to third-level education is different. Third-level tuition costs vary considerably depending on the institution, course of study, and most critically, the residency status of the student. Most undergraduate students attending publicly funded third-level courses in Ireland do not have to pay tuition fees, though do pay registration fees. To qualify for 'free fees', a student must have been living in an EEA<sup>39</sup> Member State or Switzerland for at least three of the five years before starting the course.<sup>40</sup> Fees for non-EEA nationals, most of whom do not qualify for free fees, can be substantial, though they vary between colleges.

Given the dominance of the Catholic Church in school patronage in Ireland, school patronage is relevant to migrant students, many of whom are not from a Catholic background. Around 90 per cent of primary schools and 50 per cent of secondary schools are under Catholic patronage. Policy on school patronage has been changing in recent years. In 2011 a Forum on Patronage and Pluralism in the Primary Sector was set up to inform policy change in this area. The Forum report in 2014 was not prescriptive, but outlined good practice in terms of how best to accommodate students of various belief systems in schools (Coolahan et al., 2012). The Forum pointed to the potential for the divestment of Catholic schools to other patron bodies in areas with several Catholic schools. However, progress to date has been slow, with a small number of existing schools divested.<sup>41</sup> The Department of Education and Skills also seeks to enhance the diversity of the education system by running a separate patronage process for new schools. This process is open to all patrons and is based on parental preferences in the area. Between 2011 and 2017, 25 new primary schools (all multi-denominational) and 28 post-primary schools (23 multi-denominational and five denominational) have been established. There were around 3,111 primary schools (excluding special schools) and 715 post-primary schools in Ireland in 2017.

Previous studies have highlighted difficulties in gaining access to schools for some migrant families because of the use of waiting lists and policies favouring children whose parents had attended the school (see Smyth et al., 2009). In July 2016 Minister Bruton introduced the Education (Admission

<sup>39</sup> The members of the EEA (the European Economic Area) are the Member States of the EU, along with Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.

<sup>40</sup> The student must also fulfil one of the following six criteria as regards nationality and immigration status in Ireland: be a citizen of EEA Member State or Switzerland; or have an official refugee status; or be a family member of a refugee and have been granted permission to live in Ireland; or be a family member of an EU national with permission to stay in the State with residence Stamp 4EUFAM; or have been granted humanitarian leave to stay in the country; or been granted permission to remain in the State by the Minister for Justice and Equality, following a determination by the Minister not to make a deportation order under Section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999.

<sup>41</sup> 10 schools were divested between 2013 and 2017. In early 2017 Minister for Education Richard Bruton announced an intention to accelerate the process: [www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2017-Press-Releases/PR17-01-30.html](http://www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2017-Press-Releases/PR17-01-30.html).

to Schools) Bill. Key features of the Bill include: a ban on waiting lists aimed at ensuring children who move to a new area are not disadvantaged;<sup>42</sup> a 25 per cent limit on the number of school places that can be set aside for children of past-pupils and an obligation on the 80 per cent of all schools which are not over-subscribed to admit all students who apply. Under changes announced in May 2018, all Catholic primary schools (around 90 per cent of schools) will be prohibited from giving enrolment priority to baptised children in cases where they are over-subscribed.<sup>43</sup> It is envisaged this policy change will come into force by September 2019.

Teachers play a crucial role in the educational experience of students. While the student body has become considerably more diverse over time, this is not reflected in the profile of teachers, who are largely White, Irish and middle class (Keane and Heinz, 2015). Being seen as different by teachers may reinforce negative attitudes towards migrants (Devine, 2013). Action 27 of the Migrant Integration Strategy is that 'proactive efforts will be made to attract migrants into teaching positions'. A recent initiative in Maynooth University called 'turn to teaching' aims to promote diversity among teachers in Ireland, including migrant teachers.<sup>44</sup>

### *Supports for Immigrants in Schools*

In order to support immigrant children in Irish schools, in September 2010 the Intercultural Education Strategy 2010-2015 (IES) was launched, addressing all levels of education (Department of Education and Skills, 2010). However, the Strategy ended in 2015 and has not been renewed. The monitoring of the implementation of the IES was impacted by austerity measures. A key support for migrant children in Irish schools is the provision of English language tuition delivered mainly through specialised 'English as an Additional Language' (EAL) teachers. Since the 2012/2013 academic year, assignment of teachers for special needs education and language support has been combined through the General Allocation Model (GAM). Thus, it is no longer possible to monitor spending on English language tuition in schools.

Language support is assigned based on the number of pupils requiring support: additional language support hours have been provided in schools with a high concentration of students requiring English language support and this alleviation measure is continuing for the 2018/2019 school year. Other language supports include the distribution of language assessment kits to primary and post-primary schools, in-service provision for language support teachers, and guidelines on EAL for all teachers.

### *International Students (Third Level)*

The number of 'live' residence permissions issued for education reasons overall has decreased since 2015 by 19 per cent (from around 43,540 to 35,323).

Students are eligible to work 20 hours per week during term and 40 hours per week during holidays (May, June, July and August and 15 December to 15 January).

<sup>42</sup> There is due to be a five-year phasing-in period for this provision once the legislation is enacted.

<sup>43</sup> [www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2018-press-releases/PR18-05-09.html](http://www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2018-press-releases/PR18-05-09.html).

<sup>44</sup> <https://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/turntoteaching>.

A revised Third Level Graduate Programme was announced in 2017 in an effort to incentivise high performing students to come to Ireland to study and remain in Ireland to meet skills gaps in the economy. Graduates at Level 8 and Level 9 from 2017 onwards can avail of a period of residence in the State of up to 12 months or 24 months, respectively. They may work full time for the duration of their Stamp 1G residence permission. Stamp 1G is not reckonable as residence when applying for citizenship.

### *English Language Provision for Adults*

Publicly funded English language provision for adult migrants in Ireland has developed in the absence of any overall national strategy or policy initiative (ETBI/SOLAS, 2018). McGinnity et al. (2014) outline the several initiatives set up to provide English language support for adults including English Language Programmes for migrant workers, the unemployed and asylum seekers provided by the 16 Education and Training Boards (ETBs). The courses are funded by the Department of Education and Skills, but exact spending figures are not available. ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) classes are provided by ETBs nationally to meet the needs of learners who may be highly educated with professional and skilled backgrounds who are attending classes to learn English. Solas' Further Education and Training Strategy 2014-2019<sup>45</sup> calls for the provision of clear policy for ESOL provision with priority to low-skilled and unemployed migrants, and a recent report (ETBI/SOLAS, 2018) outlines a series of recommendations for good practice in this area, building on existing provision. This report also recommends that a national framework for publicly funded ESOL be devised, within the broader context of the Further Education and Training Strategy (ETBI/SOLAS, 2018). Other groups that provide educational supports for immigrant adults include the Fáilte Isteach project, SPIRASI and Doras Luimní.<sup>46</sup> Language provision for adults is the aim of a number of actions in the Migrant Integration Strategy (Actions 32, 35, 37).

<sup>45</sup> See [www.education.ie/en/Publications/Policy-Reports/Further-Education-and-Training-Strategy-2014-2019.pdf](http://www.education.ie/en/Publications/Policy-Reports/Further-Education-and-Training-Strategy-2014-2019.pdf).

<sup>46</sup> Details of a number of educational supports funded by the OPMI for immigrant adults can be found at the following link: <http://integration.ie/en/isec/pages/opmi%20funding>.

## CHAPTER 4

### Social Inclusion and Integration

By Bertrand Maître and Éamonn Fahey

After a period of severe economic recession from 2008 to 2012 in which the level of unemployment rose from 5 per cent to 16 per cent and median annual disposable household income fell by 19 per cent from €51,020 to €41,392, the downward trend in the Irish economy has finally been reversed in recent years. Indeed, median annual disposable income increased from €40,974 in 2014, the year on which the Social Inclusion chapter of the last Integration Monitor was based, to €47,739 in 2016 – an increase of 17 per cent. This early recovery has started to have a small positive impact in terms of poverty and social exclusion as measured by falling levels of some of the key poverty indicators described in this chapter. We therefore examine the social inclusion of the migrant population and the total population in 2016 and investigate whether both groups have benefited from the early recovery to the same extent.

Social inclusion is the capacity for an individual to fully participate in the life of a society. While there are a wide range of indicators that can be used to measure social inclusion, our focus here is on poverty. However, we understand that a lack of financial resources is just one of many dimensions of social exclusion. A number of poverty indicators are used in poverty research, but in this chapter we focus on those that are widely used at national (NAP Inclusion, 2007) and European level (Europe 2020 poverty target), which are income poverty and material deprivation measures. We also use other core Zaragoza indicators for social inclusion (as described in Chapter 1) relating to health status and homeownership. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that the relationship between health and social inclusion is complex and the causality between the two is difficult to establish, health is arguably as important as income in determining people's ability to participate fully in society. Finally, provided that homeownership is a widespread feature of the host country (as it is in Ireland), it can be seen as a useful measure of social integration of migrants, in part because it signals an intention to remain.

The results presented in this chapter are based on statistical analysis of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) for the year 2016, the most recent source of information on incomes at the time of writing. The SILC survey is the national source of information on the income and living conditions of households and individuals in Ireland. The survey has been collected annually by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) since 2003, and 5,219 households were interviewed in

2016, resulting in an achieved sample of 13,186 individuals. The survey is cross-sectional but also includes a longitudinal component where individuals are interviewed repeatedly for up to four consecutive years. The SILC survey is the primary data source to measure and monitor poverty and social exclusion in Ireland with indicators such as income poverty and material deprivation. It is also the Irish component for the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), the European comparative data source which is used to monitor poverty and social exclusion within the framework of the Europe 2020 strategy.

In order to be consistent both with other chapters of this volume and with the previous Integration Monitor publications, we use the SILC nationality variable to identify the migrant population.<sup>47</sup> This means that migrants who have moved to Ireland and have since naturalised as Irish citizens are identified as Irish nationals.

## 4.1 INCOME AND POVERTY

### 4.1.1 *Household income*

In the SILC survey, households were interviewed throughout the year on a weekly basis. The income reference period is the 12 months prior the date of the interview. The total annual disposable household income is the sum of all sources of income (employment, private pensions, rental income, interests, savings, social transfers) of the individuals living in the household, less their total tax and social insurance contributions. Economic theories make the assumption that household income is equally shared between all the household members. Therefore, in order to allow comparison between households of different sizes and compositions, we adjust household income according to these differences. These adjustments are made using an equivalence scale. We use the national scale that gives a weight of 1 to the first adult (aged 14+) and a weight of 0.66 to each additional adult and a weight of 0.33 to each child (aged less than 14). We then sum the weights within each household to obtain an equivalence scale. Equivalised disposable income is calculated by dividing disposable household income by the equivalence scale, and this income is attributed to each individual in the household. Equivalised disposable income is one of the income measures used by CSO to look at trends in household income over time. It is also one of the social inclusion indicators used by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection, as reported in the Social Inclusion Monitors (Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection, 2018).

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<sup>47</sup> The SILC data also include information on country of birth so a similar analysis based on this criterion could be conducted and compared to the present results. However, we would not expect the results to differ by much because the overlap between country of birth and nationality tends to be large overall.



In February 2017 the CSO published a note advising that there was an inaccuracy in the SILC income variables in 2012, 2013 and 2014. The error, which was due to a miscalculation of the Universal Social Charge and Pay Related Social Insurance, resulted in individual and household income being marginally underestimated. For instance, the initial estimate of real median household disposable income was revised from €17,977 to €18,078, and the 'at risk of poverty' rate was changed from 16.3 per cent to 17.2 per cent.

The CSO's note contains updated headline figures for the income based measures for these years, allowing us to accurately analyse change over time. However, the note does not disaggregate these new results by nationality, meaning that we cannot comment on trends over time for individual groups. The findings presented in the previous Integration Monitor are based on the inaccurate data, and are therefore not comparable to the income-based results shown in this chapter. Note, however, that the non-income based measures, relating to material deprivation, housing and health, are unaffected by this issue.

In Table 4.1 we report one of the Zaragoza indicators, namely the median annual disposable household income and median annual equivalised disposable household income across the various nationality groupings.<sup>48</sup> The median disposable household income for non-Irish nationals, at €42,150, is just 86 per cent of the figure for Irish-nationals, which stands at €48,666. This difference is statistically significant.

Turning to the detail in the table, we find that UK nationals, at €35,644, report the lowest median income of all groups, followed by the non-EU group at €37,600 and the EU-East group at €42,018. EU-West migrants have the highest household income at €51,413, and this is significantly higher than the Irish value. While we cannot be fully certain of this because of the changes to the data mentioned above, the ranking pattern of the various migrant groups is identical to the one observed in 2014 figures (Barrett et al., 2017).

Once we take account of household size and composition, the median equivalised income for Irish nationals (€20,890) is still significantly higher than for non-Irish nationals (€17,804), and the income gap between the two groups remains unchanged at 85 per cent. Unlike for non-equivalised income, the non-EU group now has the lowest median equivalised income at €15,382. This is due to them having the largest average household size (4.1 or an equivalence scale of 2.68) of all groups, which considerably reduces their median income. On the contrary, the

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<sup>48</sup> The median income is the mid-point of the income distribution once incomes have been sorted by from lowest to highest.

UK migrant group has the smallest average household size (3.1 or an equivalence scale of 2.13) which brings their median equivalised income to €17,361. This is similar to the value for all non-Irish nationals. EU-East nationals register a slightly higher value of €17,876 and the largest median is found for EU-West nationals at €23,137 which is significantly higher than the Irish value.

**TABLE 4.1 YEARLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALISED INCOME, 2016**

	Disposable Household Income (Median) €	Equivalised (needs adjusted) Income (Median) €	No of individuals in each group (unweighted)
<b>Irish</b>	48,666	20,890	12,012
<b>Non-Irish</b>	42,150*	17,804*	1,172
<i>Of which:</i>			
<b>UK</b>	35,644*	17,361*	263
<b>EU-West</b>	51,413*	23,137*	170
<b>EU-East</b>	42,018*	17,876*	519
<b>Non-EU</b>	37,600*	15,382*	220
<b>All</b>	47,739	20,597	13,184

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, weighted.

Notes: Equivalised income is income adjusted for the size and composition of the household, see text for further details. \* signals that the group median is significantly different from the Irish median at  $p \leq 0.05$ .

#### 4.1.2 Poverty rates

National and European social policies use a wide range of indicators to monitor poverty and social exclusion. In Table 4.2 we report some of the indicators used in Ireland. While there is no perfect single indicator of poverty, the at risk of poverty measure is widely used in poverty research and it is one of the official Irish indicators of poverty (NAPS, Social Inclusion Monitor). The at risk of poverty rate is a relative poverty measure. It identifies individuals that are living below a certain percentage of the median (or sometimes mean) household income of the total population. The most common poverty threshold used is 60 per cent of the median. This is also the official poverty line used in Ireland and the EU.

In addition to the 'at risk of poverty' measure, Ireland also uses a measure of material deprivation designed by the ESRI (Nolan et al., 2002; Whelan et al., 2003). This measure of deprivation allows us to capture an absolute standard of living and to remedy some of the limitations that hamper all relative income poverty measures. Indeed, because the at risk of poverty measure is a relative measure with a threshold that changes as the economy fluctuates over time, any marked economic change such as a period of boom or recession is likely to impact on the at risk of poverty level without necessarily capturing any change in the standard of living of the population. To illustrate, consider a hypothetical example where a household has income just above 60 per cent of the median, and their income rises over the course of the following year. If the median income increases

at a faster rate in the same time period, the household may paradoxically fall into poverty, despite experiencing an absolute improvement in living standards. The official deprivation measure includes 11 items that are considered basic to maintain a minimum standard of living and to participate in society as normal (shoes, clothes, heating etc.). A household is considered to be materially deprived if its members lack at least two of these eleven items due to insufficient resources.<sup>49</sup>

The final and official indicator used is the consistent poverty measure. It combines the two previous measures and deems a household to be consistently poor when they are both at risk of poverty and materially deprived. We report in Table 4.2 the prevalence of each of these poverty indicators by groups of the population.

Between 2014 and 2016 the 'at risk of poverty' rate for the total population fell from 17.2 per cent to 16.5 per cent. Overall, at 15.7 per cent, Irish nationals have a significantly lower at risk of poverty rate than the non-Irish at 22.6 per cent, but large variation within this latter group exists. Among the non-Irish, the poverty rate for the EU-West is very low at 11 per cent, but this group is not significantly different to the Irish. There is also no significant difference between the Irish rate and the EU-East migrant group at 15.8 per cent. However, the poverty rates for UK migrants at 31 per cent, and for non-EU nationals at 42 per cent, are 2 and 2.7 times the Irish rate respectively.<sup>50</sup>

While the reduction in the overall at risk of poverty rate over time was modest, the level of deprivation fell more sharply between 2014 and 2016 – from 29 per cent to 21 per cent respectively. All groups experienced this improvement, with the exception of the non-EU group, whose deprivation rate actually increased from 27.8 per cent to 34.9 per cent. The pattern of deprivation is very different to what we find for the at risk of poverty rates across migrant groups. Overall, the range on the deprivation measure is narrower, and there are no significant differences in deprivation between the Irish (21 per cent) and non-Irish groups (24 per cent) as well as for the EU-East (22 per cent). The non-EU and UK groups are the two most deprived. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the EU-West nationals, at 8.8 per cent, are the least deprived.

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<sup>49</sup> A household is materially deprived if they can't afford the following items: two pairs of strong shoes; a warm waterproof overcoat; to buy new (not second-hand) clothes; to eat a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day; to have a roast joint or its equivalent once a week; to have had to go without heating during the last year through lack of money; to keep the home adequately warm; to buy presents for family or friends at least once a year; to replace any worn out furniture; to have family or friends over for a drink or meal once a month; and to have a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight for entertainment.

<sup>50</sup> Additional analysis using pooled 2015 and 2016 data (not shown), suggests that the high poverty rates among the non-EU group is being driven by people from African countries.

Compared to the two previous poverty measures, the combined measure of consistent poverty produces much lower levels of poverty across all the groups. Overall, there was no significant change in the level of consistent poverty between 2014 and 2016, with respective values of 8.8 per cent and 8.3 per cent. The consistent poverty rate for the non-Irish, at 12.7 per cent, is over one and half that of natives at 7.9 per cent. There is large variation in consistent poverty rates across the groups. At less than half the Irish rate, it is lowest for the EU-West (3.2 per cent). Relative to the deprivation measure, it is also relatively low for the EU-East group (8.2 per cent) even if it is not significantly different to the Irish nationals. Again, the most vulnerable groups are the UK and the non-EU nationals. The UK group's consistent poverty rate is twice the level of the Irish rate (16.4 per cent), and the non-EU's is over three and half times the Irish rate (29 per cent).

**TABLE 4.2 AT RISK OF POVERTY, DEPRIVATION AND CONSISTENT POVERTY RATES, 2016**

	At Risk of Poverty (under the 60 median poverty line) (%)	Deprivation (enforced lack of 2 or more items) (%)	Consistent Poverty (At Risk and Deprived) (%)	No. of individuals (unweighted)
<b>Irish</b>	15.7	20.7	7.9	12,012
<b>Non-Irish</b>	22.5*	23.7*	12.7	1,172
<b>Of which:</b>				
<b>UK</b>	31.0*	29.2*	16.4*	263
<b>EU-West</b>	10.6	8.8*	3.2*	170
<b>EU-East</b>	15.8	22.1	8.2	519
<b>Non-EU</b>	42.0*	34.9*	29.0*	220
<b>All</b>	16.5	21.0	8.4	13,184

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, weighted.

Notes: \* signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at  $p \leq 0.05$ . See text for further details.

## 4.2 HEALTH STATUS

There is a strong body of evidence that links health outcomes to the experience of poverty and quality of life in general (Watson et al., 2016). Good general health is a key factor in promoting the inclusion of migrants into society, which is why such a measure is included in the Zaragoza indicators. This section explores the general health status of migrants in comparison with the Irish population. The SILC survey asks all individuals aged 16 and over about their self-assessed health condition. The format of the question was 'How is your health in general?' with five possible answers from 'very good' to 'very bad'. In Table 4.3 we report the percentage of people reporting having 'very good' or 'good' health. The percentage of the population reporting very good or good health, at 83 per cent, has not changed since SILC 2014. The pattern across migrant groups is very similar too. Only the EU-West has experienced a significant change since 2014 as their assessment went from 98 per cent in 2014 to 91 per cent in 2016, a level more similar to most other migrant groups. The non-Irish report better general health (88.5 per cent) than Irish nationals (82.1 per cent). This finding holds across all groups, except the

UK group which is very similar to Irish nationals. The level of good health between the other groups ranges from 90 per cent for the EU-East migrants to 93 per cent for the non-EU migrants. The overall better health status of the migrant population compared to the natives, known as the ‘healthy immigrant effect’, has been found in many other countries such as in North America and Australia but also in Ireland to a lesser extent (Nolan, 2012). While this effect was not as strong in Ireland, Nolan (2012) still found some contributing factors to better health such as education, household income and age.

The middle column of Table 4.3 shows that the non-Irish are indeed on average much younger (39 years old) than Irish nationals (47 years old).<sup>51</sup> This is true across all migrant groups, except for UK migrants who have an average age of 52, a feature which could partially explain their relatively worse health outcomes.

**TABLE 4.3 SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH STATUS BY NATIONALITY, 2016**

	Very Good or Good health ( % )	Mean Age (rounded)	No of individuals (16 and over)
<b>Irish</b>	82.1	47	9,152
<b>Non-Irish</b>	88.1*	39	1,028
<b>Of which:</b>			
<b>UK</b>	80.1	52	249
<b>EU-West</b>	91.5*	38	151
<b>EU-East</b>	89.7*	36	436
<b>Non-EU</b>	89.3*	35	192
<b>All</b>	82.8	46	10,180

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, percentages weighted; N unweighted.

Notes: \* signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at  $p \leq 0.05$ .

### 4.3 HOUSING TENURE AND CONDITIONS

The final Zaragoza social inclusion indicator relates to homeownership among migrant groups and, as before, we compare this outcome to the native population. Homeownership is often perceived as the gold standard of economic success and social integration in the host country. Over the last ten years the Irish property market was characterised by a period of acute turmoil during the economic boom and the recession, resulting in the bursting of the property bubble with collapsing supply and demand and falling prices. During the economic boom (1995 to 2007), housing prices rose by 474 per cent before falling by 53 per cent between 2007 and 2013 (McQuinn, 2017). As the overall economy started to recover from 2013 onwards, so too did the housing market, with prices rising by 52 per cent between 2013 and 2017 (McQuinn, 2017). The rental market followed

<sup>51</sup> Note that the mean age reported in the column is based on people aged 16 or older. This explains why the figures are considerably different to the values reported using the Labour Force Survey in Chapter 3.

a similar pattern of rise and fall as the economy boomed and struggled. However, since 2013 rental prices have risen by 29 per cent (Lawless et al., 2018). In both the housing and rental market, the recent price inflation was caused by the combined effects of a recovering economy, rising demand for property and a shortage of supply.

Previous international research has identified several factors that impact negatively on homeownership among immigrants, such as low household income and savings and income requirements to secure credit. Migrants' location in the host country, household size, length of stay and expected mobility in the host country also have an impact (Mundra and Uwaifo Oyelere, 2017; Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra 2012; Gobillon and Solignac, 2015).

The results reported in Table 4.4 are based on the responses from the person answering the household questionnaire (generally the head of household) during the survey interviews. The analysis is therefore done at household level rather than the individual level as in the previous tables. Almost 80 per cent of Irish nationals own their home (with or without a mortgage) compared to 34 per cent of non-Irish nationals. Compared to the 2014 SILC figures (published in the 2016 Integration Monitor, see Barrett et al., 2017), the 2016 figures for the Irish nationals have been stable, but increased by 9 percentage points for the non-Irish, and most migrant groups have experienced this increase. With the exception of the UK, at 74 per cent, all migrant groups have significantly lower levels of homeownership. Almost half of EU-West migrants own their home and this represents an increase of 15 percentage points since the 2014 SILC. The EU-East group also experienced a large increase in homeownership in this period. Indeed, the EU-East rate, while still modest, increased two-fold since SILC 2014 – from 7 per cent to 13 per cent. This is the largest relative increase of homeownership across all non-Irish groups. However, the trend for the non-EU homeownership rate stands out, as it recorded a fall of two percentage points over the two-year period.

Less than one-in-fourteen Irish nationals rent their home on the private market. By contrast, half of the non-Irish population are private renters, but there is a diverse pattern across the migrant groups. Similar to Irish nationals, 10 per cent of UK nationals live in private rented accommodation. Private renting is more common among EU-West nationals (39 per cent), and even more so among the non-EU group (62 per cent). Almost three-quarters of EU-East nationals are in this tenure category.

Finally, the percentage of Irish and non-Irish nationals living in Local Authority rented accommodation is very similar at 14 per cent and 15 per cent respectively.

This represents a slight increase for the Irish since 2014, but a three-fold increase for the non-Irish. As with other forms of tenure, however, there is some variation in this pattern across groups. The percentages of the UK and EU-East groups in Local Authority housing, at 16 per cent and 14 per cent respectively, are quite similar to Irish nationals. The figure for EU-West nationals is slightly lower but it is considerably higher for the non-EU group, at 22 per cent.

Looking at other changes over time, there has been a reduction in private rented accommodation in favour of Local Authority housing for Irish nationals. Among UK nationals, we observe an increase in homeownership and Local Authority housing, and a fall in private rented accommodation, a pattern which is repeated by EU-West and EU-East migrants. The pattern for the non-EU group is more similar to what we find with Irish nationals, with no change in homeownership, a reduction in private renting, and increased housing in local authority properties.<sup>52</sup>

**TABLE 4.4 HOUSING TENURE BY NATIONALITY, 2016**

Nationality	Home Owners (%)	Private rented (%)	LA Rented (%)	No of households (unweighted)	Sig. (chi Sq)
<b>Irish</b>	78.7	7.1	14.2	4,644	
<b>Non-Irish</b>	34.2	50.9	14.9	456	*
<i>Of which:</i>					
<b>UK</b>	74.0	10.3	15.7	133	n.s.
<b>EU-West</b>	51.8	39.1	9.1	68	*
<b>EU-East</b>	13.4	72.5	14.1	185	*
<b>Non-EU</b>	16.2	61.6	22.2	70	*
<b>All</b>	74.0	11.7	14.3	5,100	

*Source:* Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, percentages weighted; N unweighted. A small number of households living rent-free have been excluded from the analysis.

*Notes:* The questions on homeownership were answered by the person who answered the household questionnaire, and their nationality is used. \*signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at  $p \leq 0.05$ ; n.s. indicates that the difference is not statistically significant.

While the concept of the ‘quality of life’ is multidimensional and complex, there is no doubt that the quality of people’s accommodation and living environment contributes to overall wellbeing, as is highlighted by a number of studies (Eurofound, 2003; Clarke et al., 2008; OECD, 2013). The EU-SILC collects a range of information about both the respondent’s basic housing facilities and their surrounding neighbourhoods. Based on work by Maître et al. (2006), we use these

<sup>52</sup> Under the Housing Assistance Payment (HAP), rent is paid directly from the Local Authority to a private landlord. In these cases, it is possible that some respondents consider their dwelling to be rented from the Local Authority rather than on the private market. This could partially explain the increase in the percentage of Local Authority rented dwellings.

data to construct two distinct dimensions of deprivation, relating to housing and the neighbourhood's environment.

The housing deprivation dimension is a four-item scale capturing the lack of facilities in the accommodation for hot water, a bath or a shower, indoor toilets and central heating. A household is deprived on this dimension if they lack any of these four items. The neighbourhood environment dimension is based on a five-item scale about the area where households live as well as poor housing conditions. The items are noise, pollution, crime, leaks in the accommodation and inadequate light. A household is deprived if they lack any of these five items.

In Table 4.5 we report the percentage of households experiencing any of these housing and environmental issues. Overall, while the figures show that non-Irish households are more likely than Irish households to experience either type of deprivation, the difference between the two groups is not significant. This was also the case in 2014 (Barrett et al., 2017) but the gap between Irish and non-Irish households was much smaller. Since then Irish and non-Irish households' housing deprivation has worsened but their environmental conditions have improved.

There is very little difference in the rates of either housing or neighbourhood deprivation between households in private rented accommodation and households in other tenure types. This finding holds for both Irish and non-Irish households.

**TABLE 4.5 HOUSING CONDITIONS BY NATIONALITY, 2016**

	All Households		Private Rented	
	% deprived on housing	% deprived on environ.	% deprived on housing	% deprived on environ.
<b>Irish</b>	10.9	26.4	11.6	29.8
<b>Non-Irish</b>	13.4	30.9	12.5	30.3

Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, weighted percentages.

#### 4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Since the 2014 SILC, analysed in the last Integration Monitor, households in Ireland have benefited from the consolidation of the Irish economic recovery, as the median annual disposable household income increased by 17 per cent between 2014 and 2016. While we cannot explore the extent of the increase across the various migrant groups due to data issues as explained at the beginning of this chapter, there is strong evidence to suggest that all migrant groups experienced this increase to varying degrees.



Overall, we found Irish households' disposable income in 2016 to be higher than non-Irish households, with the exception of migrants from the EU-West countries. As was the case in previous Integration Monitors, UK nationals and non-EU migrants report the lowest disposable household income.

The recent improvement in the Irish economy had a modest but positive impact on the at risk of poverty rate as it fell from 17.2 per cent in 2014 to 16.5 per cent in 2016. Again, for the same data reasons as described above, we cannot comment on the poverty trends across the various groups and we can only describe the 2016 figures. Overall, the at risk of poverty rate is higher for the non-Irish than the Irish, with a seven percentage point gap between the groups. However, these figures conceal considerable variation between migrant groups. The EU-West group has the lowest at risk of poverty rate, well below the Irish and the EU-East rates. By contrast, the at risk of poverty rate for migrants from the UK and from outside the EU is extremely high, between two and 2.7 times the Irish rate.

Over the period 2014 to 2016, more progress was made on reducing material deprivation than the at risk of poverty rate. With the exception of non-EU migrants, all groups shared in this improvement in material deprivation. The sharpest reduction in deprivation was enjoyed by the EU-West group while non-EU migrants actually experienced an increase in deprivation. The results for consistent poverty, which show higher risks for UK nationals and non-EU nationals, and lower risks for the Irish and EU-West migrants, mirror the results for the at risk of poverty and deprivation measures.

This chapter has highlighted some of the limits of aggregating nationality categories into broad groupings, particularly the non-EU group. Non-EU nationals are a heterogeneous group, comprising both migrants from the developing nations of South and East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa; and from the developed economies of North America and Oceania. It is therefore likely that they also have markedly varying experiences of poverty and social exclusion. However, due to the size of the SILC sample, it was not possible to carry out the analysis separately for these narrower nationality groupings with a satisfactory level of confidence. A larger sample of migrants in a data source with income and social inclusion measures would allow us to distinguish regional groupings and considerably enhance our understanding of social inclusion among migrants in Ireland.

Over time there was very little change in the distribution and the pattern of health status of migrants compared to the Irish nationals. It is still the case that overall

non-Irish individuals report better health outcomes than Irish nationals, with the notable exception of UK migrants.

There was more change over time in relation to housing tenure across these groups. While homeownership has remained lower among the non-Irish than the Irish (but not so much among UK migrants), there has been a large increase in homeownership across all migrant groups (except for the non-EU), which could indicate an intention to settle in Ireland for a long period of time. There was also a large reduction in the percentage of households living in privately rented accommodation and a large increase in Local Authority rented accommodation, to the point that there is no longer any difference between Irish and non-Irish nationals in Local Authority accommodation. The results regarding housing and environment deprivation were mixed. In general, non-Irish nationals seem to be more at risk of experiencing housing and neighbourhood deprivation, but the differences are not statistically significant. Since 2014, we find that rates of housing deprivation have increased, while neighbourhood deprivation decreased over the same period.

#### **BOX 4.1      ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES**

##### *Social Welfare*

The social welfare system is administered by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection. It is divided into the following main types of payments:

- Social insurance payments;
- Social assistance or means tested payments;
- Universal payments.

To qualify for social insurance payments an individual must have made the necessary number of social insurance (PRSI) payments for the scheme in question and satisfy certain conditions. Social assistance payments are made to those who do not have enough PRSI contributions to qualify for the equivalent social insurance-based payments.

EU law requires that EU nationals are treated equally to Member State nationals in regard to accessing social welfare. In practice, national administrative rules lead to differing levels of access. This is evidenced in Ireland by the application of a Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) to social assistance payments and to child benefit, which means that applicants must show they are both resident in, and have a proven close link to Ireland.

Currently the Department of Social Protection assesses the following:

- Length and continuity of residence in Ireland;
- Length and purpose of any absence from Ireland;
- Nature and pattern of employment;

- Applicant's main centre of interest;
- Applicant's intention to live in Ireland as it appears from the evidence

(Department of Social Protection, 2013).

The evidence used for each factor depends on the facts of the individual case and the final decision reached is to some extent subjective. There have been some criticisms of the subjectivity of the decision-making process (FLAC, 2012).

### *Health Services*

In Ireland there is universal access to public healthcare, though costs may apply, for example for GP services. Medical Card holders may access certain public health services free of charge and entitlement is means tested regardless of nationality. Subject to a means test, refugees and those with leave to remain are entitled to a Medical Card. Asylum applicants living in direct provision are also entitled to a means tested Medical Card.

### *Housing Services*

Local authorities in Ireland are the main provider of social housing for people who need housing and cannot afford to buy their own homes. Local authority housing is allocated according to housing need, and rents are based on ability to pay. Rent supplement is a payment made by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection for those in private rented accommodation who cannot afford to meet their housing costs. The Housing Assistance Payment is an equivalent payment made by Local Authorities directly to landlords on behalf of tenants.

The Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government reviewed access to social housing for immigrants, and in 2012 issued revised guidelines in access to social housing supports for non-Irish nationals. Generally speaking, all EEA nationals may be considered for assessment for social housing support from housing authorities if;

- 1) They are in employment/self-employed in the State; or
- 2) Where they are not currently working/employed it is because: they are temporarily unable to work because of illness/accident; they are recorded as involuntarily unemployed after having been employed for longer than a year; and they are registered as a jobseeker with Department of Social Protection and Intreo.



## CHAPTER 5

### Active Citizenship

By Emma Quinn

The indicators presented in this chapter describe the context and the opportunities for integration in the domain of active citizenship, specifically in relation to naturalisation, long-term residence and political participation. The term ‘active citizenship’ is used here as a broad concept embracing formal and non-formal, political, cultural, inter-personal and caring activities (Taskforce on Active Citizenship, 2007) and as such is not limited to the activities of Irish citizens. The indicators used here differ from the other indicators presented within the *Monitoring Report on Integration* because they do not draw direct comparisons of outcomes between Irish and non-Irish nationals. The Zaragoza Declaration<sup>53</sup> included three indicators designed to measure integration in the active citizenship domain. Firstly, the naturalisation rate, measured as the ratio of resident immigrants to those who acquired citizenship; secondly the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and thirdly the share of immigrants among elected representatives. This chapter presents the calculation of these indicators based on the best available national data, together with available supplementary information and data.

#### 5.1 NATURALISATION

Almost 140,000 non-Irish nationals acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation between 2005 and 2017.<sup>54</sup> Naturalised migrants may participate fully in the democratic process and are entitled to equal access to the institutions, goods and services of the State. Ireland has entered a new phase regarding the naturalisation of new Irish citizens. Applications and approvals have fallen from a peak in 2012 to much lower levels in recent years. With the publication of a new Migrant Integration Strategy in 2017, a new focus is being placed on the integration of these and other migrants (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017).

Figure 5.1 shows that the number of naturalisation certificates issued annually accelerated rapidly from 2010. This was due in part to processing improvements and the resolution of a large backlog of cases (see Barrett et al., 2017) as well as

<sup>53</sup> Adopted in April 2010 by EU Ministers responsible for integration, and approved at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in June 2010.


<sup>54</sup> Exact figure 139,355 includes an estimation of 20,000 certificates issued between 2005 and 2009 plus precise annual figures between 2010 and 2017. Source: Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service.

the nature of immigration flows, which increased rapidly from a relatively low base during the 2000s.

According to the 2002 Census, 6 per cent of the usually resident population was non-Irish. This proportion doubled in just nine years to reach 12 per cent in 2011 (see Chapter 1). Therefore towards the latter half of the decade 2000-2010, a large group of non-Irish nationals who wished to become citizens began to meet the minimum residence criterion – five years living in Ireland. The subsequent decline in naturalisation certificates issued in more recent years may reflect a decrease in the number of non-EEA migrant workers resident in Ireland during the 2008-2012 recession (see Section 5.1.1.1).

The number of certificates issued has fallen steadily since 2012 when a total of 25,109 were awarded to new Irish citizens. In 2016, 10,036 certificates were issued, falling again to 8,196 in 2017. The number of naturalisation certificates issued in 2017 was less than one-third of the figure seen in 2012.

**FIGURE 5.1 NATURALISATION CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS, REJECTIONS AND CERTIFICATES ISSUED, 2010-2017**



Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April and July 2018.

Recent years have seen the number of applications stabilising: naturalisation applications numbered 12,651 in 2015, 13,018 in 2016 and 11,770 in 2017. Refusals were also stable in the period, numbering 482 in 2016 and 531 in 2017. As noted in the previous *Monitoring Report on Integration*, the ratio of

applications rejected to certificates issued has decreased significantly in recent years, from 20 per cent in 2010 to 5 per cent in 2016 and 6 per cent in 2017. Figure 5.1 also shows that a significant proportion of naturalisation certificates issued each year are to the spouses of Irish nationals. In 2017, 1,456 or 17.8 per cent of certificates issued were on the basis of marriage to an Irish national. In 2016 the number was 2,005 or 20.0 per cent.<sup>55</sup>

Processing times for naturalisation applications increased slightly from an average of three months in 2014 and 2015, to four months in 2016 and five months in 2017.<sup>56</sup> Processing time is defined to run from the date the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) deems an application complete, up to the date the decision is made.

### 5.1.1 Profile of naturalised Irish citizens<sup>57</sup>

Table 5.1 shows that since 2012, the number of certificates issued to non-EEA nationals has fallen steadily from a peak of 23,659 to 4,474 in 2017. The number of EEA nationals naturalising has increased from 1,450 in 2012 to 3,722 in 2017. The overall decrease in the number of naturalisations since 2012 reflects both reductions in the issuance of non-EEA residence permits during the recession and the introduction of processing improvements in 2011 which cleared a large backlog of applications.<sup>58</sup>

**TABLE 5.1 PERSONS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP THROUGH NATURALISATION BY FORMER NATIONALITY GROUP (EEA AND NON-EEA): 2010-2017**

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
<b>EEA</b>	477	453	1,450	1,788	2,949	3,144	3,327	3,722
<b>Non EEA</b>	5,835	10,336	23,659	22,456	18,155	10,421	6,709	4,474
<b>Total</b>	6,312	10,789	25,109	24,244	21,104	13,565	10,036	8,196
<b>% EEA</b>	7.6%	4.2%	5.8%	7.4%	14.0%	23.2%	33.2%	45.4%

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.

Notes: Where relevant individuals recorded as 'stateless' are shown in the non-EEA category as follows: 2011, three stateless persons; 2013, one stateless person; 2014, two stateless persons; 2015, six stateless persons; 2016, zero stateless persons; 2017, zero stateless persons.

Non-EEA data include certificates issued to persons in respect of whom nationality information is 'not readily available' as follows: 2011, 78 persons; 2013, one person; 2014, 15 persons; 2015, 22 persons; 2016, one person; 2017, zero persons.

<sup>55</sup> Data on the numbers of persons who naturalised on the grounds of marriage to Irish national: 1,456 (2017); 2,005 (2016); 2,642 (2015); 3,157 (2014); 3,060 (2013); 1,679 (2012); 1,659 (2011); 422 (2010). Data received from Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, September 2016.

<sup>56</sup> Average time taken to process all applications processed to a decision during the reference year. Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April 2018.

<sup>57</sup> Statistics on applications for citizenship disaggregated by age, gender and nationality are now published annually in line with Action 9 under the Migrant Integration Strategy (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018a).

<sup>58</sup> Approximately 22,000 applications were awaiting decision in March 2011 and this number had fallen to approximately 8,500 applications pending decision in December 2013 (Barrett et al., 2017).

### 5.1.1.1 *Profile of naturalised Irish citizens: non-EEA*

Table 5.2 shows the top ten nationalities among non-EEA nationals who naturalised between 2013 and 2017. Declines were seen across all non-EEA national groups listed in the 2015 Top 10. Some national groups saw particularly steep drops: naturalisation certificates issued to nationals of the Philippines fell by 69 per cent between 2015 and 2017 from 1,167 to 362; certificates issued to Nigerian nationals decreased by 63 per cent from 1,360 to 509. Indian nationals saw a 59 per cent drop in the period, from 1,611 to 666, while Pakistani nationals saw a 53 per cent drop, from 733 to 341.

In order to interpret naturalisation trends it is helpful to look at data on the relevant population at least five years prior to the year in question, as this is the minimum period a non-EEA national may be in the State before applying to naturalise. Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1 shows that in the period 2008 to 2012 (during the Great Recession), the total number of non-EEA nationals granted residence permits declined substantially – from over 140,000 to 120,000. This reduction in the ‘stock’ of non-EEA residents is likely having a knock-on effect on the naturalisation rate in the years 2013 to 2017. During the recession, the number of residence permits issued for education reasons remained relatively constant, meaning that the relative drop among non-education related permits was even starker. This is consequential for the naturalisation statistics because time spent in Ireland on education residence permits is not reckonable for the purposes of acquiring citizenship. In fact, we see that almost all of the reduction is concentrated in work residence permits, which fell by almost 60 per cent from 2008 to 2012. This reduction is indicative of the labour market conditions of the time.



**TABLE 5.2 TOTAL NON-EEA NATIONALS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALISATION BY NATIONALITY 2013-2017 (TOP 10)**

Acquired Citizenship 2013		Acquired Citizenship 2014		Acquired Citizenship 2015		Acquired Citizenship 2016		Acquired Citizenship 2017	
Former Nationality	N	Former Nationality	N	Former Nationality	N	Former Nationality	N	Former Nationality	N
Nigeria	5,783	Nigeria	3,286	India	1,611	India	1,028	India	666
India	3,011	India	2,939	Nigeria	1,360	Nigeria	776	Nigeria	509
Philippines	2,485	Philippines	2,184	Philippines	1,167	Philippines	730	Philippines	362
Pakistan	1,805	Pakistan	1,244	Pakistan	733	Pakistan	419	Pakistan	341
Ukraine	694	China	576	China	473	Brazil	304	Brazil	264
China	656	South Africa	563	Brazil	393	China	304	China	225
Moldova	552	Ukraine	536	South Africa	369	US	233	US	177
South Africa	488	Brazil	459	Ukraine	323	South Africa	214	South Africa	140
Iraq	417	DR Congo	421	US	246	Ukraine	200	Ukraine	130
Bangladesh	403	Moldova	356	DR Congo	245	Thailand	173	Thailand	108
Other	6,162	Other	5,591	Other	3,501	Other	2,328	Other	1,552
Total	22,456	Total	18,155	Total	10,421	Total	6,709	Total	4,474

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.

#### 5.1.1.2 Profile of naturalised Irish citizens: EEA nationals

As noted above, Table 5.1 shows an increase in EEA nationals naturalising. While EEA nationals accounted for just 6 per cent of certificates issued in 2012, this increased to almost half of recipients (45 per cent) in 2017. Table 5.3 shows that several EEA groups listed in the top five in 2015 saw increases in the number of naturalisation certificates issued in 2017. Certificates issued to Polish and Romanian nationals in 2017 outnumber any of the non-EEA national groups. Polish nationals naturalising increased by 17 per cent in the period from 1,161 to 1,358. Polish nationals represented the largest overall national group among recipients in 2017. Census data show that the Polish population in Ireland has grown particularly rapidly in recent years, from just over 2,000 in 2002, to 63,276 in 2006, to 122,585 in 2011 and 122,515 in 2016 (CSO, 2012; 2017).<sup>59</sup> Also of interest is the increase in UK nationals acquiring Irish citizenship. In 2015 just 54 UK citizens naturalised in Ireland, increasing to 98 in 2016 and to 529 in 2017.<sup>60</sup> This increase is likely to be related to the vote by the UK to leave the EU in mid-2016 (see Section 5.1.3).

Certificates issued to Latvian and Lithuanian nationals also increased in the period, while the number of Romanian nationals who took Irish citizenship by naturalisation in 2017 (763) was 15 per cent lower than in 2015 (902).

<sup>59</sup> Central Statistics Office (2012). Census 2011 Profile 6 Migration and Diversity. [www.cso.ie](http://www.cso.ie). Central Statistics Office (2017). Census 2016 Profile 7 Migration and Diversity. [www.cso.ie](http://www.cso.ie).

<sup>60</sup> Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, June 2018.

**TABLE 5.3 TOTAL EEA NATIONALS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALISATION BY NATIONALITY 2013-2017 (TOP FIVE)**

Acquired Citizenship 2013		Acquired Citizenship 2014		Acquired Citizenship 2015		Acquired Citizenship 2016		Acquired Citizenship 2017	
Former Nationality	N	Former Nationality	N	Former Nationality	N	Former Nationality	N	Former Nationality	N
Romania	564	Romania	1,029	Poland	1,161	Poland	1,326	Poland	1,358
Poland	507	Poland	939	Romania	901	Romania	756	Romania	763
Latvia	150	Latvia	225	Latvia	327	Latvia	379	UK	529
Bulgaria	83	Hungary	137	Hungary	172	Hungary	216	Latvia	392
Lithuania	80	Lithuania	103	Lithuania	126	Lithuania	168	Lithuania	166
Other	404	Other	516	Other	457	Other	482	Other	514
Total	1,788	Total	2,949	Total	3,144	Total	3,327	Total	3,722

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.

As noted in the 2016 *Monitoring Report on Integration* (Barrett et al., 2017), despite the upward trend of EEA nationals naturalising, the proportion of the resident EEA population choosing to naturalise annually remains very low. This is not unusual in an international context: Vink et al. (2013) showed that the level of economic development<sup>61</sup> of migrants' country of origin is important in understanding the likelihood to naturalise, with immigrants from highly developed countries much less likely to make this choice. Intra-EU migration may also be more flexible, and less permanent, than non-EU immigration (Favell, 2008). There are clearly greater incentives for non-EEA nationals to naturalise in Ireland. Non-EEA nationals often lack security of residence and are more constrained in terms of movements in and out of the State when compared to EEA migrants. Resident EEA nationals have rights and entitlements that are very similar to those held by Irish citizens, the main exception being that only Irish citizens have the rights to stand and vote in all national elections and referenda.

#### 5.1.1.3 Profile of naturalised Irish Citizens: Age and gender

Some 16.8 per cent of non-EEA nationals who naturalised in 2017 were children aged under 16 years. In the EEA group this figure was substantially lower (9.8 per cent in 2017) (see Table 5.4). Table 5.5 shows that the non-EEA group was almost evenly split between males and females in both 2016 (49.5 per cent) and 2017 (49.1 per cent). A slightly higher proportion of the newly naturalised EEA population were female the same period (52.2 per cent in 2016 and 2017).

<sup>61</sup> Using data from the Human Development Index, a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and standard of living.

**TABLE 5.4 PERSONS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP THROUGH NATURALISATION BY AGE GROUP, 2015-2017**

Nationality	2015	2016	2017
<b>EEA aged under 16</b>	342	402	363
<b>EEA aged 16+</b>	2,802	2,925	3,359
<b>% of EEA nationals aged under 16</b>	10.9%	12.0%	9.8%
<b>Non EEA aged under 16</b>	1,824	1,305	753
<b>Non EEA aged 16+</b>	8,597	5,404	3,721
<b>% of Non EEA nationals aged under 16</b>	17.5%	19.5%	16.8%

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.

**TABLE 5.5 PERSONS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP THROUGH NATURALISATION BY GENDER, 2015-2017**

Nationality		2015	2016	2017
<b>EEA</b>	Male	1,587	1,589	1,778
	Female	1,557	1,738	1,944
<b>% of EEA nationals female</b>		49.5%	52.2%	52.2%
<b>Non-EEA</b>	Male	5,376	3,387	2,277
	Female	5,042	3,322	2,197
<b>% of Non EEA nationals female</b>		48.4%	49.5%	49.1%

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.

Note: 2015 non-EEA total reported in Table 5.5 includes three persons with non-specified gender.

### 5.1.2 Citizenship indicators

The naturalisation rate, measured as the ratio of resident immigrants to those who acquired citizenship, captures information on the opportunities to naturalise (policies) as well as on a range of other contextual factors such as such as immigrants' motivation to naturalise, duration of residence, and settlement in the country (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013).

This section presents an annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals, which is derived using administrative data (residence permits) in order to produce the most up-to-date and precise indicator possible.

A similar rate is provided for EU nationals, and because administrative data are not available for this group we report an indicator compiled by Eurostat. Eurostat data are then also used to place Ireland's citizenship indicators in an EU context.

### *Citizenship Indicator for non-EEA Nationals*

The annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals i.e. the ratio of the number of non-EEA population holding 'live' immigration permissions, to the number who acquired citizenship through naturalisation in the reference year, is shown in Table 5.6. The similar indicator produced by Eurostat<sup>62</sup> draws on survey-based estimates of the non-citizen resident population. Here we use administrative data obtained directly from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service. As only non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over are required to register with the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service/Garda National Immigration Bureau the indicator in Table 5.6 refers to the age group 16 and over.

The annual citizenship acquisition rate for non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over was stable in 2012-2013 at around 16 per cent, before falling rapidly to 12.8 per cent in 2014, 7.5 per cent in 2015, 4.8 per cent in 2016 and 2.9 per cent in 2017. As noted in Section 5.1.1.1, part of the reason for the steep decline may be the processing of the backlog along with the fall in the number of non-EEA migrant workers.

**TABLE 5.6 CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER 2009-2017**

Annual Naturalisation Rate									
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over acquired citizenship in reference year	NA	4,782	9,706	19,707	17,357	13,461	8,597	5,404	3,721
Number of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over holding immigration permissions	134,549	133,232	128,104	120,281	107,435	105,569	113,914	110,927	128,066
Share of total number of non-EEA nationals holding permissions in ref. year (aged 16 and over) who acquired citizenship in ref. year (%)	NA	3.6	7.6	16.4	16.2	12.8	7.5	4.8	2.9

*Source:* Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April 2018. Eurostat (migr\_resvalid), August 2018: all valid residence permits on 31 December on reference year.

*Note:* Non-EEA data include persons recorded as 'as Stateless, Unknown or Recognised non-citizen': 2011, three persons; 2012, six persons; 2013, one person; 2014, two persons; 2015, six persons. Certificates were also issued to persons whose nationality was not readily available and these are included in the non-EEA data: 2011, 78 persons; 2013, one person; 2014, 15 persons; 2015, 22 persons. Table contains updates to previously published 2010-2012 data.

A total of 102,735<sup>63</sup> non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over naturalised between 2005 and 2017 (see McGinnity et al., 2014, and Table 5.6). If we make the (significant) assumptions that there were no outflows/deaths among those

<sup>62</sup> See table migr\_acqs at <http://ec.europa.eu>.

<sup>63</sup> Includes an estimation of 20,000 certificates issued between 2005 and 2009.

naturalised, it is possible to estimate that approximately 45 per cent of the population aged 16 and over of non-EEA origin has acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation since 2005;<sup>64</sup> the population being defined as the currently registered non-EEA population aged 16 and over, plus those ‘ever’ naturalised. Given the fact that some non-EEA citizens who naturalised are likely to have left the State, or died in this period, this is likely to be the upper limit of the estimate. It does indicate that a substantial proportion of non-EEA migrants have acquired Irish citizenship.

### *Citizenship Indicator for EU Nationals*

In Table 5.7 we report the Eurostat estimates of the percentage of non-Irish EU nationals who acquired citizenship in the reference year. It is estimated that less than one per cent of the resident non-Irish EU population in Ireland acquired citizenship each year between 2009 and 2016, although the rate has increased significantly in the period from 0.06 per cent to 0.76 per cent in 2015 and 0.80 per cent in 2016.

**TABLE 5.7 CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR FOR EU NATIONALS IN IRELAND**

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
EU residents who acquired citizenship as a share of EU residents (%)	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.33	0.45	0.72	0.76	0.80

Source: Eurostat (migr\_acqs), extracted August 2018. 2013 and 2015 data are provisional.


Figure 5.2 shows Ireland in an EU context using Eurostat indicators on the share of EU citizens and non-EU citizens who acquired citizenship in different countries in 2014. The rate of naturalisation of EU citizens is calculated by Eurostat as the total number of persons of EU origin granted citizenship through naturalisation in the reference year, divided by the total estimated resident population of EU nationals. A similar method is used to calculate the non-EU rate.

Unlike in 2014, when Ireland recorded the highest rate of naturalisation of non-EU nationals (see Barrett et al., 2017), the naturalisation rate for both non-EU nationals and EU nationals in 2016 was much more in line with other EU Member States.

<sup>64</sup> Using this method of calculation the estimated population of migrant origin in 2017 is 230,801. Note that given our assumptions this figure will always increase. The stock figure used includes certain groups of non-EEA nationals, such as students, Intra-Company Transfers and trainees, whose residence in Ireland does not count as ‘reckonable residence’ when applying for naturalisation. Such groups are included in the estimate because it is a matter of national policy whether or not their residence counts towards eligibility for naturalisation. To exclude them would conflate the ‘policy outcome’ with ‘policy output’ within the indicator.

Regarding the naturalisation of EU nationals, Ireland's 2016 rate of 0.80 per cent was in the middle of the states ranked.

**FIGURE 5.2 RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP AS A SHARE OF RESIDENT NON-CITIZENS BY FORMER CITIZENSHIP (%), 2016, IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES PLUS NORWAY**



Source: Eurostat, Residents who acquired citizenship as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship and sex [migr\_acqs].

### 5.1.3 Policy issues related to naturalisation

The Migrant Integration Strategy contains four actions related to naturalisation. The Strategy makes specific reference to naturalisation processing fees, undertaking to ensure that costs are reasonable and do not deter applicants who are qualified. The high cost attached to applying for citizenship in Ireland is discussed in Barrett et al. (2017). The Strategy also foresees researching the potential introduction of civics/language tests for those seeking citizenship, and

statistics on applications are now published (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017).

In addition the Strategy undertakes to finalise arrangements to enable registration of non-EEA migrants aged under 16 years ‘as a matter of urgency’. Previous Monitoring Reports have highlighted the problems faced by non-EEA children in proving sufficient reckonable residence for the purpose of making a naturalisation application. Research by the Immigrant Council of Ireland (2016) found inconsistencies in the treatment of non-EEA children in immigration matters and emphasised the need for an independent status, especially for the children in care. The action under the Strategy, which falls to INIS to implement, has not yet been achieved. In response to an INIS stakeholder consultation in Spring 2018, the Immigrant Council of Ireland stressed that a child-sensitive approach should be taken to introducing the registration of children (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2018).

On 23 June 2016 the UK voted in a referendum to leave the EU, a development commonly referred to as ‘Brexit’. *The Irish Times* reported in October 2016 that there had been a surge in citizenship applications, foreign birth registrations and passport applications since the June result (Sheridan, 2017). In December 2017 the Department of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the highest number of Irish passports ever issued in one year had been issued in 2017. Some 779,000 passports were issued, up over 15 per cent since 2015. Almost 20 per cent of the total applications received by the Passport Service in 2017 were from Irish citizens in Northern Ireland or Great Britain (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017). As noted above some 529 UK nationals also naturalised in 2017.

The absence of an appeals procedure in Ireland for rejected applicants for naturalisation was highlighted in MIPEX 2015 as uncommon in an international context. Insecurity of status among applicants is also highlighted as a consequence of the Minister for Justice and Equality’s ‘absolute’ discretion to interpret naturalisation eligibility requirements (Huddleston et al., 2015). In January 2018 *The Irish Times* reported that absences from the State during the year prior to application had been increasingly identified as the reason for refusal of citizenship applications (*The Irish Times*, 27 January 2018). INIS stated that current policy is to allow up to six weeks absence from the State for normal holidays and other short-term absences (such as for business meetings, family weddings etc.) and that such absences do not impact on the statutory residence requirement.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Some further flexibility may also be allowed in exceptional circumstances. Comments received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, June 2016.

Nine citizenship ceremonies took place in 2016 (Sheridan, 2017) and 16 in 2017 (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018a).

## 5.2 LONG-TERM RESIDENCE

Long-term residence is a permanent residence status for migrants who have been resident in the host country for a period of time (often five years), which offers the same basic socio-economic rights as citizens of the host country. As such, it is a central element of integration policy offering the migrant almost full inclusion in the host society. Such a status is provided for in the majority of EU Member States, under Directives 2003/109/EC and 2011/51/EU.<sup>66</sup> Ireland has not opted in to either Directive and resident non-EEA nationals have much more limited access to permanent residence than elsewhere in the EU.<sup>67</sup> In Ireland an administrative long-term residence is open to employment permit holders (and their dependent spouses) and scientific researchers only. MIPEX (2015) ranks Ireland 35<sup>th</sup> out of 38 countries on access to permanent residence. Furthermore, the existing administrative scheme is identified as ‘the most unclear and discretionary procedure of all 38 countries’ (Huddleston et al., 2015).

The provision of a statutory long-term residence status with ‘transparent rules, clearly articulated expectations and predictable benefits for law-abiding immigrants’ (Council of the European Union, 2004) has been foreseen by Irish policymakers since 2008.<sup>68</sup> The Migrant Integration Strategy contains an action to introduce a statutory scheme for Long-Term Residence, but this has not been progressed to date.

The number of non-EEA nationals holding long-term residence continued to decline between 2015 and 2017, falling by 26 per cent to reach 1,484, and accounting for just 1.2 per cent of non-EEA nationals with live residence permissions. The steep decline between 2010 and 2014 coincided with a huge number of naturalisation certificates being issued (see Table 5.1). New applications increased between 2015 and 2017 (from 69 to 107), but remain very low. Statistics on applications for long-term residence are now published annually in line with Action 13 under the Migrant Integration Strategy (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018a).

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<sup>66</sup> Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 2011 amends Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection. Only Ireland, UK and Denmark do not participate in the Directives.

<sup>67</sup> Under the terms of the protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Ireland does not take part in the adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title IV of the EC Treaty unless Ireland opts in to the measure.

<sup>68</sup> Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, 2008.



**TABLE 5.8 APPLICATIONS FOR LONG-TERM RESIDENCE (LTR), 2010-2017**

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
New applications for LTR	2,415	1,812	705	288	164	69	100	107
Non-EEA nationals holding LTR	8,367	7,721	5,771	3,392	2,309	2,019	1,473	1,484
Number of non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over holding live immigration permissions	133,232	128,104	120,281	107,435	105,569	113,914	110,927	128,066
Share of the total number of non-EEA nationals holding 'live' permission in reference year (aged 16 and over) who held long-term residence in reference year	6.3%	6.0%	4.8%	3.2%	2.2%	1.8%	1.3%	1.2%

Source: Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April 2018. Data for total non-EEA nationals with live residence permission taken from Eurostat (migr\_resvalid), extracted August 2018: all valid residence permits on 31 December of reference year.

### 5.3 CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Ireland's political system offers relatively positive opportunities for migrant integration compared to most EU countries<sup>69</sup> (Huddleston et al., 2015). Irish or UK citizenship is required in order to stand or vote in general elections, but all residents in Ireland, regardless of nationality, may stand and vote in local elections. The UNHCR RICE report notes that Ireland is unusual in having easy access to politicians, representatives and institutions in general (UNHCR, 2014).

#### 5.3.1 Political participation indicators

There have been no elections since the publication of the last *Monitoring Report on Integration* in early 2017, and only minor changes to the indicators. June 2017 saw the appointment of Leo Varadkar, who has a migrant background, as Taoiseach.

#### *Non-Irish candidates*

Local and European elections took place in Ireland on 23 May 2014 and an Irish general election took place on 26 February 2016. A total of 31 New Irish/non-Irish/UK nationals contested the 2014 local elections (Kavanagh, 2014).<sup>70</sup> Polish and Nigerian were the most common nationalities among candidates.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> [www.mipex.eu/political-participation](http://www.mipex.eu/political-participation).

<sup>70</sup> Provisional data contained in the article were confirmed by the author in November 2016.

<sup>71</sup> This group included eight female and 23 male candidates. As in 2009, most of the candidates ran as independent candidates (21), with two candidates running for Fine Gael, two candidates running for Labour, one candidate

### *Non-Irish elected representatives*

The recommended indicator of integration in this domain is the share of immigrants among elected representatives. The 2014 Local Elections resulted in the election of 949 City and County Councillors. Out of this number just two non-Irish nationals were elected. In addition, following the 2016 General Election a Swedish national was co-opted onto South Dublin County Council.<sup>72</sup> Three migrants among 949 elected representatives gives an indicator of 0.32 per cent.

The 2016 general election, in which only Irish and UK citizens had a vote, took place in February 2016. Out of 166 members of the Dáil<sup>73</sup> just one member is a naturalised Irish national<sup>74</sup> giving an indicator of 0.6 per cent.

### *Non-Irish voter participation*

Table 5.9 updates Table 5.8 in the previous *Monitoring Report on Integration* with 2016 Census data. The percentage of non-Irish nationals who are listed on the electoral register (2016/2017) is supplied. Naturalised Irish nationals are included within the category of Irish nationals and cannot be separately identified. The percentage of non-Irish nationals who were resident in local authorities at the time of Census 2016 is also provided and the local authorities are sorted by the ratio of the second column to the first.

Table 5.9 shows that county Kildare, Dublin City and county Galway have the greatest relative mismatch between the percentage of non-Irish nationals who are listed on the electoral register and the percentage resident non-Irish. Data on the number of Irish, EU and non-EU national registered on the electoral register were supplied in the previous *Monitoring Report on Integration* (Barrett et al., 2017).

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running for Sinn Féin, three candidates running for the Green Party and two candidates running for the People Before Profit Alliance.

<sup>72</sup> Comments received from the Immigrant Council of Ireland, June 2018.

<sup>73</sup> [www.oireachtas.ie](http://www.oireachtas.ie).

<sup>74</sup> Comments received from Immigrant Council of Ireland, September 2016.

**TABLE 5.9 PERCENTAGE OF NON-IRISH REGISTERED TO VOTE (2016/2017) COMPARED TO PERCENTAGE OF NON-IRISH IN USUALLY RESIDENT POPULATION AGED 18 YEARS AND OVER IN LOCAL AUTHORITIES (CENSUS 2016)**

	% Non-Irish on voting register (A) %	% Non-Irish resident population aged 18+ based on Census 2016 (B) %	Difference (Ratio of B to A)
Kildare	3.3	12.2	3.71
Dublin City	5.7	19.2	3.37
Galway	2.9	9.6	3.32
Cork City	4.8	15.5	3.22
Cavan	4.1	12.9	3.15
Carlow	3.9	11.7	2.99
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown	4.4	12.6	2.86
Meath	4.1	11.7	2.85
Donegal	3.0	8.4	2.81
Kilkenny	3.4	9.5	2.79
Waterford City & County	4.0	11.0	2.75
Limerick City & County	4.0	10.6	2.65
Westmeath	4.9	12.6	2.56
<b>State</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>2.55</b>
Wexford	4.0	10.1	2.52
Wicklow	4.3	10.8	2.51
South Dublin	5.4	12.9	2.38
Sligo	4.5	10.3	2.28
Galway City	9.0	19.7	2.18
Mayo	5.1	11.1	2.18
Offaly	4.4	9.5	2.16
Fingal	8.7	18.8	2.16
Clare	5.3	11.0	2.08
Louth	5.5	11.4	2.06
Laois	5.5	11.3	2.06
Longford	8.0	16.4	2.05
Cork	5.8	11.7	2.02
Tipperary	5.0	10.0	2.00
Roscommon	5.8	11.5	1.98
Kerry	6.2	12.1	1.95
Monaghan	6.3	12.2	1.94
Leitrim	7.3	12.6	1.73

Sources: Electoral register data from Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government. Population data: CSO, Special tabulation, Census 2016.

### *Issues related to political participation*

As noted in previous Monitoring Reports, ethnic minorities are less likely to register to vote than the majority population (Heath et al., 2013) and less likely to

stand as candidates (Fanning and O’Boyle 2010; O’Boyle et al., 2016). Irish NGOs have been actively seeking to increase the proportion of non-Irish nationals registered to vote and become more informed about Irish politics, often via government-funded programmes.<sup>75</sup>

The Migration Integration Strategy contains a number of actions to promote better political participation of migrants: migrants will be encouraged to participate in local and national politics; they will be supported to register to vote, and multi-lingual materials will be made accessible and available (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017).

International research indicates that the acquisition of citizenship can improve political integration, with immigrants becoming more knowledgeable on political matters and more likely to vote (Hainmueller et al., 2015). The Immigrant Council of Ireland has expressed particular concern about the large number of EEA nationals resident in Ireland who do not apply for citizenship and therefore cannot vote in general elections.<sup>76</sup>

The UNHCR (2014) highlighted the importance of volunteering to refugees as a platform for creating and sustaining social and ethnic-community bridges, as a tool to improve English language skills, and as a space for learning skills which could then be transferable to other spheres of life. McGinnity et al. (2018) showed that social contact generally promotes less negative attitudes to immigration and immigrants, and suggest that enhancing opportunities for meaningful and positive interactions will reduce anti-migrant sentiment. The Migration Integration Strategy also includes actions intended to promote better representation of migrants in volunteering<sup>77</sup> (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). It is a continued problem that national level data on volunteering and other civic activities are not available in Ireland disaggregated by nationality.

#### 5.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP

Almost 140,000 non-Irish nationals acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation between 2005 and 2017. Naturalised Irish nationals now represent a very significant cohort of the population. With the publication of a new Migrant Integration Strategy in 2017, a new focus is being placed on the integration of

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<sup>75</sup> For example: ‘Participate’, which seeks to promote the political and civic participation of migrants in Ireland is part of a joint EU project, which includes several partners including the Immigrant Council of Ireland, Migration Policy Group and NASC. AkiDwA runs a programme which aims to engage migrant women and promote their active civic engagement in their communities and at society level. A political internship programme is also run by the Immigrant Council of Ireland which enables migrants to shadow participating local councillors for one day a week over a four-month period.

<sup>76</sup> Comments received from the Immigrant Council of Ireland, June 2018.

<sup>77</sup> See Action 72 and 73.

‘new Irish’ citizens and other migrants (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). If we assume no outflows/deaths among those naturalised it is possible to estimate that approximately 45 per cent of the population aged 16 and over of non-EEA origin acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation between 2005 and 2017. This raises important issues for future monitoring as almost half of migrants have ‘disappeared’ from key datasets that use nationality as identifier (see Chapter 7).

Access to long-term residence continues to be a challenge in Ireland as does the lack of transparency regarding the rules and entitlements attached. These problems are reflected in the very low proportion of resident migrants holding the status. The Integration Strategy contains a commitment to a statutory scheme, but this has not yet been achieved.

The annual citizenship acquisition rate for non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over has fallen rapidly from 16 per cent in 2012 to 2.9 per cent in 2017. The number of naturalisation certificates issued in 2017 (11,770) was less than one-third of the figure seen in 2012.

Declines were seen across all non-EEA national groups listed in the 2015 Top ten. Some national groups saw particularly steep drops including the top three nationalities: India, Nigeria and Philippines. The overall decrease in the number of naturalisations since 2012 reflects reductions in the stock of non-EEA workers during the recession and processing improvements introduced in 2011 which allowed a large backlog to be cleared.

Despite an upward trend in EEA nationals choosing to naturalise, the proportion of the resident EEA population naturalising annually remains very low – just 5 per cent of certificates issued in 2012 were to EEA nationals, increasing to 45 per cent in 2017. Holding Irish citizenship allows migrants full participation in society, including the right to vote and stand in national elections and referenda. The fact that less than one per cent of the resident non-Irish EU population in Ireland acquired citizenship each year between 2009 and 2016 means that the large majority of this group may not avail of such opportunities.

Research indicates that naturalised immigrants have been shown to have better socio-economic outcomes than immigrants who do not take on the host country citizenship (Liebig and Von Haaren, 2011). Bauböck et al., (2013) argue that the naturalisation of immigrants not only secures equal rights for the individual concerned, but when citizens of immigrant origin can exercise equal power in

elections and politics at national level where the rights of foreigners are regulated, this benefits the wider migrant group.

Citizenship does not equate to full inclusion. Naturalisation policy often complements and is at the heart of wider integration policy (Huddleston and Vink, 2015). The publication and active implementation of the Migrant Integration Strategy is an important step towards the meaningful extension of equal rights and opportunities to migrants in Ireland.

There have been no national elections since the publication of the last *Monitoring Report on Integration* in early 2017. However a Swedish national was co-opted onto South Dublin County Council in 2016.<sup>78</sup> Three migrants among local elected representatives gives an indicator of just 0.32 per cent. One member of the 166 seat Dáil (0.6 per cent) is a naturalised citizen. June 2017 saw the appointment of Leo Varadkar, who has an immigrant background, as Taoiseach. The proportion of non-Irish on the electoral register is also considerably lower than the proportion of non-Irish in the population.

McGinnity et al. (2018) showed that social contact generally promotes less negative attitudes to immigration and immigrants, and suggest that enhancing opportunities for meaningful and positive interactions may help to reduce anti-migrant sentiment. Volunteering represents one avenue to such interaction but unfortunately national level data on volunteering disaggregated by nationality remain unavailable. Studies have indicated however that the migration ‘crisis’ (approximately 2014-2016) led to increased engagement and volunteering within the host community (Arnold et al., 2018; European Migration Network, forthcoming).<sup>79</sup> The Migration Integration Strategy contains a number of actions to promote better representation of migrants in volunteering.

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<sup>78</sup> Comments received from the Immigrant Council of Ireland, June 2018.

<sup>79</sup> Indicators on a broader range of forms of civic participation of migrants are recommended in the evaluation report on the Zaragoza indicators, including on: participation in voluntary organisations; membership of trade unions; membership of political parties; political activity (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013).

## BOX 5.1 ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP

### *Defining Nationality and Citizenship*

Citizenship describes the particular legal bond between an individual and his or her state, acquired by birth or naturalisation, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means according to national legislation (European Migration Network, 2014). In the Irish Constitution, the individual member of the State is referred to as a 'citizen' but the status is referred to as 'nationality and citizenship'.<sup>80</sup> The *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956* provides for the issue of 'certificates of nationality'. The use of the word 'nationality' is interpreted by the EUDO Citizenship Observatory<sup>81</sup> to reflect the fact that such certificates may be used as evidence of status in states other than Ireland. The term 'nationality' is often used to denote Irish ethnicity ('Irishness') and the concept of 'Nation' continues to be important in constitutional terms, to describe the collectivity of the Irish people. All citizens are entitled to be part of the Irish Nation.

### *Citizenship through naturalisation*

An application for a certificate of nationality is considered under the *Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956, as amended*. Foreign nationals living in Ireland may apply to the Minister for Justice and Equality to become an Irish citizen by naturalisation if they are over 18 years, or a minor who was born in the State after 1 January 2005. The applicant must 'be of good character' and have had a period of one year continuous reckonable residence in the State immediately before the date of application and, during the previous eight years, have had a total reckonable residence in the State amounting to four years. The applicant must intend in good faith to continue to reside in the State after naturalisation and make a declaration of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State. Applicants are usually required to have been 'self-supporting' i.e. not dependent on social welfare for the three years prior to application. Periods spent in Ireland as an asylum applicant or as a student are not considered when calculating reckonable residence. The spouses/civil partners of Irish citizens may apply for citizenship by naturalisation if they are married to or in a recognised civil partnership with the Irish citizen for at least three years. Applicants must have resided in Ireland for at least three out of the previous five years, including one year of continuous residence immediately before the date of application.

There is now an obligation on the State to provide reasons for a refusal of an application for naturalisation (although this issue continues to be a source of some debate). Aside from judicial review of proceedings there is no mechanism for challenging the refusal of an application. Currently Irish citizenship acquired through naturalisation may be withdrawn no matter how long a person has been an Irish citizen (though not if it would make them stateless).

<sup>80</sup> The EUDO Citizenship Observatory notes that the two terms describe different elements of the relationship between the individual and the Irish State. Nationality relates to the external (international) dimension, whereas citizenship relates to the internal (domestic) dimension. EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 'Translations and a brief discussion of the use of the terms 'citizenship' and 'nationality in legal documents and political debates'. Available at: <http://eudo-citizenship.eu>.

<sup>81</sup> <http://eudo-citizenship.eu>.

*Citizenship through birth or descent*

The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 provides that only children born to Irish citizen parent(s) automatically become Irish citizens. A child born on the island of Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 is entitled to Irish citizenship if they have a British parent, or a parent who is entitled to live in Northern Ireland or the Irish State without restriction on their residency. Other foreign national parents of children born on the island of Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 must prove that they have a genuine link to Ireland (evidenced by being resident legally for at least three out of the previous four years) in order for their child to claim Irish citizenship. Irish citizens may hold the citizenship of another country without giving up their Irish citizenship.

*Application Fees*

The standard application fee payable by all applicants is €175. A further €950 is payable by successful adult applicants for naturalisation. The naturalisation fee is €200 in the case of minors and widows or widowers of Irish citizens. Persons granted refugee status and those recognised as stateless persons are exempt from payment of the naturalisation fee. There is no possibility to have the naturalisation fee waived on economic or hardship grounds (Becker and Cosgrave, 2013). The Migrant Integration Strategy undertakes to ensure that costs are reasonable and do not deter applicants who are qualified (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017).

**BOX 5.2      ACCESS TO LONG-TERM RESIDENCE**

Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence status. The Migrant Integration Strategy also contains an action to introduce a statutory scheme for Long-Term Residence, but this has not happened to date (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). The current administrative scheme allows persons who have been legally resident in the State for a continuous period of five years or more on the basis of an employment permit (and their dependent spouses) or scientific researchers, to apply for a five-year residency extension. They may also then apply to work without the need to hold an employment permit. A €500 fee for processing applications under this scheme was introduced in 2009. This long-term residence scheme is available to those who are still in employment and to those with an employment permit who, having completed five years' work, have been made redundant.

A small number of non-EEA nationals who have lived in Ireland for at least eight years and who are of 'good character' are permitted to remain in Ireland 'without condition as to time'. They receive a Stamp 5 registration on their passport and can work without an employment permit (Becker, 2010). In 2017, 246 Stamp 5 registrations were issued out of a total 107,954.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Data received from Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2018.



## CHAPTER 6

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### Special Topic: Muslims in Ireland

By Éamonn Fahey and Frances McGinnity

As a group, Muslims are defined by religion rather than by nationality, and therefore are not technically an immigrant group. Yet the Muslim experience in Ireland is inextricably linked to the challenges of immigration and integration for two reasons. First, recent European scholarship has identified both Islamophobia and the integration of Muslims into European societies as a growing issue for public policy (Helbling, 2012; Carr, 2016). However, most of this research has been focused on countries like Britain, France and Germany, all of which have relatively large and long-standing Muslim communities (e.g. Adida et al., 2016; Bertelsmann Foundation, 2017). Second, the vast majority of the Muslim population in Ireland is newly arrived, meaning that even more so than in European countries with long histories of Islam, they resemble an immigrant group from an integration perspective. Before the recent economic boom (the Celtic Tiger), the Muslim population in Ireland was largely comprised of doctors or medical students, some of whom stayed in Ireland to practice medicine (Scharbrodt and Sakaranaho, 2011). Since the early 1990s the Muslim population has grown rapidly from its small base. There are currently over 62,000 Muslims living in Ireland compared to just under 4,000 in 1991.

Scharbrodt et al. (2015) documents increased flows of Muslim migrants to Ireland for a variety of reasons – to study, to work or to seek international protection. This reflects more general migration patterns in Ireland. Both Scharbrodt et al. (2015) and Fanning (2018) make the point that a socio-economic gap has emerged between two distinct Muslim populations in Ireland – more privileged students and highly educated professionals on the one hand, and disadvantaged asylum seekers and refugees on the other. What can we learn about the Muslim population from the 2016 Census?

This special theme uses 2016 Census data to give a broad overview of the circumstances of Muslims in Ireland. The analysis is split into four sections. First, we look at basic demographics, focusing on age, sex and geographic distribution within Ireland. Second, we study Muslims as a group that has been shaped by recent immigration, by analysing their place of birth, ethnic background and nationality. Third, we build on the contributions of Chapters 2 and 3 of this Integration Monitor by briefly reporting their labour market and educational


status. Finally, we look at other aspects of wellbeing by turning our attention to housing and health.

This chapter exploits the rich data from recent Irish Censuses published online. Without access to the Census microdata, it is not possible to conduct a statistical analysis of these outcomes to investigate the mechanisms underlying the patterns, but we do suggest avenues for further research. We use the term Muslim as people report their religion in the Census as a social grouping. However, we appreciate that what being a Muslim means is not accurately conveyed in this classification, as it underestimates the diversity of the group (Scharbrodt et al., 2015). As Fanning (2018) notes, Muslims living in Ireland come from a range of countries, speak different languages, identify with different denominations of Islam and differ in the extent and nature of their religious practice: readers should bear this in mind.

## **6.1 THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN IRELAND: AGE, GENDER AND LOCATION**

The Census data reveal that there are substantial differences in the socio-demographic characteristics of Muslims and non-Muslims resident in Ireland. Demographically, Muslims are a disproportionately young, male, urban, non-White community, most of whom were born abroad, particularly in South Asian countries. Due to naturalisations and an increasing share of Muslims being born in Ireland, however, just over half of Muslims living in Ireland now have Irish citizenship.


The Census data detail exactly how many Muslims live in Ireland, going back as far as 2002. The data show a strong and steady growth in the Muslim population from 2002 to 2016. The Muslim population increased at a rate well beyond the total population, rising from just under 20,000 in 2002 to over 62,000 in 2016. However, in a cross-national European perspective, the Muslim share of the population remains quite small, at 1.3 per cent of the total in 2016. Typical values in large European countries such as Germany and France range between 5 and 10 per cent (Hackett, 2017). The Muslim community is also small relative to the overall foreign-born population in Ireland, which at almost 17 per cent of the total is among the highest in the OECD.

**FIGURE 6.1 MUSLIM POPULATION IN IRELAND**

Source: CSO Statbank Tables E8009, Census 2016 and C1316, Census 2006.

### *Age and Sex*

One of the most striking features of the Muslim population in Ireland is its demographic profile. Figure 6.2 presents two overlapped population pyramids, one for the entire Irish population (in light blue) and one for the Muslim population (in grey). Areas where the grey lines extend out from the centre beyond the blue lines indicate demographic segments that are over-represented in the Muslim population compared to the total population. Areas where the grey lines are shorter than the blue lines are segments where Muslims are under-represented. It clearly shows that the Muslim population is particularly young and male. Children (both male and female) and young adults (especially young men) are much more common in the Muslim population. For instance, men aged 30-34 make up 6.6 per cent of the Muslim population, but only 3.3 per cent of the total population. Conversely, there are very few elderly Muslims living in Ireland. In fact, the average age of a Muslim resident in Ireland in 2016 is only 26 years old – more than ten years younger than the average Irish person. Even when compared to immigrant groups, this is remarkably young. For instance, the labour force survey shows that the mean non-Irish age is just under 34 and the mean age for non-EU nationals is 31. In the population as a whole, there are 0.97 men for every woman. Among the Muslim population, however, there are almost 1.3 men for every woman.


**FIGURE 6.2 AGE AND SEX OF MUSLIM POPULATION RESIDENT IN IRELAND**

Source: CSO Statbank Table E8055, Census 2016.

When comparing employment and education figures later in this chapter, it is important to keep these different age profiles in mind, as the Census data as accessed do not permit comparisons of, for example, educational qualifications for different age groups.

### *Geographic location*

Where do Muslims in Ireland live? In line with previous research on the geographic distribution of immigrants in Ireland, we expect Muslims to be concentrated in urban regions, in particular around Dublin. This is indeed what the data reveal: 43 per cent of Muslims in Ireland live in Dublin city or its surrounding suburbs, compared to 25 per cent of the total (Muslim and non-Muslim) population. The smaller cities of Cork, Limerick, Galway and Waterford account for between 6 per cent and 2 per cent of the total each, bringing the share of the Muslim population living in urban regions up to 60 per cent, compared to 33.8 per cent for the entire population. Figure 6.3 shows that Muslims are over-represented in all cities, meaning that they are under-represented in small towns and rural areas.

**FIGURE 6.3** PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIMS LIVING IN URBAN AREAS


Source: CSO Statbank Table E8055, Census 2016.

## 6.2 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY

This section considers country of origin, ethnic background and nationality of the Muslim population in Ireland, and indicates the considerable diversity within the population.

### *Place of Birth*

The Census contains three measures of the origin of Muslim people – place of birth, nationality and citizenship. While all of these measures are important, place of birth is particularly useful, because the CSO publishes a detailed breakdown for each religious group, allowing for more comprehensive analysis.

**FIGURE 6.4 PLACE OF BIRTH OVER TIME – MUSLIM POPULATION**

Source: CSO Statbank Tables E8058, Census 2016 and C1315, Census 2006.

Over 82 per cent of all people enumerated in the 2016 Census were born in Ireland. This figure is much lower, but is rapidly rising, among the Muslim population. It has increased from 23.6 per cent in 2002 to just under 30 per cent in 2016. There was a similar increase of four percentage points among the Asian Muslim population, but the share born in non-EU European countries and Africa fell substantially.

Turning to individual countries, we find that one-in-five Muslims living in Ireland (12,400 people) in 2016 were born in Pakistan. This is also the foreign-born group that grew the most from 2011, accounting for almost a third of the overall 2011-2016 increase displayed in Figure 6.1 above. Scharbrodt (2012) notes how migrants from Pakistan come to Ireland as work permit holders, seeking asylum, and as students. Just over 8 per cent (348 individuals) of the total increase can be attributed to arrivals from people born in Afghanistan, and 5.7 per cent to people born in Saudi Arabia. However, it is noteworthy that the largest increase, over one-third, is attributable to natural population increase i.e. to Muslims born in Ireland.


Only 17 per cent of the Muslim population was born in Africa, but this group exhibits interesting compositional changes between 2011 and 2016. In 2011, 63 per cent of Muslims born in Africa originated from Sub-Saharan Africa, with the remainder from the five North African nations of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. In 2016, the split was 58 per cent Sub-Saharan Africa to 42 per cent North Africa. This change is largely due to an absolute fall in the number of

Muslims born in Nigeria living in Ireland, from 2,314 to 1,835, and an increase of a similar order in Muslims born in Egypt (1,064 to 1,412).

### *Ethnic background*

A related but distinct concept is the ethnic background of the Muslim population. It refers to an individual's self-perception as relating to a group of people who are similar with respect to a range of ethnic or cultural factors (Nandi and Platt, 2012). Consistent with the place of birth analysis, these data show a clear increase in the percentage of Muslim Census respondents identifying as ethnically Asian, and concomitant decline in those reporting Black or Black-Irish ethnicity.


**FIGURE 6.5 ETHNIC BACKGROUND OF MUSLIMS RESIDENT IN IRELAND**



Source: CSO Statbank Tables E8009, Census 2016 and C0507, Census 2006.

### *Nationality*

As noted in Chapter 5, acquisition of Irish citizenship may indicate an intention to remain in Ireland. Indeed the naturalisation rate is a recommended indicator of integration (see Table 1.1). Chapter 5 documents how almost 100,000 non-EEA nationals have naturalised since 2005, and estimates that a significant minority of the non-EEA population – perhaps as high as 47 per cent – now holds Irish citizenship. What about the nationality of Muslims living in Ireland?

**FIGURE 6.6      NATIONALITY OF MUSLIMS IN IRELAND**

Source: CSO Statbank Table E8082, Census 2016.

Even though only 29.7 per cent of Muslims were born in Ireland, almost 55 per cent report their nationality as Irish. The data suggest a significant increase in the attainment of citizenship by naturalisation since 2011, which has resulted in fewer Muslims reporting African and Asian nationalities. The fall in the share of Muslims with Asian nationalities from 2011 to 2016 is remarkable considering the marked increase in the proportion that were born in Asia in this period. These changes in nationality may be in part explained by the clearing of the backlog of citizenship applications by the Irish State in the last inter-census period (2011-2016, see Chapter 5).


Irish nationality among Muslims is highly contingent upon their length of residence in Ireland. This is not surprising, given that applicants are required to have lived in Ireland for at least five years before being eligible to apply for citizenship (see Box 5.1). The CSO publish data on the year of taking up residence in Ireland among the Muslim population that had previously lived outside of Ireland for at least one year.<sup>83</sup> The stacked bars in Figure 6.7 show the number of Muslim arrivals by the date of arrival, with the dark blue portion indicating the share that are Irish nationals, and the light blue portion the share that are non-Irish nationals. The dark blue line details the percentage of each bar that is Irish-born.

<sup>83</sup> Of course, some of this group may be Irish-born, who had subsequently moved abroad for over a year and then returned to Ireland. However, judging by the previous figures, which show that a large majority of Muslims are foreign-born, and that the Muslim population in 2002 was very small, it is likely that the vast majority of this group is foreign-born.



A clear pattern emerges in Figure 6.7. In addition to the immigration of Muslims clearly being a fairly recent phenomenon, we see that among the small numbers that arrived before 1990, 80 per cent are Irish nationals. This compares to just 9 per cent among those that arrived between 2012 and 2016. The downward trend of the dark blue line clearly shows that the less time that has elapsed since a Muslim residents' arrival in Ireland, the lower the probability that they will have attained Irish citizenship.

**FIGURE 6.7 CITIZENSHIP AMONG MUSLIM RESIDENTS BY YEAR OF ARRIVAL/RETURN**



Source: CSO Statbank Table E8076, Census 2016.

### 6.3 EDUCATIONAL PROFILE AND LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES


The socio-economic situation of Muslims in Ireland is positive on some measures but not others, and any evaluation of Muslim integration is complicated by their atypical demographic characteristics as described above. Although the Census does not gather poverty data, the wellbeing and social inclusion of minority groups can be assessed using measures of employment, education, housing tenure and health.<sup>84</sup> The situation of Muslims in Ireland is mixed on these counts. While Muslims have above average levels of education and are more likely to be students, they are more at risk of unemployment and exhibit low levels of homeownership. Some of these patterns may be driven by the age and immigration histories of Muslims in Ireland.

<sup>84</sup> Social class is another relevant Census measure, but between 37 and 39 per cent of Muslims are enumerated under an 'unknown' category on this item, making interpretation of social class patterns unreliable. However, when these 'unknowns' are excluded, we find Muslims to be disproportionately concentrated in the higher managerial and professional classes.

### Labour market

Some of the principal Zaragoza integration indicators pertain to the position of immigrants in the labour market (see Chapter 2). Figure 6.8 presents selected findings for the principal economic status of Muslims in Ireland aged 15 or older with the equivalent figures for all Irish people marked as a reference. The employment rate of Muslims, at 40.7 per cent, is markedly lower than the national average of 53.3 per cent in 2016. This is partly explained by higher unemployment among Muslims,<sup>85</sup> but also by a greater concentration of students. In fact, one in every five Muslims in Ireland is a student, compared to one-in-ten across the entire population. Considering the age structure of the Muslim population (see Figure 6.2), it is not surprising that the share of Muslims in retirement is a fraction of the national average.

**FIGURE 6.8 PRINCIPAL ECONOMIC STATUS AMONG MUSLIMS IN IRELAND**



Source: CSO Statbank Table E8060, Census 2016.

We would expect integrated groups to have high employment rates and a larger student population than groups which struggle to integrate. On the former count, Muslims had employment rates around 13 percentage points lower than the total population; on the latter, they outperform the rest of the population. However, as noted above, these results must be interpreted with some caution because Muslims are on average much younger than non-Muslims, and age is strongly related to educational attainment (see also Chapter 3).

<sup>85</sup> Note that this refers to the population unemployment rate, rather than unemployment as a percentage of the labour force.

Do labour market patterns differ by gender? Some scholars have posited a negative relationship between Islam and the position of women in society (Korotayev et al., 2015). However, the exact causal mechanism behind the relationship is still debated, and evidence of lower labour market participation among Muslim women in Western countries is weaker (Abdelhadi, 2017). Here we take a first step in investigating the issue in Ireland by disaggregating rates of homemaking and employment by gender and religion.<sup>86</sup>

An initial glance at the data reveals that 4 per cent of non-Muslim homemakers and 7 per cent of Muslim homemakers are male. However, because of the difference in the overall gender composition of the Muslim and non-Muslim populations, the effect of gender on homemaking is best calculated at the individual level rather than the population level. In other words, by how much does being female increase one's chances of being a homemaker? And how does this effect differ for Muslim women?

**TABLE 6.1 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYMENT AND HOMEMAKING BY RELIGION**

		Men	Women	Female to Male Ratio
<b>Percentage Homemakers</b>	Non-Muslim	1.2%	14.9%	12.1
	Muslim	2.5%	27.6%	11.0
<b>Percentage Employed</b>	Non-Muslim	58.4%	48.4%	0.8
	Muslim	53.0%	23.4%	0.4

Source: CSO Statbank Table E8060, Census 2016.

Table 6.1 presents these rates and ratios for the two economic statuses of interest – homemaking and employment. It shows that women are much more likely to be homemakers than men, and that this holds across both Muslims and non-Muslims. However, both Muslim women and Muslim men are almost twice as likely to be homemakers as their non-Muslim counterparts. Because this religious difference is found across the gender divide, the values for the ratio between the two remains fairly stable, at 11 and 12. Gender differences in employment rates between Muslims and non-Muslims are more marked than gender differences in homemaking. Here we see that lower employment rates exist for women in both religious groups, but that the gender ‘penalty’ in employment is much higher for Muslim women. While the employment rate for non-Muslim women is 80 per cent that of non-Muslim men, the rate for Muslim women is only 40 per cent that of Muslim men. Additional analysis shows that is largely driven by relatively higher unemployment rates among Muslim women (nearly 20 per cent) compared to non-Muslim women (7 per cent), although a difference in employment rates remains.


<sup>86</sup> This information is based on respondents’ responses to a question on their principal economic status.

A number of other factors may explain these lower employment rates. Muslim mothers may be more likely to face issues with childcare, if there are no relatives available to assist with child-rearing and they cannot afford expensive market-based care (see Röder et al., 2017). Accessing employment may also be a challenge for some women if they have come to Ireland to join a spouse as they may be required to apply for an employment permit. Arnold and Quinn (2017) cite evidence that a lack of employer engagement in this process may be a barrier to employment for some migrants arriving in Ireland under family reunification legislation. Further analysis would be required to investigate these causal mechanisms.

### Education

A second measure related to the income and living standards of the Muslim community is the distribution of educational attainment. Given that over 20 per cent of Muslims in Ireland are students, it is not surprising that we find Irish Muslims to be highly educated. Furthermore, the educational profile of Muslims appears to be improving over time. However, the same can be said for the rest of the population, which is improving its educational profile at an even faster rate. The proportion of Muslims who had completed education with a tertiary qualification increased from 45.6 per cent in 2006 to 56.9 per cent ten years later – an increase of 25 per cent. The share of the entire Irish population with third-level education increased by 65 per cent over this period, meaning that if current trends were to continue, the Muslim advantage in this area may disappear.

**FIGURE 6.9 HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE COMPLETED EDUCATION BY RELIGION**




Source: CSO Statbank Table E8065, Census 2016.

## 6.4 HOUSING AND SELF-REPORTED HEALTH

### *Housing*

The prevalence of homeownership among a minority group is often taken to be a sign of a settled, integrated community (see Chapter 4). However, the opposite is not necessarily true of a group that is highly concentrated in the private rental sector, as the Census data show that Muslims are (Figure 6.10). That is because homeownership among migrants in Ireland, much like citizenship, is highly conditioned by the duration of their residence. Nonetheless, it is a cause for concern that in 2016, 64 per cent of Muslims are tenants in the private rented sector (compared to just 18 per cent for the total population), especially in the current rental market in Ireland. Previous research has shown that private renters are twice as likely to experience housing deprivation and almost 2.5 times as likely to experience overcrowding as owner-occupiers (see Grotti et al., 2018). This research has also shown that Muslims are over-represented among Ireland's homeless population (ibid).

**FIGURE 6.10 HOUSING TENURE BY RELIGION**




Source: CSO Statbank Table E8070, Census 2016.

### *Health*

There is very little difference in the self-reported health status between the Muslim population and the entire Irish population. Although Muslims are slightly over-represented among those reporting 'very good' or 'good' health, and slightly under-represented among those in 'fair' health (6 per cent compared to an average of 8 per cent), we would expect the religious difference in subjective health to be greater when we consider the fact that Muslims in Ireland tend to be younger, and more educated than the general population in Ireland. The similarity

in self-reported health may therefore signal a degree of health disadvantage among Muslims, but this would require further investigation.

**FIGURE 6.11 SELF-REPORTED HEALTH STATUS BY RELIGION**



Source: CSO Statbank Table E9094, Census 2016.

## 6.5 SUMMARY

This chapter has sought to make the most of published Census data to sketch the socio-demographic characteristics of Muslims in Ireland, and to evaluate the extent to which they are successfully integrating into Irish society. We find that much of the recent increase in the Muslim population is due to natural increase. Approximately one-in-three Muslims was born in Ireland. By 2016, over half (55 per cent) were Irish citizens. Regarding the flow of Muslim immigrants in recent years, we observe a shift in origin, with more arriving from South Asia, and fewer from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Muslims in Ireland are more likely to be students and are on average more highly educated. However, we also find that they have lower employment and higher unemployment rates. They live disproportionately in urban areas, in particular in Dublin, and a sizeable majority live in private rental accommodation.

On the basis of this relatively extensive analysis of the published Census data, it is not possible to evaluate the claims made by Scharbrodt et al. (2015) and Fanning (2018), that there are essentially two Muslim populations in Ireland – one a highly educated, settled class of professionals, the other a more disadvantaged group fleeing conflict and persecution in the developing world. Nor is it possible to investigate whether outcomes differ for African and Asian Muslims, for example. Using Census microdata to address this question and others raised in this chapter would be an exciting avenue for future research.

## CHAPTER 7

### Issues for Policy and Data Collection

By Frances McGinnity

The primary aim of this Integration Monitor is to report on integration outcomes. This chapter briefly discusses some implications for future data needs, as well as highlighting policy issues that have emerged.

While immigration to Ireland is far behind the 2007 peak, a significant proportion of the population now living in Ireland is born abroad (17 per cent were born abroad in 2017). Most migrants to Ireland come from other EU countries: EU migrants make up around three-quarters of residents born abroad in 2017. This proportion is among the highest in the EU (Figure 1.1.). Another distinctive feature of migrants in Ireland is that a significant minority of those of non-EEA origin are now Irish citizens (see Chapter 5). This raises questions about how to identify those of migrant origin, and measure their outcomes. It also underlines the need for a long-term proactive approach to policy on integration.

The Migrant Integration Strategy, published in early 2017, represents a significant statement of policy intent. While not without limitations, the strategy has brought new energy and focus into efforts to integrate migrants in Ireland. Whether those policy intentions are realised depends on how effectively the strategy is implemented: an interim report to government is due in late 2018.

#### 7.1 ISSUES FOR FUTURE DATA COLLECTION

While both the OECD and the EU continue to highlight the importance of monitoring integration (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013; OECD 2015; 2016), the value of such monitoring will only be as good as the evidence on which it is based.

For an Integration Monitor primarily based on repeated national social surveys, an important issue is how well the migrant population is represented in these surveys. Some groups, both Irish and non-Irish nationals, are excluded from survey data, such as those residing in institutions, communal accommodation, direct provision centres and the homeless, a group that may be particularly disadvantaged and has grown considerably in recent years. This means that asylum seekers will be excluded from measures of poverty using SILC, for example, if they are living in direct provision centres. To the extent that non-Irish

nationals are disproportionately excluded from surveys, their disadvantage may be underestimated. Other groups, while not excluded from the data by design, may be under-represented in the surveys.

In the short term, it is important that efforts be continued to encourage the participation of non-Irish nationals in the SILC and the LFS, the major sources of information on income, poverty and the labour market in Ireland. Immigrant or ethnic minority boost samples, like in many other European countries, could address the problem of small sample sizes in these ongoing large-scale surveys. Small sample size is a particular problem for SILC. Chapter 4 showed high rates of deprivation and poverty among non-EU nationals, yet we know this is a very diverse group. Employment rates vary considerably between Asian and African nationals, for example (Chapter 2). It would be of considerable benefit to the monitoring of integration in Ireland to know which national groups are most disadvantaged. Ireland needs a survey that allows us to track poverty and deprivation among migrant groups.

While it is only carried out every five years, small numbers are not a problem in the Census of Population. Chapter 6 of this Integration Monitor illustrates what a rich resource this is. The Census is invaluable for measuring the outcomes of smaller population groups, and is now easier to access than before. And of course the Census has a role not just in investigating outcomes, but for adjusting ongoing surveys and creating valid estimates of the migrant population, given that Ireland lacks a population register. As noted in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, the recent 2016 Census has led to revised population and migration estimates, as well as a revised Labour Force Survey.

Of course some indicators are specific to the migrant population and will never be collected on national surveys. Migrants' feeling of belonging in Ireland, their intentions to stay, motives for migration, migration history, social contact with the Irish population, work experience in their country of origin could only be collected in a dedicated survey of migrants. Some smaller scale surveys of immigrants have been collected, for example the cross-national Socio-cultural Integration Processes among New Immigrants in Europe (SCIP) survey of new Polish immigrants in 2011 and 2013 (Diehl et al., 2015). But a large survey of the migrant population in Ireland has not yet been fielded.

The fact that a significant group of immigrants are now Irish citizens may be a positive development in terms of their integration, but this does present a challenge for monitoring integration. By measuring integration on the basis of nationality, as this publication does to be consistent with previous Integration Monitors, and because it is sometimes the only option, we are likely to miss an



increasing number of naturalised citizens. This is particularly relevant for migrants of non-EEA origin, given that we estimate up to 45 per cent of them may have become Irish citizens by the end of 2017. Any statistics on the basis of nationality will miss an important proportion of the population it is designed to measure, and those remaining in the non-Irish group may differ from those who have naturalised. To address this issue, at least in part, Chapter 2 examines outcomes of foreign-born Irish nationals. This is very useful, yet around half of these were born in the UK and came to Ireland many years ago. Their profile is rather different to recent migrants who naturalised in the past five to ten years.

What are the alternatives to monitoring based on nationality and/or place of birth? One possibility is to use a more durable measure like ethnicity or ancestry to include both naturalised citizens and second-generation immigrants when measuring integration (Waters, 2014). Yet some have criticised the ethnicity or ancestry approach as being too subjective and linked to identity (Massey, 2018). Another alternative currently under discussion at European level, is to include a question on standard social surveys (LFS, SILC) about the country of birth of the respondents' parents. The increasingly permanent nature of migration in Ireland means researchers and policymakers working on integration need to think carefully about whose outcomes they are measuring and how they do this; and those collecting data, such as the Central Statistics Office, need to continue to develop measures to respond to the changing migrant population in Ireland.

Survey data are crucial for monitoring immigrant outcomes, but administrative data sources are another potentially rich resource for measuring a range of migrant outcomes. The clear advantage is that administrative data record all recipients of a given training, benefit, or examination outcome, for example, and if migrant status is recorded this allows monitoring of both participation and outcomes. This assumes the data are usable and accessible for the purpose, which may not be the case. Administrative data are limited by the underlying policy; in particular the continued lack of residence permit data on non-EEA children is a challenge. Under Action 8 of the Migrant Integration Strategy a data gaps working group has been set up to identify both shortcomings in data collection and under-use of existing data. Ideally, administrative data would form an important complement to outcomes measured using survey data.

With the exception of data gathered on residence permits (see Chapter 1), refugees are not identified in national survey or general administrative data in Ireland. While recent migration debates in Europe have been dominated by the refugee crisis, and Ireland has increased its intake of resettled and relocated refugees, there is no way of tracking how well refugees are integrating into Irish society in terms of employment, income and poverty, political participation and socio-cultural integration, aside from occasional ad hoc studies, such as the

Refugee Integration Capacity and Evaluation (RICE) report (UNHCR, 2014). This is true regardless of whether they have come here as part of a refugee programme, or seeking protection, later determined to be Geneva Convention refugees. This gap is all the more problematic given that research shows that refugees face greater challenges when compared to other groups of migrants, for example in the labour market, due to lower language proficiency, trauma and lack of support from social and other networks (Connor, 2010; Bevelander, 2011).

Many studies have stressed that integration takes place at local level, and understanding neighbourhoods and their composition plays an important role (Casey, 2016). National and ethnic concentration within neighbourhoods is a major topic in international research (Massey and Mullan, 1984; Charles, 2003), but has received less recent attention in Ireland. An investigation of how national/ethnic groups are distributed across localities in Ireland using Census data is now underway, and should significantly enhance our understanding of the experience of integration at local level in Ireland. The accurate tracking of racist incidents is crucial and addressing underreporting is an action under the Migrant Integration Strategy. Academics and various NGOs such as ENAR Ireland, the Immigrant Council of Ireland, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and NASC Ireland have expressed concern about the under-reporting of racism (Haynes and Schweppe, 2017). IReport, an online system of reporting was established in 2013 with public funding.<sup>87</sup> Data on volunteering would usefully enhance our understanding of migrant participation and integration in local communities.

## 7.2 POLICY ISSUES

The Migrant Integration Strategy is ambitious in scope and covers a very broad range of policy areas from employment, education, health, political participation to intercultural awareness. This discussion is a more focused consideration of some issues arising from previous chapters.

In terms of employment, Chapter 2 assesses the extent to which migrants have shared in the ongoing recovery in the Irish labour market. Overall, the picture is positive: there is no longer a significant gap in unemployment rates between Irish and non-Irish nationals overall. In fact, we find slightly higher employment and participation rates among non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals. To maintain this trend, it is important that the jobseeker engagement and labour market activation policies described in Actions 39, 40 and 41 of the Migrant Integration Strategy are appropriate to the needs of migrants and are effectively implemented.

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<sup>87</sup> Funded by Pobal, SSNO (Scheme to Support National Organisations) and the Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government.

However, not all groups of non-Irish nationals are faring so well. Chapter 2 finds that in general non-EU nationals have higher unemployment rates and lower employment rates than Irish nationals. In particular, we find high unemployment and a very low employment rate among African nationals. Investigating the factors underlying this disadvantage is beyond the scope of a report like this, but Chapter 2 points to a number of explanations: time spent in the asylum system and not in the labour market for those who were seeking protection, and potentially also the experience of racism and discrimination in the Irish labour market (see Kingston et al., 2015). Fanning and Michael (2017) argue that much of the institutional infrastructure for responding to racism in Ireland – for example the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism – was dismantled during the recession and has not been replaced.

Chapter 4 also documents high rates of poverty and deprivation among the non-EU population. The overall non-EU population has a consistent poverty rate of 29 per cent, compared to 8 per cent for the Irish population. (Consistent poverty measures those who are income poor and deprived on two or more items). Some of this is accounted for by the high proportion of students in the non-EU group. However, when students are excluded, consistent poverty still remains quite high, at 23 per cent. Previous research in Ireland has shown clearly the link between low employment rates and income poverty and deprivation for working-age adults and children (Watson et al., 2012). Further detailed research on African migrants would allow us to investigate their outcomes in more depth, and point at some potential policy responses. Ongoing work by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection on the jobseekers longitudinal dataset will also be useful in this regard.

Housing and homelessness are not identified as issues in the Migrant Integration Strategy. Yet findings from this Integration Monitor suggest that migrants (Chapter 4) and Muslims (Chapter 6) are much more likely to be in private rented accommodation than Irish nationals, which is a potential problem in the current housing market. Grotti et al. (2018) find non-EU nationals to be at greater risk of overcrowding compared to others on the same income and with the same characteristics. They also find higher rates of homelessness among both African migrants and the Muslim population than among the Irish population.

The key message from Chapter 3 is that while educational achievement of non-Irish adults is similar to or even slightly better than Irish nationals, there are gaps in reading proficiency at age 15 between Irish children and migrant children who do not speak English as their first language. This is important as many non-Irish adults in Ireland were educated abroad, so the performance of children is a better indicator of how well the Irish education system is integrating migrants. The findings suggest maintaining language support for migrant students is very

important. In order to plan effectively, policymakers need to know what proportion of students at primary and secondary level require English language tuition, what the budget requirement is and how effective English language tuition is (see Actions 29 and 33 in the Migrant Integration Strategy). The fact that the budget allocation for English language tuition in schools has now been combined with the budget for special needs education and can no longer be monitored separately remains problematic (see Box 3.1). To supplement PISA data more differentiation of education statistics would be very useful. Are there differences in achievement between Irish students and those from a migrant background in State examinations? What about the post-school transitions of students from a migrant background? Chapter 3 did note that the rate of early school leaving among young East European adults was twice as high as the national average. Were this pattern consistent over time, and relating to those who have come through the Irish education system, as opposed to having been educated abroad, this may be in need of policy attention.

Chapter 5 shows that although the annual naturalisation rate has now declined from the 2012 peak, there has been a rapid rise in the size of the naturalised population in the last few years. This is due to increased applications, as more migrants became eligible to apply, as well as improvements in the processing of applications. Over the last decade just over 100,000 migrants of non-EEA origin acquired Irish citizenship, resulting in improved opportunities for integration. Recent years have also seen a rise in naturalisation of EEA migrants, albeit from a low base. This also represents important progress. Yet Ireland remains without a Long-Term Residence permission with transparent rules and predictable benefits for immigrants. The current administrative scheme has unclear conditions and access is limited to a very specific group of migrants. Placing the Long-Term residence permission on a statutory footing would allow legally resident migrants to benefit from increased transparency and security.

Given generous voting rights, the political participation of migrants in Ireland is, in principle, favourable. Yet Chapter 5 documents a serious under-representation of migrant candidates in politics and on the voting register. NGOs have been active in trying to increase participation, but some commentators argue that political parties have tended to give insufficient attention to potential migrant candidates and the migrant electorate (O'Boyle et al., 2016). Continued efforts to encourage migrant voter registration and voting could potentially increase the proportion of migrants registered to vote and migrant participation in Irish politics (see Actions 58, 59 and 60 of the Migrant Integration Strategy). Commentators argue that the low naturalisation rate of EEA migrants is a problem for their long-term integration into Irish politics, given that they cannot stand and vote in national elections or referenda.

Immigration may have fallen, but there are no indications that the proportion of migrants living in Ireland has fallen. If anything, the indications are that many migrants have settled in Ireland. In this context, the publication of the Migrant Integration Strategy in early 2017 presents a positive opportunity, assuming the strategy is effectively implemented. Of course as migrant integration policies are mainstreamed into government departments, implementing the strategy is not just the responsibility of the Department of Justice and Equality, but of all relevant government departments and agencies who interact with migrants. In addition, if migrant integration policy adopts a mainstreaming approach, it is crucial that any integration strategy is accompanied by monitoring of migrant outcomes to ensure the needs of the target population are being served.



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## APPENDIX 1

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### Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union

- 1 Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
- 2 Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.
- 3 Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.
- 4 Basic knowledge of the host society's language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.
- 5 Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.
- 6 Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration.
- 7 Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.
- 8 The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.
- 9 The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.
- 10 Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation.
- 11 Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.



## APPENDIX 2

### Definition of indicators, based on those agreed at Zaragoza

Indicator	Definition	Data Source
<b>1. Employment</b>		
Employment rate	Proportion of population of working age (15-64) who are employed.	Labour Force Survey (LFS)
Unemployment rate	Proportion of labour force (employed plus unemployed) of working age (15-64) who are unemployed.	Labour Force Survey (LFS)
Activity rate	Proportion of adults of working age (15-64) who are in the labour force (employed and unemployed).	Labour Force Survey (LFS)
Self-employment rate	Proportion of employed population who are self-employed (that is working in his or her own business, professional practice or farm for the purpose of making a profit).	Labour Force Survey (LFS)
<b>2. Education</b>		
Highest educational attainment	Share of population aged 15 to 64 with third-level, Post-Leaving Certificate, upper secondary and no formal/lower secondary education.	Labour Force Survey (LFS)
Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment*	Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary (third-level) education.	Labour Force Survey (LFS)
Share of early leavers from education and training*	Share of population aged 20 to 24 with no more than lower secondary education and not currently in education.	Labour Force Survey (LFS)
Mean achievement scores at primary level in reading and Mathematics at age 15*	Mean achievement scores in reading and Mathematics at age 15.	PISA 2015
<b>3. Social inclusion</b>		
Median net income	Median net income – median net (household and equivalised) income of the immigrant population and the Irish population.	SILC
At risk of poverty rate	At risk of poverty rate – share of population with net disposable income of less than 60 per cent of national median.	SILC
Consistent poverty rates	Proportion of population both (1) at risk of poverty and (2) living in households that lack two or more basic items such as food, clothing or heat.	SILC
Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good	Share of population aged 16+ perceiving their health status as good or very good.	SILC
Ratio of property owners to non-property owners among immigrants and the total population	Percentage of property owners among immigrant and Irish household respondents.	SILC

*Contd.*

Indicator	Definition	Data Source
<b>4. Active citizenship</b>		
Share of immigrants that have acquired citizenship (best estimate)	Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population who have acquired citizenship (best estimate).	Department of Justice and Equality
Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits	Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population granted long-term residence (best estimate).	Department of Justice and Equality
Share of immigrants among elected representatives	Share of immigrants among elected national representatives.	Immigrant Council of Ireland

*Notes:* Employment and unemployment are defined in this table and elsewhere in this report using the standard International Labour Organisation's (ILO) definitions. People are defined as employed if they have worked for pay in the week preceding the survey interview for one hour or more, or who were not at work due to temporary absence (i.e. sickness or training). Unemployed persons are those who did not work in the week preceding the interview, but were available to start work in the next two weeks and had actively sought work in the previous four weeks. ILO unemployment estimates differ from both the live register of unemployment and from the individual's own self-assignment of his or her principal economic status. \* indicates where definitions of the indicators differ slightly from those proposed at Zaragoza, based on data constraints. Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment instead of the share of 30- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational achievement; share of early leavers from education and training aged 20 to 24 instead of 18 to 24; mean achievement scores among 15-year-olds instead of the proportion achieving Level 1 or under in the PISA assessment tests.



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